Vengoyil V.N. Anilkumar v. Anandhoth A Kunhikannan & others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **MONDAY, THE 9[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2023 / 19TH POUSHA, 1944 RSA NO. 30 OF 2016** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 19.09.2015 IN AS 145/2014 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT KOZHIKODE AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 23.08.2014 IN OS 135/2008 OF** ## **SUB COURT, VADAKARA** ## **APPELLANT/APPELLANT/DEFENDANT NO.1:** VENGOYIL V.N.ANILKUMAR, AGED 40 YEARS S/O.RAGHAVAN,THONDARNADU AMSOM DESOM,MANANTHAVADI TALUK, WAYANAD-670731. BY ADV SRI.KALEESWARAM RAJ ## **RESPONDENTS/PLAIANTIFF & DEFENDANTS 2 TO 4:** 1 ANANDHOTH A KUNHIKANNAN AGED 85 YEARS S/O.CHATHUKUTTY ADVOCATE,KUMMANKODE AMSOM,NADAPURAM DESOM,VADAKARA TALUK-673101. [Died, LRS impleaded) 2 KALLIANI AMMA AGED 74 YEARS W/O.KUNHIRAMAN VAIDYAR,VATTAPARAMBATH,VELLOOR AMSOM DESOM,VADAKARA TALUK-673101. 3 RAMACHANDRAN AGED 54 YEARS S/O.KUNHIRAMAN VAIDYAR,VATTAPARAMBATH,VELLOOR AMSOM DESOM,VADAKARA TALUK-673101. 4 PREMARAJAN AGED 44 YEARS S/O.KUNHIRAMAN VAIDYAR,VATTAPARAMBATH,VELLOOR AMSOM DESOM,VADAKARA TALUK-673101. 5 A.RAJEEVAN, AGED 62 YEARS, S/O.LATE ANANDOTH KUNHI KANNAN, RESIDING AT ANANDOTH HOUSE, P.O., NADAPURAM, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT – 673 504. R.S.A.No.30/2016 2 - 6 A.SANJEEV, AGED 60 YEARS,S/O.LATE ANANDOTH KUNHI KANNAN, ADVOCATE, "KRISHNA KRIPA", KAKKAMVEETTIL, P.O., NADAPURAM, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT – 673 504. - 7 A.SABITHA, AGED 58 YEARS, D/O.LATE ANANDOTH KUNHI KANNAN AND W/O.SUDHAKARAN, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT KUTTONEPOYIL, P.O.MALAPPARAMBA, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT - 673 - 8 A.SANTHOSH, AGED 56 YEARS, S/O.LATE ANANDOTH KUNHI KANNAN, RESIDING AT ANANDOTH HOUSE, P.O., NADAPURAM, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT – 673 504. (LEGAL HEIRS OF DECEASED R1 ARE IMPLEADED AS ADDL.R5 TO R8 AS PER ORDER DATED 01.07.2022 IN I.A.NO.01/2022 IN R.S.A.NO.30/2016) BY ADVS. SRI.V.J.JAMES AND SMT.M.M.FATHIMA JALEENA FOR R2 TO R4 FOR ADDL.R5 TO R8 BY R.PARTHASARATHY FOR R1, ADDL.R5 TO R8 BY B.KRISHNAN THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.12.2022, THE COURT ON 09.01.2023 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: R.S.A.No.30/2016 3 ## **M.R.ANITHA, J** *************** R.S.A.No.30 of 2016 -------------------------------------------Dated this the 9[th] day of January, 2023 ## **JUDGMENT** Appellant is the defendant No.1 in O.S.No.135/2008 on the file of Subordinate Judge's Court, Vadakara. The suit was one for arrears of rent. It has been decreed by the trial court, against which first appeal was filed and as per the impugned judgment, the II Additional District Judge, Kozhikode confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 2. (Parties would hereafter be referred as per their status before the trial court). The plaint schedule building belongs to the plaintiff. R.C.P.No.46/1992 was filed earlier before Rent Control Court, Nadapuram to evict defendants 2 to 4 and that was allowed and Rent Control Appeal and Revision filed against the R.S.A.No.30/2016 4 same ended in dismissal. Ultimately, defendants 2 to 4 approached the Apex Court by special leave which was also decided against them. Thereafter, as per the order in E.P.No.52/2005 filed by the plaintiff, defendants 2 to 4 surrendered the building to the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaint schedule building was let out to the first defendant on 01.01.2006 on a monthly rent of Rs.3,750/- and the 4[th] defendant was conducting the business in the building on behalf of the first defendant. Since there was failure to pay the rent the present suit was filed for realisation of arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.1,42,481/-. 3. First defendant filed written statement denying the entire tenancy arrangement between him and the plaintiff. According to him, he has close acquaintance with the plaintiff and in October, 2005 plaintiff approached him stating to execute a lease deed for the purpose demanding higher rent since several people are approaching to take the schedule building on rent. Accordingly, a sham document was executed as lease deed and it was not acted upon and there is no landlord tenant relationship R.S.A.No.30/2016 5 between himself and the plaintiff. 4. Defendants 2 to 4, filed separate written statement contending that 4[th] defendant is conducting the business in the plaint schedule building. During the pendency of E.P.No.52/2005 in the earlier rent control proceedings dispute was amicably settled between the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4 and he agreed to let out the building to them after carrying out repairs. Accordingly, they paid Rs.1,00,000/- and out of which Rs.30,000/- was paid for carrying out repairs and maintenance and balance of Rs.70,000/- was agreed to adjust towards the future rent. The agreed rent is Rs.300/-per month. 5. PW1 examined. Exts.A1 to A7 marked from the side of the plaintiff. DW 1 to 3 examined from the side of the defendants. On appreciating the facts, circumstances and evidence the learned Munsiff found that Ext .A1 is duly executed by the first defendant and decreed the suit. The first appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 6. Against which first defendant approaches this Court in R.S.A.No.30/2016 6 second appeal. Notice was issued to the first respondent and notice as against respondents 2 to 4 was dispensed with as per the order dated 13.01.2016. Pending the proceedings first respondent died and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional respondents 5 to 8. 7. Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as counsel for the respondents. No substantial question of law seen formulated at the time of admission. Substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal memorandum reads thus: _(i) Whether a tenancy could be created on the basis of a sham document and whether the person named as tenant in the said document is liable to pay arrears of rent when the circumstances show that he is not the tenant in occupation?_ _(ii) When conduct of the parties indicate that the document referring to creation of tenancy was not actually acted upon whether the person who has no interest in the premises can be fastened with the liabilities including the liability to pay the rent?_ _(iii) When the question as to who is the actual tenant is now under the consideration in Ex.S.A.No.9/2010, was it not incumbent upon the Courts below to stay the proceedings?_ 7 R.S.A.No.30/2016 8. According to the learned counsel for the first defendant, Ext.A1 rent deed is a sham document which was executed by the first defendant at the request of the plaintiff. She would contend that father of the first defendant and the plaintiff were in close acquaintance in connection with the treatment which the plaintiff had undergone under his father and during such visit he asked to execute the rent deed in order to claim high rent since there are several prospective lessees to take the schedule building on rent. So, at the request of plaintiff Ext.A1 rent deed was executed without any intention to act upon the same. She would also contend that the period of lease arrangement stated as three months also probabilise the case of the first defendant and he never paid any rent to the plaintiff and no evidence could be adduced by the plaintiff proving the payment of rent by the first defendant. With respect to Ext.A2 letter produced from the side of the plaintiff, the case of the defendant is that it was a signed blank paper obtained by the plaintiff and that has been subsequently utilised for creating the false document as a consent letter alleged to have been given by R.S.A.No.30/2016 8 the first defendant. Plaintiff during examination deposed that the handwriting in Ext.A2 is that of the first defendant. Hence it has been sent for expert opinion and the expert did not give any conclusive opinion about the same and that also has been wrongly relied on by the courts below. Further, she would contend that defendants 2 to 4 are the tenants and 4[th] defendant is conducting the business and the licence issued in the name of 4[th] defendant also would probabilise the case of the defendants 2 to 4 that they continued the tenancy based on the mediation agreement after the surrender of the building in the Rent Control Proceedings. Learned counsel also would contend that the building number shown in the plaint schedule is NP VII/396 whereas the building number of the plaintiff is NP VII/390. To substantiate that contention, she filed I.A.No.01/2020 for receiving additional documents. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand fully supports the judgment and decree passed by the courts below and seeks to dismiss the appeal. R.S.A.No.30/2016 9 10. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant Ext.A1 rent deed is a sham document and was never intended to be acted upon and has been created at the request of the plaintiff for enabling him to claim higher rent since so many prospective tenants are approaching for taking the building on rent. Needless to say, that the burden to prove the above fact is upon the first defendant himself. For supporting that contention he would also rely upon the contention of the defendants 2 to 4 that they are tenants with respect to the building. Though notice was initially dispensed with, as against defendants 2 to 4 in this R.S.A since this appeal was heard along with Ex.S.A.No.09/2010 which was filed by defendants 2 to 4 herein, the counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 was also heard in this matter. Their specific contention as stated earlier is that though there was an earlier R.C.P and the case went up to the Supreme Court and was decided in favour of the plaintiff, there was a subsequent mediation and as per which they were again put in possession of the building and accordingly they are continuing the business. They have also filed claim petition as R.S.A.No.30/2016 10 E.A.No.140/2008 in E.P.No.76 of 2008 in R.C.P No.35/2007, which was decided against them and appeal filed against that order also dismissed and Execution S.A.No.09 of 2010 filed against the same was heard along with this appeal and also ended in dismissal. So, they could not establish that they were put in possession on a subsequent mediation after the eviction proceedings in R.C.P.No.46/92 and accordingly their claim petition was dismissed finding that they are not the tenants with respect to the petition schedule building. So their contention that they are tenants in occupation of the building is no longer sustainable. 11. Coming back to the contention of the first defendant that Ext.A1 is a sham document. It is contended that first defendant is from Wayanad which is another district and far away from the plaint schedule building and the rent deed is also executed for a period of three months. It is stipulated in the rent deed that the first defendant can conduct the business either by himself or through workers. According to learned counsel, all those factors probabilise that this document was never intended R.S.A.No.30/2016 11 to be acted upon. It is also her contention that Ext.A2 letter alleged to have been given by the first defendant to the plaintiff to give consent to the fourth defendant for obtaining licence was not given by him and his specific defence is that his signature was obtained in a blank paper and subsequently Ext.A2 letter was concocted by the plaintiff. During examination since plaintiff stated that the handwriting in Ext.A2 is that of the first defendant after the examination of PW1, Ext.A2 was sent for expert opinion and the learned counsel raised serious objection regarding the appreciation of expert opinion by the courts below, which would be discussed later. 12. Ext.A3 is the copy of the application given by the plaintiff before the Nadapuram Grama Panchayat for issuing licence with respect to the building No.NP VII/396 in the name of fourth defendant. Plaintiff has got a specific case from the beginning that after execution of Ext.A1 rent deed, as per Ext.A2 letter given by the first defendant he had given Ext.A3 letter to the Grama Panchayat for issuing licence in the name of fourth defendant. Plaintiff also adduced evidence in support of the R.S.A.No.30/2016 12 averments. 13. One of the circumstances projected by the first defendant to contend that Ext.A1 was never intended to be acted upon is that first defendant is from Wayanad, a far away place. But, it is to be noted that even in Ext.A1, there is a specific clause that first defendant can run the business either directly or through workers. Subsequently, he addressed Ext.A2 letter to the plaintiff for giving consent letter for issuing licence in the name of fourth defendant. Even though the defendants 2 to 4 attempted to establish that Ext.A1 lease deed was got executed in collusion between the plaintiff and first defendant, the first defendant, on the other hand, contend otherwise. Though defendants 2 to 4 has got a contention that there was close contact between the plaintiff and the first defendant and hence Ext.A1, the sham rent deed was got executed, the defendants could not bring in any materials to prove such a close contact between the plaintiff and the first defendant. On the other hand, first defendant has got a different story that Ext.A1 was got executed on demand by the plaintiff for enabling him to claim higher rent from the R.S.A.No.30/2016 13 prospective tenants. But, first defendant could not substantiate that fact. Learned counsel also would take my attention to **Smt.Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar : (1979) 4 SCC 60** , **Gangabai W/o. Rambilas Gilda (Smt) v. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt) : 1982 (1) SCC 4 , R. Janakiraman v. State represented by Inspector of Police, SBI, SPE, Madras : (2006) 1 SCC 697 : (2006) 1 SCC Cri. 442** . 14. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 bars any oral statement or agreement in between the parties contrary to the instrument or agreement in order to vary, add or subtract the terms. Proviso (1) to Section 92 enables a party to prove any fact which would invalidate any document or which would entitle any person to any decree or order to prove the fraud, intimidation or illegality for want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want of failure of consideration or mistake in fact or law. No doubt, Section 92 would enable the first defendant to contend that Ext.A1 is a fraudulent document, which was never intended to be acted upon. R.S.A.No.30/2016 14 ## 15. Paragraphs 27 of **Smt.Krishnabai Bhritar** **Ganpatrao Deshmukh** has been highlighted by the learned counsel which reads thus: _“Secondly, there is ample authority for the proposition that when there is a dispute in regard to the true character of a writing evidence de hors the document can be led to show that the writing was not the real nature of the transaction, but was only an illusory, fictitious and colourable device which cloaked something else, and that the apparent state of affairs was not the real state of affairs. [See Chandi Prasad Singh v. Piari Bidi C.A. No. 75 of 1964, decided on 16-3-1966, and Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst. Reoti Devi (supra) ]._ ## 16. In **Gangabai W/o. Rambilas Gilda (Smt)** paragraph 11 was highlighted by the learned counsel wherein it has been provided that Sub Section (1) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act declares that when the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to Section 92(1) of the Act, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the R.S.A.No.30/2016 15 parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms and the first proviso to Section 92 says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity etc and hence the bar under sub Section (1) of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. 17. In **R. Janakiraman** while dealing with Section 92, it has been held that the bar under Section 92(1) does not apply where anyone, including a party to the instrument, seeks to establish that the transaction under the instrument itself is a sham or fictitious or nominal and not intended to be acted upon. 18. According to the learned counsel for the first defendant, Ext.A1 was never intended to be acted upon by him and was executed only at the request of the plaintiff for enabling him to demand higher rent from prospective tenants. As has been rightly found by the courts below in R.C.P.No.35/2007 first R.S.A.No.30/2016 16 defendant though entered appearance and filed vakalath, subsequently remained ex parte and eviction was ordered and in that R.C.P defendants 2 to 4 filed claim petition and that was dismissed, appeal filed against which also dismissed and subsequently, Ex.S.A.No.09/2010 was filed before this Court which was heard simultaneously with this appeal. The contention of the first defendant is that since he was not a tenant with respect to the said building he did not prosecute R.C.P No.35/2007. But it is to be noted that R.C.P was filed based on Ext.A1 rent deed executed between the plaintiff and the first defendant. So, wilfully he did not contest the matter after appearing in that proceedings. So, that is also a circumstance showing the lack of bona fides on the part of the first defendant in contending that Ext.A1 is a sham document. 19. Moreover, Ext.A2 is a letter addressed by the first defendant to the plaintiff requesting to issue consent letter to conduct business in the schedule building by the fourth defendant. A contention was raised that his signature was obtained in blank paper and subsequently Ext.A2 was also sent R.S.A.No.30/2016 17 for expert opinion denying the handwriting in the contents in Ext.A2. Vehement arguments were advanced by the learned counsel with regard to appreciation of expert opinion. According to her, expert did not give any definite opinion regarding handwriting of first defendant in Ext.A2 letter. But, both courts below acted upon the expert opinion and that according to her, is against the settled principles of law. In this context, learned counsel placed reliance on **Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi) : (2003) 1 SCC 21** wherein while dealing with Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, it has been held that opinion of handwriting expert can be relied on when supported by other evidence. It is also held that though there is no rule of law that without corroboration, the opinion evidence cannot be accepted, due caution and care should be exercised and it should be accepted after probe and examination. Portion of paragraph 13 has been highlighted by the learned counsel which reads thus: _13. " .............................. Gurney v. Langlands (1822, 5B) and Matter of Alfred Foster's Will (34 Mich 21). The Supreme Court of Michigan pointed out in the last mentioned case :_ R.S.A.No.30/2016 18 _Every one knows how very unsafe it is to rely upon any one's opinion considering the niceties of penmanship--Opinions are necessarily received, and may be valuable, but at best this kind of evidence is a necessary evil."_ _We need not subscribe to the extreme view expressed by the Supreme Court of Michigan, but there can be no doubt that this type of evidence, being opinion evidence is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot of itself form the basis for a conviction. We must, therefore, try to see whether, in the present case, there is, apart from the evidence of the handwriting expert B. Lal, any other evidence connecting the appellant with the offence."_ _In our view, however, reliance in Magan (supra) is rather misplaced in the contextual facts since no conviction is based on the opinion of the handwriting expert but admittedly it can be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. The handwriting expert's opinion simply corroborates the circumstantial evidence and as such we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Singh on this score.""_ R.S.A.No.30/2016 19 ## 20. In **Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) thr. L.Rs. And Ors. : MANU/SC/1165/2019,** paragraph 8 has been highlighted by the learned counsel which reads thus: _"8. By now, it is well settled that the Court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. It is also settled that it may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the Court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it. In this respect, reference may be made to a long line of precedents that includes Ram Chandan Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529, Magan Bihari , Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210, and S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596._ _We may particularly refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), where it was observed that the evidence of a handwriting expert can_ R.S.A.No.30/2016 20 _rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence. In the said case, the Court chose to disregard the testimony of the handwriting expert as to the disputed signature of the testator of a Will, finding such evidence to be inconclusive. The Court instead relied on the clear testimony of the two attesting witnesses as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will."_ 21. Hence the settled proposition of law is that the opinion of the expert has to be approached with caution and while determining its reliability, the court should seek independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of prudence. 22. Though the learned counsel would contend that the courts below found Ext.A2 letter as proved merely based on the report of the expert and hence it is illegal, on going through the judgment passed by the learned Munsiff, the contention so advanced is not at all seems to be correct. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the learned Munsiff had made a detailed discussion with respect to Ext.A2 document and the expert report as well as the evidence of the expert who was examined as R.S.A.No.30/2016 21 DW2. It has been found that according to the expert, there are 24 similarities and the expert would say that 24 similarities noted by him are sufficient to have a probable conclusion regarding the authorship of the disputed writings and dissimilarities noted are not so vital and there is no fundamental divergence in between standard writing and the disputed writing. It is also found that an expert can only give an opinion evidence and not a conclusive finding regarding the authorship of the disputed writing and ultimately it was found that the expert's evidence supports and corroborates the direct evidence given by the plaintiff. So, it is not the evidence of expert alone or the report of the expert alone that was relied on by the trial court. 23. It is true that the first appellate court more or less relied on the evidence of DW2, the expert, coupled with the report to find that Ext.A2 is written by the first defendant himself. That does not appear to be a correct approach. However, on going through the evidence, it could be seen that apart from the evidence of expert as well as his report to prove Exts.A2, A3, the certified copy of the letter issued by the plaintiff in pursuance of R.S.A.No.30/2016 22 Ext.A2 letter has also been marked. Ext.A3 is the certified copy of the letter given by the plaintiff to the Nadapuram Panchayat to issue licence with respect to building No.NP VII/396 in favour of the forth defendant. Ext.A3 letter could be successfully proved through PW1 and hence Ext.A3 also corroborates with Ext.A2 letter of the first defendant. It would infer that as per Ext.A2 request of the first defendant, the plaintiff has written to the Secretary of the Nadapuram Grama Panchayat to issue licence with respect to the plaint schedule building in favour of the forth defendant. So also though the first defendant contended that Ext.A1 rent deed is a sham document, that could not be established by adducing any convincing evidence by the first defendant. It has also come out in evidence that R.C.P.No.35/2007 has been filed by the plaintiff against the first defendant herein in which, after making appearance ,he remained ex parte and an order of eviction was passed and when the plaintiff taken up the matter for execution, defendants 2 to 4 herein filed claim petition alleging that they are the tenants and Ex.S.A.No.9/2010 which arose out of the dismissal of the claim R.S.A.No.30/2016 23 petition has been heard along with appeal simultaneously and also stands dismissed on this day. So, all those factors would indicate that the first defendant is the tenant with respect to plaint schedule building who had taken the building on rent as per Ext.A1 rent deed agreeing to pay monthly rent of Rs.3,750/-. But, he did not pay the rent. That fact is not seen disputed and his specific case is that it is defendants 2 to 4 are the tenants. That contention has already been found against. So, there are ample evidence to prove that the first defendant is the tenant with respect to the petition schedule building who kept the rent in arrears, as alleged by the plaintiff. 24. Finally, a contention was also raised at the time of argument, with respect to the difference in building number with respect to plaint schedule building. According to the defendants, the building with respect to which R.C.P was filed originally as well as the number of the building borne out from the building tax assessment register, is V11/390 whereas the building number shown in the plaint schedule is V11/396. First of all, the defendants have no such contention in the written statement R.S.A.No.30/2016 24 disputing the building number or the identity of the building. In the trial court and the first appellate court also, no such contention disputing the identity of the building is also seen raised. So, in the second appeal, without any pleadings, defendants are estopped from raising such a contention. It is relevant in this context to quote **Elizabeth v. Saramma : 1984 KLT 606** wherein the object and purpose of pleadings have been dealt with in detail. In paragraph 11 of the said judgment, **Lakshmi Narain v. State (AIR 1977 Patna 73)** , a Division Bench ruling has been quoted and it has been found that Order VI Rule 2 and Order VIII Rules 2, 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal with object of pleadings. The Division Bench observed that " _the sole object of the pleading is, as was pointed out by the Privy Council in (1895)22 Ind App 4 (PC), that each side may be fully alive to the questions that are about to be argued in order that they may have an opportunity to bringing forward such evidence as may be appropriate"_ and hence it has been held that “ _the importance of the pleadings cannot, of course, be ignored, because it is the pleadings that lead to the_ R.S.A.No.30/2016 25 _framing of issues and a trial in every civil case has inevitably to be confined to the issues framed in the suit. The whole object of framing the issues would be defeated if parties are allowed to travel beyond the issues and claim or oppose reliefs on grounds not made in the pleadings and not covered by the issues._ In **Gian** **Chand and Brothers v. Rattan Lal : 2013 (1) KLT SN 67 (Case No.55) SC,** while dealing with Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 it has been held that Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order VIII form an integral part dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. It is obligatory on the part of the defendant to specifically deal with each allegation in the plaint and when the defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. It is clearly postulated therein that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiffs but he must be specific with each allegation of fact. 25. In the plaint and in all the documents produced from the side of the plaintiff the number of the building is specifically R.S.A.No.30/2016 26 stated as NP VII/396. But, no contention was raised in the written statement and no question was put to PW1 or any of the witnesses with respect to difference in the building number and hence, at this stage without any pleadings, the defendants are not entitled to raise such a contention in the second appeal and it will also not amount to a substantial question of law since it is purely a question of fact. I.A.No.1 of 2020 has been filed by the appellant to receive additional documents to substantiate the contention with regard to the difference in the building number cannot at all be allowed at this stage and accordingly it is hereby dismissed. So, on a meticulous evaluation of the facts and circumstances, evidence adduced and the rival contentions, I am of the considered view that courts below rightly found that the first defendant is the tenant under the plaintiff, who had taken the building on rent as per Ext.A1 rent deed and thereafter committed default in payment of rent. Hence the claim for realisation of arrears of rent has been allowed by the courts below. So, no substantial question of law, as formulated, emerges for consideration in this second appeal. R.S.A.No.30/2016 27 26. In the result, second appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and hence dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, parties shall bear their respective cost. All pending interlocutory applications are closed. (sd/-) **M.R.ANITHA, JUDGE** jsr R.S.A.No.30/2016 28 ## **APPENDIX TO R.S.A.NO.30 OF 2016** ANNEXURE 1: CERTIFIED COPY OF NADAPURAM GRAMA PANCHAYAT ASSESSMENT REGISTER FROM 1996-97 TO 20002001. ANNEXURE 2: CERTIFIED COPY OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENT TAX INFORMATION. ANNEXURE 3 : CERTIFIED COPY OF JUDGMENT IN RCP 10/2012 PASSED BY MUNSIFF COURT – PERAMBA. TRUE COPY P.S TO JUDGE