Usha U. v. Assistant Educational Officer, Nilambur; District Educational Officer, Wandoor; Director of General Education; Manager, Devadar Aided L.P. School, Pulliyil

``` IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM ``` ``` PRESENT ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V MONDAY, THE 11[TH]DAY OF JULY 2022 / 20TH ASHADHA,1944 ``` ``` WP(C) NO. 17898 OF 2020 ``` ## `PETITIONER/S:` ``` USHA U., AGED 54 YEARS W/O.P.T.VENUGOPALAN, THOTTEKKAD, AMARAMBALAM P.O., POOKKOTTUMPADAM, MALAPPURAM PIN-679 332. ``` ``` BY ADV C.DINESH ``` ## `RESPONDENT/S:` ``` 1ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER NILAMBUR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, NILAMBUR P.O., MALAPPURAM. 2DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, WANDOOR, OFFICE OF THE EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, WANDOOR P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT. 3DIRECTOR OF GENERAL EDUCATION JAGATHI, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 014. 4THE MANAGER DEVADAR AIDED L.P.SCHOOL, PULLIYIL, MANNATHIPOYI P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN- 679 332. ``` ``` SMT.NISHA BOSE, SR GP ``` ``` THISWRITPETITION(CIVIL)HAVINGCOMEUPFORADMISSION ON11.07.2022,ALONGWITHWP(C).23279/2020,THECOURTONTHE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 2 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ``` IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM ``` ``` PRESENT ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V ``` ``` MONDAY, THE 11[TH]DAY OF JULY 2022 / 20TH ASHADHA,1944 ``` ## `WP(C) NO. 23279 OF 2020` ## `PETITIONER/S:` ``` THE CORPORATE MANAGER DEVADAR SCHOOLS, MANNATHIPOIL P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-679332. BY ADVS. M.P.ASHOK KUMAR SMT.BINDU SREEDHAR SHRI.ASIF N ``` ## `RESPONDENT/S:` ``` 1STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, GENERAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-679332. 2ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR OF GENERAL EDUCATION AND VIGILANCE OFFICER, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF GENERAL EDUCATION, JAGATHI, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695014. 3USHA.U, HEADMISTRESS (NOW UNDER SUSPENSION), DEVADAR AIDED LOWER PRIMARY SCHOOL, PULLIYIL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, RESIDING AT THOTTEKKAD, AMARAMBALAM P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-679332. 4DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, WANDOOR, OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, WANDOOR P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-679328. 5THE ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, ``` 3 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ``` VENGARA, MALAPPURAM-676304. ``` ``` 6ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, NILAMBUR, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, NILAMBUR P.O., MALAPPURAM-679329. SMT.NISHA BOSE, SR.GP ``` ``` THISWRITPETITION(CIVIL)HAVINGCOMEUPFORADMISSION ON11.07.2022,ALONGWITHWP(C).17898/2020,THECOURTONTHE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 4 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ## **JUDGMENT** W.P.(C) No.17898 of 2020 is filed by Smt. Usha U., the Head Teacher of the Devadar Aided LP School, Pulliyil, against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by the Manager. She has approached this Court seeking issuance of directions to respondents 2 and 3 to substitute enquiry officers on the ground of outright bias and impartiality. She has also sought to quash Ext.P5 show cause notice and Ext.P6 enquiry report submitted by the AEO. 2. W.P.(C) No.23279 of 2020 is filed by the Manager, Devadar Aided L.P. School, Pulliyil, seeking to quash Exts.P6 and P7 orders issued by the 2nd respondent substituting the former enquiry officer with the AEO, Vengara on receiving information about the transactions which took place on 30.07.2020 between the teacher and the AEO which led to the registration of crimes. 3. As common issues are involved, both these writ petitions are taken up and disposed of by a common judgment. Facts and exhibits shall be as described in W.P.(C) No. 17898 of 2020. 4. Brief facts of the case are as under: a) The Manager, Devadar Aided L.P. School, Pulliyil, initiated 5 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 disciplinary proceedings against Smt. Usha, the Head Teacher of the school on various allegations. The teacher was placed under suspension under Chapter XIV A Rule 67 of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder. - b) In terms of Rule 75 of Chapter XIV A, the AEO issued a notice to the teacher on 21.03.2013. - c) The proceedings got delayed due to pendency of certain writ petitions instituted by the Teacher. The teacher raised a contention that she is entitled to engage the service of a legal practitioner, which was refused by the AEO on the ground that Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIV A of the KER prohibited the engagement of a lawyer by the teacher facing the disciplinary proceedings. Finally, the matters reached the Division Bench of this Court, and by judgment reported as **Manager, Devadar Aided Lower Primary School v. Usha U. and others** [2020 KHC 343], this Court read down the provisions of Rule 75(5) and it was held that teacher would be prohibited from engaging a legal practitioner only in circumstances where the Manager is not so represented. The submission of the Manager that he does not intend to engage a legal practitioner was recorded and the writ 6 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 petition was disposed of. - d) Immediately thereafter, a notice was issued by the AEO, to the petitioner. It appears that on the premise of serving notice on the petitioner, the AEO, along with his subordinates, visited the residential home of the petitioner. Some incidents took place on - 30.07.2020. - e) Ext.P2 FIR in Crime No.318/2020 of the Pookkattupadom Police Station was registered at the instance of the petitioner herein, alleging offences under Sections 448, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC on the allegation that, on 30.07.2020, at about 11.15 am., the accused which include the AEO trespassed into her residential home and criminally intimidated him. - f) Ext.P3 would reveal that Crime No.320 of 2020 was registered on - 02.08.2020, at about 5.12pm, wherein the allegation is that, on 30.07.2020, at about 11.30 am, when the AEO and the subordinates reached the residential house of the petitioner, she and her husband used criminal force to deter the public servant from discharging the official duty. - g) According to the teacher, in view of the registration of the crimes, she has a reasonable apprehension in her mind that the AEO will 7 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 not act impartially. It is contended that there is a real likelihood of bias on the part of the enquiry officer and her worst fears stood vindicated when the AEO, after registration of the crime on 01.08.2020 proceeded to conduct the enquiry in the absence of the petitioner and submitted the report dated 25.08.2020 concluding that the petitioner is guilty of all charges. - h) It is in the afore circumstances that W.P.(C) No.17898 of 2020 has been filed seeking the following reliefs: I. issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 2nd and 3rd respondents to substitute some impartial officer in the place of the 1st respondent to conduct inquiry under Rule 75 Chapter XIV A of the Ker against the petitioner. (i)(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling the documents leading to the issuance of Ext.P5 show cause notice dated 16.09.2020 and Ext.P6 Enquiry Report dated 25.08.2020 and set aside the same. 5. W.P.(C) No.17898 of 2020 was filed before this Court on 20.10.2020, and this Court, by order dated 25.11.2020, directed the AEO to file an affidavit detailing the dates and events that led to the report dated 25.08.2020. 8 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 6. By order dated 13.10.2020, this Court stayed further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P6 enquiry report. On 27.10.2020, an order was passed by the DGE directing the DEO, Wandoor, to enquire into the allegations. Later, on 28.10.2020, the AEO, Vengara was appointed as the officer to conduct the enquiry against the Head Teacher. 7. W.P.(C) No.23279 of 2020 is filed by the Manager, challenging the orders passed by the Additional Director of General Education as per which the enquiry officer has been substituted and for incidental reliefs. 8. Sri. Dinesh, the learned counsel appearing for the Head Teacher, submitted that Ext.P2 and P3 would reveal that a case and a counter case has been registered and it was in the fitness of things that the DGE issued orders during the pendency of the writ petition entrusting the enquiry with the AEO, Vengara. According to the learned counsel, the principles of natural justice imply fair hearing, unbiased judgment and a clear speaking order. In the case on hand, after registering a crime against the petitioner and her husband on 02.08.2020, in respect of an incident that took place on 30.07.2020, the enquiry officer rejected the request of the petitioner for an adjournment and proceeded to conclude the enquiry and issued Ext.P6 order on 25.08.2020 finding the petitioner guilty of all charges and additionally stating that the allegations are extremely grave. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court 9 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 in **S.Parthasarathy v. State of A.P.** [(1974) 3 SCC 459], it is submitted that if there exists circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the enquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent, there is no requirement for further proof as to whether the enquiry officer was really prejudiced or not. The learned counsel further pointed out that the teacher had filed Ext.P4 representation before the 2nd respondent on 02.08.2020, and since no action was taken, the petitioner approached this Court and filed the writ petition. It is further contended that the place where the enquiry was conducted was a designated relief camp and according to the learned counsel, the entire proceedings was just a farce. Based on the enquiry report, Ext.P5 notice was issued fixing punishment as termination from the service without even hearing her version. 9. Sri. M.P. Ashok Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the Management, submitted that the petitioner has been adopting the very same tactic from 2013 onwards. She initially filed W.P.(C) No.7319/2013 seeking to change the enquiry officer and this Court by Ext.R4(a) judgment, taking note of the fact that the AEO against whom bias was attributed was transferred, had closed the writ petition. Later, she raised a contention that she wanted the assistance of a lady lawyer. This case was disposed of only in the year 2020. It is submitted that multiple notices were issued by the enquiry officer, 10 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 but the petitioner failed to appear. According to the learned counsel, this Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would rarely interfere in disciplinary proceedings, and there is no reason to take a contrary view in this case as well. The petitioner can exhaust the remedies provided for her under the provisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter, there is absolutely no reason to interfere. 10. I have considered the submissions advanced and have perused the records. 11. From the records, it appears that case and counter case has been registered against the teacher as well as the enquiry officer. It was after the registration of the crime that a notice of enquiry to be held on 06.08.2020 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner has a case that she had submitted Ext.P4 representation before the DEO on 02.08.2020 informing about the incident which took place on 30.07.2020 and requesting the change of the enquiry officer stating that she will not get a fair treatment. It appears that the enquiry officer, after recording the absence of the petitioner on 06.08.2020, proceeded with the enquiry and submitted Ext.P6 report on 25.08.2020. The petitioner had approached this Court and had filed this writ petition on 20.10.2020 and during the pendency of the writ petition, the DGE 11 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 issued orders removing the enquiry officer and appointing the DEO, Vengara to continue with the proceedings. It was only when Ext.P5 notice was received by the petitioner on 21.09.2020 that she came to know about the report of enquiry. 12. The question is, whether there existed a real likelihood of bias, is to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances objectively by the court or upon the basis of the impression that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. In **S Parthasarathi** (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 15 to 17 of the judgment has elucidated the principles. **15.** The question then is: whether a real likelihood of bias existed is to be determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by the court objectively or, upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large. **16.** The tests of “real likelihood” and “reasonable suspicion” are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood 12 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, H.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon [(1968) 3 WLR 694 at 707] ] We should not, however, be understood to deny that the Court might with greater propriety apply the “‘reasonable suspicion” test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings. **17.** As there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above, we think that the inquiry and the orders based on the inquiry were bad. The decision of this Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1958 SCR 595 : 1958 SCJ 242] makes it clear that if an inquiring officer adopts a procedure which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, the ultimate decision based on his report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. We see no reason for not applying the same principle here as we find that the inquiring officer was biased. 13. The Apex Court has observed that the question is whether a reasonable man would, in the circumstances portrayed before him, infer that there is a real likelihood of bias. The court is also required to look at the impression that a person looking from the outside may have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. 13 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 However, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmises or conjectures would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the enquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court is not to enquire whether he was really prejudiced. 14. In **Union of India v. B.N. Jha** , [(2003) 4 SCC 531], the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the different aspects of Bias. Paragraphs 22 to 30 of the judgment reads thus: **22.** This Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. [(1974) 3 SCC 459] proceeded on the footing of real likelihood of “bias” and there was in fact a total unanimity on this score between the English and the Indian courts. ## **23.** Mathew, J. in that case observed: “ 16. The tests of ‘real likelihood’ and ‘reasonable suspicion’ are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right-minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the inquiry; nevertheless, there 14 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, H.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon [(1968) 3 WLR 694]. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.” **24.** Lord Thankerton, however, in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948 AC 87] had this to state: “… I could wish that the use of the word ‘bias’ should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute.” **25.** Natural justice as is well known is founded on two basic principles: (a) Audi alteram partem. (b) Nemo judex in causa sua. 15 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 **26.** The duty to act fairly is the theme of the principles of natural justice. The rule generally applies with full force to conduct leading directly to a final act of decision. **27.** In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1(1), 4th Edn., it is stated: “ 85. … Thus a presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily where there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or where the decision is one entailing the determination of disputed questions of law and fact. Prima facie, moreover, a duty to act in accordance with natural justice will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where that status is not merely terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation so to act. Where a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised, factors to be taken into account in deciding what fairness requires in the exercise of the power include the nature of the interests to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions, if any, involved. The content of the duty to act fairly will normally be very limited where the authority is in the course of exercising a function not culminating in a binding decision, but that may not be the case if the wording of the grant of powers or the context indicates that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons likely to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or recommendation.” 16 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ## It has further been observed therein: “94. Audi alteram partem.—The rule that no man shall be condemned unless he has been given prior notice of the allegations against him and a fair opportunity to be heard is a cardinal principle of justice. This rule has been refined and adapted to govern the proceedings of bodies other than judicial tribunals; and a duty to act in conformity with the rule has been imposed by the common law on administrative bodies not required by statute or contract to conduct themselves in a manner analogous to a court. Moreover, even in the absence of any charge, the severity of the impact of the discretionary decision on the interests of an individual may suffice in itself to attract an implied duty to comply with this rule.” ## **28.** Bias can be classified under three different heads: (a) A legal interest which means that the Judge is “in such a position that a bias must be assumed”. (b) Pecuniary interest. (c) Personal bias. **29.** Law in this regard has expanded to a great extent. In J.F. Garner's Administrative Law, it is stated: “The natural justice ‘bias’ rule looks to external appearances rather than to proof of actual improper exercise of power. If the reasonable observer would have the requisite degree of suspicion of bias in the decision-maker then that decision can be challenged. It is a matter of the courts ensuring that ‘justice is seen to be done’. Since 17 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 successful challenge is based on appearances, it is natural that the types of matter to which the rule applies is somewhat confined. As we shall see it clearly applies to judicial and disciplinary functions but not generally more widely to administrative decision-making and actions.” **30.** In Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon [(1968) 3 WLR 694] Lord Denning, M.R. observed: “In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand: see R. v. Huggins [(1895-99) All ER Rep 914] ; Sunderland Justices [R. v. Sunderland Justices, (1901) 2 KB 357] , per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough: see R. v. Camborne Justices, ex p Pearce [(1954) 2 All ER 850] ; R. v. Nailsworth Licensing Justices, ex p Bird [(1953) 2 All ER 652]. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘The Judge was biased.’ ” 18 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 15. In the case on hand, I found that the AEO had lodged a complaint against the teacher, and a crime was registered. He was also facing accusations in the crime registered at the instance of the teacher. A representation was also pending before the higher authority, seeking a change of the enquiry officer. In spite of the above, the AEO scheduled the enquiry on 06.08.2020, proceeded ex parte and submitted the enquiry report. I am of the considered opinion that any right-minded person would think that there is a real likelihood of bias. There are clear circumstances from which a reasonable man would think, it is likely or probable that the enquiry officer did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court is not required to enquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking that the enquiry officer was biased. The DGE had issued the order dated 28.10.2020 entrusting the enquiry with the DEO, Vengara, taking note of these aspects. I am not impressed with the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the authority who passed the order had no jurisdiction. I find no reason to interfere with the said order in the facts and circumstances. In view of the discussion above, these writ petitions are ordered by 19 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 issuing the following directions: a) Exts.P5 and P6 in W.P.(C) No.17898/2020 will stand quashed. - b) Ext.P7 order produced in W.P.(C) No.23279/2020 is upheld. The AEO, - Vengara shall issue fresh notice to the petitioner and proceed with the enquiry and submit report in accordance with law, within an outer limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. - c) The parties shall cooperate to enable the AEO, Vengara to conclude the - proceedings as ordered. ## d) W.P.(C) No. 23279/2020 will stand dismissed. Sd/- **RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V JUDGE** ps 20 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ## `APPENDIX OF WP(C) 17898/2020` ``` PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS : ``` |`EXHIBIT P1`|`TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE INTIMATING THE DATE OF`| |---|---| ||`HEARING ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENTDATED`| ||`15.7.2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P2`|`TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO. 318/2020`| ||`DATED 1.8.2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P3`|`TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO.320/2020`| ||`DATED 2.8.2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P4`|`TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 2/8/20`| ||`SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 2ND AND`| ||`3RD RESPONDENTS TO APPOINT SOME IMPARTIAL`| ||`OFFICER IN THE PLACE OF 1ST RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P5`|`TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 16.9.2020 ISSUED`| ||`BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P6`|`TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED`| ||`25.8.2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P7`|`TRUE COPY OF THE MATHRUBHUMI DAILY DATED`| ||`7.8.2020 SHOWING THE NEWS ITEM OF RELIEF CAMP`| ||`AT GOVERNMENT U.P. SCHOOL, PULLIYIL.`| |`EXHIBIT P8`|`TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WRIT APPEAL 1962`| ||`OF 2018 DATED 19.5.2020 BEFORE THE HON'BLE HIGH`| ||`COURT OF KERALA.`| |`EXHIBIT P9`|`TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN SPECIAL LEAVE TO`| ||`APPEAL (C) NO-8961 OF 2020 DATED 25.9.2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P10`|`TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 30.9.2020.`| |`RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS :`|| |`EXHIBIT R4A :`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WPC 7391 OF 2013`| ||`DATED 3.3.2014.`| 21 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ``` EXHIBIT R4BPHOTOCOPY OF THE LETTER DATED 12.3.2013 WHICH IS PRODUCED AS EXT.P10 IN WPC 13053/2014. EXHIBIT R1A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATE 26.8.2020. ``` 22 W.P.(C) Nos.17898 & 23279 of 2020 ## `APPENDIX OF WP(C) 23279/2020` |`PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS`|| |---|---| |`EXHIBIT P1`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT ACCOMPANIED`| ||`WITH A COVERING LETTER DATED 25.08.2020 ISSUED`| ||`BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P2`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED`| ||`16.09.2020 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 3RD`| ||`RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P3`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE REPLY DATED 30.09.2020`| ||`SUBMITTED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P4`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE PROPOSED PUNISHMENT ORDER`| ||`NO.01/2020 ALONG WITH COVERING LETTER DATED`| ||`09.10.2020 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.`| |`EXHIBIT P5`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT DATED`| ||`20.10.2020 WITHOUT EXHIBITS FILED BY THE`| ||`PETITIONER HEREIN WP(C)17898 OF 2020.`| |`EXHIBIT P6`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.10.2020 PASSED`| ||`BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.`| |`EXHIBIT P7`|`PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.10.2020 ISSUED`| ||`BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.`| ``` RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS : NIL ```