High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; no order as to costs.

Union of India v. Orient Engg. & Commercial Co. Ltd. & Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1296/1977

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • Jaswant Singh
  • D. A. Desai
Judgment Date
1977-10-07
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; the order summoning the arbitrator to testify is set aside. The court held that summons should not be issued routinely and that grounds must be affirmatively established. It left open the possibility of a fresh application if a party can demonstrate proper grounds for examining the arbitrator. There will be no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; no order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Union of India

Respondents

  • Orient Engg. & Commercial Co. Ltd.
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Girish Chandra
  • • E. C. Agarwala (Solicitor General)

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Bakshi Shivcharan Singh
  • • H. S. Marwah

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court decision concerns the propriety of summoning an arbitrator who had rendered an award to testify as a witness under Order XLVI Rule 3 CPC read with Section 121 of the Indian Evidence Act. Respondent No. 1 filed a list of witnesses including the arbitrator, and the High Court Registrar issued summons in routine fashion without weighing the necessity to call the arbitrator or examining the grounds to summon. The appellant contended that compelling an arbitrator to testify violates public policy and the protective aims of s. 121, since a quasi-judicial official's mental process and deliberations cannot be exposed in court. The appellant cited Khub Lal v. Bishambhar Sahai to argue that such examination should be rare and grounded in prima facie reasons, not as a routine procedure. The court emphasized that s. 121 does not automatically prevent examination in the arbitration context, but insisted that the power to summon must be exercised sparingly and only when grounds affirmatively establish a need to probe the arbitrator’s materials, not merely to rehash the award or test points already resolved. In the instant matter, the court found no sufficient justification to examine the arbitrator and set aside the summons, allowing the appeal. It left open the possibility of a fresh application if proper grounds are shown, and directed that there be no order as to costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 121 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872Order XVI Rule 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPCOrder XLVI Rule 3 CPCSection 151 CPC

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Court's power to summon a witness under Order XLVI Rule 3 CPC read with Section 151 CPC should be exercised sparingly and only when grounds exist.
  • Arbitrators should not be examined to reveal the mind or deliberations behind a decision; grounds for summoning must be affirmatively established.
  • Khub Lal v. Bishambhar Sahai (A.I.R. 1925 All. 103) cited as authority for restrained approach to examining arbitrators.
  • Mindful and deliberate use of court process; routine summons are discouraged.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicant argued that summoning an arbitrator to testify is improper and contrary to public policy and the protective aims of s. 121 of the Evidence Act. The Registrar’s routine summons, without examining the necessity to summon, offends the principle that the court’s process must be used sparingly. The doctrine from Khub Lal v. Bishambhar Sahai was cited to show that calling arbitrators to reveal their mental processes would undermine the arbitral process. The applicant urged that a prima facie case of mala fides or other relevant matters must be established before such summons are issued, and that the arbitrator should not be cross-examined merely to obtain reasons behind the award.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the court’s authority to summon a witness should be exercised where there are genuine grounds to probe the basis of the award. They argued that the arbitrator’s testimony may be necessary to test miscalculations or misapprehensions in the award, and that s. 121’s protections should not operate to shield the grounds on which the decision rests from scrutiny in appropriate proceedings. They urged a flexible approach under Order XLVI Rule 3 CPC when the facts warrant examination to arrive at a just resolution.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Khub Lal v. Bishambhar SahaiA.I.R. 1925 All. 103PositiveCited to support that the examination of arbitrators should be sparing and not routine, aligning with the principle that the court should not compel arbitrators to reveal their mental process.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A B # c D E F G H 63 2 UNION OF INDIA _v._ ORIENT ENGG. & COMMERCIAL CO. LTD. & ANR. 1 _October_ 7, 1977 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JASWANT SINGH AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] 1'Vitne.~s-Suntn1oni11g _of_ _a_ _witness-Arbitrator_ _or other quasi-judicial autho-_ _rity, whether covered by_ _s._ 121 _of_ _the Evidence_ _Act-Duty_ _of_ _the Cou1t before_ _issuing sum1nons_ _under Order_ _XLVI_ _Rule_ 3, _C.P.C. read with_ _s._ 121 _of_ _the_ _Evidence_ _Act_ _when parties present a list_ _of_ _witnesses to be_ _sun11no11ed._ Respondent Nd. 1 filed, under Order XVI Rules 1 and 2 read \Vith s. 151, C.P.C., a list of witnesses to be summoned includirig the Arbitrator \Vho made an a-w·ard in a matter betwee_n the appellant and the respondent No. 1. The Registrar of the High Court in the routine course granted sumn1ons '~'ithout satis'fying himself as to the sufficiency of cause to summon the arbitrator as required under Order XVI Rule 3, C.P.C. An objection petition u/s. 151, C.P.C. filed before the learned Judge of the High Court against the orders of the Registrar was dismissed. Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD : ( 1) It is not right that every one who is included in the witness list is automatically summoned, but the true rule is that if grounds are made out for su1nmoning a witness, he will be called. The court must realise that its process should be used sparingly and after careful deliberation if the arbitrator should be brought into the witness box. If a party has a case of _1nala {ides_ and makes out _prin1a facie_ that it is not a frivolous charge or has other reasonably relevant matters to be brought out, the court may, in given circumstances, exercise its power to summon even an arbitrator because nobody is beyond the reach of truth or trial by court. [634 A-B, C-DJ (2) Courts should bear in mind the reason behind s. 121 of the Evidence Act when invited to issue summons to an arQitrator. It will be very embarrass ing and in many cases objectionable if every quasi-judicial authority or tribunal were put to the necessity of getting into the witness box and testify as to what ¥.'eighed in his mind in reaching his verdict. The slightest attempt to get to the materials of his decision, to get back to his mind and to examine him as to why and how he arrived at a particular decision should be immediately and ruthlessly excluded as unreasonable. When an arbitrator has given an award, if grounds justifying his·1 being ca11ed as a witness are affirmatively made out, the court may exercise its powers--0therwise not. In the instant case the court has not approached· the question from the proper ~rspective and on the materials on record, there is no justification for the examination of the arbitrator. [633 C-D, HJ _Khub_ _Lal_ v. _Bisluunbhar Sa'1ai_ A.I.R. 1925 Allahabad 103, approved. [The Court left open to the High Court to issue necessary proce$$ on a fresh application stating why he wants to examine the arbitrator, if and when "°' rnade by the respondent.1 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1296 ilf,, 1977. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order _,, dated 25-1-77 of the High Ci;iurt _of_ Delhi at New Delhi in T. No. 2253 of 1976 in Suit No. 459-A of 1974. r1 _Soli_ _J._ _Sorabji, Addi. Solicitor General E. C. Agarwala anq_ _G11'ish_ _Chandra_ for the Appellant. UNION _v._ ORIENT ENGG. & COMMERCIAL co. _(Krishna_ _Tyer,_ /.) 633 _Bakshi Shivcharan Singh_ and _H._ _S._ _Marwah_ _for_ Respondent No. 1 The Order of the Court was delivered by KRJ'SHNA IYER, J.-We live and learn from counsel's arguments each day and in this case we were asked to unlearn. Counsel for the appellant has objected, in this appeal, to the examination, as a witness, of an arbitrator who has ·given his award on a dispute between the appellant and the .!st respondent. His contention is that, on broad principle and public policy, it is highly obnoxious to summon an arbitrator or other adjudicating body to give evidence in vindication of his award. This is a wholesome principle as is evident from s. 121 of the Indian. Evidence Act. That provision states that no Judge or Magistrate shall, except upon the special order of some court to which he is subordinate be compelled to answer any questions as to his own conduct in court as such Judge or Magistrate or as anything which came to his knowledge in court as such Judge or Magistrate, but he may be examined as to other matters which occurred in his presence whilst he was so acting. Of course, this section does not apply _proprio vigore_ to the situation present here. But it is certainly proper for the court to bear in mind the reason behind this rule when invited to issue summons to an arbitrator. Indeed, it will be a very embarrassing and, in many cases, objectionable if every quasi-judicial authority or tribunal were put to the necessity of geeting into the witness box and testify as to what weighed in his mind in reaching his verdict. We agree with the observations of Walsh, A.C.J. in _Khub_ _Lal_ v. _Bishambhar Sahai(')_ A B ## c D E F G H _(_ where the learned Judge has pointed out that the slightest attempt to get to the materials of his decision,, to get back to his mind and to examine him as to why and how he arrived at a particular decision should be im-· mediately and ruthlessly excluded as undesirable. In this case, a list of witnesses was furnished by the !st respondent and the Registrar of the High Court, in the rou'ine course, granted summons, perhaps not adverting as to why the arbitrator himself was being summoned. That was more or less mechanical is evident from the fact that the reason given for citing the arbitrator is the omnibus purpose of proving the case of the party-not the specific ground to be made out. We should expect applica,!i_on of the mind of the Registrar to the particular facts to be established by a witness before the coercive process of the court is used. It is seen that the learned Judge IYefore whom objection was taken under s. 151 C.P.C. to the summons to the arbitrator dismissed the petition on the score that he saw no ground to refuse to summon the arbitrator Ma witness. The approach should have been the other way round. When an arbitrator has given an award, if grounds justifying his being called as a witness are affirmatively made out, the coort may exercise its power, otherwise not. It is not right that every one who is included in the witness list is automatically summoned; but the true rule is that, if grounds are made out for summoning a witness he will be called; not if the demand is belated, vexatious or frivolous. Thus the court also has not approached the question from the proper - ..--+---- :·--- . . ' (l) A.l.R. 1925 All. 103. A B # c D 634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 1 s.c.R. perspective. If arbitrators are summoned mindlessly whenever applications for setting aside the award are enquired into, there will be few to undertake the job. The same principle holds good even if the prayer is for modification or for remission of the award. The short point is that the court must realise that its process should be used sparingly and after careful deliberation, if the arbitrator should be brought iuto the witness box. In no case can he be summoned merely to show how he arrived at the conclusions he did. In the present case, we have been told that the arbitrator had gone wrong in his calculation and this had to be extracted from his mouth by being examined or cross-examined. We do not think that every Munsif and every Judge, every Commissioner and every arbitrator has to undergo a cross-examination before his judgment or award can be upheld by the appellate court. How vicious such an approach would be is apparent on the slightest reflection. Of course, if a party has a case of _11U1/a_ _{ides_ and makes out _prima_ _jacie_ that it is not a frivolous charge or has other reasonably relevant matters to be brought out the court may,, in given circumstances, exercise its power to summon even an arbitrator, because nobody is beyond the reach of truth or trial by Court. In the present case, after having heard counsel on both sides, we are not satisfied that on the present material there is justification for the exantination of the arbitrator. We therefore set aside the order. However, we make it clear that if the court is convinced, after hearing the respondent on a fresh application stating why he want to examine the arbitrator, it is still open to it to issue the necessary process. Such a step must be a deliberate step and not a routine E summons. With these observations, we allow the appeal. Th()re ·will. be no order as to costs. I _Appeal allowed._ \