High CourtDivision BenchAppeal disposed of; remanded to High Court for ...

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. v. MAJOR BAHADUR SINGH

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 4482 of 2003
Neutral Citation:2005 SCC Supp. 5

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Arijit Pasayat
  • C.K. Thakker
Judgment Date
2005-11-22
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is disposed of. The Court held that the High Court erred in quashing the 1989-90 ACR entry and remanded the matter to the Delhi High Court for fresh consideration of the writ petition in light of the established ACR parameters and communication rules, while keeping an express reservation that no opinion on the merits is being formed at this stage.
Final Disposition
Appeal disposed of; remanded to High Court for fresh consideration of the writ petition in light of ACR parameters and communication rules; no opinion on merits expressed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Union of India
  • Chief of Army Staff

Respondents

  • Major Bahadur Singh

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Gopal Subramanium, Additional Solicitor General
  • • Dayan Krishnan
  • • Gautam Narayan
  • • Ms. Sushma Suri

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Naresh Kaushik
  • • Ms. Shilpa Chohan
  • • Mrs. Lalita Kaushik

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court decision concerns the annual confidential reports (ACRs) of an Army officer and the scope of judicial review over promotional decisions made through the Selection Board. The respondent, Major Bahadur Singh, challenged ACRs for 1988-89 and 1989-90 and sought to be reassessed by the Selection Board, alleging adverse remarks and non-communication of detractors. The Delhi High Court had quashed the ACR entry for 1989-90 and remanded the matter for reconsideration, finding an adverse element and improper communication. The Union of India, along with the Chief of Army Staff, contended that the system for recording and communicating ACRs is well-defined and that promotion is ostensibly merit-cum-seniority, based on appropriate procedures and parameters preserved by the MS branch, including stages of counseling, guidance and consequences for failure to improve. The Supreme Court held that the ACR process is elaborately laid out with multiple officers (Initiating Officer, Superior Reviewing Officer, First Technical Officer, Higher Technical Officer) and that the thresholds and parameters for Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel differ. It stressed that adverse or advisory remarks arise only after proper counselling and guidance, and that termination of the adverse entry requires adherence to the established procedure. Accordingly, it remitted the case to the High Court for fresh consideration without expressing a view on merits.

Provisions of Law Cited

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Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Each case depends on its own facts; a close similarity between cases is not decisive (flexibility of precedent).
  • Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice; cut the dead wood and avoid treating judgments as statutes.
  • Judgments are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament; language of judgments must be read in their proper context.
  • Circumstantial flexibility; one additional fact may alter the outcome between cases.
  • Performance counselling is a continuous process and adverse/advisory remarks are anchored to the pen picture and the accompanying guidance.
  • Not all references to judgments or dicta should be treated as controlling law; the facts must fit the reasoning.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the ACR process is governed by detailed guidelines, parameters and communication rules. They argued that the three-stage framework—counseling, guidance and consequences of non-improvement—was properly followed, and that adverse entries could only be made after proper counselling and explicit elaboration in pen pictures. They emphasized that the 1989 memo and the confidential-report procedures provide explicit safeguards; the High Court’s reliance on decisions like UP Jal Nigam and Yamuna Shanker Misra was misplaced since those authorities do not apply universally to the Army selection context. They urged remand to the High Court for fresh consideration, asserting no determination on merits should be inferred while the matter is being reheard.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent argued that the ACRs reflected adverse elements affecting promotion prospects and demanded that entries be communicated and corrected. They asserted that the High Court’s conclusions were consistent with the lack of explicit parameters in earlier writs and that the matter required scrutiny of the counselling/consultation process, including the adequacy of the pen-picture and the communications of adverse remarks. They contended that the earlier decisions, though distinguishable, provided relevant guidance on how communications and parameters should be managed within the ACR framework.

Cited Precedents (5)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
U.P. Jal Nigam v. Prabhat Chandra Jain[1996] 2 SCC 363DistinguishedHeld inapplicable to the Army ACR context; not universally applicable as the judgment itself notes the difference in the factual matrix.
State of U.P. v. Yamuna Shanker Misra[1997] 5 SCC 7DistinguishedReasoning not directly applicable to the Army selection framework; distinguished on its facts.
London Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton(1951) AC 737Mentioned OnlyCited for general principle about not treating judgments as statutes; used as supportive dicta.
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.[1970] 2 All ER 294Mentioned OnlyCited for caution in statutory interpretation; used as general principle.
Herrington v. British Railways Board[1972] 2 WLR 537Mentioned OnlyCited for general caution on interpreting judgments as statutory language.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. v. MAJOR BAHADUR SINGH ## NOVEMBER 22, 2005 [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] ## _Service Law:_ _Annual Confidential Report (ACR)-Appraisal and grading-Judicial review-Scope and ambit of-Selection Board held in 1995 and 1996_ C _considered promotion of a Major to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel-Officer not empanelled on the basis of overall profile and comparative batch meritStatutory complaint for setting aside ACRs of 1988-89 and 1989-90, rejectedOfficer filed writ petition praying that he be assessed afresh by the Selection Board and for setting aside ACRs for the years 1988-90-High Court held that there was an adverse element in the ACRs of the Officer/or years 1988-_ D _90 and 1989-90 and, therefore, he ought to have been given performance counseling-Therefore, entry of the ACRfor the year 1988-90 quashed-High Court also held that there was down grading which was adverse to the Officer and it ought to have been communicated-Correctness of-Held: The standards for demonstrated performance in the case of Major, Lieutenant Colonel and_ E _Colonel are different-The promotion is virtually on merit-cum-seniorityThere are three stages for communication of adverse and advisory remarks in the Confidential Reports-First stage is counseling, second is guidance and third is the consequences of the officer failing to show the desired improvement-The High Court had clearly overlooked these aspects-Hence, matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration of the grievances of the_ F _Officer._ The respodent was considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by the Selection Board held in 1995 and 1996 and was not empanelled on the basis of overall profile and comparative batch merit The respondent filed statutory complaint for setting aside the Annual G Confidential Reports (ACR) of 1988-89, which were rejected. The respondent filed a writ petition praying that he be assessed afresh by the Selection Board and for setting aside ACRs for the years 1988-90. The High Court quashed the entry of the ACR for the year 1988385 II 386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. _S_ S.C.R. - A 90 holding that there was an adverse element in the ACRs of the respondent for the years 1988-90 and 1989-90 and, therefore, the respondent ought to have been given perforamnce counseling. The High Court also held that there was down grading which was adverse to the respondent and it ought to have been communicated. to him. Hence the - B appeal. ## Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD. 1. The materials on record clearly reveal that the procedure for recording of Annual Confidential Record (ACR) has been elaborately C provided for. There are different o(ficers involved in the process, they are: Initiating Officer, the Superior Reviewing Officer, the First Techincal Officer and Higher Technical Officer. The standards for demonstrated performance in the case of Major, Lieutenant Colonel and ~olonel are different The respondent had filed the writ application making a grievance that there were some adverse remarks which were not communicated. The D absence of parameters was not specifically highlighted in the writ. petition. (391-F-GJ _U.P. Jal Nigam_ v. _Prabhat Chandra Jain,_ (19961 2 SCC 363 and _State of U.P._ v. _Yamuna Shanker Misra,_ [1997) 5 SCC 7, held inapplicable.' E _London Graving Dock Co Ltd_ v. _Horton,_ (1951) AC 737, _Home Office_ v. _Dorser Yacht Co.,_ [1970) 2 All ER 294 and _Herrington_ v. _British Railways Board,_ (1972) 2 WLR 537, referred to. 2.1. The promotion is virtually on merit-cum-seniority basis. The paper on the selection system dated 6-5-1987 elaborately provides the F guidelines for assessment. [392-B) 2.2. In the case of Majors, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, three . sets of Demonstrated Performance variables have been provided in the ACR forms. These variables correspond to "Regimental and Command G Assignments". [393-A) 3. The modalities provided for recording and communication of adverse entries clearly indicate as to in which cases the communication of adverse or advisory remarks are to be made. Word "Advisory" is not necessarily adverse. (394-A) H 387 U.0.1. _v._ MAJOR BAHADUR SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 4. A reading of the instructions clearly indicate that there are different stages: first is the counseling, second is the guidance and third are the consequences of the officer failing to show desired improvement. Only when an officer fails to show the desired improvement, the adverse/ advisory remarks are included in his Confidential Report so that cognizance is taken for his weakness while planning his future placements. The High Court has clearly overlooked these aspects and on that ground alone the judgment is vulunerable. Additionally, it is noticed that the writpetitioner had merely made a grievance of non-communication but the High Court quashed the entry for 1989-90 which is clearly indefensible. In the fitness of things, therefore, the High Court should re-hear the matter consider the grievances of the writ-petitioner in the background of the parameters which clearly exist. It is made clear ~hat no opinion on the merits of the case is expressed as the matter is being remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. (394-E-G) CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4482 of2003. D From the Judgment and Order dated 7 .2.2003 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 148 of 1997. Gopal Subramanium, Additional Solicitor General, Dayan Krishnan, Gautam Narayan and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Appellants. E Naresh Kaushik, Ms. Shilpa Chohan and Mrs. Lalita Kaushik for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Union of India and the Chief of Army staff, F Army Headquarters, South Block, New Delhi, call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that though the Court cannot moderate the appraisal and grading given to an officer while exercising the power of judicial review yet the Annual Confidential Report (in short the 'ACR') for the year 1989-90 has an element of adverse reflection G leading to denial of promotion and, therefore, the same ought to have been communicated to the writ petitioner-respondent which has not been done. Though a detailed statutory complaint was filed the same was summarily dismissed without assigning any reason. The sting of adverseness in all events has perilously affected and damaged the career of the writ-petitioner though H \ \ 388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. _5_ S.C.R. A[not reflected ][in ][the variation ][of ][the marks. Accordingly, the entry ][in ][the ACR ] for the year 1989-90 was quashed and the matter was remand.ed back to the respondents in the writ petition i.e. the present appellants for re-consideration of the writ-petitioner's case for promotion to the post of Lieutenant Colonel. It is to be noted that the writ petition filed- by the respondent was dismissed by a learned Single Judge and the same was challenged in the Letters Patent B Appeal. Background facts in a nutshell are as under: The respondent was considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by the Selection Boards held in August 1995, August 1996 and c November 1996. He was not empanelled on the basis of overall profile and comparative batch merit. The respondent filed statutory complaint on 3.10.1995 for setting aside the ACRs of 1988-89 and 1989-90. According to him the then initiating officer resented the amalgamation of Food Inspection Cadre officers of ASC main stream and disliked the DFRL trained officers. Statutory D[complaint ][of ][the respondent was rejected ][on ][27.9.1996. The respondent made ] second statutory complaint which was also rejected on 17.10.1996. The respondent filed writ petition No.1774 of 1997 before the Delhi High Court praying therein that a writ of mandamus be issued to the appellants herein to promote ~him or in the alternative he be assessed afresh by the Selection Board and for setting aside ACRs. for the years 1988-1990. Writ petition of E the respondent was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by order dated 29.4.1997. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal respondent filed LPA No.148 of 1997 before the High Court. The appellants herein filed counter-affidavit in the said LPA. The High Court after going through the records of the case came to the F conclusion that there was an adverse element in the ACRs of the respondent for the years 1988-89 and 1989-90 and, therefore, in the terms of letter dated 21.8.1989 of the Sena Sachiv Shakha (no. 32301/34/F/MS/4) he ought to have been given performance counseling. The Hon'ble High Court quashed the entry of the CR for the year 1988-90 and remanded the case to the G appellants for reconsideration. The High Court was of the view that there was down grading ·which was adverse to the respondent and ought to have been communicated. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted H that the High Court has not kept[in ] view the correct position in law. The 389 U.0.1.v. MAJORBAHADURSINGH[PASAYAT, J.] fundamental mistake in the approach of the High Court is that it proceeded A on the basis as if whenever there was allotment of marks at a figure lower than for the previous period, it was down gradation, resulted in adverse consequences and ought to have been communicated before the same was considered while considering the respondent's suitability for promotion. The High court proceeded to record that the parameters for recording of ACR was not specified and that being the position, the fact that for the year 1988-89 B the respondent was awarded seven marks and for 1989-90 it was six marks amounted to down grading. Since there was no challenge in the writ petition to the effect that there were no parameters for assessment the High Court ought not to have introduced a fresh case of absence of parameters. Said conclusion is erroneous because elaborate guidelines and parameters have C been prescribed. Additionally the ACR for 1989-90 was recorded when the respondent was holding the post of Major while for the previous period he was holding the post of Captain. The High Court erred in treating un-equals to be equal and proceeded on the basis as if allotment of marks at a figure lower than for the previous period amounted to down grading. This is in fact really not so. The question of any communication did not arise because there D was no adverse entry as such. The circumstances when communications have to be made of adverse entries are elaborately provided for. As there was no averment that parameters did not exist in the counter filed, present appellants did not touch on that aspect. But the High Court overlooked this vital aspect and proceeded on the footing that no parameters existed. On that ground E alone according to learned counsel for the appellants the High Court's judgment is vulnerable. It is also pointed out that the High Court relied on the decision of this Court in _U.P. Jal Nigam and Ors._ v. _Prabhat Chandra Jain and Ors.,_ [1996] 2 SCC 363 to buttress its view. According to learned counsel for the appellants, bare reading of the said judgment clearly indicates that it was only applicable in the case of _U.P. Jal Nigam_ and has no application F to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the decision in _State of U.P._ v. _Yamuna Shanker Misra and Anr.,_ [ 1997] 4 SCC 7 was rendered on a different set of facts and has no application to the facts of the present case. The office memorandum on G which the High Court relied upon i.e. the letter/circular dated 21st August, 1989 does not in any way help the respondent, and in fact goes against him. It only lays down the modalities to be followed when an officer is found to be not up to mark. The performance counseling is a continuous process and the concerned employee has to be given appropriate guidance for an improvement as and when a weakness is noticed. Only when the officer fails H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. ' S.C.R. 390 ' I, I A to show the desired improvement the adverse/advisory remarks can be included in the confidential report. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the High Court has taken the correct view considering the fact that serious consequences were involved and directed communication of the entry which had adverse B consequences. The reduction in marks for a subsequent period is a clear case of adverse consequences and, therefore, it was correct on the part of the High Court to give direction as contained in the impugned order. It was also submitted that the _U.P. Jal Nigam 's,_ case (supra) clearly points out that when there is a down grading in the assessment by award of lesser marks, adverse C consequences are involved. As has been rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, _U.P. Jal Nigam 's,_ case (supra) has no universal application. The judgment itself shows that it was intended to be meant only for the employees of the U.P. Jal Nigam only. D Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which rel~ance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they E appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to F be interpreted as statutes. In _London Graving Dock Co. Ltd._ v. _Horton,_ (I _9S_ I) AC 737 at p.761, Lord Mac Dermot observed: G "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." In _Home Office_ v. _Dorset Yacht Co.,_ (1970] 2 All ER 294 Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech .... .is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) I H WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved 391 U.0.1. _v._ MAJORBAHADURSINGH [PASAYAT, J.] judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in _Herrington_ A v. _British Railways Board,_ (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." B Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying C precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching D the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." *** *** *** E "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." F The materials on records clearly reveal that the procedure adopted for recording of ACRs. has been elaborately provided for. There are different officers involved in the process, they are: Initiating Officer (in short the 'LO.'), the Superior Reviewing Officer (in 'short 'the S.R.O.'), the First Technical Officer (in short the 'FTO') and Higher Technical officer (in short G the 'HTO'). As submitted by learned counsel for the appellants the standards for demonstrated performance in'the case of Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel are different. The appellant had filed the writ application making a grievance that there were some .adverse remarks which were not communicated. The absence of parameters was not specifically highlighted in the writ petition. It appears that on 6th May, 1987 a paper on the selection system was circulated. H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. _5_ S.C.R. 392 _I_ ·~ A Paragraph 3 thereof reads as follows: "Promotion upto the rank of substantive major is carried out based upon the length of service, provided the officer fulfills the mandatory requirements of such a promotion. However, promotions above the rank of Major are done through process of selection." ## B This is indicative that the promotion is virtually on merit-cum-seniority basis. The document in question elaborately provides the gui~elines for assessment. Some of the relevant provisions need to be noted. They are as follows: ## C "Assessment of the officer is based on the comparative merit of the overall profile of the officers within his own batchee. Needless to say, the grading of the Board is to be assessed from the material placed before the board, and not from personal knowledge, if any. In case of doubt, benefit must go to the "Service"." ## D Objectivity in the system of Selection is ensured by the MS Branch, by the following: "Concealment of the identity of the officers being considered to the members of the Board. The MOS placed before the members does E not contain the officer's particulars, date of birth, names of the reporting officers or the numbers of the fmn/unit the officer has served, there by denying any identification of the officer under consideration. (Applicable for Nos. 2, 3 & 4 Selection Board)." Instruction for Rendition of Confidential Reports of officer for 1989 F has also been detailed and the following procedure of Assessment is relevant:- \ • - "The Personal Qualities and variables of Demonstrated Performance have been selected after a considerable research on Confidential Reports over a period of years to cover the inherent attributes considered essential for- the job content of an Army Officer. Each - G quality has been defined. Marks are required to be entered by the IO and the RO in the columns against each quality. Two marks each have been allotted for three gradation (viz. Above Average 8 or 7, High Average 6 or 5, Low Average 3 or 2) to differentiate within the same." H 393 U.O.Lv. MAJORBAHADURSINGH[PASAYAT, J.) In the case of Majors, Lieutenant Colonels and Cofonels, three sets of Demonstrated Performance variables have been provided in the CR forms. These variables correspond to "Regimental and Command Assignments". The difference in approach from Captains and below and Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel also spaced out from paragraphs l 08 and 109. Paragraph 109 is of considerable importance so far as the present case B concerned. The same reads as follows: "109. _Low and Below Average Assessment:_ When an officer is assessed 3 marks or less in any Personal Quality or the aspect of Demonstrated Performance, then it is a matter of concern since, by an large, officers are required to demonstrate at least High Average performance. In C order to establish the cause and for the purpose of natural justice, the assessment needs adequate and explicit elaboration. Further, such assessment should invariably be supported by verbal and written guidelines for improvement, details of which also need to be1n'entioned in the pen-picture." D A reading of para 109 show~ that three marks or less is considered to be adverse and in such cases verbal and written guidelines for improvement are to be given and the details are to be mentioned in the pen picture. The brief contents (pen picture) and objectivity of the report is provided m paragraph 113. E A reference is also necessary to the instructions issued on 3rd February, 1989. Paragraph 103 is of considerable importance and reads as follows: "103. Assessment contained in a CR will not to be communicated to the officer except in the following contingencies:- F (a) When ~gurative assessment any where in the CR is Low or Below Average (i.e. 3 marks). In such cases extract of figurative assessment (i.e. 3 or less) will be communicated to the officer. (b) When the brief comments (pen picture) contains adverse or G advisory remarks. In such cases completes pen picture (excluding the box grading) together with comments on Guidance for Improvements will be communicated to the officer. Further, the box grading will also need communication to the officer when assessment is \ow or Below Average (3 or less)." H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. _S_ S.C.R. 394 A c According to the modalities prov,ided for recording and communication of adverse entries clearly indicate as to in which cases the communication of adverse or advisory remarks are t~· be made. Word "Advisory" is not necessarily adverse. Great emphasi; was laid on the instructions dated 21.8.1989 titled "Reflection and Communication of adverse and advisory B remarks in the Confidential Reports". The same reads as follows: D "The actual pen picture comprises the brief comments given at Paragraphs 13(e)/19(a) of the ACR forms for Majors to Colonels or Paragraphs 13/15 of the ACR Form for Captains and below. Therefore· adverse/advisory remarks, if any, should be endorsed in these paragraphs/sub paragraphs only. The information to be given under the Column "Verbal or Written Guidance for Improvement" (i.e. Para I 8(b )/l 9(b) or Para 15/16) is only to support the adverse/advisory remarks reflected in the pen picture. If there are no adverse/advisory remarks reflected in the pen picture, there is no requirement of including details of verbal or written guidance for improvement given to the ratees during the reporting period. It is reiterated that "Performance Counselling is a continuous process and, therefore, the ratee must be given appropriate "Guidance for improvement" as and when noticed." A reading of the instructions clearly _indicate that there are different E stages: first is the counseling, second is the guidance and third is t.he consequences of the officer failing to show desired improvement. Only when an officer fails to show· the desired improvement the adverse/advisory remarks are included in his Confidential Report so that cognizance is taken for his weakness while planning his future placements. The High Court has clearly F overlooked these aspects and on that ground alone the judgment is vulnerable. Additionally, it is noticed that the writ-petitioner had merely made a grievance of non-communication but the High Court quashed the entry for 1989-90 which is clearly indefensible. In the fitness of things, therefore, the High Court should re-hear the matter and consider the grievances of the writpetitioner in the background of the parameters which clearly exist. We make G it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case as the matter is being remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. v.s.s. Appeal disposed of.