Ultra Tech Cement Ltd v. Rakesh Kumar Singh & Anr.

Case Details & Bench

Court: High Court
Hon'ble Judges: Jagdish Singh Khehar
S. A. Bobde
Judgment Date: 2015-04-24
Court Decision / Holding: Appeal allowed. The Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta will be deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain the controversy arising out of the complaint under Section 138 NI Act; the court shall proceed accordingly in consonance with law.
Final Disposition: Appeal allowed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

Ultra Tech Cement Ltd

Respondents

Rakesh Kumar Singh
Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

• Siddhartha Dave
• Abhay Anand Jena
• Ranjit Raut
• Bina Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

• Avijit Bhatacharjee
• Upma Shrivastava
• Ratan Kumar Choudhari

Case Synopsis & Summary

Ultra Tech Cement Ltd challenged the Calcutta Metropolitan Magistrate’s jurisdiction to entertain a complaint under Section 138 NI Act filed against Rakesh Kumar Singh. The Supreme Court’s brief focuses on territorial jurisdiction and the interpretation of Section 145(2) NI Act in light of the Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod decision (2014) 9 SCC 129. The issue was whether the complaint, lodged in Calcutta, could be tried there or must be transferred to the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. The appellant, along with its counsel, relied on the principle laid down in Dashrath Rathod that proceedings must remain in the court having territorial jurisdiction if the recording of evidence has commenced post-summoning, whereas earlier stages may be preserved only when post-summoning evidence has begun. The Court examined the factual chronology—filing of affidavits, issue of summons, appearance of the accused, and subsequent recording of evidence—to determine if evidence had commenced post-summoning under Section 145(2). It concluded that evidence had indeed commenced in the post-summoning stage, and as a result the Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta, was deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 NI Act. The appeal was allowed, directing the Calcutta court to proceed in accordance with law, thereby clarifying the practical application of 145(2) and reconciliating pre- and post-judgment NI proceedings.

Provisions of Law Cited

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 s. 138Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881CrPC s. 251

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that jurisdiction to try the complaint under Section 138 NI Act is determined by the place where the cheque is dishonoured. Relying on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, they argue that since post-summoning recording of evidence has commenced in Calcutta, the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. They further submit that the pre-summoning proceedings and the sequence of steps in the record should be considered under Section 145(2) to preserve the filing place for the case.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents invite attention to the Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod decision and contend that territorial jurisdiction should follow the place where the complaint is pending if post-summoning recording of evidence has begun, and that if not, the proper court must be determined and the complaint may be transferred. They emphasise preserving jurisdiction at the place where dishonour occurs.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case Name	Citation	Treatment	Explanation
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.	(2014) 9 SCC 129	Positive	Cited as the governing principle on territorial jurisdiction and the interpretation of Section 145(2) of the NI Act; it informs the post-summoning evidence commencement requirement and preservation of proceedings at the filing place.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

153 A ## ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD v. ## RAKESH KUMAR SINGH &ANR. (Criminal Appeal No.717of2015) B ## APRIL24, 2015 [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR ANDS.A. BOBDE, JJ.] - - _Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 s. 138_ C - - _Complaint under Territorial jurisdiction for lodging Post the judgment in_ *Rupsingh Rathod _case whereby it was held that jurisdiction to try the complaint would be determined by reference to the place where cheque is dishonoured- Held:_ *Rupsingh Rathod's _case had clarified that pending_ D _proceedings where evidence at the post-summoning stage had commenced before the date of the judgment, would not_ - _be dislodged In the present case, evidence had commenced as envisaged by s.145(2) of the 1881 Act, the complaint would be maintainable before the Court it was_ E - _lodged Territorial Jurisdiction._ ## Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. In view of the factual position in the F present matter, evidence had commenced, as envisaged by Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in terms of the clarification recorded in _*Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's_ case viz., the proceedings initiated prior to the rendering of the judgment in _Dashrath_ G _*Rupsingh Rathod's_ case i.e. on 01.08.2014, will be preserved at the place they were filed, only when "post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R. A in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881". Therefore, in the present case, the Metropolitan Magistrate before whom the complaint was lodged, will be dee !ed to have jurisdiction to entertain the controversy arising out of the complaint filed by the B appellant u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The said Court shall accordingly proceed with the matter, in consonance with law. [Paras 5,7) [156-E-F; 157-E-G] _Dashrath Rupsing Rathod vs. State of Maharahstra and_ C _Anr._ (2014) 9 SCC 129- relied on. ## Case Law Reference (2014) 9 sec 129 relied on. Para4 D CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 717 of 2015 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.06.2013 of the High Court at Calcutta in CRR No. 721 of 2012 E Siddhartha Dave, Abhay Anand Jena, Ranjit Raut, Bina Gupta for the Appellant. F Avijit Bhatacharjee, Upma Shrivastava, Ratan Kumar Choudhari for the Respondents. The judgment of the Court was delivered by J. S. KHEHAR, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. G 2. Leave granted. 3. The question is whether the Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta, where the appellant initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, H ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD v. RAKESH KUMAR SINGH 155 , [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.] had the jurisdiction to entertain the same. A 4. Learned counsel for the rival parties have invited our attention, to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 9SCC129, and have drawn B our attention to the following observations recorded therein: > "22. We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly > lakhs of cases pending in various courts spanning across the country. One approach could be to declare that this judgment will have only prospective pertinence i.e. applicability to complaints that may be filed after this pronouncement. However, keeping in perspective the hardship that this will continue to bear on alleged respondent-accused who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence, and also mindful of the legal implications of proceedings being > permitted to continue in a court devoid of jurisdiction, this recourse in entirety does not commend itself to us. Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused. the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement. the complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications. the category of complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred c D E F G H 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R. A by us from the court ordinarily possessing territorial jyrisdiction, as now clarified, to the court where it is Qresently pending. All other complaints (obviously including those where the respondent-accused has not been properly served) shall be returned to the B complainant for filing in the proper court, in consonance with our exposition of the law. If such complaints are filed/refiled within thirty days of their return, they shall be d13emed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself timec barred." c (emphasis is ours) 5. On a perusal of the conclusions drawn in paragraph D 22, extracted hereinabove, we feel that the proceedings initiated prior to the rendering of the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra) on 01.08.2014, will be preserved at the place they were filed, only when "post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the - E recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ". In order to further explain its intent, the judgment clarifies, that merely leading of evidence at the pre-summoning stage, either by way of affidavit or by oral statement will not exclude - F applicability of the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra). The above judgment, thereby seeks to confirm the position, that only when recording of evidence at the postsummoning stage had commenced, before 01.08.2014 (the - G date on which the judgment in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case was pronounced), such proceedings would not be dislodged, the declaration of law, on the subject of jurisdiction, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra). H 6. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD v. RAKESH KUMAR SINGH 157 [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR J.] dispute in hand, and having examined the orders placed on A the record of this case collectively asAnnexure P-5, we are of the view that the appellant recorded its statement at the presummoning stage by filing an affidavit on 16.02.2007. Consequent upon the filing of the aforesaid affidavit, the summons were issued to the accused-respondent No.1 for B 21.04.2007. On 21.07.2008, the accused was examined under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the substance of the allegations were read over to him, whereupon, the accused having pleaded not guilty, the matter was adjourned C for recording evidence on 31.12.2008. On 22.04.2009, the appellant filed an affidavit to be treated as the statement-inchief of PW-1, whereupon, PW-1 was to be cross-examined. The Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, Calcutta, then posted the matter for 22.07.2009 for the cross-examination of PW-1. D The date for the cross-examination of PW-1 was first adjourned to 15.12.2009 and thereafter successively to 25.05.2010, 21.09.2010, 25.07.2011 and finally to 09.12.2011. 7. In view of the factual position noticed hereinabove, E we are satisfied that evidence had commenced in the present matter, as envisaged by Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in terms of the clarification recorded in paragraph 22, in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra). That being the factual position, we are of the view, that the F instant appeal is liable to be allowed. The same is accordingly allowed. The Metropolitan Magistrate, 11[1] h Court, Calcutta will be deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain the controversy arising out of the complaint filed by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The said Court G shall accordingly proceed with the matter, in consonance with law. Appeal allowed. Kalpana K. T ripathy H