U.K. Jayaraj v. State of Kerala

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN MONDAY, THE 7[TH] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2022 / 16TH KARTHIKA, 1944 CRL.REV.PET NO.1555 OF 2017** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC 45/2015 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS (SPECIAL COURT) FOR TRIAL OF CASES U/S.138, NI ACT (TEMPORARY) CRA 465/2016 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT - IV, KOZHIKODE** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:** U.K.JAYARAJ, AGED 66 YEARS S/O.U.K.APPU, 5/3131, U.K.S. ROAD, KOZHIKODE. BY ADV. SRI.K.PRAVEEN KUMAR ## **RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT & STATE:** 1 K.P.PRADEEP KUMAR, S/O.SREEDHARA NAIR, AGED 50 YEARS, SARADHI, WEST HILL.P.O., KOZHIKODE -673 005. 2 THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM -682031. BY ADVS. SRI.E.G.GORDEN SRI.S.K.KRISHNAKUMAR THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 07.11.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 2 ## **O R D E R** ## **Dated this the 7[th] day of November, 2022** This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.', for short), by the revision petitioner, who is the sole accused in C.C. No.45/2015 on the file of the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (N.I.Act cases), Kozhikode, arraying the original complainant as the 1[st] respondent and State of Kerala as the 2[nd ] respondent. 2. The revision petitioner impugns judgment in C.C.No.45/2015 dated 15.10.2016 on the file of the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (N.I.Act cases), Kozhikode and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.465/2016 dated 09.11.2022 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Kozhikode arising therefrom. ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** **==> picture [7 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** 3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, learned counsel for the 1[st] respondent as well as the learned Public Prosecutor, on admission. 4. I shall refer the parties in this revision as 'complainant' and 'accused' for easy reference. 5. The brief facts of the case put up by the complainant before the trial court are as under: The complainant launched prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred as 'NI Act', for short), by the accused, when cheque for Rs.15 lakh dated 01.03.2013 alleged to be issued by the accused to the complainant towards discharge of Rs.15 lakh alleged to be borrowed by the accused, was dishonoured, when it was presented for collection. 6. The trial court proceeded with trial. ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 4 During trial, PW1 was examined and Exts.P1 to P5 were marked on the side of the complainant. 7. On completion of prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and provided opportunity to adduce defence evidence. Accordingly, DWs 1 to 3 were examined and Ext.D1 marked on the side of the accused. 8. The trial court appraised the evidence and finally found that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakh Only). The fine was ordered to be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. It was ordered further that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused would undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. 9. The judgment in C.C.No.45/2015 dated 15.10.2016 was challenged before the ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** ## 5 Additional Sessions Court-IV, Kozhikode. The learned Sessions Judge also confirmed the said conviction and sentence as per judgment dated 09.11.2017 in Crl.Appeal No.465/2016. 10. The concurrent verdicts entered into by the trial court as well as by the appellate court are under challenge in this revision petition. 11. While impeaching the veracity of the concurrent verdicts of the trial court, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the accused that Ext.P1 cheque lacks consideration and the same was not issued to the complainant. According to him, Ext.P1 was issued in favour of DW1 and PW1 being the Benami of DW1, launched prosecution on misrepresenting facts and, therefore, the courts below should have appraised the contention raised by the accused. 12. In this case, the courts below relied on the evidence of PW1 and Exts.P1 to P5 hold ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 6 that the complainant herein discharged his initial burden in the matter of transaction led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque. 13. The defence evidence put in by the accused before the courts below is to the effect that the accused borrowed Rs.50,000/from one Mahija Rathnam, 7 years back and issued 12 blank cheques to her and the complainant misused one among the cheques and manipulated the case. This contention was considered by the trial court and the trial court negatived the said contention, since DW1, summoned to give the said defence case, did not support the case of the accused in any manner. 14. When the matter is taken to appeal, the appellate court also appreciated the evidence and finally concurred the finding. **==> picture [372 x 12] intentionally omitted <==** exercising power of revision and the power of revision is not available to appreciate or re- **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 7 appreciate to have a contra-finding. 16. It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], _**State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath**_ _**Jathavedan Namboodiri**_ , the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5): _“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its_ **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 8 _own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”_ 17. In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], ## _**Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao**_ _**Phalke**_ , the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly - unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135): **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 9 _“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”_ 18. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], _**Kishan Rao v.**_ _**Shankargouda**_ . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** ## 10 jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is nonconsideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 19. In this matter, the courts below given benefit of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act in favour of the complainant, on the finding that the evidence of PW1 in the ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 11 matter of transaction led to execution of the cheque is believable. 20. Regarding law on presumptions, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], _**Rangappa v. Sri Mohan**_ . In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act and held as under: _“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong_ **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 12 _criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”_ **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 13 21. In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], _**Bir Singh**_ _**v. Mukesh Kumar**_ , the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: _“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus_ ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 14 _would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”_ **==> picture [372 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : **==> picture [408 x 75] intentionally omitted <==** **==> picture [407 x 14] intentionally omitted <==** _**P.Balasubramanian**_ the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act it was held as under: _“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2[nd]_ **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 15 _Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the ComplainantRespondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay._ _…................_ _18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:_ _“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”_ 23. Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharges the **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** ## 16 initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities. 24. In this matter, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the evidence available established commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act by the accused and, accordingly, the accused was convicted. In fact, there is no reason to revisit the concurrent verdicts of conviction. 25. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner sought three months time to deposit the fine amount. Since the matter has been pending as revision before this Court for more ## **Crl.R.P.No.1555 of 2017** 17 than 5 years, grant of time in a most liberal manner cannot be considered. However, I direct the revision petitioner to pay the amount within a period of 30 days from today. 26. In the result, this revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. 27. The revision petitioner/accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 07.12.2022 to pay the compensation or to undergo default sentence. The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 06.12.2022. On failure to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the courts below concerned for information and compliance. Sd/- ## **A.BADHARUDEEN, JUDGE.** ww