Thresiamma Varghese W/o Baby Thomas; Akhila Baby; Arun Baby v State of Kerala represented by Addl. Chief Secretary, Forest & Wildlife Department; The Custodian (Ecologically Fragile Land) and Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Extw); Divisional Forest Officer, Mannarkad
Case Details & Bench
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Hon'ble Judges
- K. Harilal
- A. M. Babu
- Judgment Date
- 2017-12-21
- Court Decision / Holding
- The appeal is allowed. The order of the tribunal in I.A 13/2017 and OA 9/2017 are set aside. The case is remitted back to the tribunal for disposal anew in accordance with law. Costs shall abide the result of the appeal. Parties to appear before the tribunal on 1.2.2018.
- Final Disposition
- Appeal allowed; tribunal orders set aside; remitted for disposal anew in accordance with law.
Parties to the Case
Appellants / Petitioners
- Thresiamma Varghese W/o Baby Thomas
- Akhila Baby D/o Baby Thomas
- Arun Baby D/o Baby Thomas
Respondents
- State of Kerala represented by Additional Chief Secretary, Forest & Wildlife Department, Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram 695 001
- The Custodian (Ecologically Fragile Land) and Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Extw), Forest Head Quarters, Vazhuthakkad Thiruvananthapuram 695 010
- Divisional Forest Officer Mannarkad, Mannarkad Taluk, Palakkad
Legal Representation & Advocates
Counsels for Petitioners
- • Sri. P. Babu Kumar
Counsels for Respondents
- • Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan, Special Government Pleader for Forest
Case Synopsis & Summary
This Kerala High Court judgment concerns MFA (Forest) No.146 of 2017, a misc. first appeal arising from an order of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Tribunal, Palakkad. The appellants own land notified as an ecologically fragile area under Sec.3(2) of the Act. They approached the Tribunal in OA 9/2017, accompanied by I.A.13/2017 seeking to condone delay in filing under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. The Tribunal dismissed I.A 13/2017 for unexplained delay, and consequently OA 9/2017 was treated as time-barred. The High Court held that there is no fixed limitation period for filing an application under Sec.10 of the Act; rule 3(1) of the Tribunal Rules prescribes limitation only where the custodian has taken a decision. Since the custodian had not taken any decision in their case, rule 3(1) does not apply, and Article 137 of the Limitation Act (which generally does not apply to tribunals) is also inapplicable to their Sec.10 filing. The court found the position to be an anomaly created by the rule, but held that a reasonable period must be observed. Relying on Supreme Court precedents on reasonable time, the appeal is allowed; the tribunal orders are set aside and remitted for disposal in accordance with law. The parties are to appear on 1.2.2018.
Provisions of Law Cited
Legal Doctrines & Maxims
- Limitation Act is not applicable to tribunals (M.P.Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2005) 7 SCC 58)
- Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals (Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282)
- Reasonable period for exercise of statutory power when no period of limitation is prescribed (Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 942; Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 3491; P.K. Sreekantan v. P. Sreekumaran Nair, AIR 2007 SC 516)
Submissions & Arguments
Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners
The appellants submit that their land, measuring 0.8215 hectares, was notified as ecologically fragile under Sec.3(2) of the Act without any notice to them. They learned of the notification only on 28.2.2017, resulting in a delay of 1498 days before filing OA 9/2017. They contend that the Act does not prescribe a fixed period for filing under Sec.10, and that the Tribunal Rules, particularly Rule 3(1), apply only if the custodian has taken a decision, which did not occur here since no prior approach to the custodian was made. They further argue that the appellant could invoke Sec.10 directly before the Tribunal, and that Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Tribunals. They rely on decisions emphasizing reasonable time where no specific period exists. The failure to notify and the lack of custodial decision should not bar relief, and the matter merits restitution and remand for disposal according to law.
Contentions of Respondents
The respondents contend that the applicants were aware of the notification as early as 2012, evidenced by a criminal case (OR 1/2012) for felled trees on the notified land. They assert that the delay is unexplained and that the Tribunal properly dismissed I.A 13/2017. They argue that Rule 3(1) contemplates a limitation when a custodian has issued a decision, and that even where the custodian had not yet decided, there are rules and precedents that may justify time-bound actions. They maintain that the appellants are bound by the limitations and that the tribunal’s dismissal of OA 9/2017 for time-barred relief should stand, subject to any further analysis on reasonable time if needed.
Cited Precedents (5)
| Case Name | Citation | Treatment | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| M.P.Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise | ((2005) 7 SCC 58) | Positive | Supports that the Limitation Act does not apply to Tribunals; used to justify non-applicability of Article 137 in tribunal context. |
| Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma | (AIR 1977 SC 282) | Positive | Affirms that Article 137 of Limitation Act applies to courts only, not tribunals. |
| Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar | (AIR 2003 SC 942) | Positive | Allows that where no period of limitation for a statutory power is prescribed, exercise must occur within a reasonable time. |
| Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India | (AIR 2004 SC 3491) | Positive | Supports reasonable time principle in absence of prescribed period. |
| P.K. Sreekantan v. P. Sreekumaran Nair | (AIR 2007 SC 516) | Positive | Reinforces concept of reasonable period for statutory actions. |
Diagnostic Tool
Does this judgment govern your specific facts?
Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against Thresiamma Varghese W/o Baby Thomas; Akhila Baby; Arun Baby v State of Kerala represented by Addl. Chief Secretary, Forest & Wildlife Department; The Custodian (Ecologically Fragile Land) and Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Extw); Divisional Forest Officer, Mannarkad and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.
Extracted Judgment Text
Exact text extracted from official judgment records.