High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; suit dismissed with costs.

The State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail Haji

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1955

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. R. Das
  • N. H. Bhagwati
  • M. Hidayatullah
Judgment Date
1959-08-04
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The suit filed by the respondent was dismissed with costs; the Administrator’s act was treated as an act of State, not justiciable in municipal courts.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; suit dismissed with costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Saurashtra

Respondents

  • Memon Haji Ismail Haji Valimahomed, Junagadh (the respondent)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • G. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India
  • • R. Ganapathy Iyer
  • • D. Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

  • • I. N. Shroff
  • • H. J. Umrigar
  • • K. L. Hathi

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the resumption of a granted property in Junagadh following the integration of Junagadh State into the Union of India and the ensuing administration by an official appointed by the Government of India. Memon Haji Ismail Haji filed suit seeking a declaration that Secretariat Order No. 2/3289, dated October 1, 1948, cancelling the grant and resuming the land, was illegal and against natural justice, and alternatively that the respondent be restored Rs. 30,000 plus Rs. 541-2-0. The Civil Judge and later the Saurashtra High Court (in appeal) decreed in favor of the respondent, prompting the State of Saurashtra to appeal. The central issue was whether the Administrator’s resumption of state land, performed before completion of the act of State, constituted an act of State on behalf of the Government of India and thus immunized from municipal judicial review under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act and Ordinance No. 72 of 1949, or whether it could be subject to ordinary legal scrutiny. The Court, examining the concept of an act of State, held that when a sovereign acts in a manner akin to catastrophic or extraordinary exercise of power against aliens outside the State, such actions are not ordinarily reviewable by municipal courts. However, where the act is within the law and not a true act of State, a court may adjudicate. In this case, the majority concluded the Dominion action constituted an act of State, and the Administrator’s act, though arbitrary, was not justiciable in municipal courts. The appeal was allowed and the suit dismissed with costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution of India, Article 133 (as applied to appeals from the High Court);Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ss. 109, 110 (and Art. 133)Indian Independence Act 1947, s. 7 (paramountcy lapse)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Act of State doctrine: a sovereign act not grounded in municipal law; courts do not adjudicate on acts of State involving aliens outside the State.
  • Test for act of State: whether the State or its agents purport to act catastrophically or within ordinary law.
  • Acquisition of territory doctrine: rights of inhabitants of newly acquired territories are recognized only after sovereignty over the territory is established; rights do not necessarily transfer from the ex-sovereign to the new sovereign until acquisition completes.
  • Forester principle that not all administrative actions constitute acts of State; some are within legal title and reviewable.
  • When rights accrue to residents of acquired territories, those rights are defined by the new sovereign, not the former sovereign.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The State of Saurashtra contended that the Administrator’s resumption of property was an act of State pure and simple, exercised on behalf of the Government of India and outside the ordinary municipal law, thereby rendering the civil courts without jurisdiction. It argued that the act occurred during a transitional period and that the Central Government’s exercise of sovereignty over Junagadh placed the action beyond judicial review under EPJA and Ordinance 72/1949; the act should be treated as an act of State rather than as a private act affecting rights within the State.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contended that the theory of an act of State did not apply: the State Council invited the Dominion to intervene and local laws remained applicable; hence, the Administrator’s actions should be subject to municipal judicial review, and relief could be granted.

Cited Precedents (15)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Salaman v. Secretary of State for India(1906) 1 K.B. 613PositiveCited to illustrate the concept of act of State and the emergency, catastrophic nature of certain sovereign acts.
Johnstone v. Pedlar(1921) 2 A.C. 262PositiveUsed to discuss immunity of the State in acts involving external entities.
Secretary of State in Council for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba(1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22PositiveFoundational discussion on what constitutes an act of State.
Vaje Singh Ji Joravar Singhji and Others v. Secretary of State for India(1924) LR 51 IA 357PositiveUsed to articulate the territorial acquisition doctrine and its effect on rights.
Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax[1959] SCR 729PositiveCited in relation to acts of State and rights under new sovereignty after merger.
Forester and Others v. Secretary of State for India(1959) 18 WR 349 PCPositiveDiscussed in context of act of State and sovereignty.
Campbell v. Hall(1) Comp. 204; 98 E.R. 1045PositiveIllustrates treaty/sovereign power and its limits vis-à-vis municipal law.
Ruding v. Smith(1921) 2 Hag. Con. 384; 161 E.R. 774PositiveUsed to support the concept of acts of State and immunity from municipal interference.
E.I. Co. v. Syed Ali(186?); 7 M.I.A. 555PositiveCited for principles on acts of State and legal recognition of rights.
Sardar Rustam Khan v. Secretary of State for India[3]PositiveReferenced in the context of State acts and rights when sovereignty changes.
Secretary of State v. Bai RajbaiLR 42 IA 229PositiveKey authority on rights post-sovereignty transition and state action.
Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, AjmerAIR 1947 PC 1PositiveCited in the broader discussion of how acts of State affect rights.
Raja of Coorg v. East India Company(1860) 29 Beav. 300PositiveHistorical authority on acts of State and its sui generis nature.
Raja Saligram v. Secretary of State in Council(1872) LR Ind App Suppl.PositiveUsed to support the doctrine governing rights of territories after annexation.
Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board(1941) A.C. 224PositiveReferenced as a comparative illustration of act-of-State Concepts in colonial contexts.

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Extracted Judgment Text

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###### S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 537 within the decisions of this Court in the earlier cases referred to above. ###### In the light of the above discussion it follows, there- fore, that the answer to the referred question should by in the negative. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed, the answer given by the High Court to the question is set asicfo aDd the question is answered in the negative. The appelli1nt must get the costs ###### of the reference in the High Court and in this Court. _A ppe,al_ _allowed._ ###### THE STATE O:F SAURASHTRA _v._ MEMON HAJI ISMAIL HAJl (S. R. DAs, C.J., N. H. BHAGWATI and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) _Act of State-Taking over_ _of administration_ _of_ _Junagadh Staie_ _by Domi;, o"on_ _of_ _India-Resumption_ _of property by Administi;ator_ _before completion_ _of_ _such act-If an_ _act_ _of_ _State not justiciable_ _in_ _municipal Co14Tts._ The suit, out of which the present appeal arose, was one originally brought by the respondent against the State of Junagadh, later on substituted by the State of Saurathtra, for a declaration that the Administrator's order dated October r, 1948, resuming the immQveable property in suit was illegal, unjust and against all canons of natural justice. The.suit was decreed by the Civil Judge and the decree was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. The only point for determination in this appeal was whether the act of resumption by the Administrator was an act of State performed on behalf of the Government of India and involved an alien outside the State and was not, therefore, justiciable in the municipal Courts. With the passing of the Indian Independence Act 1947, and lapse of paramountcy by reason of s. 7 thereof, the Nawab of Junagadh became sovereign, but instead of acceding to the new Dominion he left for Pakistan. It appeared from the White Paper on Indian States that the Government of India took over the administration of the State on November 9, 1947• at the request of the Nawab's Council, but did not formally annex it till January 20, 1949• and during that period the Administrator maintained law and order and carried on the administration. _Held,_ that there could be no doubt thaf the act of the Dominion of India in assuming the administration of Junagadh State was an act of State pure and simple and the resumption in _I959_ _Godrej_ _&Co_ v. _Commissioner of_ _I n&ome-tax_ _Das_ _C.J._ _I959_ _August 4._ _z959_ _**TheStato of**_ _**Saurashlra**_ v. _**Menum**_ _**Haji**_ _**Ismail Haji**_ _Hidayalullo_ _**J.**_ 538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1}] question having been made by the Administrator before that act was completed and at a time when the people of Junagadh, including the respondent, were aliens outside the State, the act of resumption, however arbitrary, was an act of State on behalf of the Government of India and was not, therefore, justiciable in the municipal Courts. The test in such cases must be whether the State or its agents purported to act "catastrophically " or subject to the ordinary course of law. _Salaman_ v. _Secretary_ _of State for India,_ (1906) l K.B. 613, _Johnstone_ v. _Pedlar,_ (1921) 2 A.C. 262, _Secretary of State in Council_ _for India_ v. _Kamachec Boye Sahaba,_ (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22, _Vaje_ _Singh Ji Joravar Singh_ 0- _Ors._ v. _Secretary_ _of_ _State for India,_ (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357, _Dalmia Dadri Cement_ _Co._ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax,_ [1959] S.C.R. 729, relied on. _Forester and Others_ v. _Secretary_ _of_ _State for India,_ 18 W.R. 349 P.C., considered. The essence of an act of State was the arbitrary exercise of sovereign power, on principles other than or paramount to the municipal law. Although the sovereign might allow the inhabitants to retain their old laws and customs, it could not itself be bound by them until it purported to act within them, thus bringing _to_ an end the act of State. _Campbell_ v. _Hall,_ l Comp. 204; 98 E.R. 1045, _Ruding_ v. _Smith,_ 2 Hag. Con. 384; 161 E.R. 774 and _E.I._ _Co._ v. _Syed_ _Ali,_ 7 M.I.A. 555, referred to. CIVIL• APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1955. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the ###### February 19, 1953, of the former Saurashtra High Court in Civil First Appeal No. 16 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated December 15, 1951, of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh in Civil Suit No. 470 of 1950. _G._ _!(._ _Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,_ _R. Gana-_ _pathy Iyer_ and _D. Gupta_ for the appellant. ##### I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. ###### H.J. Umrigar and K. L._ Hathi, for the lnterveners. 1959. August 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ###### liIDAYATULLAH J.-This appeal with a certificate from the former High Court of Saura11htra under Art.133 of the Constitution read with Ss. 109 and 110 of S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 539 the Code of Civil Procedure, has been brought against the judgment of that Court dated February 19, 1953, in Civil First Appeal No. 16 of 1952. The appellant is the State of Saurashtra, which stood substituted for the State of Junagadh,. against which the snit was originally filed. The respondent, Memon Haji Ismail Haji Valimahomed of Junagadh, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), brought this suit originally against two defendants, the State of Junagadh and one Jamadar Abu Umar Bin Abdulla Abu Panch (hereafter referred to as Abu Panch), for a declaration that the Secretariat Order No. 2/3289 dated October 1, 1948, was "illegal, unjust and against all ###### canons of natural justice ". He also asked for an alternative relief that the second defendant do return to him a sum of Rs. 30,000 plus Rs. 541-2-0, being the consideration and expenses of a transfer of immovable property resumed under the said Order. The suit was decreed by the Civil Judge, to whom after integration ###### the case was transferred, and the decree was confirmed ##### by the High Court by the judgment under appeal. It may be pointed out that during the course. of this suit, a. third defendant, namely, the Mamlatdar, Viswadar was also impleaded, because the property of Abu Panch had passed into the management of the Saurashtra Government under what is described in the case as the ##### Gharkhod Ordinance. It may further be pointed out ###### that the two defendants other than the State of Sau rashtra were discharged from the suit, and it proceeded only against the State of Saurashtra for the relief ###### of declaration above described. The facts of the case are as follows : One Ameer Ismail Khokhar Ka.yam Khokhar purchased a plot of land in Junagadh town from the State of Junagadh, and built a house on it. A Rukka was issued to him on December 2, 1939, which is plaintiff's Exhibit ###### No. 34. In the year 1941, the Nawab of Junagadh purchased the property from Khokhar, though the document by whfoh this purchase took place has not been produced in the case. On November 17, 1941, the Nawab gave this property by gift to Abu Panch. Abu _1959_ _The Slate of_ _Saurashlra_ v. _MemonHaji_ _Ismail Haji_ _Hidayalullah_ _J._ _I959_ _**The State of**_ _**Saurashlra**_ v. _**Mtmon**_ _**Haji**_ _Ismail_ _**Haji**_ _**Hidayatullah**_ _**J.**_ 540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] Panch in his turn sold on November 24, 1943 the pro###### perty to the respondent for Rs. 30,000. In the original gift deed (described in plaintiff's Exhibit dated May 18, 1942) there does not appear to have been any mention ###### of a power to transfer the property. Indeed, in the said document of May 18, 1942, it was stated that the house was given for the " use and enjoyment " of Abu Panch. Subsequently, on February 12, 1944, the Nawab ordered certain amendments in the Palace Order by making it possible for Abu Panch to sell the ###### house. It was stated as follows : " .. . you are hereby granted from the date of gift i.e. 17-11-41 the title to sell the house as defined in this Rukka and as per directions received." ##### It appears that this additional Shera was issued to validate the sale which had been effected by Abu Panch earlier. However, t·he matters stood thus when after Independence the affairs of Junagadh State fell into a chaos, and at the invitation of the State Council the ###### the Government of India ordered the Regional Com missioner, Western India and Gujerat States Region to assume charge of the administration of the State on ###### behalf of the Government of India. The Regional Commissioner on November 9, 1947, issued a Proclamation which was published in the Destural Amal ###### Sarkar Junagadh of November 10, 1947, stating that he had assumed charge of the administration of the Junagadh State at 18·00 hours under the orders of the Government of India. The Proclamation which is brief, may be quoted here : ##### "I, N. M. Buch, Barrister-at-law O.B.E., I.C.S., Regional Commissioner, Western India &- Gujarat States Region, have this day assumed charge of the administration of the Junagadh State at 18·00 Hours under the orders of the Government of India, at the request of the Junagadh State Council supported by ###### the people of Junagadh in view of the complete breakdown of administration resulting in chaotic condition in the State. The first task of myself and ###### my officers will be to ensure complete peace and order throughout Junagadh State territory, and to give even justice to all communities. The majority S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 541 ###### community of the State has a special responsibility for the protection of the minorities. All the Junagadh State Officials and subjects are, therefore, invited to offer unconditional and loyal support and cooperation to the new Administration. Any a.ct of non.cooperation and disloyalty must in the interest ###### of the people and for the preservation of " peace and order " be dealt with and shall be dealt with firmly. J unaga.dh, NIM. Buch, 9th November, 1947, Regional Commissioner, Western India. & Gujarat States Region." On November 14, 1947, the Regional Commissioner by a Notification (No. 6 of 1947), appointed Shri S. W. ###### Shiveshwa.rka.r as Administrator of Juna.gadh State. That N otifica.tion was as follows : _z959_ _Thi Slate of_ _S_ _aurashlra_ v. _Memon Haji_ _Ismail Haji_ _Hidayatullah_ _J._ "Mr. S. W. Shiveshwa.rka.r M.B.E., I.C.S. on being relieved as Secretary to the Regional Commissioner, Western India. and Gujarat States Region, is appointed Administrator of the Junaga.dh State vice Rao Sa.heh T. L. Shah, B.A. Under my genera.I guidance and supervision the Administrator will have full authority to pass all orders and to take all action ###### necessary to carry on the affairs of the J una.ga.dh State. #### * * * J unaga.dh, N. M. Buch, 14th November, 1947. Regional Commissioner, Western India. & Gujarat States Region." On October 13, 1948, Shri Shiveshwarkar passed Secretariat Order No. R/3289of1948, which was im##### pugned in the suit. It reads : ###### "Land measuring Sq. Yds. 1,846-9-12 with the building thereon, situated outside Ma.jevdi Gate opposite workshop was given as a gift by way of ###### Inam to Abu U mar Bin Abdulla Abu Panch '::.f Junagadh under Private Secretary's Office No. Pl58 dated 17th November, 1941. The donee had no right ##### to sell the said land and building under Rulli No. 32/98 and the vendor Sheth Haji Ismail Haji 6Q _I9$9_ _**The State of**_ _**Saurashtra**_ v. _**Memon·Haji**_ _**Ismail**_ _**Haji**_ _**Hidayatullah**_ _]._ 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] Valimahomed had purchased the same with the full knowledge of the contents hereof. The grant being a wanton and unauthorised gift ###### of Public property the above-said order is hereby cancelled and' as the subsequent purchaser does not ###### get any .right, title or interest higher than that possessed by the donee, Mr. Abu Panch, it is ordered ###### that the said land with the superstructures thereon should be resumed forthwith by the State as State property. Sd. S. W. Shiveshwarkar Administrator President's Executive Council, Junagadh State_" #### It appears that immediately afterwards the Admini strator took this property in his possession, and the plaintiff-respondent after serving a notice under s. 423 ###### of the Junagadh State Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) filed the suit for the above declaration in the High Court of the State. As pointed out above, the suit was transferred subsequently to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Junagadh, who decreed it granting the declaration on December 15, 1951. He held that the Administrator's order was illegal and inoperative and also against " all canons of natural justice." An appeal was filed by the State of Saurashtra pleading, as was done in the suit itself, that the action of Shri Shiveshwarkar who was a delegate of the Government of India appointed under s. 3(2) of the Extra.Provincial Jurisdiction Act, was ###### not justiciable being an act of State, that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred under s. 5 of the Extra.###### Provincial Jurisdiction Act and s. 4(2) of Ordinance No. 72 of 1949 and that the grant was always resum- able by the Ruler and Shri Shiveshwarka.r as the successor could also resume the same. ###### The High Court of Saurashtra referred in detail to a minute prepared by Sir Raymond West in Col. Webb's Political Practice, wherein the author had stated what the rights of Rulers were to resume grants ma.de by them and stated that such resumption was not possible by the Rulers. The High Court also ##### S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 543 stated that this action could not be regarded as an act of State and further that the jurisdiction of the Courts was neither barred by s. 5 of the Extra-Provip.cia.l Jurisdiction Act nor by s. 4(2) of Ordinance No. 72 ###### of 1949. In this appeal, the learned Solicitor-General on behalf of the State of Saurashtra abandoned three of the contentions which were raised in the Courts below. He said that the State was not relying upon the power of Shri Shiveshwarkar as successor to the Ruler of Junagadh to resume this property, and no reference to Sir Raymond West's minute was therefore necessary. He also said that the State Government did not seek to justify the resumption nor question the juris diction of the Court under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act and the above-mentioned Ordinance. He pleaded that the action of Shri Shiveshwarkar was an act of State performed on behalf of the Government of India, and was therefore not justiciable in Municipal Courts. The term 'act of State' has many uses and meanin,gs. ###### In France and some Continental countries the acts of the State and its officers acting in their official capacity are not cognizable by the ordinary courts nor are they ###### subject to the ordinary law of the land. The reason of the rule is stated to be that the State as the fount ###### of all law cannot be subordinate to it. In our system of law which is inherited from English Jurisprudence ###### this is not accepted and save some acts of a special kind, all other official acts must be justified as having ###### a legal foundation. In this sense 'act of State' means not all governmental acts as it does in the French and Continental Systems but only some of them. The term is next used to designate immunities and prohibitions sometimes created by statutes. The term is also extended to include certain prerogativ.es and special immunities enjoyed by the sovereign and its a.gents in ###### the business of internal government. The term is even used to indicate all acts into which, by reason ###### that they are official in character, the Courts may not inquire, or in respect of which an official declaration is binding on the Courts. _I959_ _The Slate of_ _Saurashlra_ v. _MemonHaji_ _Ismail_ _Haji_ _H_ _idayatullah_ _J._ 544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)) _r959_ _TM State_ _of_ _**Saurashtra**_ v. _**Memon**_ _**Haji**_ _**Ismail**_ _**Haji**_ _**Hidayalullali**_ _**J.**_ We are not concerned with these and such other meanings. The defence is founded on an act of State ###### involving an alien outside the State. Such an act of State was described in elegant phrase by Fletcher###### Moulton, L. J., in Salaman v. Secretary of State for _India(')_ as 'a catastrophic change constituting a new ##### departure.' It ·is a sovereign act which is neither ###### grounded in law nor does it pretend to be so. Exam ples of such 'catastrophic changes' are to be found in declarations of war, treaties, dealings with foreign countries and aliens outside the State. On the desirability or the justice of such actions the Municipal ###### Courts cannot form any judgment. In Civil commo tion, or even in war or peace, the State cannot act 'catastrophically' outside the ordinary law and there is legal remedy for its wrongful acts against its own subjects or even a friendly alien within the State. See _Johnstone v._ _Pedlar_ ( [2] ). But there is immunity from courts' interference in respect of acts done by the State against an alien outside the State. The question thus is always: Did the State or its agents purport to act 'catastrophically' or subject to the ordinary course of the law? This question was ###### posed in Secretary of State in Council for India v. _Kamachee Boye Sahaba_ ( [8] ) by Lord Kingsdown in these ###### words: " What was the real character of the act done in this case? Was it a seizure by arbitrary power on ###### behalf of the Crown of Great Britain, of the dominions and property of a neighbouring State, an act not affecting to justify itself on grounds of Municipal Law ? Or was it, in whole or in part, a possession taken by the Crown under colour of legal title of the ###### property of the late Raja of Tanjore, in trust for those who, by law, might be entitled to it on the #### death of the last possessor? If it were the latter, the defence set up, of course, has no foundation.'' ###### In that case the Supreme Court of Madras was moved by a bill to claim certain properties seized on the death of Raja Sivaji of Tanjore without heirs. The (1) (1go6) 1 K.B. 613 at 6to. (2) (1921) 2 A.C. 262. (5) (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 545 claim was accepted by the Supreme Court of Madras but was rejected by the Privy Council. Lord Kingsdown ob-served in the case :###### "The general principle of law could not, with any colour of reason, be disputed. The transactions of independent States between each other are governed ###### by other laws than those which Municipal Courts administer. Such Courts have neither the means of deciding what is right nor the power of enforcing any decision which they make." After deciding that there was a.n act of State, Lord Kingsdown further observed: ###### " of the propriety or justice of that act, neither the Court below nor the Judicial Committee have the means of forming, 01· the right of expressing if #### they had formed, any opinion. It may have been just or unjust, politic or impolitic, beneficial or injurious, taken as a whole, to those whose interests a.re affected. These are considerations into which ###### their Lordships cannot enter. It is sufficient to say that, even if a. wrong has been done, it is a. wrong for which no Municipal Court of justice can afford a. remedy." Similar view was expressed also in _Raja of_ _Ooorg_ v. _East India Company_ (1), _Raja Saligram_ v. _Secretary of_ _State for India_ _in_ _Council_ ( [2] ); and _Sardar Bhagwan_ _Singh_ v. _Secretary of State_ ( [3] ), and _Secretary of_ _State_ v. _Sardar Rustam Khan_ ( [4] ). The principJe of these cases ###### has been extended to all new territories whether acquired by conquest, or annexation or cession or otherwise and also to rights, contracts, concessions, immunities and privileges erected by the previous para.mount power. These are held to be not binding on the succeeding power even though before annexation it was a.greed between the two powers, that they ###### would be respected. Lord Dunedin in Vaje Singh Ji _Joravar Singh_ & _{)thers_ v. _Secretary of State for_ _India_ ( [5] ) summed up the law in these words:###### "When a territory is acquired by a. sovereign ##### State for the first time that is a.n act of State. It _I959_ _The State of_ _Saurashtra_ v. _Memon Haji_ _Ismail Haji_ _H idayatullah_ _J._ (1) (186o) 29 Beav. 300. (2) (1872) L.R. Ind. App. Suppl. Vol. n9. (3) (1874) L.R. 2 A.I. Ca.s. 38. (4) (1941) L.R. 68 I.A. 109. (S) (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357, ~6o. _1959_ _The State of_ _Saurashtra_ v. _1lfemon_ _Haji_ _lsinail_ _Huji_ 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] matters not how the acquisition has been brought ##### about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation ·of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognized ruler. ###### In all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in municipal courts established by the new sovereign any such rights, as ###### that sovereign has, through his officers, recognized. Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing. May more, even if in a treaty ###### of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enfore these stipulations in the municipal Courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties." These cases and others like _Cook_ v. _Sprigg('), Hoani_ _Te_ H~uheu _Tukino_ v. _Aotea District Maori Land_ _Board(')_ were approved and applied by this Court in _Dalrnia Dadri Cernent_ _Co._ v. _Comrnissioner_ _of_ _Incorne-_ _tax_ (") in which an agreement with the ex-Ruler of Jhind for tax concessions was held not binding upon the Income-tax authorities after the merger of the State with the Union of India and the defence of an act of State was upheld. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., then ###### observed: " When the sovereign of a State-meaning by that expression, the authority in which the sovereignty of the State is vested, enacts a law which creates, declares or recognizes rights in the subjects, any infraction of those rights would be actionable in the courts of that State even when the infraction is by ###### the State acting through its officers. It would be no defeuce to that action that the act complained of is an act of State, because as between the sovereign and his subjects there is no such thing as an act of State, and it is incumbent on his officers to show that their action which is under challenge is within the authority conferred ou them by law. Altogether different considerations arise when the act of the sovereign has reference not to the rights (1) (1899) A.C. _572._ (2) (1941) A.C. 308. (3) [1959] S.C.R. 729, 740-<11. _Jlidayatull(l.h_ _J._ _1959_ _Tlze Stale of_ _Saurashtra_ v. _Memon Haji_ _Ismail Haji_ _Hidayatullah ],_ # ###### S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 547 of his subjects but to acquisition of territories ###### belonging to another sovereign. That is a matter between independent sovereigns, and any dispute arising therefrom must be settled by recourse not to municipal law of either State but to diplomatic ###### action, and that failing, to force. That is an act of State pure and simple, and that is its character until the process of acquisition is completed by oonquest or cession. Now, the status of the residents of the ###### territories which are thus acq'uired is that until acquisition is completed as aforesaid they are the subjects of the ex-sovereign of those territories and thereafter they become the subjects of the new sove##### reign. It is also well established that in the new set up these residents do not carry with them the rights which they possessed as subjects of the exsovereign, and that as subjects of the new sovereign, they have only such rights as are granted or recognized by him; vide _Secreta,ry_ _of_ _State for India_ v. _Bai_ _Rajbai_ (1), _Vajesingji Joravar Singhji and_ _Others v. Secretary of State_ ( [2] ), _Secretary_ _of_ _State_ _v._ _Sardar Rustam Khan_ ( [3] ) and _Asrar Ahmed_ v. _Durgah_ ###### Committee, Ajmer ( [4] ). In law, therefore, the process of acquisition of new territories is one continuous act of State terminating on the assumption of sovereign powers _de_ _jure_ over them by the new sovereign ###### and it is only thereafter that rights accrue to the residents of those territories as subjects of that sove###### reign. In other words, as regards the residents of territories which come under the dominion of a new sovereign, the right of citizenship commences when the act of State terminates and the two, therefore, cannot co-exist. ###### It follows from this that no act done or declaration made by the new sovereign prior to his assumption of sovereign powers over acquired territories can quoad the residents of those territories be regarded as having the character of a law conferring on them rights such as could be agitated in his courts." (1) L.R. 42 I.A. 229. (3) (1941) L.R 68 I.A. 109. (2) (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357, 360. (4) (1947) A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 1. 548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] _I959_ _**The State of**_ _**Saurashtra**_ v. _**Memon**_ _**Haji**_ _**Ismail Haji**_ _**Hidayatullah**_ _]._ ##### It is, however, otherwise if the act of the new sove reign is meant to be within the law and is not a ###### concomitant of an act of State. One such case was Forester and Others v. Secretary of State for India ( [1] ). In that case one of the questions was whether there was an act of State at all,-a question which the Courts ###### can legitimately consider. It was held thatthe Begum, whose estate was seized by the East India Company after her death, wa.s not a sovereign princess but a ###### mere Jaidadar and th,e resumption of her jagir upon her death was not an act of State but an act done under ##### a legal title. It was observed : " The act of Government in this case was not the ###### seizure by arbitrary power of territories which upto that time had belonged to another sovereign State ; it was the resumption of lands previously held from the government under a particular tenure, upon the alleged determination of that tenure. The possession was taken under colour of legal title, that title being the undoubted right of the sovereign power to resume, and retain. or assess to the public revenue, all lands within its territories tipon the determination of the tenure, under which they may have been #### exceptionally held rent free. If by means of the continuance of the tenure or for other cause, a right be claimed in derogation of this title of the govern ###### ment, that claim, like any other arising between the government and its subjects would _prima_ _facie_ be cognizable by the Municipal Courts of India." From these cases it is manifest that an act of State is an exercise of sovereign power against an a.lien and neither intended nor purporting to be legally founded. ###### A defence of this kind ooes not seek to justify the action with reference to the' law but questions the very jurisdiction of the Courts to pronounce upon the legality or justice of the action. ###### We have now to consider whether the necessary facts to support the plea in defence existed in this case. We must determine what was the status of the respondent on the date the impugned Order was passed ###### against him. The position of the ex-Rulers of the former Indian States has, on more than one occasion, (1) 18 W.R. 3'19 P.C, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 549 been analysed by this Court and need not detain us for long. After the lapse of paramountcy by reason of s. 7 of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the Nawa.b of J unagadh became a sovereign but he did not accede to the new Dominion by executing an Instrument of Accession as did the other Rulers in Saurashtra. He left the country. The position of Junagadh w~s thus unique and what subsequently happened is describ.ed in the White Paper on Indian States which it has become customary to rely upon as a constitutional document, without proof. ###### "Mter the Nawab of Junagadh had left the State for Pakistan, the administration of this State was taken over by the Government of India on Novem###### ber 9, 1947 at the request of the Nawab's Council. Obviously, the action taken by the Government of India. had the fullest approval of the people of Junagadh in that the results of the referendum held in Junagadh and the adjoining smaller States in ###### February 1948, showed that voting in favour of accession to India was. virtually unanimous. During ###### the period the Government of India. held charge of the State, an Administrator appointed by the Government of India assisted by three popular representatives conducted the administration, of the ###### State. In December 1948, the elected representatives of the people of Junagadh resolved that the administration of the State be made over ~o the Government ###### of Saurashtra and that the representatives of Junagadh be enabled to participate in the Constituent Assembly of Saurashtra State with a. view to framing a common Constitution for Sa.urashtra and theJunagadh State. Similar resolutions were adopted by the representatives of Manavadar, Mangrol, Bantwa, Babariawad and Sardargarh. Accordingly, a Supplementary Covenant (Appendix XXXVI) was executed by the Rulers of Kathiawar States with a view to giving effect to the aforementioned resolutions. The administration of Junagadh was taken over by the Saurashtra Government on January 20, ###### 1949,..... . Accordingly the Constitution treats Juna.gadh and these States as part of Sa.ura.sht:ra," _70_ _I959_ _Th• State of_ _Saurashtra_ v. _MemonHaji_ _Ismail Haji_ _Hidayatullah_ _]._ _**c959**_ _**The**_ _State of_ _Saurashlra_ v. _Memon_ _Haji_ _I stnail H aji_ _Hidayatulldh_ _]._ 550, SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)] ###### It would appear from this .that between Novem ber 9, 1947 and January 20, 1949, there was no forinal ###### annexation of the· State by the Dominion of India, though the Central Govtirnment through its Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujrat States Region was maintaining law and order and carrying on the administration. On November 16, 1947, the following Notification was issued by the Administrator: "NOTIF'ICATION No. 9 of 1947. ##### It is hereby ordered that the J unagadh State Order No. 568 of 1944 is cancelled. The ·State Council created by the said order is hereby dissolved. Any reference required by any Enactment, Rules, Orders, Convention, Usage etc. to be made to the Council shall henceforth be made to the Administrator, Junagadh State, in whom all the powers so far exercised by the Council and its Members shall henceforth vest. Junagadh, . S. W. Shiveshwarkar, 16th November, 1947 Administrator, J unagadh 16th November, 1947 Administrator, J unagadh State." From that date the administration of the Junagadh State was centered in the Administrator as the agent ###### of the Dominion of India. The people of Junagadh did not, strictly speaking, become the citizens of the Dominion till much later. During the interval they were aliens even though they desired union with India and had expressed themselves almost unanimously in the Referendum. ###### The act of the Dominion in thus assuming the administration of the J unagadh State was an act of State pure and simple and the action of the Adminis trator was taken before the act of State was over. The respondent contended before us that the theory of an act of State did not apply to this case. According to him the State Council was in existence and had invited the Dominion of India to step in and all the ###### local laws were still applicable. He pointed out that the Saurashtra Civil Procedure Code was a.mended by ###### administration of the J unagadh State was an act of State pure and simple and the action of the Adminis trator was taken before the act of State was over. The respondent contended before us that the theory ## of an act of State did not apply to this case. According to him the State Council was in existence and had invited the Dominion of India to step in and all the ###### local laws were still applicable. He pointed out that the Saurashtra Civil Procedure Code was a.mended by a notification on 7th July, 1948, and that also proved ###### S.C.:R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 551 that the local laws were in force and the Administra tor was subject to them in his dealings with private property, under the general superintendence .of the Regional Commissioner. All this is beside the point and does not truly interpret the act of State which had taken place. The essence of an act of State is the ###### exercise of sovereign power and that is done arbi trarily, on principles either outside or paramount to ###### the municipal law. The fact that the sovereign allows the inhabitants to retain their old laws and customs does not make the sovereign subject to them and all rights under those laws are held at the pleasure of the ###### sovereign. It is only when the sovereign can be said to have purported to act within the laws that the act of State ceases to afford a plea in defence. Before that stage is reached, government may be influenced by the existing laws and rights and obligations but is not governed or bound by them. See _Campbell_ v. _Hall_ ( [1] ), _Ruding_ v. _Smith_ ( [2] ) two cases of conquest and _E. I. Co._ v. _Syed Ali_ ( [3] ). See also Mayne Criminal Law of India ###### (4th Edition) II pp. 119, 120 where the law is summarised. There is nothing to prove that the Dominion had expressly or even tacitly recognized the old rights, the .burden of proving which lay upon the respondent _Secretary of State for_ _India_ v. _Bai Rajbai_ ( [4] ) and _Vaje.singh's_ _case_ ( [5] ) _(op._ _cit.)._ ###### In this view. of the matter it is not necessary to determine whether the Na.wab could or did confer title on the donee in respect of this property. Equally fruitless will be an inquiry into the powers of the Na.wab to resume or derogate from, his grants and whether similar or identical powers were inherited by the Dominion Government or its a.gents. The action of the Dominion Government being a.n act of State, the act of the Administrator, however arbitrary, was not justiciable in the municipal courts and the suit was not well founded. The appeal is, ther~fore, allowed. The respondent's suit shall be dismissed with costs. throughout. _Appeal allowed._ (l) l Comp. ~04; 98 E.R. 104.5· (3) _7_ M.I.A. 555 at 578. (2) 2 Hag. Con. 3g4; 161 E.R. 774. 14}L.R. 4z I.A. :z29. (5) (1924) L.R. 51 J.A. 357, 36o. _I959_ _The State of_ _Saurashtra_ v. _l'.f_ _emon_ _H_ _aji_ _Ismail Haji_ _Hidayatullah_ _]._