The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bijumon M., Paul Issac & Johnny Joseph

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN MONDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF AUGUST 2017 / 30TH SRAVANA, 1939 **MACA.No. 819 of 2015** AGAINST THE AWARD IN O.P(MV)No.11/2013 of M.A.C.T, PALA DATED 11-08-2014 ## **APPELLANT** /3RD RESPONDENT THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., METRO PALACE, GROUND FLOOR, OPP.NORTH RAILWAY STATION, ERNAKULAM, REPRESENTED BY ITS DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICER. BY ADV.SRI.VPK.PANICKER ## **RESPONDENTS** /RESPONDENTS 1 & 2 AND PETITIONER: 1. BIJUMON M., S/O.MICHAEL.P.V, UZHUTHUVAL(H), ANTHINADU.P.O-686651. 2. PAUL ISSAC, NIRAPPEL(H), CHETHUTHODU.P.O, THIDANAD-686123. 3. JOHNY JOSEPH, KALAPURAYIL(H), VELLAPADU KARA, KOTTARAMADOM, PALA, REPRESENTED BY NEXT FRIEND HIS WIFE JINCY KALAPURAYIL, PALA-686575. R3 BY ADV. SRI.M.P.MADHAVANKUTTY R3 BY ADV. SRI.GOKUL DAS V.V.H. THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 21-08-2017, ALONG WITH C.O.NO.102 OF 2015, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ## **C.T.RAVIKUMAR & ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JJ.** ------------------------------------------ M.A.C.A.No.819 of 2015 and Cross Objection No.102 of 2015 in M.A.C.A.No.819 of 2015 -----------------------------------------Dated 21[st] August, 2017 ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Ravikumar, J.** This appeal is filed by the third respondent in O.P(M.V) No.11 of 2013 on the files of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pala against the judgment and award passed thereon. The appellant was the insurer of the motor vehicle which is a pick up van bearing Reg. No.KL-35/A-8768, involved in the motor vehicle accident in question. The claim petition was filed by the third respondent herein. The appellant is not disowning the liability to indemnify the insured owner of the offending vehicle and it assails the award on the ground of exorbitancy of the quantum of compensation. The accident had occurred on 24.07.2010 when the third respondent/petitioner was riding his motor cycle bearing reg. No.KL-05/R-4063. At the place of accident, the aforementioned pick up van dashed against the said motor vehicle ridden by the third respondent/ petitioner and consequently, he sustained severe injuries. He had to remain as an inpatient for a period MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 2 of 109 days. The injuries resulted in permanent disability, as well. Due to the nature of the disability and its extent, the third respondent moved the claim petition through his next friend and wife, claiming an amount of Rs.25 lakhs as compensation. Before the Tribunal, the wife of the injured was examined as PW1, besides getting examined one Renjit as PW2. Exts.A1 to A25 were got marked on his side. On the side of the respondents therein, the driver of the pick up van was examined as RW1. Ext.X1 is the disability certificate of the injured. The Tribunal on a careful evaluation of the evidence on record and considering the rival contentions, granted an amount of Rs.12,19,750/as compensation with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition till the date of realisation. 2. As stated earlier, the appellant/the 3[rd] respondent assails the award mainly on the ground of exorbitancy of the quantum of compensation. At the same time, the third respondent/the petitionerthe injured, took up cross objection in the captioned appeal contending that the compensation granted by the Tribunal is too inadequate and it falls short of the just compensation. It is contended by him that the Tribunal fixed his monthly income, notionally, as Rs.8,000/disregarding the averments in the claim petition and also the evidence tendered through PW2 in support of his claim regarding income. In short, the contention is that in view of Ext.A20 certificate and the MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 3 evidence of PW2, there was no justification for the Tribunal to fix the monthly income, notionally, and that too, so meagrely, as Rs.8000/-. It is the further contention that the Tribunal had failed to take note of the fact that the extent of disability incurred by the third respondent/petitioner, has considerably reduced his earning capacity. In short, it is contended that the Tribunal ought to have assessed the loss of earning power due to permanent disability, appropriately. In view of the said rival contentions, we are of the considered view that it is only apposite to consider the question as to whether the compensation granted by the Tribunal as per the impugned award is exorbitant as contended by the appellant. Certainly, the question of enhancement of compensation would arise only if we are answering it in negative. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant - insurance company, contended that the Tribunal went wrong in assessing permanent disability based on Ext.X1 and also in granting compensation separately under combined heads of loss of earning capacity and loss of amenities, after granting compensation for permanent disability. It is the further contention that in view of Ext.A22 scene mahazar and Exts.A24 and A25 AMVI reports and oral evidence of RW1, The Tribunal ought to have found that the third respondent/petitioner had also contributed to the cause of the accident and therefore, towards contributory negligence, the Tribunal ought to have effected deduction MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 4 of the proportionate extent of negligence, after apportioning the degree of negligence in between the third respondent herein, the motorcyclist and the second respondent, the driver of the pickup van. The learned counsel appearing for the third respondent/petitioner submitted that since the Tribunal had fixed the monthly income so meagrely as Rs.8000/- disregarding the evidence of PW2 and the averments made in the claim petition and also taking note of the fact that the compensation granted under the heads bystander expenses, extra nourishment and loss of earnings are on the lower side, no appellate interference is called for. The learned counsel went on to contend that, in fact, an interference is required to make an upward modification of the compensation granted under different heads. As observed earlier, we will proceed to consider the contention as to whether the quantum of compensation awarded could be said to be exorbitant, as contended by the appellant. Evidently, the Tribunal had granted compensation for permanent disability assessing the disability as 30%. In this context, it is to be noted that Ext.X1 disability certificate is issued by a duly constituted Medical Board and the extent of permanent disability of the third respondent/petitioner is certified thereunder as 43%. A perusal of Ext.X1 would reveal that he sustained multiple disabilities. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that when the injured sustained multiple disabilities, in other words, a combination of two or more disabilities, MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 5 the combining formula (a+b(90-a/90), has to be applied going by the Manual for Doctors to evaluate permanent physical impairment developed by Expert Group Meeting of disability evaluation. In the said formula, 'a' represents the higher score and 'b' represents the lower score. It appears that the Tribunal applied the said formula and took note of the multiple disabilities and, ultimately, assessed the permanent disability as 30%. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Tribunal went wrong in assessing the permanent disability and it ought to have been less than 30%; and at the same time, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent/petitioner-cross objector contended that the Tribunal ought to have granted compensation for loss of earning power, taking into account the extent of permanent disability. 3. For proper appreciation of the aforesaid contention, it is only apposite to look into the manner in which the Medical Board ought to have and must have assessed the extent of disability of the third respondent/petitioner-cross objector. True that, in Ext.X1 disability certificate, the details of calculation of the extent of disability are not given. But, at the same time, it is evident that the disability suffered by the third respondent/petitioner owing to the injuries sustained in the accident is multiple disabilities and in such circumstances, going by the Manual for Disability Evaluation referred to hereinbefore, the combining MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 6 formula has to be applied. In such circumstances, it can only be taken that the Medical Board must have followed the combining formula to assess the permanent disability. As noticed hereinbefore, the disability was assessed by the Board as 43%. Going by Ext.X1, the third respondent/petitioner sustained or incurred multiple disabilities as hereunder:- - “1) Left upper motor neuro (UMN) lesion facial palsy - 12% - 2) Mild dysarthria – 25% - 3) Loss of memory for recent events and risk of post traumatic epilepsy (PTE) not on drugs – 5% - 4) Bylateral spastic gate (sic-git) with difficulty on walking on lower ground – 12%.” 4. Evidently, the Board converted the said multiple disabilities into whole body disability and certified that the third respondent/petitioner has incurred a total permanent whole body disability of 43%. Taking into account the permanent disabilities referred to hereinbefore, it is to be noted that the highest score is 25% due to mild dysarthria. But, at the same time, the question is whether it could be treated as a permanent disability. Evidently, the Tribunal followed the Manual referred to hereinbefore for calculating the extent of disability. Going by the very same Manual, mild dysarthria, which is a speech defect, would not incur any permanent disability. But at the same time, a moderate dysarthria will result in 25% disability and a MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 7 severe dysarthria will result in 50% permanent disability. Evidently, what is certified under Ext.X1 is that the injuries sustained by the third respondent-cross objector in the accident resulted in mild dysarthria as well. The Guidelines for Assessment and Certification of Disabilities were virtually finalised by a group of experts and were notified by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, in part II of the Government of India Extra Ordinary Gazette, in June, 2001. Going by the same, mild dysarthria would not incur any permanent disability, though it is a speech defect. In other words, for the purpose of getting compensation based on the said notification, a person afflicted with mild dysarthria will not be considered as a person affected with any kind of speech defect capable of takig as permanent disability. In this case, Ext.X1 would reveal that the Medical Board certified that the third respondent/petitioner sustained speech defect to the extent of 25%. Though going by the assessment of certification following the guidelines referred hereinbefore, it was to categorise as moderate dysarthria, the Board in the certificate recorded it as only a mild dysarthria. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that the Medical Board was assessing the degree of speech defect. It virtually to be evaluated the degree of speech defect as can be seen from the cefrtificate. When once that is done the question of one falling under a particular category or another would depend only upon the extent of the degree of speech MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 8 defect. Going by clause 4.2 of the guidelines referred to hereinbefore, up to 24% it would only constitute mild dysarthria and in which event it would not incur any permanent physical impairment to get the benefit flowing from the said notification. But, at the same time, when a person lost his bodily integrity by speech defect as a result of the tortious action of another it cannot be said that the said person is not entitled to get compensation for the loss of his bodily integrity. Certainly, the person is entitled to get it. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant insurance company attempted to canvass the position that when the injuries resulted in permanent disability, but, it had not reduced the earning capacity of the person, the injured is not at all entitled to get compensation for permanent disability and, at the same time, he is entitled to get compensated for that only under the head `loss of amenities'. In other words, the contention is that whenever a person is disabled due to a motor vehicle accident, he is entitled to get compensated for that disablement provided, he lost his earning capacity lest he will be only entitled to get compensation under the head loss of amenities. In short, the nub of the contention is that in such eventuality, a person whose earning capacity is not at all reduced owing to the injury he is not entitled to get compensation for disability and that such a person is entitled to be compensated only under one head, on that count, viz., MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 9 compensation for loss of amenities. Before considering the contention in detail, we will peruse the schedule of compensation given in the impugned award. 6. Under part II, the third respondent/petitioner was granted compensation for permanent disability to the tune of Rs.4,60,800/- (8,000x12x16x30/100). In addition to that, under the combined head of “loss of earning capacity and loss of amenities” an amount of Rs.2,30,400/- was granted. But, a perusal of paragraph 21 of the impugned award would suggest that an amount of Rs.2,30,400/was granted to the petitioner under the head `loss of amenities'. A scanning of the grounds raised in this appeal viz., `A' to `N' would reveal that though the appellant raised challenge and grievances against the fixation of monthly income as Rs.8,000/- and the assessment of permanent disability based on Ext.X1, no specific challenge was raised against the method viz., multiplier-multiplicand method, followed by the Tribunal in assessing compensation for permanent disability as Rs.4,60,800/-. Reverting back to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, the question is whether in a case where the injuries sustained by the victim of a motor vehicle accident did not affect his earning capacity even while resulting in permanent disability how can it be said that the injured is entitled to get compensated only under the head loss of MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 10 amenities, on account of such permanent disability. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether a person, injured in a motor vehicle accident incurred permanent disability but, the disability is of such a nature that did not result in loss of earning capacity, be compensated for his permanent disability in addition to compensation for loss of amenities. For a proper consideration of this question it is only apropos to consider what exactly is `loss of amenities' and `permanent disability'. Loss of amenities embraces a hotchpotch of disabilities, such as the interference with or prevention of the pursuits of the former activities and it goes further. It can be elucidated in a better manner. In the decision in **Marley** v. **Rugby Portland Cement Co. (1951 C.A. No.286 of 1952)** Birkett L. J., explained the the head `loss of amenities of life' vividly as hereunder:- “There is a head of damage which is some times called loss of amenities; the man made blind by the accident will no longer be able to see the familiar things he has seen all his life; the man who has had both legs removed and will never again go upon his walking excursions-things of that kind-loss of amenities.” The term `permanent disability' can be understood as the loss of bodily integrity. A Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in **Gurdipsingh** v. **Chauhan Bhupendrakumar (AIR 1980 Guj. 44)** held that the loss of bodily integrity would give a right to damages even if there is no damage at all to the earning capacity or even to enjoyment of life. But, MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 11 damages then are to be considered commensurating with the extent, gravity and duration of injury. In such circumstances, when the tortious action of a person caused bodily integrity to a person the tort feasor could not be heard to contend that the person could not be compensated for the loss of bodily integrity or permanent disability, in case it had not affected his earning capacity. In the case on hand, it is evident from Ext.X1 that the injuries ultimately caused speech defect. A duly constituted Medical Board assessed the same and certified its extent as 25%. We have already taken note of the fact that the classification under the guidelines viz., mild dysarthria, moderate dysarthria and severe dysarthria are evidently, for the purpose of determining the entitlement of persons to get certain concessions or benefits payable to persons with disability under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. But, at the same time, we are of the view that even if a person is not entitled to the benefits flowing from the said Act, still, such a person who lost his bodily integrity owing to the tortious action of another, in a motor vehicle accident, is entitled to get compensated for permanent disability, in other words, for loss of his bodily integrity. In this case, the speech defect was assessed at 25%. Even though going by the guidelines referred hereinbefore, it ought to have been categorized as moderate dysarthria, it is so happened that it MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 12 was recorded thereunder that the third respondent/petitioner was afflicted only with mild dysarthria. When the extent of speech defect is 25% it is bound to be categorized as moderate dysarthria. Even if it is not a moderate dysarthria, we are of the view that a person who is afflicted with speech defect as a result of the motor vehicle accident is certainly entitled to get compensation for such loss of bodily integrity. In other words, even if he was afflicted only with mild dysarthria it could not be held that he is disentitled to get compensated for that. In this case, a scanning of Ext.X1 would reveal that even after recording the speech defect as one falling under the category mild dysarthria, while assessing the extent, its percentage was also taken into account and the procedures for certification of multiple disabilities were virtually followed. The combining formula for assessing such multiple disabilities is a+b (90-a/90) where `a' will be the higher score and `b' will be the lower score. The Board must have arrived at the certified extent of 43% by assessing it in three stages:- - 1) 25 + 12 (90-25/90) = 33.6 2) 33.6 + 12 (90-33.6/90) = 41.12 3) 41.12 + 5 (90-41.12/90) = 42.184. The said figure must have been rounded off as `43'. True that, a disability certificate issued by a duly constituted Medical Board is also having the status of an expert opinion. But, at the same time, in MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 13 matters of this nature, when there is a certificate issued by a duly constituted Medical Board, the extent of disability certified thereunder can be interfered with only on specific reasons which could be mentioned specifically. For deviating from the assessment made by a duly constituted Medical Board specific reasons should be assigned. We have carefully gone through the impugned judgment. As per the impugned judgment, the Tribunal disregarded Ext.X1 certificate and took the extent of disability for calculation purpose only as 30%. A perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the Tribunal has also referred to the combining formula, mentioned hereinbefore, but without further discussion came to the conclusion that going by the said formula the disability can only be taken as 30%. How and why it should be restricted to 30% is not specifically mentioned in the impugned award. In the decision in **Raj Kumar** v. **Ajay Kumar (2011 (1) KLT 620)** , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that mere production of a disability certificate would not be a proof of the extent of disability. At the same time, in the light of the said decision, there would not be any impediment for accepting the certification in a disability certificate issued by a duly constituted Medical Board. However, if the doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of the claimant, is not tendered for cross examination with reference to the certificate, such a MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 14 certificate could not be acted upon. Going by the said decision, if the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by a claimant, it would constitute a Medical Board or even refer the claimant to a Medical Board for getting assessed the disability. As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, Ext.X1 is a disability certificate issued by a duly constituted Medical Board and the extent of disability of the third respondent/petitioner viz., speech defect, was assessed thereunder as 25% and after following the procedure for assessing multiple disabilities the whole body was certified thereunder as 43%. Going by the manner by which it ought to have been assessed by the Medical Board, as referred hereinbefore, and after perusing the certificate, we do not find any reason to hold that the assessment made by the Board invites interference. At any rate, we do not find any reason to be given in writing for not acting upon the same or for the purpose of effecting any deduction in regard to the extent of disability certified thereunder. The long and short of the discussion is that the entire extent of disability owing to speech defect and the other disabilities were to be taken into account for the purpose of considering the extent of disability for which the third respondent is entitled to get compensated. As noticed hereinbefore, the whole body disability was assessed by the Board as 43%. However, the Tribunal granted compensation only taking the disability as 30%. Since we do not find any reason in the impugned MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 15 judgment and also no illegality in the assessment of disability, we are of the view that the extent of disability for which the third respondent/petitioner ought to have been compensated, should have taken by the Tribunal as 43% as certified in Ext.X1. 7. For assessing compensation under that head the Tribunal fixed the monthly income as Rs.8,000/-. While the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the fixation of monthly income as Rs.8,000/- is liable to be interfered with, the learned counsel for the third respondent/petitioner submits that it is liable to be interfered with for the purpose of an upward modification. True that, the third respondent/petitioner had specifically averred in the claim petition that he was a Manager in a shop for car accessories. He has also stated therein that he was earning Rs.12,000/- as monthly income. But, at the same time, it is to be noted that in the salary certificate, which he has produced in a bid to substantiate his contention viz., Ext.A20, his salary was certified as only Rs.10,000/-. True that, it is also stated therein that he is also getting Rs.2,000/- towards certain other allowances. It is to prove the same that the third respondent/petitioner examined PW2. PW2 would depose that he was not maintaining any account with respect to the salary being paid to the petitioner. The Tribunal took note of the fact that even in his letter head and also in the visiting card the mobile number of the petitioner MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 16 was also incorporated. That apart, while being examined, PW2 deposed that the total investment of his shop is Rs.38,000/-. He had also deposed that the monthly rent of the shop is Rs.2,500/-. Thus, it can be seen that, going by the evidence of PW2, the total capital investment of his shop is only Rs.38,000/- and he has employed the petitioner with a monthly salary of Rs.12,000/-. When that be the nature of the evidence let in by the petitioner, to substantiate his contentions taken up in the claim petition relating occupation and income, we do not find any reason to hold that the Tribunal went wrong in declining to accept such averments as also evidence. In other words, the Tribunal is perfectly justified in fixing the monthly income of the third respondent/petitioner notionally. The accident in question occurred in the year 2010. Taking into account the fact that the evidence let in by the petitioner was not sufficient and the Tribunal took note of the year of the accident as also the age of the third respondent/petitioner for fixing the monthly income as Rs.8,000/- we do not find any reason to hold that the monthly income was fixed meagerly by the Tribunal warranting an interference. The multiplier was rightly identified by the Tribunal with reference to the age of the injured third respondent/petitioner. In short, in view of our conclusion made hereinbefore, a re-assessment of compensation for permanent disability MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 17 has to be made by substituting the re-assessed extent of permanent disability. 8. We will therefore, proceed to consider the question of modification of the award to grant just compensation to the injured. We have already found that a re-assessment of compensation for permanent disability is required. On such re-assessment, the amount payable is Rs.6,60,480/- (8,000x12x16x43/100). The Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.4,60,800/-. Hence, after deducting the said amount, the third respondent/petitioner is entitled to get an additional compensation of 1,99,680/- under that head. It is granted. ₹ 9. We have already taken note of the fact that though the schedule of compensation would suggest that the third respondent was granted compensation under the combined head of `loss of earning capacity and loss of amenities', a perusal of paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment would reveal that he was virtually compensated only under the head `loss of amenities'. Under the said head, the third respondent was granted an amount of Rs.2,30,400/-. Therefore, the question is whether granting compensation of Rs.2,30,400/- for loss of amenities invites interference. While considering the adequacy or inadequacy of the compensation granted by the Tribunal under the head `loss of amenities', it is only worthwhile to refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in **Paul Varghese** v. **Shanveen (2016** MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 18 **(3) KLT 961)** . Going by the dictum laid down therein, under normal circumstances, only a conventional amount can be granted under the head `loss of amenities'. For awarding compensation in excess of conventional amount the Tribunal has to state valid reasons. In this case, the Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.2,30,400/-. Ext.A5 is the discharge certificate and Ext.A6 is the treatment certificate issued from the Brain and Spine Centre, Vaikom. Going by Ext.A5, there is diffuse axonal injury (small contusions frontal and temporal lobes and brain oedema). Going by Ext.A6, there is diffuse axonal injury with subdural hygroma and he is also in a very morbid state. It would also indicate that he had post traumatic amensia and he would not be able to re-collect the accident. Going by Ext.X1, the disability was split up as follows:- - “1) Left UMN (Upper Motor Neuron lesion) facial palsy - 12% - 2) Mild dysarthria (sic., moderate dysarthria) -25% - 3) Loss of memory for recent events & risk of PTE not on drugs-5% - 4) Bilateral spastic gait with difficulty on walking on level ground-12%” Certainly, the said certificate would definitely justify the granting of compensation in excess of conventional amount. Taking into account the nature of the injuries and also the disabilities affecting different organs as mentioned hereinbefore, we are of the view that an amount in excess of the conventional amount viz., Rs.1,00,000/-, would not MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 19 have been the just and reasonable compensation under the said head. In that view of the matter, it can be said that the third respondent/petitioner was granted an amount of Rs.1,30,400/- in excess, under that head. 10. Yet another ground raised by the appellant for inviting interference with the impugned award was that the Tribunal has granted exorbitant amount towards future treatment. As against a claim of Rs.50,000/-, the Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that a scanning of the impugned judgment would reveal that no specific reason has been given by the Tribunal for giving such an amount in excess of the amount claimed. While considering the rival contentions as regards the amount granted thereunder, it is relevant to refer to paragraph 49 of the decision in **Paul Varghese's** case (supra). In the said decision, this Court held that a person who sustained injuries resulting disabilities has to be adequately compensated for the incidental expenses, including expenses towards future treatment. But, it is held therein that it should be for the purpose of enabling him to recover from the disabilities caused by the tort feasor. We have already taken note of the nature of the injuries as also their impact. We may hasten to add that in this case, there is absence of evidence regarding the nature of treatment which is to be undergone. In short, MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 20 no evidence was let in by the third respondent/petitioner in that regard. In such circumstances, the injuries sustained by the third respondent in different organs would suggest that he may have to undergo future treatments. In the absence of any evidence regarding the nature of the treatment required in future there will not be any justification for granting compensation in excess of the claim made by the third respondent. In fact, he has let in some evidence only to support his claim of Rs.50,000/-. Therefore, there was absolutely no reason for granting an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- without specifically mentioning the nature of the treatment which is to be undertaken, when the third respondent himself got no case that he had let in cogent evidence in that regard. As noticed hereinbefore, the third respondent claimed only an amount of Rs.50,000/- thereunder and the Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- against the said claim. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the said contention raised by the appellant is without any substance. In short, an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was granted in excess under that head. In view of the contentions in the cross objection, we will proceed to consider whether the compensation granted by the Tribunal to the third respondent under any other head warrants interference. Towards bystander's expenses the Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.21,800/- i.e., at the rate of Rs.200/- for a period of 109 days. The third respondent was an inpatient for a period MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 21 of 109 days. In paragraph 21, the Tribunal observed that the third respondent would require the help of a bystander throughout his life. We do not find any reason to sustain the said observation. The nature of injuries sustained by the third respondent would not indicate that he would be requiring a bystander's service throughout his life. Taking note of the fact that the accident had occurred in the year 2010, and taking into account the cost of living and price index at that time, we are of the view that Rs.250/- per day can be granted for 109 days. In such event, the amount payable was Rs.27,250/-. The Tribunal has granted an amount of Rs.21,800/-. Hence an amount of Rs.5,450/- is payable additionally under that head. Towards extra nourishment, the Tribunal has granted only an amount of Rs.5,000/-. Taking into account the year of the accident and the aforesaid factors the amount payable was Rs.10,900/- (Rs.100x109). The Tribunal has granted only an amount of Rs.5,000/-. Hence an amount of Rs.5,900/- is granted additionally under that head. No amount was granted by the Tribunal towards damage to clothing. The nature of the injuries would undoubtedly reveal that the dresses worn by the third respondent at the time of the accident must have been spoiled. We are granting an amount of Rs.1,000/- under that head. 11. Despite the persuasive arguments of both sides we do not find any reason to interfere with the compensation granted under MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 22 any other head. In the light of the interference with the compensation granted by the Tribunal towards `future treatment expenses' and `loss of earning capacity and loss of amenities', an amount of Rs.2,80,400/has to be deducted from the amount awarded by the Tribunal. But, at the same time, we have interfered with the compensation granted for `permanent disability' and by virtue of the interference the third respondent is entitled to get an additional amount of Rs.1,99,680/-. So also, we have effected an upward modification of the compensation/expenses granted under the heads `extra nourishment', `damage to clothing' and `bystander's expenses'. Under the said heads, Rs.5,900/-, Rs.1,000/- and Rs.5,450/- respectively were the amounts payable to the third respondent in excess of the amounts already granted. By adding the total amount payable under those heads to Rs.1,99,680/- the amount payable to the third respondent additionally would be Rs.2,12,030/-. In such circumstances, the impugned judgment has to be modified by taking into account the aforesaid aspects. After deducting the amount of Rs.2,12,030/- from Rs.2,80,400/- the differential amount viz., Rs.68,370/- has to be deducted from the amount awarded by the Tribunal. Thus, the third respondent/petitioner would be entitled to get a total compensation of Rs.11,51,380/- (12,19,750 - 68,370). MACA.No.819/2015 & C.O.No.102/2015 23 In the result, the appeal and the cross objection are partly allowed and are disposed of accordingly. The impugned award is modified by scaling down the quantum of compensation to Rs.11,51,380/-. It is made clear that the amount granted towards future treatment would carry interest only from the date of the impugned judgment viz., from 11.8.2014. It is also made clear that we have not interfered with the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs. **Sd/C.T.RAVIKUMAR Judge** Sd/- **ANIL K.NARENDRAN Judge** TKS