The Kerala Health Research & Welfare Society & The Managing Director vs V. Achuthan Nair & The State of Kerala & The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH** **MONDAY, THE 02ND DAY OF APRIL 2018 / 12TH CHAITHRA, 1940** ## **WA.No. 673 of 2018** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WPC 18430/2009 of HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 28-11-2016** |**APPELLANTS**<br>**:**|**APPELLANTS**<br>**:**||| |---|---|---|---| |**1**|||**THE KERALA HEALTH RESEARCH & WELFARE SOCIETY,**| ||||**RED CROSS ROAD, GENERAL HOSPITAL CAMPUS,**| ||||**THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 077,**| ||||**REP: BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.**| |**2**|||**THE MANAGING DIRECTOR**| ||||**KERALA HEALTH RESEARCH & WELFARE SOCIETY,**| ||||**RED CROSS ROAD, GENERAL HOSPITAL CAMPUS,**| ||||**THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 077.**| ||||**BY ADV. SRI.M.AJAY,SC,KERALA HEALTH RESEARCH&WE**| |**RESPONDENTS**<br>**:**|||| |**1**|||**V.ACHUTHAN NAIR**| ||||**S/O. VASUDEVAN NAIR, "VAVA" C.S.M NAGAR, HOUSE**| ||||**NO.97/1, EDAPAZHANJI, SASTHAMANGALAM P.O,**| ||||**THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 10.**| |**2**|||**THE STATE OF KERALA**| ||||**REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,**| ||||**HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,**| ||||**THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.**| |**3**|||**THE REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER**| ||||**EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND ORGANISATION, BHAVISHYA**| ||||**NIDHI BHAVAN, PATTOM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 004.**| ||||**BY ADVS.**| ||||**R1 BY SRI.ELVIN PETER**| ||||**R2 BY SMT.K.R.DEEPA, GOVERNMENT PLEADER**| ||||**R3 BY SRI.S.SUJIN, STANDING COUNSEL**| **THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 02.04.2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-2-: C.T RAVIKUMAR & MARY JOSEPH, JJ. **================================** W.A No.673 of 2018 ================================ Dated this the 2[nd] day of April, 2018 ## **J U D G M E N T** ## C.T Ravikumar, J. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in WP(C) No.18430/2009 are the appellants. They are aggrieved by the judgment dated 28.11.2016 passed thereon. The writ petition was filed by the first respondent herein seeking the following reliefs:- - _“(i) To issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records leading to Ext.P-14 and quash the same;_ - _(ii) To issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing respondents 1 & 2 to grant the scale of pay of Rs.3050-5230 to the petitioner with effect from 29.04.97 in the category of Laminating Machine Operator Gr.II upto 22.04.2000 and thereafter grant him salary in the scale of pay of Rs.4500-7000 with all consequential benefits till the date of his retirement;_ - _(iii)To issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to refix the pensionary benefits of the petitioner taking into account the Scale of Pay of Rs.4500-7000 fixed for Laminating Machine Operator Gr.II w.e.f 22.04.2000 with all consequential benefits;_ W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-3-: - _(iv) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 2[nd] respondent to forward the contribution of the petitioner towards Employees Provident Fund and further direct the 4[th] respondent to disburse the amount due to the petitioner under the Employees Provident Fund with statutory interest due thereon;”_ 2. As per the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge set aside Ext.P14, the order which was under challenge and declared that the petitioner/first respondent is entitled to fixation of `3050-5230 in the post of Laminating Machine Operator Gr.II with effect from 29.04.1997 and the scale of pay of `4500-7000, with effect from 22.04.2000. The second respondent therein/the first appellant herein was directed to pass appropriate orders giving effect to the aforesaid declaration, and also to calculate and disburse all benefits flowing from such declaration, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. It is in the said circumstances that the aforesaid appeal has been preferred. 3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, the learned Government Pleader appearing for W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-4-: the second respondent herein and also the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the third respondent herein. 4. In the circumstances obtained in this case, it is profitable to refer to certain aspects. The appellants had not entered appearance and contested the matter when the writ petition was originally taken up for consideration and disposed of as per the judgment dated 28.11.2016. Thereafter, they filed RP No.1053/2017 in WP(C) No.18430/2009. The said review petition was dismissed as per order dated 28.02.2018. It is to be noted that though the review petition was dismissed on 28.02.2018, as per the said order the appellants have not chosen to challenge the same and they have chosen only to challenge the judgment dated 28.11.2016. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in _**DSR Steel (Pvt. Ltd) v. State of Rajasthan and Other** [2012 (6) SCC 782],_ there is no requirement to challenge the order passed in the review petition and a challenge need be made only against the judgment whereby W.P(C) No.18430/2009 was allowed, as W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-5-: mentioned above. In that regard, the learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph No.25 of the said judgment, wherein the Apex Court held that different situations might arise in relation to a review petition filed before a Court or Tribunal. They were elaborately discussed under paragraph Nos.25.1, 25.2 and 25.3. It is further submitted that paragraph No.25.3 alone is relevant for the purpose of this case. It reads as follows: _“25.3. The third situation with which we are concerned in the instant case is where the revision petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The decree in such a case suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It is an order by which the review petition is dismissed thereby affirming the decree or order. In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition”_ 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that a perusal of the order in the review petition would reveal that as per the order in R.P No.1053/2017 dated 28.02.2018 this Court ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-6-: simply dismissed the review petition and it would reveal that the judgment dated 28.11.2016 had not suffered any reversal or modification, by virtue of the order in the said review petition. It is in the said circumstances, that the learned counsel made the submission that in law, a separate challenge against the order in the R.P is unnecessary and challenge need be made only against the judgment in W.P(C) No.18430/2009. This contention though appears to be attractive and acceptable a deeper probe is required in the matter for the reason that the appellants herein had not entered appearance at the time when the writ petition was virtually allowed by setting aside Ext.P14 order and consequential declaration and direction were made as per the impugned judgment. Therefore, it need no special wisdom to perceive that the impugned judgment is not one rendered after considering the contentions of the appellants. 6. As noticed hereinbefore, at the time of passing the judgment dated 28.11.2016, for the reasons explained in the review petition, the appellants could not enter appearance and contest ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-7-: the matter. Thus, admittedly, for the first time, they raised their contentions to counter the claims of the writ petitioner only in the review petition. Evidently, the learned Single Judge elaborately considered their contentions, raised in the review petition and declined to accept them, as can be seen from the order dated 28.02.2018 whereby and whereunder, the review petition was dismissed. Indubitably, there was no pleadings at all on the side of the appellants herein for consideration before the learned Single Judge when WP(C) No.18430/2009 was disposed of, as per judgment dated 28.11.2016. When that be the circumstances, undisputed and indisputable, the appellants cannot be heard to contend that the learned Single Judge had not considered their contentions while rendering the judgment dated 28.11.2016 in WP(C) No.18430/2016. When the admitted position is that they had not filed counter affidavit in the writ petition before it was disposed of, how can they be permitted to raise factual contentions or legal questions founded on facts, raised by them in the review petition, for the first time in an appeal filed only against the judgment in WP(C) No. 18430/2009. ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-8-: 7. Now, we will proceed to consider the question whether the appeal merits admission. In that context, it is also relevant to note that as per the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge had set aside the order passed by the third respondent viz., Ext.P14. Though Ext.P14 was set aside and consequential directions were issued to the second respondent, the third respondent whose order was interfered with by this Court had not preferred an appeal. Even then, taking into account the fact that after setting aside Ext.P14 order consequential directions were issued to the second respondent/first respondent herein, we think it only proper to proceed with consideration of the appeal. 8. Another aspect also has to be borne in mind while considering the scope of this appeal. On more than two occasions, the first respondent/the writ petitioner had approached this Court for getting redressed. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that since the order was passed by the second respondent viz., the State and the Society is fully owned by the Government of Kerala, the appellants can only support the order in W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-9-: Ext.P14 or in other words they cannot be heard to contend against Ext.P14 order. In other words, the correctness of Ext.P14 order cannot be questioned by the appellants in this writ petition. We made the aforesaid remark as the learned counsel appearing for the appellants attempted to canvass the position that Ext.P14 order was passed by the Government not fully taking into consideration the relevant records. In this context it is also to be noted that the appellant society had not independently challenged Ext.P14 and hence, in this appeal, the appellants who were respondents in the writ petition cannot be permitted to assail Ext.P14 order. 9. The first appellant-Society is registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act, by the Government and as noticed hereinbefore, it is fully owned by the Government of Kerala. The second appellant is its Managing Director. The above extracted prayers made by the first respondent/writ petitioner in the writ petition would reveal that the writ petition was filed mainly challenging Ext.P14 order which was passed by the second respondent herein/the first respondent W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-10-: in the writ petition, whereby the claim of the petitioner for the scale of pay of `3050-5230 with effect from 29.04.1997 was declined and he was granted the same only with effect from 25.05.2003. 10. It is relevant to refer to ground (F) of the appeal. It reads thus:- “ _F. The learned Single Judge has not adverted to any of the other grounds taken by the respondents 2 and 3 in the review petition filed by them against the judgment. This has caused grave miscarriage of justice. All the grounds raised in the Memorandum of Review Petition may be read, treated and construed as grounds of this Appeal and are not repeated herein only for the sake of brevity.”_ The question is how the appellant is justified in taking up such a ground when he is not challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the review petition. The learned Single Judge cannot be found fault with in not considering the contentions at the time when the judgment dated 28.11.2016 was rendered. Admittedly, at that point of time, the appellants had not entered appearance and filed any counter affidavit raising their contentions. In such circumstances, it can only be said that there was absence of any pleading on the part of the appellant at that stage. It is only after the disposal of the writ ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-11-: petition, that they had filed the review petition raising certain contentions. The order in R.P.No.1053/2017 in W.P(C) No.18430/2009 dated 28.2.2018 would reveal that various contentions raised by the appellants herein in the review petition were actually considered by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge had also arrived at a conclusion that they could not completely disown Ext.P10 recommendation as also Ext.P3 communication sent by the Society to the Government. The learned Single Judge had also held that the appellants/review petitioners therein could not be permitted to bring in different factual contentions in respect of the very same situation in different proceedings. Even after suffering such an order, for reasons best known to the appellants, they have chosen not to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the review petition and at the same time, raising a ground in the appeal, that the learned Single Judge had not adverted to any of the grounds raised in the review petition. It is to be noted that the pleadings from the part of the appellants are available only in the review petition. Having chosen not to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-12-: review petition, the question is whether solely by relying on the decision in **DSR Steel (Pvt. Ltd.)'s case** (supra), the appellants can challenge the judgment raising the grounds raised in the review petition. Since the learned Single Judge has passed an order in the review petition, we are refrained ourselves from making any comments upon the scope of the review petition filed by the appellants herein and suffice it to say that going by the settled position of law, if the contention of a review petitioner is that the decision sought to be reviewed is erroneous it cannot be a ground for review and it is certainly a ground for an appeal. To put it briefly, pertaining to this case, the appellants cannot be permitted to take up a contention as aforesaid based on their pleadings in the review petition, especially in the absence of any challenge against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the review petition and when they had not filed a counter affidavit or even a statement in the writ petition. 11. As noticed hereinbefore, in the writ petition, they had not placed on record any affidavit or statement raising their pleadings, before its disposal. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-13-: contended that on receipt of notice in the proceedings from the court, the appellants were under the mistaken notion that the copy must have been received by the counsel and it is that belief that caused their nonrepresentation in the proceedings. Even if it is taken as true, we do not find any reason as to why the appellants had not contacted the counsel for briefing him appropriately to defend the case even on receipt of notice in the writ petition. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants are not justified in raising such a contention. In short, in the said circumstances, we are of the considered view that the appellants can only be permitted to defend Ext.P14 based on the grounds available from the facts discernible from it. In the light of the said circumstances, we do not find any reason to go into the question rather, the contention raised by the appellants that the recommendations in Exts.P10 and P13 are not true facts and therefore, ought not to have been taken into consideration. The fact is that Ext.P13 carries a recommendation in favour of the writ petitioner/the first respondent in the appeal and the said favourable recommendation was made presumably taking into account Ext.P6. W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-14-: They would go to show that pursuant to the acquisition of additional qualification, the first respondent herein/the writ petitioner was given additional charge of lamination work, as per proceedings dated 14.10.1997. In Ext.P6, it is further stated thus:- _“At present, he is working as Laminating machine operator and also doing additional work of Time Keeper in the KHRWS head quarters. He is the only incumbent having knowledge and ability to operate the lamination machine independently.”_ (Empahsis added) True that as per Ext.P6, it is further ordered thus:- “ _In the above circumstances, Sri.V.Achuthan Nair, Time Keeper is appointed as Operator Grade II in the IPP Press in the scale of pay of Rs.3050-75-3950-80-5230 with effect from 29.4.1997. He is eligible for monetary benefit only with effect from the date of issue of this order. He could attend duties of Time Keeper also.”_ In the said circumstances, in the light of Ext.P6, it cannot be said that the finding of the learned Single Judge that the review petitioners/appellants herein could not completely disown the recommendations in Exts.P10 and P13, is bereft of any basis. 12. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to the fact that the State Government, which issued Ext.P14 order, has not W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-15-: chosen to prefer an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, though Ext.P14 order was set aside by the learned Single Judge. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellants attempted to canvass the point that the appellants are entitled to mount challenge against the very appointment of the first respondent as Laminating Machine Operator, we do not find any reason to uphold the same for more than one reason. 13. It is to be noted that Ext.P6 issued by the appellants itself would reveal that they had given posting to the petitioner as Laminating Machine Operator with effect from 14.10.1997. Taking into account such circumstances they also made a recommendation favourable to him in Ext.P13. That apart, as per the impugned order Ext.P14, the Government had also taken note of the fact that retrospective assignment was given to the first respondent as Operator by the appellants themselves and it is the said retrospective assignment given to him that persuaded the Government, as can be seen from Ext.P14, to hold that he is entitled to get the scale of pay of ` _305075-3950-80-5230_ with effect from 15.5.2003. In such circumstances, W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-16-: there can be no doubt with respect to the position that the appointment rather, promotion of the first respondent as Laminating Machine Operator (Grade II Operator) is not available for the appellants to challenge. 14. It is relevant to note that the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent herein contended that the only question available for consideration in the writ petition was whether there was any justification for denying the scale of pay of ` _3050-75-3950-80-5230_ to the first respondent herein/the writ petitioner with effect from the date on which he was appointed against the said post. For the above purpose, the learned counsel drew our attention to Exts.P8 to P12 judgments of this Court. The petitioner had earlier, approached this Court by filing W.P(C) No.20587/2006. The challenge therein was against Ext.P1 order, referred as such in the said writ petition, which is a Government Order dated 28.7.2006 whereby and whereunder the Secretary to Government, Health & Family Welfare (G) Department informed the second appellant- Managing Director of the appellantsociety that the promotion of the writ petitioner as Operator Grade II W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-17-: was irregular. Evidently, while considering the said writ petition, a learned Single Judge of this Court referred to Ext.P7 (referred as such herein) viz., the action taken report filed by the second appellant herein/second respondent therein (Managing Director, Kerala Health Research and Welfare Society) before the second respondent- the Government, in which it was stated as follows:- “ _In this connection, it is to be noted that Sri.V.Achuthan Nair had acquired the proficiency in the operation of Laminating Machine in 1997 and posted as Laminating Machine Operator w.e.f.14.10.1997 vide order No.E2-1582/85/KHRWS. This was prior to the introduction of the Special Rules. So the restrictions, if any, included in the special rules is not binding to him also, as in the case of his counter parts. It is to be noted further that all the other employees who were grouped as operators and termed as under qualified by the Sub committee become eligible for the scale of pay of Rs.3050-5230 consequent on 1997 pay revision. Though Achuthan Nair was also designated as Operator, the scale of pay sanctioned to him w.e.f.1.3.97 was Rs.2650-4150 only. This was a clear anomaly/discrimination. Therefore,as in the case of his counter parts, the scale of pay of Rs.3050-5230 was sanctioned to him vide order N:E1-582/86/KHRWS dated 15.5.2003 and rectified the anomaly. He may be retained in the scale so sanctioned, if the Government approves it.”_ Evidently, a perusal of Ext.P8 would reveal that taking note of the fact that Ext.P1 in W.P(C) No.20587/2006 was passed in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice, it was set aside. It is to be noted W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-18-: that in the said writ petition, it was submitted on behalf of the second respondent therein that immediately on receipt of Ext.P1 letter, the service of the petitioner was terminated. Taking into account the said submission, this Court in Ext.P8 ordered thus:- “. _........ Now that Ext.P1 has been quashed, the petitioner will stand reinstated in service with effect from the date of termination of his service. But this will be subject to further orders to be passed by the Government.”_ 15. The first respondent herein/the writ petitioner was again constrained to approach this Court by filing W.P(C) No.32831/2007. The said writ petition was disposed of as per Ext.P12 dated 28.11.2007. It is to be noted that at that point of time, the first respondent was working as Operator Grade-II in IPP Offset Press. His case was that he was promoted as Operator Grade-II as per proceedings dated 14.10.1997 and further that in terms of the Special Rules brought into with effect from 22.02.2000, the scale of pay sanctioned by the Government against the said post was revised to `4500-100-5000-125-7000. According to the first respondent-the petitioner therein, despite such revision of pay, the scale of pay of W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-19-: `3050-5230 was sanctioned to him. A perusal of Ext.P12 judgment would reveal that the main dispute therein was with respect to the scale of pay allowable to the first respondent/petitioner. It is evident from Ext.P12 judgment that the first respondent herein referred to Ext.P2, (the document which is referred as such in the said writ petition) which contained a recommendation of the Managing Director to the effect that the first respondent herein be fitted in the scale of pay of `4500100-5000-125-7000 w.e.f. 29.4.1997. Further, it is evident from it that the said question was reiterated in Ext.P4 (the document which is referred as such in the said writ petition). According to them, since there are financial implications, the recommendations in Exts.P2 and P4 require the approval of the Government. Taking into account all such aspects, this Court vide Ext.P12 disposed of the writ petition directing the second respondent therein/the Managing Director of the appellant-Society to draw up an order taking into account the recommendations contained in Exts.P2 and P4, within the time stipulated therein. Further, it was held therein as follows:- W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-20-: _“.......... On receipt of the same, the Government shall, taking into account the said recommendations and after hearing the petitioner, take a decision in the course of complying with the directions issued by this Court in W.P(C) No.20587/06 dated 28.8.2006. If approval is granted by the Government, petitioner shall be fitted in the scale of pay as decided and recommended by the Managing Director and appropriate consequential benefits arising therefrom shall be granted to him.”_ 16. Evidently, Ext.P13 recommendation was effected by the Managing Director, who is the second appellant, pursuant to the said judgment and referring to the same, on 27.03.2008. Evidently, it contains a recommendation in favour of the first respondent/the writ petitioner. It is stated therein that Sri.V.Achuthan Nair (the first respondent herein) was appointed as Operator Grade II with effect from 29.4.1997, vide order No.E1- 1582/86/KHRWS dtd 15.5.2003 without sanctioning the scale of pay due to the post of Operator GradeII, viz., `4500-100-5000-125-7000 and since the post of Sri.V.Achuthan Nair as Laminating Machine Operator or Operator Grade II were ordered prior to the introduction of the Special Rules. A perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the learned Single W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-21-: Judge took note of all such situations and set aside Ext.P14, which was passed by the Government without properly appreciating all the relevant aspects. The materials on record would thus reveal that the first respondent was appointed against the post of Laminating Machine Operator Grade-II with effect from 29.4.1997, but he was not granted the scale of pay attached to the said post. It is taken note of such situation that the learned Single Judge directed the second respondent to pass appropriate orders giving effect to the declaration made as per the judgment that the first respondent is entitled to fixation of pay at `3050- 5230 in the post of Laminating Machine Operator Grade-II w.e.f. 29.4.1997 and the scale of pay of `4500-7000 w.e.f. 22.4.2000. It is true that it was followed by a further direction to the effect that all benefits shall be calculated and disbursed to the petitioner, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of that judgment. 17. We have already found that the order which was mainly under challenge in the writ petition, viz., Ext.P14 order was passed by the Government. Despite its setting aside Government had not thought W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-22-: it fit to prefer an appeal. In view of the reason extracted herein before, we have already held that the appellants could not be permitted to take up all contentions and that they should be made to confine the challenge only against the grant of scale of pay with effect from a particular date. The finding of the learned Single Judge is based on Exts.P6 and P13 recommendations. The learned Single Judge has also rightly referred to Exts.P8 and P12 judgments. In the light of Ext.P12 judgment, while passing Ext.P14 order, the Government could not have ignored the recommendation of the appellants. Evidently, the recommendation made by the Managing Director of the Society is the one contained in Ext.P13 and such recommendation was made pursuant to Ext.P12 judgment. Though the learned counsel for the appellants attempted to canvass the position that the recommendations in Ext.P13 were made without taking into account actual state of facts, in the light of Ext.P6, which was never cancelled by any of the authorities, we do not find any reason to uphold the said contention. Ext.P6 would undoubtedly go to show that the first respondent was given posting as a Laminating Machine Operator Grade-II, with effect ## W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-23-: from 14.10.1997. True that it would also reveal that he was given such a posting with effect from 29.4.1997. It can only be held that the first respondent was posted as such only on 14.10.1997 and therefore, it cannot be believed that he was made to work as Operator Grade-II in a day prior to the said order. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the declaration made by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the writ petitioner/first respondent is entitled to fixation of pay of `3050-5230 in the post of Laminating Machine Operator Grade-II w.e.f. 29.4.1997 invites interference and in the light of the indisputable and undisputed facts obtained from Ext.P6, he is entitled to the said scale of pay only w.e.f. 14.10.1997. We do not find any reason to interfere with the declaration made regarding the entitlement to get fixation of the scale of pay of `45007000 of the first respondent w.e.f. 22.4.2000. In the light of the judgment, the second respondent is bound to give effect to the declaration made by the learned Single Judge, which was modified by us, as mentioned hereinbefore within a period of three months W.A.No.673 of 2018 :-24-: from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to say that all benefits shall be calculated and disbursed to the petitioner within the above stipulated period. Subject to the above modification, this writ appeal is dismissed. Sd/C.T.RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE. Sd/MARY JOSEPH, JUDGE. SKK/MBS