High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed with costs.

The Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal v. Royal Calcutta Turf Club

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 419 of 1958
Neutral Citation:/null

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • J. L. Kapur
  • M. Hidayatullah
  • J. C. Shah
Judgment Date
1960-11-28
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • The Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal

Respondents

  • Royal Calcutta Turf Club

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Hardyal Hardy
  • • D. Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

  • • N. C. Chatterjee
  • • Dipak Choudhri
  • • B. N. Ghosh

Case Synopsis & Summary

This judgment concerns whether Rs. 61,818 spent by the Royal Calcutta Turf Club (the respondent) in 1948–49 to train Indian boys as jockeys is deductible under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922). The Turf Club conducted commercial race meetings and did not own horses or jockeys; jockeys were engaged by owners/trainers. Facing the risk of unavailability of suitable jockeys, the Club established a school to train jockeys to ensure the availability of skilled riders, a prerequisite for profitable races. The central question was whether the expenditure was “wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business” such that it qualifies as a revenue deduction. The Income Tax Officer and the Tribunal disallowed the claim; the Calcutta High Court referred the matter to the Supreme Court, which held in favor of the respondent. The Court held that expenditure aimed at preventing the extinction of the business can be wholly and exclusively laid out for the business, provided the facts show a direct connection to the business’s operations. It drew on authorities such as Eastern Investments Ltd., Chandulal Keshavlal & Co., and Morgan v. Tate & Lyle Ltd. and distinguished Boarland v. Kramat Pulai Ltd. It concluded that the expenditure was for preserving the business, not creating an enduring asset, and dismissed the appeal with costs, upholding the High Court’s view that the deduction was allowable.

Provisions of Law Cited

Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), s. 10(2)(xv)Income-tax Act, 1922, s. 66(1)Business Profits Tax Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business
  • Commercial expediency
  • Preservation of the existence of the business as a deductible objective
  • Enduring asset prohibition (not a capital expenditure)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that (1) the question whether an item of expenditure is wholly and exclusively laid out for business is a question of fact; (2) the connection between expenditure and profit-earning must be direct and substantial, not remote; (3) to be admissible as revenue expenditure it must not be a capital expense or create an enduring asset. They urged the Tribunal’s findings should be read as established facts and that the expenditure failed the test of being directly and exclusively in the business's profit-making process.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the expenditure was incidental to preserving the business, since the availability of skilled jockeys is essential for profitable races. Training Indian jockeys reduced the risk of race cancellations and ensured continuity of business; benefits accrued to the racing operations and owners/trainers. The expenditure, though possibly benefitting third parties, was undertaken to sustain the respondent’s commercial undertaking and not for the benefit of a separate asset; thus it should be deductible under s. 10(2)(xv).

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Eastern Investments Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal[1951] 20 I.T.R. 1PositiveUsed to establish that the final conclusion can be a matter of law and that expenditure justified by commercial expediency may be deductible when it facilitates the business.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chandulal Keshavlal & Co.[1960] 38 I.T.R. 601PositiveCited for the test that expenditure must be part of the assessee’s legitimate commercial undertaking to facilitate carrying on of its business.
British Insulated and Helsby Cables v. Atherton[1926] A.C. 205PositiveCited for the principle that expenditure made on grounds of commercial expediency, not strictly necessary for immediate trade, can still be wholly and exclusively for the trade.
Morgan v. Tate & Lyle Ltd.[1955] A.C. 21PositiveCited for the idea that preserving the assets of the company to enable it to carry on trade can be a deductible expense.
Boarland v. Kramat Pulai Ltd.[1953] 2 All E.R. 1122DistinguishedNoted as a case where the expenditure was not wholly and exclusively for the business; distinguished due to differing statute and facts.
Strong & Co. v. Woodifield[1906] A.C. 448PositiveCited as supporting the view that expenditures may be necessary for the business even if it yields indirect benefits.
Smith v. Incorporated Council of Law Reporting[1914] 3 K.B. 674PositiveCited for the array of cases building the doctrine of commercial expediency and business necessity.
Ward & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes[1923] A.C. 145Mentioned OnlyCited but distinguished due to being under a different statute with restrictive language.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 729 ##### THE COMMISSIONER OE' INCOME-TAX, _I960_ _November a8._ WEST BENGAL _v._ ROYAL CALCUTTA TURE' CLUB # • (J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.) _Income_ _Tax-Expenditure_ _for preservation_ _of_ _business-If_ _wholly and exclusively laid out for_ _the_ _purpose of business-Indian_ _Income_ _Tax_ _Act,_ _r922_ _(XI of_ r922), _s._ _ro_ (2)(xv). The business of the respondent club was to run race meetings on a .commercial scale. The club did not own any horse and therefore did not employ jockeys. It. was a matter of some importance to the club that there were jockeys of requisite skill and experience in sufficient numbers who would be available to the owners and trainers because otherwise the running of the race meetings would not be commercially profitable and its interest would suffer and it might have had to abandon its business if it did not take steps to make jockeys of the necessary calibre available. Therefore it established a school for the training of Indian boys as jockeys and claimed the sums spent on the running of the school as deductable amount under s. 10 (2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act. Th.e question was whether in the circumstances of the case the expenditure claimed was one which was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the respondent's business. _Held,_ that any expenditure which was incurred for preventing the extinction of a business would be expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business of the assessee and would be an allowable deduction. In the instant case the amount in dispute was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the respondent's business, because if the supply of jockeys of requisite efficiency and skill failed, the business of the respondent would no longer be possible. _Eastern Investments Ltd._ v. _Commissioner of Income-tax, West_ _Bengal,_ [r95r] S. C.R. 594 and _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax_ v. _Chandulal Keshavlal_ & _Co.,_ [1960] 38 I.T.R. 6o1, relied on. _British ltisulated and Helsby Cables_ v. _Atherton,_ [1926) A. C. 205, _Morgan_ v. _Tate_ 0- _Lyle Ltd.,_ [1955) A. C. 21 and _Boarland_ v. _Kramat Pulai Ltd.,_ [1953] 2 AIL E. R. n22, discussed. _Strong_ & _Co._ v. _Woodifield,_ (1906) A. C. 448 and _Smith_ v. _Incorporated Council of Law Reporting,_ (1914) 3 K.B. 674, referred to . . _Ward_ 0- _Co._ _Ltd._ v. _Commissioner of Taxes,_ [1923] A. C. 145, distinguished. 730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] ' •· _**:c960**_ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. _The_ _Commission"_ 419 of 1958. _**of**_ _**Tncom!!·tax,**_ _**West Bengal**_ v. _**Royal**_ _**Calcutta**_ _Turf Club_ Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 20, 1957, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1956. _Hardyal Hardy_ and _D. Gupta,_ for the appellant. _N._ _C._ _Chatterjee, Dipak Choudhri_ and _B._ _N._ _Ghosh,_ for the respondent. 1960. November 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by #### KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of ##### Judicature at Calcutta in a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. The following question was referred: ##### "Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 61,818 spent by the assessee to train Indian boys as jockeys, did not constitute expenses of the business of the assessee allowable under s. 10(2)(xv)?" which was answered in favour of the respondent. The Commissioner is the appellant before us and the asses. see is the respondent. The respondent is an association of persons whose business is to hold race meetings in Calcutta. on #### a commercial basis. It holds two series of race meetings during the two seasons of the year. The respondent does not own any horses and therefore does not employ jockeys but they are employed ##### by owners and trainers of horses which are run in the races. It is a matter of some importance to the respondent that there should be jockeys avail able to the owners with sufficient skill and experience because the success of races to a considerable extent depends upon the experience and skill of a jockey who rides a horse in a race. Because it was of the opinion ##### that there was a risk of the jockeys becoming unavail- able and that such unavailability would seriously affect its business which might result in its closing _Kapur_ _J._ 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 731 down the business, the respondent considered it ex- _i96o_ ##### pedient to remedy that defect. Therefore in 1948, it Tl c ---.. established a school for the training of Indian boys as ~j 1;;::;~;::~er ##### jockeys SO that after their training they might be West Bengal available for purposes of race meetings held under its v. auspices. The school, however, did not prove a sue- _Royal_ _Calcutta_ _1_ cess and after having been in existence for three years _·urj Club_ ##### it was closed down. Kapur J. During the year ending March 31, 1949, the respon##### dent spent a sum of Rs. 62,818 on the running of its school and claimed that amount as a deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act and also in the assessment under the Business Profits Tax for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1949. This claim was disallowed by the Income Tax Officer and on appeal by Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. At the instance of the respondent the question already quoted was referred to the High Court and was answered in favour of the respondent. This appeal is brought by special leave against that judgment. The decision under the Business Profits Tax Act will be consequential upon the decisfon of the deduction under the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal found ##### that it was not the business of the respondent to pro- vide jockeys to owners and trainers, that the jockeys trained in the respondent's school were not bound to ##### ride only in the races run by the respondent and that the benefit, if any, which accrued was of ap. enduring nature. It also found that the respondent had been conducting race meetings since long, that it was not the case of the assessee that if-it did not train jockeys they would become unavailable and that the mere policy of producing efficient Indian jockeys was not a sufficient consideration for treating the expenditure as one incurred for the business of the respondent. For these reasons the expenditure was disallowed. Before the Appellate Assistant e,pmmissioner, it was contended by the respondent, that the reason for incurring the expenditure was "to promote efficient Indian jockeys" and it was in the interest of the res##### pondent to see that the races are not abandoned on ##### 732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] ##### r96o account of the scarcity of jockeys. In the order of the ##### Tribunal it is stated that this was not the case of the _T_ _**he**_ C _**omnnsstouer**_ [--. ] [. ] d d _I:_ _of Income-tax_ respon ent, an thereiore when the respondent want_West_ _Bengal'_ ed paragraph 5 of the statement to be substituted by v. the following: ##### Royal Calcutta "It was the case of the assessee that unless it _Turf Club._ trained Indian Jockeys,· time may come when there may not be sufficient number of trained jockeys to _**Kapur].**_ ride horses in the races conducted by the assessee." the Tribunal did not agree to do so. Counsel for the appellant raised three points before ##### us; (1) The question as to whether an item of expenditure is wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of business or not is a question of fact; (2) the connection between an expenditure and profit-earning of the assessee should be direct and substantial and not remote and (3) to be admissible as revenue expenditure it should not be in the nature of a capital expense, i.e., it should not bring into existence an asset of an enduring nature. As to the first question this court has held in _Ea11-_ _tern Investments Ltd._ v. _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax,_ ##### West Bengal(') that "though the question must be decided on the facts of each case, the final conclusion ##### is one of law". In Commissioner of Income Tax v. _Chandulal Keshavlal_ _&_ _Co._ (2), this Court said: " Another test is whether the transaction is properly entered into as a part of the assessee's legitimate commercial undertaking in order to facilitate the car##### rying on of its business; and it is immaterial that a third party also benefits thereby. _(Ea11tern_ _Investment_ ##### Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1951) 20 I.T.R. 1). But in every case it is a question of fact whether the expenditure was expended wholly and exclusively ##### for the purpose of trade or business of the assessee. In the present case the finding is that it was laid out for the purpose of the assessee's business and there is evidence to support this finding." But those observations must be read in the context. ##### In that case the assessee firm was the Managing Agent of a Company and at the request of the Direotors of (1) [1951] S.C.R. 59~. 598. (2) [1g6o] 38 I.T.R. 6o1, 610. ##### 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 733 the latter agreed to accept a lesser commission for the _Z9_ _[60 ]_ #### year of account than it was entitled to. It was found Ths Commissione by the Appellate Tribunal there that the amount was _of Income-tax,_ expended for reasons of commercial expediency and _west_ _Bengal_ was not given as a bounty but to strengthen the v. ##### managed company so that if its financial position Royal Calctttta became strong the assessee would benefit thereby, and _Turf_ _Club_ on the evidence the Tribunal came to the conclusion _Kapur_ _1._ ##### that the amount was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business. It was on this evidence that the expense was held to be wholly and exclusive ly laid out for the purpose of the assessee's business ##### and this was the finding referred to. In that case the Tribunal had not misdirected itself as to the true scope and meaning of the words "wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the assessee's business". ##### In the present case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had misdirected itself as to the true scope and ##### meaning of these words. In our opinion, in the cir- cumstances of this case, it. cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal was one of fact. The question as to whether the expenses of running the school for jockeys is deductible has to be decided ##### taking into consideration the circumstances of this case. The business of the respondent was to run race meetings on a commercial scale for which it is necessary to have races of as high an order as possible. For ##### the popularity of the races run by the respondent and to make its business profitable it was necessary that there were jockeys of requisite skill and experience in sufficient numbers who would be available to the owners and trainers because without such efficient jockeys the running of race meetings would not be ##### commercially profitable. It was for this purpose that the respondent started the school for training Indian ### jockeys. If there were not sufficient number of effi cient Indian jockeys to ride horses its interest would have suffered, and it might have had to abandon its business if it did not take steps to make jockeys of the necessary calibre available. Therefore any expenditure which was incurred for preventing the extinction 93 ##### 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961) _'9_ _[60 ]_ of the respondent's business would, in our opinion, be ##### The Commissioner expenditure wholl:y and exclusively laid out for the _of Income-tax,_ purpose of the busmess of the assessee and would be ##### West Bengal an allowable deduction. This finds support from v. decided cases. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Royal Calcutta Ohandulal Keshavlal & Go. ( [1 ] ), this Court held that in _Turf Club_ order to justify a deduction the disbursement must be ##### Kapur J. for reasons of commercial expediency; it may be voluntary but incurred for the assessee's business; and ##### if the expense is incurred for the purpose of the busi- ness of the assessee it does not matter that the pay- ment also enures to the benefit of a third party. Another test laid down was that if the transaction is ##### properly entered into as a part of the assessee's legitimate commercial undertaking in order to facilitate the carrying on of its business it is immaterial that a third ##### party also benefits thereby. In British Insulated and Belsby Gables v. Atherton('), Viscount Cave L. C. held that a sum of money expended, not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the ##### trade, but voluntarily and on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate ##### the carrying on of the business may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the trade. In a case more recently decided Morgan v. Tate & Lyle Ltd. ( [8] ) the assessee company was engaged in sugar refining business and it incurred expenses in a propaganda campaign to oppose the threatened nationalisa#### tion of the industry. It was held by the House of Lords by a majority that the object of the expenditure ##### being to preserve the assets of the company from seizure and so to enable it to carry on its business and earning profits, the expense was an admissible deduction being wholly and exclusively laid out for the pur##### pose of the company's trade. Lord Morton of Henry. ton said: "Looking simply at the words of the rule I would #### ask: "If money so spent is not spent for the purpose ##### of the company's trade, for what purpose is it spent?" #### If the assets are seized, the company can no longer (1) (1g6o) 38 I.T.R. 601, 610. (2) [1926] A.C. 205. (3) [1955] A.C . .,, / ##### 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 735 carry on the trade which has been carried on by the _z96o_ ### use of these assets. Thus the money is spent to pre- Th c --. . ##### . f th ., t d,, e ommissioner serve th e very existence o e company s ra e . _of Income-ta"·_ See also _Strong_ & _Co._ v. _Woodifield(_ _[1]_ _),_ the observations _West Bengal_ of Lord Davey; and _Smith_ v. _Incorporated Council_ _of_ v. _Law Reporting_ (g). _Royal Calcutta_ . _Turf Club_ C ounsel for the appel 1 ant relied upon t e Judgment h of the Privy Council in _Ward_ & _Co._ _Ltd._ v. _Commis-_ _Kapu_ _1_ _1._ ##### sioner of Taxes ( [3] ), but that decision proceeds on a different statute where the words were of a very restrictive character, the words being: " ..................... Expenditure or loss of any kind not exclusively incurred in the production of the assessable income derived from that source ............ ". This case was distinguished in _Morgan_ v. _Tate_ & _Lyle(')_ on the ground that the language of the New Zealand statute was much narrower than the language of r. 3A ##### in England. Reference was also made by the appellant to _Boar-_ ##### "land v. Kramat Pulai Ltd. ( [5] ). In that case DiJ'.ectors of three Companies engaged in tin mining in Malaya incurred expenditure on printing and circulating to shareholders a pamphlet containing remarks of the ##### Chairman of the Company. The pamphlet was an attack on the policy and acts of the Socialist Government and it was held that the question whether the money was wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purpose of trade within the meaning of rules applicable to the question was one of law but on ##### a consideration of the question it was held that the expenditure was not solely incurred with that object. #### It is not necessary to discuss that case at any length because what was held in that case was that the pamphlet was not wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the company's trade. . Applying the law, as laid down in those cases, to the present case the conclusion is that the amount in ##### dispute was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the respondent's business because if the (1) [19o6] A.C. 448, (2) (1914] 3 K.B. 674. (3) [1923)] A.C. 1.45· (4) [1955] A.C. 21. (5) [1953] 2 All E.R. 1122. ##### 736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] ##### '96° supply of jockeys of efficiency and skill failed the business of the respondent would no longer be possi## Th e C ommissioner [-. ][. ] b . _of Income-tax_ le. Thus the money was spent for the preservation _West_ _Bengal'_ of the respondent's business. v. As to the third point there is no substance in the _Royal_ _Calcutta_ submission that the expenditure was in the nature of _Turf_ _Club_ a capital expense because no asset of enduring nature _Kapur_ _J._ was being created by this expense. ##### In our opinion the High Court has rightly held that the expenditure claimed was one which was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the respon#### dent's business. It was to prevent the threatened ##### extinction of the business of the respondent. In the result this appeal is dismissed with costs. _**November ag.**_ _Appeal dismissed._ ##### K. R. C. S. BALAKRISHNA CHETTY & SONS & CO. _v._ THE STATE OF MADRAS (J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.) _Sales_ _Tax_ - _Claim of exemption. by_ _licensee-If_ _conditional_ _upon_ _observance_ _of_ _conditions and restrictions-Ma4J'as General_ _Sales Tax Act, I939 (Mad._ _IX of z939), s. 5._ The appellants, who were dealers in Cotton yarn, obtained a license under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (IX of 1939). Section _5_ of that Act exempted such dealers from payment of sales tax under s. 3 of the Act subject to such restrictions and conditions as might be prescribed, including the condi**tions as to licenses and license fees. Section 13 required a licen-** see to keep and maintain true and correct accounts of the value of the goods sold and paid by him. Rule _5_ of the General Sales Tax Rules provided that any person seeking exemption under s. _5_ of the Act must apply for license in Form 1 which made the license subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The appellants on surprise inspection were found to maintain two separate sets of accounts, on the basis of one of which they submitted their returns and the other