S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 101
THE COMMISSIONER
WEST BENGAL,
_v._
OF INCOME-TAX,
CALCUTTA
1957
_May,_ 23
RAJA BENOY KUMAR SARAS ROY
(BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and
J.L. KAPUR JJ.)
_Income-tax-Exemption-Income from_ _sale_ _of_ _forest_ _trees,_ _if_
_.and when_ _agricultural income-"Agriculture",_ _Meaning_ _of-Indian_
_Income-tax Act (XI of_ 1922), _ss._ 2(1), 4(3) _(viii)._
The question for decision in this appeal by the Commissioner
·of Income-tax was whether a sum of Rs. 51,978 shown by the
assessee in his return as income from his forest land was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Indian Incometax Act and was as such exempt from taxation under s. 4(3)(viii)
of the Act. The forest was of spontaneous growth, 150 years old,
and consisted of _sal_ and _piyasal_ trees. It was in parts denuded of
trees from time to time by destructive elements and the . assessee
had to plant fresh trees in those parts. Considerable amount of
human labour and skill lmd to be applied year after year for .
maintaining the forest, protecting the offshoots from the stumps
of the trees that had been cut and sold and in reviving its denuded
parts by fresh plantation. The staff employed by the assessee
performed such operations as· pruning, weeding, felling, clearing,
cutting of channels, guarding the trees and sowing seeds by digging the soil in the denuded areas. The Income-tax Officer rejected
the assessee's claim of exemption an added a sum of Rs. 34,430
to the assessable income, allowing a sum of Rs. 17,548 as expenditure. The Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax confirmed the
assessment. The Appellate Tribunal held that the sowing of seeds
were few and far between and the income, derived as it was from
jungle products, was not agricultural income within the meaning
of the Act. The High Court took a contrary view, held that
tillage of the soil was not essential, and the income was agricultural income as human labour and skill had been expended on the
land itself and answered the question in favour of the assessee.
No attempt was, however, made by the Income-tax Authorities
to ascertain the income actually derived from the trees planted by
the assessee, nor were any materials placed on the record from
which its exact amount could be ascertained, but having regard
to the magnitude of the expenditure shown by the assessee as
against the total income this Court held that a substantial portion
of it must have been derived from the trees planted by the
assessee.
_Held,_ that the income actually derived from the trees planted
by the assessee was agricultural income within the meaning of
s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and no attempt having been
.,
**102** **SUPREME COURT REPORTS** [1958J
_19S1_ made to ascertain its exact amount and a fresh enquiry being
_The_ _Commissioner_ u!'de~irable after such a long lapse of time, the appeal must be
_**of**_ _**Income-tax,**_ **d1sm1ssed.**
_Wc!rc!::fal_ The term 'agriculture' in s. 2(l)(b)(i) of the Indian Income-tax
•· Act connotes the entire and integrated activity of an agriculturist
_Raja Benoy Kumar_ performed on the land in order to raise its produce and consists of
_Sahas_ _Roy_ such basic and essential operations, requiring human skill and
labour on the land itself, as the tilling of the soil, sowing of the
seeds, planting and similar operations on the land and such other
subsequent operations, performed after the produce sprouts from
the land, as weeding, digging of the soil around the growth,
removal of undesirable under-growths, tending, pruning, cutting,
harvesting and marketing. But these subsequent operations, if
unconnected with the basic operations, cannot by themselves
constitute agriculture. It is only when the land is subjected to
such integrated activity, that it can be said to be used for
'agricultural purpose' and its income called agricultural income
within the meaning of the Act. .
Case-law discussed.
Whatever is produced by such agriculture must be an agricultural product and the ambit of the term 'agriculture' cannot be
confined merely to the production of grain and food for men and
cattle but must extend to all products of the land that have some
utility either for consumption or trade and commerce. Fruit and
vegetable plantations, groves, pastures, articles of luxury such as
betel, coffee, tea, spices, tobacco etc. or commercial crops like
cotton, flax, jute, hemp, indigo etc. as also forest products such as
timber, _sol_ and _piyasal_ trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves,.
horranuts etc. can come within its ambit.
_Murugesa Chetti_ v. _Chinnathambi Goundan,_ (1901) I.LR. 24
Mad. 421 and _Raja of Venkatagiri_ v. _Ayyappa Reddy,_ (1913) I.LR.
38 Mad. 738, disapproved.
Such an extended meaning of the term 'agriculture' and it&,
processes and products can be tenable only where there is cultiva**tion,** **which** **means** **the basic** **operations,** **and** **can** **never** **be** **disso-**
**ciated from them. There is, therefore, no** **warrc1.nt** **for its further**
**extension so** **as** **to include activities** **which** **are** **in** **some way**
connected with or dependent on land, such as breeding and rearing of livestock, dairy-farming, butter and cheese making and
poultry-farming.
_Moo/ji Sicko_ & _Co., In re,_ (1925) 10 T.C. 341 and _Commissioner_
_of Income-tax_ v. _K. E. Sundara Mudaliar,_ (1950) 18 l.T.R. 259,
disapproved.
Although human labour and skill are required both in the
performance of the basic as well as the subsequent operati~ns, it
is only in the case of the basic operations alone that such skill and
labour can be said to have been spent on the land itcself, and this
distinction becomes important where they arc disjointed and do
,.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 103
not form an integrated activity, as in the case of products of land
that are of spontaneous growth where hunian skill and labour are
spent merely in fostering the growth, preservation and regeneration of such products.
_West Bengal,_
1957
_The_ _Commissioner·_
_of_ _Income-tax,_
_Calcutta_
-Judicial opinion is unanimous that products which grow wild v.
on the land or are of spontaneous growth and do not involve any _Raja Benoy Kumar_
human skill or labour on the land, and all that the assessee has. _Sahas Roy_
to perform in respect of them is only to collect them for consump-tion and marketing, are not products of agriculture and the income
derived from them is not agricultural income within the meaning
of s. 2(1) of the Act.
When, however, the assessee performs subsequent operations
on these products of land, the nature of those operations will
have to be determined in the light of the principles enunciated
above.
_Held.further,_ that there is no basis for the argument that the·
demarcation of- agriculture and forestry as separate head~ of legislation in Entries 14 and 19 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution has the effect of making them mutually exclusive.
Income from forestry coming within the definition of 'agricultural
income' contained in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act will be
agricultural income under Entry 46 and thus fall within the
purview of that Act.
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
165of1954.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 27,
1953, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax
Reference No. 35 of 1952.
_G._ _N. Joshi_ and _R.H._ _Dhebar,_ for the appellant.
_Jyotish Chandra Pal_ and _D._ _N._ _Mukherjee,_ for the
respondent.
1957. May 23. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BHAGW ATI, J .-This appeal with certificate of fitness _Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_
under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of
1922) is directed againstthe Judgment and order of
the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act.
The respondent owns an area of 6,000 acres of forest
land assessed to land revenue and grown with _Sal_ and
_Piyasal_ trees. The forest was originally of spontaneous
growth, "not grown by the aid of human skill and
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
1957 laobur" and it has been in existence for about 150
_1 he_ _Commissioner_ years. A considerable income is derived by the assessee
_0_ _1_ _,Income-tax,_ from sales of trees from this forest. The assessment
JI _est_ _Bengal,_ . h. h h.,. . 1 d d
_[Calcutta_ year m w 1c t 1s 1orest mcome was ast taxe un er
_R_ [. ] _[s'" ]_ _[v ]_ the Indian Income-tax Act was 1923-24 but thereafter
_a;a Sahas ''"'Y Roy numar_ an d ti '11 1944 - 45 w h' h . 1c 1s t e assessment year m ques-h _J(-._ _0_ _1_ tion, it was always left out of account. The assessment
_,._ _[8]_ _"'_ _"_ - for 1944-45 also was first made without including therein any forest income, but the assessment was subsequently re-opened under s. 34. In response to a
notice under s. 22(2) read with s. 34 of the Act, the
respondent submitted a return showing the gro$s
receipt of Rs. 51,978 from the said forest. A claim
was, however, made that the said income was not
assessable under the Act as it was agricultural income
and was exempt under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act. The
Income Tax Officer rejected this claim and added a sum
of Rs. 34,430 to the assessable income as income
derived from the forest after allowing a sum of
Rs. 17,548 as expenditure. The Appellate Assistant
Commissioner confirmed the assessment and the
Jncome-tax Appellate Tribunal also, was of opinion
that the said income was not agricultural income but
was .income derived from the sale of jungle produce of
spontaneous growth and as such was. not covered by
s. 2(1) of the Act. At the instance of the assessee the
Tribunal referred to the High Court under s. 66(1) of
the Act two questions of law arising out of its order,
one of which was:
"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances
of this case, the sum of Rs. 34,430 is "agricultural
income" and as such is exempt from payment of tax
under section 4 (3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax
Act?"
The Tribunal submitted a statement of case from
which the following facts appear as admitted or
established :
"(i) The area covered by the forest is about 6,000
acres, trees growing being Sal and Piyasal;
(ii) It is of spontaneous growth being about 150
years old. It is not a forest grown by the aid of
human skill and labour;·
#
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 105
(iii) The fores·t is occasionally parcelled out for 1957
the purposes of sale and the space from which trees _The_ _Commissioner_
sold are cut away is guarded by forest guards to _0_ _1_ _Income-tax,_
' _West Bengal,_
protect offshoots; _Calcutta_
(iv) It has been satisfactorily proved that _R<rja_ Ben~y _Kumar_
.considerable amount of human labour and care is _Sahas_ _Roy_
being applied year after year for keeping the forest _Bhagwati_ _.1._
alive as also for reviving the portions that get denuded
as a result of destruction by cattle and other causes;
(v) The staff is employed by the asscssee to
perform the following specific operations;
(a) Pruning, .
(b) Weeding,
(c) Felling,
( d) Clearing,
(e) Cutting of channels to help the flow of rain
water,
(f) Guarding the trees against pests and other
destructive elements,
(g) Sowing of seeds after digging of the soil in
denuded areas."
The Tribunal found that the employment of human
labour and skill in items (a) to (f) was necessary for the
maintenance and upkeep of any forest of spontaneous
:growth. Regarding item (g), however, it found that
the said operation had been performed only occasionally and over a small fraction of the area where the
original growth had been found to have been completely denuded. Such occasions were however few
and far between, the normal process being that whenever a tree was cut, a stump of about 6" height was
left intact which sent forth offshoots all round bringing about fresh growth in course of time. This went
on perpetually unless an area got ·otherwise completely
denuded.
The reference was heard by the High Court and the ·
High Court held that actual cultivation of the land
was not required and as human Jabour and skill were
spent for the growth of the forest the income from the
forest was agricultural income. It accordingly
answered the above question in the affirmative. The
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 Revenue obtained the requisite certificate of fitness
_The_ _commissioner_ for appeal to this Court and hence this· appeal.
0{v;:,c~,;',f· The question that arises for consideration in this
_Calcutta_ ' appeal is whether income derived from the sale of _Sal_
_Raja Be!y Kumar_ and _Piyasa/_ trees in the forest owned by the assessee
_sa1ras_ _Roy_ which was originally a forest of spontaneous growth
_Bhagwati_ _J._ "not grown by the aid of human skill and labour" but
on which forestry operations described in the statement
of case had been carried on by the assessee involving
considerable amount of expenditure of human skill and
labour is agricultural income within the meaning of
s. 2(1) and as such exempt from payment of tax under
s. 4 (3) (viii) ofthe Indian Income-tax Act.
Section 2(1) of the Act defines agricultural income
and states (so far as it is relevant for the purposes of
this appeal) :
(l) "agricultural income" means:
(a) any rent or revenue derived from land which
is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed
to land-revenue in the taxable territories or subject to·
a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the
Government as such :
(b) any income derived from such land by :
(i) agriculture, or
(ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver
of rent-in-kind of any process ordinarily employed by
a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render the
produce raised or received by him fit to be taken to
market, or
(iii) the sale by a cultivator or .receiver of rent-·
in-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in
respect of which no process has been performed other
than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii); ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ·Section 4(3) of the Act provides:"(3) Any income, profits or gains falling withinthe following classes shall not be included in the total
income of the person receiving them;
(viii) Agricultural income .................. "
S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 107
Even though "agricultural income" which is 1957
exempted under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act is defined in _The Commissioner_
s. 2(1) as above, there is no definition of "agriculture" 0·fv.1~co;:-';J·
or "agricultural purpose" to be found in the Act and _caJcu1"!:_ '
it therefore falls to be determined what • . is -the connota- _R_ _a1a_ . _Bev._ _noy .n.umar_ .,
tton of these terms. _sa1uu Roy_
An argument based on entries 14 and 19 of List II _Bhagwati_ _J._
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution may be
disposed of at once. It was urged that entry No. 14
referred to agriculture including agricultural education
and research, protection against pests and prevention
of plant diseases while entry No. 19 referred to forests
and there was therefore a clear line of demarcation
between agriculture and forests with the result that
forestry could not be comprised within agriculture.
If forestry was thus not comprised within agriculture,
any income from forestry could not be agricultural
income and the income derived by the assessee from
the sale of the forest trees could not be agricultural
income at all, as it was not derived from land by
agriculture within the meaning of the definition of
agricultural income given in the Indian Income-tax
Act. This argument, however, does not take account
of the fact that the entries in the lists of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution are heads of legislation
which are to be interpreted in a liberal manner
comprising within their scope all matters incidental
thereto. They are not mutually exclusive. If the
assessee plants on a vacant site trees with a view that
they should grow into a forest, as for example,
casuarina plantations and expends labour and skill
for that purpose, the income from such trees would
clearly be agricultural produce. It has to be remembered that even though this demarcation between
agriculture and forestry was available in the Lists
contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Government
of India Act, 1935, no such demarcation existed in the
Devolution Rules made under the Government of India
Act, 1919, and in any event the definition of agricultural income with which we are concerned was
incorporated in the Indian Income-tax Acts as early as
1886, if not earlier: _vide_ s. 5 of the Indian Income-tax
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958J
f 1957 Act 1886 (II of 1886). It has also to be remembered
_The commi1Sio11er_ that in spite of this demarcation between agriculture
°;!;I":"~",J· and forests in the Constitution, taxes on agricultural
·~alcutta ' income are a separate head under entry 46 of List II
_R 0_ . _Be"·_ _x_ of the Seventh Schedule and would comprise within
_'"sa1i':YR0':".,_ their scope even income from forestry operations pro
°;!;I":"~",J· and forests in the Constitution, taxes on agricultural
_Bh•trivatl_ _J._ vided it falls within the definition of agricultural
income which according to the definition given under
Art. 366(1) means agricultural income as defined for
the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian
Income-tax.
The terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purpose"
not having been defined in the Indian Income-tax Act,
we must necessarily fall back upon the general sense
in which they have been understood in common
parlance. "Agriculture" in its root sense means ager,
a field and culture, cultivation, cultivation of field
which of course implies expenditure of human skill
and labour upon land. The term has, however,
acquired a wider significance and that is to be found in
the various dictionary meanings ascribed to it. It may
be permissible to look the dictionary meaning of the
term in the absence of any definition thereof in the
relevant statutes. As was observed by Lord Coleridge
in _R._ v. _Peters(')_ :
"I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be
taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of
words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a wellknown rule of courts of law that words should be taken
to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books."
Cozens-Hardy, M.R., also said in _Camden (Mar-_
_quis)_ v. _l.R. C._ (') :
"H is for the Court to interpret the statute as
best it may. In so doing the Courts may no doubt
assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any
literary help they can find, including of course the
consultation of standard authors and reference to wellknown and authoritative dictionaries."
S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 109
Turning therefore to the dictionary meaning of 1957
"agriculture" we find Webster's New International _11ie Commissioner_
Dictionary describing it as "the art or science of _of Income-tax,_
cultivating the ground, including rearing and manage- _w<!a1:':i'f%_ _[01]_ _•_
ment of livestock, husbandry, farming, etc. and also . . _v._
including in its broad sense farming, horticulture, Ra10/1f:YR~;"'ar
forestry, butter and cheese-making etc.". Murray's
Oxford Dictionary describes it a~ "the science and art _Bhagwati_ _J._
of cultivating the soil; including the allied pursuits of
gathering in the crop and rearing livestock; tillage
husbandry, farming (in the widest sense)". In ..,,..
Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting the Standard
Dictionary "agriculture" is defined as "the cultivation of soil for food products or any other useful or
valuable growths of the field of garden; tillage ;
husbandry; also, by extension, farming, including
any industry practised by cultivator of the soil in
connection with such cultivation, as breeding and
rearing of stock, dairying, etc. The science that treats
of the cultivation of the soil".
In Corpus Juris the term "agriculture" has been ""
understood to mean : · "art or science of cultivating
the ground, especially in fields or large quantities,
including the preparation of the soil, the planting of
seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the
rearing, feeding and management of livestock; tillage,
husbandry and farming. In its gerleral s_ense the
word also includes gardening or horticulture".
Bhasyam Ayyangar J. in _Murugesa Chetti_ v.
_Chinnathambi_ _Goundan_ ( [1] ) gave the following dictionary
meanings of agriculture a.s culled out from the Century
Dictionary anc! Anderson's Dictionary of Law:
"The primary meaning of agriculture is the _/_
cultivation of the ground (The Century Dictionary)
and in its general sense it is the cultivation of the
ground for the purpose of procuring vegetables and
fruits for the use of man and beast including gardening
or horticulture and the raising or feeding of cattle and
other stock (Anderson's Dictionary of Law). Its less
general and more. ordinary signification is the cultivation with the plough and in large areas in order to raise
(1) (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423.
IlO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
19$7 food for man and beast (The Century Dictionary) or,
_The_ _Commissioner_ in other words, "that species of cultivation which is
"//~co;e-1".f intended to riase grain and other field crops for man
Ca/cu~': ' and beast." (Anderson's Dictionary of Law). Horti_Rqj_ _B_ v. _/(,_ culture, which denotes the cultivation of garden or
"//~co;e-1".f intended to riase grain and other field crops for man
'
_0_
_sa'f.":.'&;mar_ orchards, is a species of agriculture in its primary and
_Bhagwati_ _J._ more general sense."
Ramesam J. in _Panadai Pathan_ v _Ramasami_
_Chetti_ (') referred to the following connotation of
'agricultrure';
"Wharton's Law Lexicon adopts the definition of
"agriculture" in 8 Edw. VII, c. 36, as including
"horticulture, forestry, and the use of land for any
purpose of husbandry etc. In 10 Edw. VII, c. 8 s. 41,
it was defined so as to include the use of land as
"meadow" or pasture land or orchard or osier or woodland, or for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments, etc. In 57 and 58 Viet. c. 30 s. 22, the term
'agricultural property' was defined so as to include
agricultural land, pasture and woodland, etc."
These are the various meanings ascribed to the term
" ·"agriculture" in various dictionaries and it is significant to note that the term has been used both in the
narrow sense of the cultivation of the field and the
wider sense of comprising all activities in relation to
the land incl~ding horticulture, forestry, breeding and
rearing of livestock, dairying, butter and cheesemaking, husbandry etc.
It was urged on behalf of the assessee that the
Court should accept the wider significance of the term
and include forestry operations also within its
connotation .even though they did not involve tilling
of the land, sowing of seeds, planting, or similar work
on the land. The argument was that tilling of the land,
sowing of the seeds planting or similar work on the
land were no doubt agricultural operations and if they
were part of the forestry operations carried on by the
assessee the subsequent operations would certainly be
a continuation of the same and would therefore acquire
the characteristic of agricultural operations. But the
(1) (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 710.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 111
absence of these basic operations would not necessarily 1957
make any difference to the character of the subsequent _The_ _Ccmmissioner_
operations and would not divest them of their _o{v. lltCOme-':i,_
character of agricultural operations, so that if in a c~S:::: .
particular case one found that the forest was of _Ra'_ n!'. .,
_Ra'_
- f _c_ - _ga_ _,,.,,,oy,.umQT_
spontaneous grow, even so th i 1orestry operations _Sa/tas_ _Roy_
were carried on in such forests for the purpose of
furthering the growth of forest trees, these operations _BhagwatiJ._
would also enjoy the character of agricultural opera·
tions. If breeding and rearing of livestock, dairying,
butter and cheese-making etc., could be compri~d
within the term "agriculture", it was asked, why
should these also be not classed as agricultural
operations.
Considerable stress was laid on the fact that
s. 4(3) (viii) of the Act enacted a provision in: regard to
the exemption of "agricultural income" from assessment and it was contended that exemptions should be
liberally construed. Reliance was placed on the observa~
tions of Vishwanatha Sastri J. in _Commissioner_ _of_
_Income-tax, Madras_ v. _K.E. Sundara Mudaliar(1) :_
"Exemption from tax granted by a Statute should
be given full scope and amplitude and should not be
whittled down by importing limitations not inserted
by the Legislature."
Mookerjee J. in _Commissioner_ _of_ _Agricultural_
_Income -tax, West Bengal_ v. _Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo_
_Dhabal_ . _Deb_ (2) also expressed himself similarly :
"and the present day view seems to be that where
an exemption is conferred by statute, that clause 'has
to be interpreted liberally and in favour of the assessee
but must always be without any violence to the
language used. The rule must be construed together
with the exempting provisions, which must be regarded
as paramount."
He also quoted a passage from _The_ _Upper_ _India_
_Chamber of Commerce_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax,_
_C.P.& U.P._ (3) :
(1)[1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. (3) [1947] 15 I,T.R. 263, A.LR. 1948 All, 7n
(g) (1949] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438.
M2SC-S
ll2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 "It is needless to observe that, as in the present
_The Commisswner_ case, we are concerned with the interpretation of an
_of_ _Inoome-tax,_ exemption clause in a taxing statute that clause must
_West calcutta Bengal,_ b e, as f; ar as poss1 'bl l'be e, 1 ra y construe an m avour 11 ' d d · f:
_v_ of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the
_R_ _**a1a**_ [. ] [Bev. ] _**noy**_ _**,,..u111ar**_ l d,,
_sa1ias_ _Roy_ anguage use .
_West calcutta Bengal,_ b e, as f; ar as poss1 'bl l'be e, 1 ra y construe an m avour 11 ' d d · f:
_Bhagwati_ _J._ It was also pointed out that "Taxes on agricultural
income" formed a head of legislation specified in item
46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and should be liberally construed, with the result
that agriculture should be understood in the wider
significance of the term and all agricultural income
derived from agriculture or so understood should be
included within the category. There was authority
for the proposition that the expression "agricultural
land" mentioned in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, should
be interpreted in its wider significance as including
lands which are used or are capable of being used for
raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other
purpose of husbandry. [see _Sarojinidevi_ v. _Shri_
_Krishna Anjanneya Subrahmanyam_ ( [1] ) and _Megh Raj_ v.
_Allah Rakhia_ (').
While recognizing the force of the above expressions
of opinion we cannot press them into service in favour
of the assessee for the simple reason that "agricultural
income" has been defined in the Constitution itself in
Art. 366(1) to mean agricultural income as defined for
the purposes of enactments relating to Indian incometax and there is a definition of "agricultural income"
to be found in s. 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
We have therefore got to look to the terms of the
definition itself and construe the same regardless of any
other consideration, though, in so far as the terms
"agriculture" and "agricultural purposes" are
concerned, we feel free in view of the same not having
been defined in the Act itself to consider the various
meanings which have been ascribed to the same in the
legal and other dictionaries.
(1) I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 61 (2) [1942] F.C.R. 53,62.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 113
We may also note here the dictionary meanings of 1957
the terms "Forestry" and "Cultivation." The Shorter _The_ _c;;;;;;issioner_
Oxford Dictionary, Vol I. page 735, gives the meaning _of_ _Income-tax,_
of "forestry" as the "science and art of forming and _wc:i,::,i;:ai,_
cultivating forest~, management of growing timber." _R_ . _B_ v. _Kumar_
Webster's New lnternationtal Dictionary, Vol. I,· a''Sat:J:~oy
page 990, gives the following meaning of forestry:
"Science and art of farming, caring for, or culti- _Bhagwati_ _J._ vating forests; the management of growing timber."
Webster's New International Dictionary. Vol. I,
page 643, while talking of cultivation says that "to
cultivate" means "(i) to prepare, or to prepare and
use, for the raising of crops; to till; as to cultivate
the soil; to loosen or break up the soil about. (growing
crop or plants) for the purpose of killing weeds, etc.
especially with a cultivator, as to cultivate the corn;
(2) to raise, or foster the growth of, by tillage or
by labour and care; to produce by culture; as to
cultivate roses; to cultivate oysters."
Whether the narrower or the wider sense of the term /
.. agriculture" should be adopted in a particular case
depends not only upon the provisions of the various
statutes in which the same occurs but also upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. The definition of the
term in one statute does not afford a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the
sense in which the terin has been understood in the
several statutes does not necessarily throw any light
on the manner in which the term should be understood
generally. The decided cases disclose a variety of
opinions in regard to the connotation of the terms
"agriculture" and "agricultural purposes." At one
time "agriculture" was understood in its primary
sense of cultivation of field and that too for production
of food crops for human beings and beasts. This
limited interpretation could not be adhered to even
though tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting
or similar work on the land were the basic operations,
the scope of the crops produced was enlarged and all
crops raised on the land, whether they be food crops
or not were included in the produce raised by agriculture. There was however another school of thought
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 which extended the term "agriculture" and included
_The Commissioner_ within its connotation not only the products raised by
0{v~n;o;::;:"t• the cultivation of the land but also allied activities
_ca1c.,1:'_ which had relation to the land and operations which
_Raja Be;:;,y_ _Kumar_ had the . effect of fostering the growth, ~reservation
_sa1ias Roy_ and mamtenance as also the regenerat10n of the
_Bhagwati_ _J._ products of the land, thus bringing within its compass
not only the basic agricultural operations but also the
further operations performed on the products of the
land even though they were not necessarily accompanied by these preliminary basic operations. _AB_
against these cases which dealt with these preliminary
basic operations and also the further operations either
by themselves or•in conjunction with the former which
of course necessarily involved in the expenditure of
human skill and labour in carrying out those operations, there were instances of products of land which
grew wild or were of spontaneous growth without the
expenditure of human skill and Jabour and which it
was agreed on all hands could not be comprised within
"agriculture" and the income from which could not
fall within the definition of "agricultural income".
We shall briefly discuss the various cases dealing with
these different aspects and try to evolve some principle
therefrom which would serve as a guide in the determination of the question before us.
_Kunhaven Haji_ v. _Mavan_ (') was the earliest case in
which it was held that a lease of a coffee garden wai;
not an agricultural lease within the meaning of Transfer
of Property Act, s. 117. The case however concerned itself with the situation where as far as the
Court could gather from the Karar the lease was of the
coffee plants only. There was no further discussion of
the legal position and it may be noted that Shephard,
J., who was a party to this decision stated in the later
case of _Murugesa Chetti_ v. _Chinnathambi Gounden_ (2)
that he was wrong in the opinion he expressed with
regard to a coffee garden in this case.
_Murugesa Chetti_ v. _Chinnathambi Goundan_ (2) also
was concerned with s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. The lease there was a lease of land for
(1) (1893) l.L.R. 17 Mad. g8. _(2)_ [1901) l.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 115
the cultivation of betel and the Court held that 1957
such a lease was an agricultural lease falling _The commissioner_
under s. 117. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., who delivered _of_ _Income-tax,_
the main judgment of the Court discussed the w~~1:;:at,
dictionary meanings of the term "agriculture" and . v.
stated that in s • 117 of the Transfer of Property Act it _Ra;a Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy_
was used in its more general sense as comprehending
the raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden _Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_
products as food for men or beast, though some of
them may be regarded in England as products of
horticulture as distinguished from agriculture. The
learned Judge considered the distinction between
"agriculture" and "horticulture" and observed :
''The distinction between agriculture when it is
used otherwise than in its primary and more general
sense and horticulture is a fine one even in England
and in India, especially, it will be impossible in the
case of several products of the land to draw a line
between agriculture and horticulture according to
English notions. The only practical distinction which
I can suggest and one which will give effect to the
policy of the Legislature in exempting agricultural
leases from the operations of section 107, etc., of the
Transfer of Property Act is to regard as agriculture, as
distinguished from horticulture, not only all field
cultivation by tillage but also all garden cultivation
for the purpose chiefly of procuring vegetables or fuits
as food for man or beast and other products fit for
human consumption by way of luxury, if not as an
article of diet."
He then discussed the policy of exemption setting out
the observations of Cave. J. in _Ellis_ & _Co._ v. _Hilse_ (1):
"The very object of this exemption is the wellknown one of favourin$ agriculture-an old object of
English Legislation in favour of a very important
industry",
and stated:
"This observation of Mr. Justice Cave will apply
with much greater force in this country where the
agricultural industry is more important than in
England and is one that is common to wet cultivation
(') { 1889) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 24.
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958J
1957 as to garden and dry cultivation, the object of all such
_T'_ _c-;;;;;;;;sioncr_ cultivation being chiefly to procure food for men and
·~f _Income-zax,_ cattle and other products of the soil which are
wg~1!,,~7%01 usually consumed by the people as gentle stimulants
v. or by way of luxury. Betel leaf is an article of daily
_11_ ~":,0 ~,:C,:11110' consumption with all classes in this country as
Rai~ ~":,0 ~,:C,:
_11_
- tobacco leaf is with most classes and betel vine is
_Blwo,,-ur;_ _[1]_ _•_ generally grown side by side with plantations, the
products of which are among the chief articles of
vegetable food."
The lease in that case being one for the cutivation
of betel was therefore held to be agricultural lease and
Shephard, J., agreed with this conclusion revising the
opinion which he had expressed earlier in _Kunhavan_
_Haji_ v. _Mavan (supra)._
In _Raja_ _of_ _Venkatagiri_ v. _Ayyappa Reddy_ (') the
question was whether land usually fit only for pasturing cattle and not for cultivation, i.e., ploughing and
raising agricultural crops, was "ryoti" land, though it
might have been "old waste" and a tenant of such land
was a "ryot" and any amount agreed to be paid for
pasturing cattle was "rent" within the definitions of
s. 3 of the l\1adras Estates Land Act (Mad. 1 of 1908).
The Court held that such land was not "ryoti" land
inasmuch as it was not fit for ploughing and raising
agricultural crops. The ordinary meaning of "agriculture" was taken to be "the raising of annual <:>r
periodical grain crops through the operations of
ploughing, sowing, etc." (Per Sadasiva Ayyar, J.,
at page 741).
_The_ _Chief Commissioner_ _of Income Tax, Madras_ v.
_Zamindar_ _of Singampatti_ (') was a reference arising out
of the assessment for income-tax under Act VII of 1918
of the income derived by the Zamindar of Singampatti
from forests and fisheries within the ambit of his
Zamindari. The assessee objected to the assessment
(i) on the ground that the income was agricultural
income within the meaning of s. 4 of the Act and
therefore, not chargeablP. to income-tax; (ii) that the
(1J [1913) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 738. _(•)_ _[19,>]I.L.R._ 45 Mad. 5•8 (F.D.)
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 117
assessment was illegal as contravening the terms of 19~7
his permanent sanad for the Zamindari and the pro- _The commissioner_
visions of Regulation :XXV of 1802; The Court held _of Income-tax,_
that where the peishkush of a permanently ' settled wc~1:1:t~al,
estate was fixed in commutation not only of the . Be~. _'/[,_
rentals of the cultivated lands but also of all income Ra'~a11:'s0~0;mar
which might be derived from forests or fisheri~s,
both under the terms of the sanad and s. I of Regula- _Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_
tion :XXV of 1802, these incomes were exempt from
further taxation by the Government, and s. 3 of the
Income-tax Act did not abrogate this exemption. In
view of this conclusion the Court did not think it
necessary to determine whether income from forests
or fisheries came under the definition of "agricultural
income". The Court, however, pointed out that "a
reference to Murray's and Webster's dictionaries
shows that the word "agriculture", while sometimes
used in the narrow sense of the art or science of
cultivating the ground, is also used in a much wider
sense so as to include even "forestry'', according to
Webster. In which sense it was used by the framers
of the Income-tax Act would be a matter for determination and to this end it would not be out of place to
consider the probable reason for the exemption of
agricultural income from income-tax. No other reason
is suggested than the equity of exempting from further
burden income· which had already paid toll to the
State in the shape of land revenue."
The question, therefore, whether the income from
forests would be "agricultural income" within the
meaning of s. 4 of the Income-tax Act was thus· left
open and the decision that income from forests was
not liable to income-tax was reached under the terms
of the Sanad of s. I of Regulation No. 25 of 1802.
_Kaju Mal_ v. _Salig Ram_ (1) was concerned _inter alia_
with a field in which tea was grown and the question
was whether the land fell within the definition of
"agricultural income" or "village imrooveable
property" as given in s. 3(i) and (ii) of the Punjab
Pre-emption Act, 1905. The Court held that fields
planted with tea bushes were fields used for agricultural
(1) [1919) P.R. No. 19. p. 237.
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_19s1_ purposes and this decision was affirmed by the Privy
_Tlze Commissioner_ Council in _Kaju Mall_ v. _Salig Ram_ (1). It was held
_0_ _0_
_fj,":,_ _1;;,{g":J•_ that the words "agricultural purposes" in s. 2(iii) of
_Calcutta_ ' the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, included the
u,,; 2 ne:~.v _Kumar_ cultivation of tea; consequently, land which was
_Sa!'.as_ _Roy_ not occupied as the site of any building in a town or
_liltagwati_ _J._ village, and was occupied or let for the cultivation
of tea was "agricultural land" within the meaning of
s. 3(i) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905.
_Emperor_ v. _Probhat Chandra Barua_ (')was a case
under the Indian Income-tax Act and the classes of
income derived from permanently settled estates were
"1. Income from fisheries. 2. Income from land used
for stacking timber. 3. Income from pasturage." The
income from the first two heads was certainly not
agricultural income or income derived from "land
which is used for agricultural purposes" within the
meaning of ss. 2 and 4 of the Act. But income derived
from pasturage was held to be agricultural income
which could not lawfully be charged with income-tax.
There was a difference of opinion between Rankin, J.,
and Page, J., in regard to the liability of income from
fisheries and income from land used for stacking
timber based on the construction of the Permanent
Settlement Regulations of 1793. But that is immaterial
for our present purposes. What is material is that
both the learned Judges were unanimous in their
opinion that income from pasturage was income
derived from "land which is used for agricultural
purposes" and was, therefore; within the exemption
given by s. 4(3) (viii) to agricultural income as defined
by s.2(l)(a) of the Act.
In _Kesho Prasad Singh_ v. _Sheo Pragash Ojha_ (') the
Privy Council held that a grove was not land "held
for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of
s. 70 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, affirming the
decision of the High Court of Allahabad that it was
impossible to hold that that section had any application
whatever to such a property as the grove in fact was.
(1) (1223] I.L.R. 5 Lah. 50.
(2) (1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 504.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119
_The_ _Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras_ v. _T._ _Mana-_ 1957
_vedan_ _Tirumalpad_ (') was also a decision under the _The_ ~issioner
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922) and the assessee _[0]_ _f.t,llCB:tax,_
there was assessed by the Income-tax Officer for the C:fc,,11~gal,
year 1928-29 on the amount received by the sale of . __,v·_ .
timber trees cut and removed from the forests. The Rq;~·~~'."'"" _8_
question was whether these amounts were liable a-s
such to income-tax and the Court observed : _Bhagwari_ _[1]_ _·_
" ....... we are unable to distinguish between the
income derived from the sale of paddy which is grown
on land and the income derived from the sale of timber
cut in a forest; but the profits earned from the sale of
paddy would be assessable to income-tax but for the
special exemption given to that income in the Incometax Act, by reason of its being agricultural income.
There is such exemption in the case of income derived
from the sale of timber."
There is no further discussion to be found in the
judgment which would throw light on the question
whether such receipts by the assessee were agricultural
income and as such exempt from income-tax.
The later decision of the Madras High Court in
_Chandrasekhara_ _Bharathi_ _Swamigal_ v. _Duraisami_
_Naidu_ (2) however contains an elaborate discussion as
to the connotation of the term "agriculture". The
case arose under the Madras Estates· Land Act (Mad.
I of 1908) and the question which the Court had to
consider was whether growing casuarina trees, i.e.,
trees for fuel, was an agricultural purpose so as to
make the person who held the land for that purpose a
"ryot" within the meaning of the Madras Estates
Land Act. The Court held that land held for growing
casuarina trees was not land held for purposes of
agriculture and the person holding the land for that
purpose was not a "ryot" within the meaning of the
Act. '.Vhile . delivering the judgment of the Court
Reilly, J., embarked upon a consideration of what the
term "agriculture" meant and came to the conclusion
that agriculture could not be defined by the nature of
the product cultivated but should be defined rather by
(1) [1930) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 21 (S.B.) (2) [1931) l.L.R. 54 Mad. 900.
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19581
1957 the circumstances in which the cultivation was carried
_The Commissioner_ on. He observed at page 902 :
_of lnconie-tax._ - h
1957
_West Bengal,_ "I agree wit the remark of Shephard, J., in
_Calcutta_ _Murugesa Chetti_ v. _Chinnathambi Goundan_ (0 that a
_Raja_ ee~~Y _Kumar_ man who plants or maintains trees for firewood is not
_Sahas_ _Roy_ in ordinary parlance an agriculturist. If we take the
_Bhagwati_ _J._ strict meaning of "agriculture" according to its
derivation, it means the cultivation of a field, the
cultivation of an open space, as opposed to horticulture,.
the cultivation of a comparatively small enclosed
space. The cultivation either of the field in agriculture or of the garden in horticulture cannot be
confined, I think, to any particular product. With
great respect, I do not agree with the opinion of
Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in _Murugesa Chetti_ v. _Chinna-_
_thambi Goundan_ (')that agirculture implies production of
things useful as food for men or beast or other products
fit for human consumption by way of luxury. That
appears to me to be too narrow an interpretation. Still
less do I agree with the opinion expressed by Sadasiva
Ayyar, J., in _Raja_ _of Venkatagiri_ v. _Ayyappa Reddi_
that agriculture is confined to the production of grain
crops. I can see no reason why the cultivation in
open spaces of such useful products as cotton, jute,
. flax and hemp should not be agriculture. Indeed I
think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of
the products- cultivated but should be defined rather
by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried
on. In some cases it has been suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage. I think it can easily be
shown that agriculture was carried on in this ~orld
before ploughs were invented. In the p~nt day in
many places cultivation is done with spades and not
with ploughs, but the planting of timber or firewood
trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable
number of years, forming plantations or woods or
forests, appears to me to be opposed to the idea of
agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is
true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first to prepare the land.
(1} [1901] I.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423 (>} [1913] I.L.R. 38 Mad. 738.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 121
Later on it may be necessary to protect and water 1957
the young plants. Still later it may be necessary to _171c Commissioner_
thin out the plantation. But, when the land is covered 0{l;~0;:~~':;1:
thin out the plantation. But, when the land is covered 0{l;~0;:~~':;1:
with trees which had to stand on it for a number of _Calcutta_
years, sometimes as long as a century, during most of _R_ 01. _B_ v. 0 _K_ _ma·_
which period the land itself is untouched, to describe ~ah~~ 1l<o;'
01 0
which period the land itself is untouched, to describe ~ah~~ 1l<o;'
that as agriculture appears to me inappropriate. To _Bilagwati.f._
my mind it is something very different from the
cultivation of a field or of an open space It may be
noticed that in _Kesho_ _Prasad Singh_ v. _Sheo Pragash_
_Ojha_ (1) their Lordhips of the Privy Council approved
- of the opinion expressed by two learned judges of the
Allahabad High Court that land let for a grove was
not let for an agricultural purpose. It happened that
the case then under consideration was one arising under
the Agra Tenancy Act. But in that Act there is no
definition of 'agriculture'. Therefore both the learned
judges of the Allahabad High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Co1~ncil were, we may take it
considering what is the meaning of the word 'agriculture' in its general sense. I may mention also that
in _Commissioner_ _of Income Tax_ v. _Manavedan Tint-_
_malpad_ (2) a Full Bench of this Court remarked that
income from cutting timber was not agricultural
income."
01~ah~~
It may be noticed that the learned Judge enlarged
the connotatiqn of the term "agriculture" by having
regard to the circumstances in which the cultivation
was carried on rather than the nature of the products
cultivated and embraced within the scope of the term
not merely the production of things useful as food for
man or beast or other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury but also such useful products as
cotton, jute, flax and hemp, though he stopped short
at those products and hesitated to include therein
growing of trees in plantation where the land was
covered with trees which have to stand on it for a
number of years.
The last case to be ref erred in this series in that of
_Deen_ _Mohammad Mian_ v. _Hulas Narain Singh_ (2)
(2) (1952) 23 Pat. L.T. 143, 152
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
1957 where it was held that an orchard is an agricultural
_Tire Commissioner_ land. It WaS Observed :
_0_ _1_ I~mc-tax, "The case of an orchard is quite different. Orchard
_West Bengal,_ d. . d be
_calcutta_ trees or manly are, an can presumed to have been,
Ben~y _Kumar_ plante~ b~ men after preparation of the ground whic~
- _Sahas_ _Roy_ is cult1vat1on and seasonal crops are gathered. Frtut
_Eliagirnti 1._ trees also require seasonal attention such as pruning
and digging of the soil around the roots and it cannot
be said that this ceases to be cultivation merely because
the whole tree is not replanted every year . .... ...• . . .
'~"ia Ben~y _Kumar_ plante~ b~ men after preparation of the ground whic~
. . . . . . . . In my opinion the land in suit is agricultural
land; it is land from which by preparing the soil and
planting and cultivating trees the raiyat expects to
enjoy periodical returns in the way of produce for
food."
This was a further extension of the idea which had
germinated in the opinion expressed by Reilly, J., in
_Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamigal_ v. _C.P. Duraisami_
_Naidu_ (') and even plantation of trees in orchards
which did not require to be replanted every year was
included in the connotation of the term "agriculture".
A still further extension of the term is to be found
in the following observations of Vishwanatha Sastri, J.,
in _The Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax, Madras_ v. _K.E._
_Sundara_ _Mudaliar_ (2) at p. 273 :
"It is a matter of ordinary experience, at least in
this part of the country, that mango, cocoanut,
palrnyra, orange, jack, arecanut, tamarind and other
trees are planted usually in an enclosed land, and that
these trees do not yield any fruit or crop in the early
years of their growth. They remain on the land for a
Jong number of years yielding fruit only after their
maturity. There is no reason why the planting,
rearing, watering, fencing and protection of such trees
and the gathering of their fruits during the annual
seasons should not be held to be "agriculture''. There
is some kind of cultivation or prodding of the soil at
the inception when the planting is done and subsequently also at intervals. In the case of coffee grown
on hill slopes, there is no ploughing or tillage as in the
(1) {1 93 1} I.I •. R. 5'i Mad. 9<x1
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPO.RTS 123
case of wet and dry fields; but it cannot be main- 1957
tained that growing coffee is not an agricultural _The._ ca~siotrl!f'
operation. Coffee and tea plants stand on the soil for _0_ _1,t;r;:;::f,· 0_
many years, and their produce is gathered periodically. _ca1c111ra_
_0_
.
_ca1c111ra_
In the _padugai_ lands or lands lying between the sandy _Raja ;;,,,,Y K"mct_
bed and flood bank of rivers, plantains are grown in _Sa/rQs Roy_
many places in deltaic tracts. Young plants are often _Bhagwati_ _J._
brought and planted in pits dug for the purpose in a
row with sufficient interspaces. Trenches are dug by
the side of a row of plantain trees in order to catch and
detain water. The plantain trees last for about two
years, and from each tree off-shoots spring up and
grow in place of the parent tree. There is thus a
natural replenishment of the plantain garden. It
cannot be said that the raising of plantains is not an
agricultural purpose. Similarly in the case of sugarcane the plants stand on the land for two years or a
little more, and there are usually two cuttings. Castor
plants stand for some years on the soil and the seeds
are periodically gathered in. Ba,inboo is often planted
in enclosed lands by digging pits, filling them with
sand and manure and then planting the young stalks
in a bunch at suitable distances. Watering is done forthe first 2 or 3 years. Every year, the land surrounding
each bamboo cluster is dig with a spade and small
earthen ridges are put up so as to catch and retain rain
water. Bamboo plants attain maturity in about 3 or
4 years, and the thorny branches which grow on the
main stem are then fit to be cut off and used for f encing purposes .................... I am unable to see
why these operations are not agricultural operations."
The cases above noted all of them interpret the term
"agriculture" in its narrower sense, though there is a
marked progress from the extremely narrow construction put upon it by Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in
_Murugesa Cehtti_ v. _Chinnathambi Goundan_ C) to somewhat wider connotation thereof adopted by Reilly J.
in _Chandrasekhara Bharathi Swamiga/v. C.P. Duraisami_
_Naidu_ (2) and by Vishwanatha Sastri J. in _The_ _Com-_
_missioner_ _of_ _Income-tax, Madras_ v. _K.E._ _Sundra-_
(2) [1931) 1.L.R. 54 Mad. gJo.
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
J9S7 _Muddaliar_ ('). It is interesting to note that all
_The_ _co--;;;;;;issio11cr_ throughout these cases runs the central idea of either
_0_
_r{.,f,•<J:,;!f•_ t\ll3:ge of thke landhor sodwinhg. ohf .seeds orhplanting_ or
_Calcutta_ s1m1 1ar wor on t e an w 1 IC mvests t e operat10n
_R_ . _;·_ _g_ with the characteristic of agricultural operations and
_010_ _8_ _110_
_010_ _8_ _110_
_sah":!R_ _0';_ _'_ whenever that central idea is fulfilled there is the user
-· - of land for agricultural purposes and the income deriv_.fihagii-ati_ _J._ d h f b . 1 1 .
e t ere rom ecomes agncu tura mcome.
There were, on the other hand, decisions which
interpreted the term "agriculture" in the wider sense
as including all activities in relation to the land even
though they did not comprise these basic agricultural
operations. _King Emperor_ v. _Alexander Allen_ (')
involved the interpretation of the expression "land used
solely for agricultural pruposes" in sub-s. (3) of s. 63 of
the Madras District Municipalities Act (Mad. IV of
1884) as amended by the Madras District Municipalities
Amendment Act (Mad. III of 1897) and the Court held
that the lands on which potatoes, grain, vegetables,
etc., were grown, as well as pasture land, were used
"solely ior agricultural purposes" within the meaning
of the sub-section. The court adopted the definition
of agricultural land given in the Agricultural Rates
Act (59 and 60 Viet., Chap. 16) s. 9:
"The expression "agricultural land" means any
land used as arable, meadow, or pasture ground only,
cottage gardens exceeding one-quarter of an acre,
market gardens, nursery grounds, orchards, or allotments, but does not include land occupied together
with a house as a park, gardens other than as aforesaid
pleasure grounds or any land kept or preserved mainly
or exclusively for purposes of sport or recreation or land
used as a race course."
and also the meaning ascribed to it in Murray's Oxford
English Dictionary quoted above and observed:
"We also note that it is there pointed out that the
restriction of the word agriculture to tillage as in the
following quotation is rare. The lands were not fields
for agriculture but pastures for cattle. We believe that
we cannot do better than follow these definitions in
(I) [1950) 18 l.T.R. 059, 071.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 125
.attempting to decide what, for the purposes of sub- 1957
section (3) of section 63 of the Municipalities Act, are or _The_ _Commissioner_
.are not lands used solely f ~r agricultural .P~rpo.ses $fs~7::;':t
•••••••••• _4_ ; We do not consider that any distinction _Calcutta_
can be drawn between large and small plots of lands _R 01_ . &· _K_
on which roots of grain are cultivated. All such land _'S0ha2°.k0y_
_01_
_'S0ha2°.k0y_
_01_ _111110_
on which roots of grain are cultivated. All such land _'S0ha2°.k0y_ _'_
must be held to be land used solely for agricultural
h h _Bhagwati_ _J._
purposes .... Counsel has urged be1ore [" ] us t at t ese
t10-called waste lands are pasture lands and as such
should be held to be lands used solely for agricultural
purposes .... _1_, •••• If, therefore, it could be shown
- that these so-called waste lands were in reality pasture
grounds or lands used for "rearing livestock", we
should certainly decide that they were lands used solely
for agricultural purposes."
## - [_, ]
The learned Judges there were inftuenced by the
dictionary meaning of the term agriculture as given in
Murray's New Oxford Dictionary and understood the
term agriculture in the wider sense as including the
user of land for rearing livestock also.
In _Panadai Pathan_ v. _Ramaswami Chetti_ (') a lease
of land was given for growing casuarina trees and the
question was whether such a lease was a lease for
agricultural purposes within the meaning of s. 117 of
the Transfer of Property Act. The Court held that it
was a lease for agricultural purposes and therefore did
not require a registered instrument for its creation.
Spence J. in the course of his judgment differed from
the opinion of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in _Murugesa_
_Chetti_ v. _Chinnathambi_ _Goundan_ (2) that the word
agriculture in its more general sense comprehends the
raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden products
as food for man or beast, if the learned Judge intended
thereby to limit it to the raising of food products. For
to so restrict the word would be to exclude flower,
indigo, cotton, jute, flax, tobacco and other such cultivation. He also differed from the opinion expressed
by Sadasi Ayyar J. in _Seshayya_ v. _Rajah_ of
(1) [192~) l.L.R. 45 Mad. 7rn.
(2) [1901) l.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423.
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958J
_19s1_ _Pittapur_ (') and _Rajah_ _of_ _Venkatagiri_ v. _Ayyappa_
_Th•_ _comlftissi<Jw_ _Reddi_ (2) that agriculture meant the raising of annual
3; _In'B:;'f_ - or periodical grain crops through the operation of
_c::C.11._ - ploughing, sowing, etc., as such definition would
. •· exclude sugarcane, indigo, tea, ftower, tobacco, and
_R•_ _[1]_ _'S.f!"%/_ _[0]_ _Y_ betel cultivation from agriculture. He then referred
to the dictionary meaning of the term "agriculture"
_Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_ as given in the Oxford Dictionary and the Bouvier's
Law Dictionary set out above and observed :
"In my opinion agriculture connotes the raising
of useful or valuable products which derive nutriment
from the soil with the aid of human skill and labour;
and thus it will include horticulture, arboriculture and
silviculture, in all cases where growth of trees is effected
by the expenditure of human care and attention in
such operations as those of ploughing, sowing, planting,
pruning, manuring, watering, protecting etc."
Ramesam, J, who delivered a concurring judgment
referred to the definition of agriculture adopted in
Wharton's Law Lexicon and was of opinion that it
would include the use of land as "meadow or pasttsre
o;- orchard or osier or woodland, or for market gardens,
nursery grounds or allotments etc." but would exclude
all cultivation of fibrous plants such as cotton, jute and
linen and all plants used for dyeing purposes, such as
indigo, etc., and all timber trees and flowering plants
etc. According to him, the rearing of a casuarina
plantation requires some preparation of the ground
and subsequent care by watering the plants and he
was therefore of opinion that rearing of casuarina
trees was an agricultural purpose within the meaning
of s. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act.
It may be observed however that according to both
the learned Judges some preparation of the ground or
some expenditure of human care and attention in such
operations as those ploughing, sowing, planting etc.,
was considered essential for constituting these operations agricultural operations.
In _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax, Burma_ v. _Kokine_
_Dairy, Rangoon_ (') the question was whether income
**(1)** [1916) 31 ~l.L.J. 2IJ.1; 1916 M.W.N·. :166. (3) (1936] 61..1'.R. 'jo2,509.
{:.l) [191:11 I.L.lt. 38 ~lad. 73H.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 127
from a dairy farm and the milk derived from the farm 1957
is agricultural income and exempt as such from income- _Tire_ _commissioner_
tax. Roberts C.J., who delivered the opinion of the _0fw.IncBeome-talax,_
_estng,_
C ourt o serve : b d _Calcutta_
"Where cattle are wholly stall-fed and not pastured _R_ . _B_ v. _K_
upon the land at all, doubtless it is trade and no _a_ _[1]_ _"sa%::YRo;mar_
agricultural operation is being carried on; where cattle
are being exclusively or mainly pastured and are _BhagwatiJ._
none the less fed with small amounts of oil-cake or the
like, it may well be that the income derived from the
sale of their milk is agricultural income. But between
the two extremes there must be a number of varying
degrees, and the task of the Income-tax Officer is to
apply his mind to the two distinctions and to decide
in any particular case on which side of the fence, if I
may use the term, the matter falls".
He then referred to the case of _Lean and Dickinson_ v.
_Ball_ (1) where Lord Cullen had said that he proceeded on the footing that the case, which was one dealing
with poultry-farming, was one in which the poultry
derived sustenance to a material extent from the
produce of the ground.
This method of approach was on a par with the one
adopted by Lord Wright in _Lord Glanely_ v. _Wightman_
(2) where it was observed :
"If authority were needed the provisions just
quoted do at least show that profits of 'occupation'
include gains from the animal produce as well as the
agricultural, horticultural, or arboricultural produce of
the soil; ............ equally it is obvious that the
rearing of animals, regarded as they must be as products of the soil-since it is from the soil that they
draw their sustenance and on the soil they liveis a source of profit from the occupation of land,
whether these animals are for consumption as food
(such as bullocks, pigs or chickens), or for the provision
of food (such as cows, goats or fowls), or for recreation
(such as hunters or race horses), or for use (such as
draught or plough horses). All these animals are
appurtenant to the soil, in the relevant sense for this
purpose, as much as trees, wheat crops, flowers or roots
though no doubt they differ in obvious respects. Nor
(2) (1925) 10 Tax Cas. 341.
M2SC6l-9
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958J
195
7 is it now material towards determining what are pro_The Commissioner_ ducts of occupation that farming has developed in its
_0_ _1_ _Income-tax,_ use of mechanical appliances and power, not only in
_West Bengal, Calcutta_ sue matters as p oug mg, reapmg, t res mg, an so h I h' . h h' d
_Raja 8,";,,y Kumar_ forth, but in sue~ ancient methods of preparing its
_sahas_ _Roy_ products as makmg cream, butter or cheese. The
_Bhagwati_ _J._ farmer is still dealing with the products of the soil, and
Schedule B covers the income."
The House of Lords were dealing with the profits of
occupation of land not with income derived from user
of land for agricultural purposes and therefore not
restricted in their interpretation of the term "occupation" and all these activities which were described
therein might as well have been comprised within the
scope of the taxing statutes. What we have, however,
to see is whether these activities fall within the connotation of the terms "agriculture" and "agricultural
purpose" which are the only terms to be considered
for bringing the income derived therefrom within the
definition of agricultural income in s. 2(l)(a) of the
Indian Income-tax Act.
In _Moolji Sicka_ & _Co.,_ _In_ _re_ (') Derbyshire C.J.
understood the term "agriculture" in a wider sense as
including operations not only on the land itself but
on the shrubs which grew on the soil and were according to him a part of the soil. The assessees were
' manufacturers of biri, a kind of cigarette consisting of
tobacco wrapped in tendu leaves. The tendu plant
was of entirely wild growth and propagated itself
without human agency in jungle and waste lands.
The assessees had taken several villages on "lease"
for plucking the leaves of such plants and the work
done by the assessees consisted in pruning the trees
and burning the dead branches and dried leaves lying
on the ground. The Court held that the profits accruing to the assessees by the sale of tendu leaves was
not exempt as agricultural income but to the extent to
which pruning of the tendu shrub occurred, there was
in a technical and legal sense a cultivation of the soil
(1) [1939] 7 J.T.R. 493· (2) [1933] A.C. 618 (H.L.) 638.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 129
in which the shrub grew and therefore so much of the 1957
income as was shown by the assessee to be profit Th~ _Commissioner_
derived from the collection and preparation so as to 0~Income-ti.
make them fit to be taken to the market, of tendu ec~l!':fa0
make them fit to be taken to the market, of tendu ec~l!':fa0
leaves produced by the pruning of the tendu shrubs _R_ . _B_ v. _IG_
_0_
was exempt as agricultural income under s. 2(1) and _'°s0%:?R0_
_0_
was exempt as agricultural income under s. 2(1) and _'°s0%:?R0;mar_
s.4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The learned
Chief Justice observed : _Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_
"Cutting back or pruning the wild tendu clearly
contributes to the growth of the leaves in that shrub
and I am prepared to hold that the pruning of the shrub
is a cultivation of the shrub and as the shrub grows in
the soil and as a part of it, is a cultivation of the soil
in a legal and technical sense."
The word cultivation was here understood by the
learned Chief Justice not only in the sense of cultivation of the soil but in the sense· of cultivation of the
tendu shrubs which grew on the soil and were therefore
a part of it. The operations which were performed on
the shrubs were certainly not operations performed on
the soil itself and the opinion expressed by the learned
Chief Justice has certainly given an extended meaning
to the term cultivation and used with reference to the
soil. It is significant however to observe that cultivation of the soil was considered an essential ingredient
which rendered the income derived from the tendu
leaves agricultural income within the meaning of its
definition s. 2(1)(a) of the Act.
_Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax, Madras,_ v. _K._ _E._
_Sundara 1l1udaliar_ (1) contains a further extension of this
idea where Vishwanatha Sastri J. Observed at p. 274:
"Pasture land used for the feeding and. rearing of
livestock is land used for agricultural purposes:
_Emperor_ v. _Alexander Allen_ (2). Rearing of livestock
such as cows, buffaloes, sheep and poultry is included
in "husbandry". These animals are considered to be
the products of the soil, just like crops, roots, flowers
and trees, for they live on the land and derive their
sustenance from the soil and its produce : _Glanely_ v.
_Wightman_ (3); _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax, Burma_ v.
(1) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. (3) [1933) 1 A.C. 616 (H.L:) 638.
(2) [ 1901) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 627 629, 630.
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1958]
1957 _Kokine Dairy Co._ ('). It is therefore not legitimate, in
_rhe commissioner_ my opinion, to confine the word "agriculture" to the
"r~/ncoBme-tax _,est_ _enga,_ 1 [• ] [cultivation ] l'k [of ] h [an ] [open ] . [field ] . [with annual or periodical ] b .
_catcutta_ crops 1 e w eat, nee, rag1, cotton, to acco, JUte, etc.
Casuarina is usually raised on dry lands of poor quality,
01 [. ] _[B ]_ [v. ] _[K ]_
~,0%:~YRo;mar and it is usual to find the same land used alternatively
for the cultivation of ordinary cereal crops like ground_Bhagwati_ _J._ I h 1 k d " h - ·
nut, gingel y, c o am, ambu, etc., an 1or t e ra1smg
of Casuarina plantations. The land bears the dry
assessment whatever be the nature of the crop raised."
Casuarina is usually raised on dry lands of poor quality,
11 01 [. ] _[B ]_ [v. ] _[K ]_
This enlarged connotation of the. term "agriculture"
has been tinged by the dictionary meanings ascribed
to it in Murray's Oxford Dictionary and the Webster's
Dictionary quoted above which understood the term
as including the allied pursuits of rearing, feeding and
management oflive-stock and also including husbandry,
farming horticulture, etc., in the widest sense, as also
butter cheese-making etc. We shall have to
consider at the appropriate stage as to how far such
enlargement is warranted by the definition of "agricultural income" as given in s. 2(l)(a) of the Indian
Income-tax Act.
The cases above noted all of them involve some
expenditure of human skill and labour either on the
land or the produce of the land, for without such
expenditure there would be no question of the income
derived from such land being agricultural income.
Where, however, the products of the land are of wild,
or spontaneous growth involving no expenditure of
human labour and skill there is unanimity of opinion
that no agricultural operations were at all involved
and there is no agricultural income. In such cases, it
would be the absence of any such operations rather
than the performance thereof which would be the
prime cause of the growth of such products.
The' cases bearing on this aspect of the question may
be noted.
_Kaju Mal and others_ v. _Salig Ram_ (')is the earliest
case where a stretch of natural forest came in for
consideration. It was a forest land and it was held to
(2) (1919) P.R. No. I!J p. 237.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 131
be agricultural land or land used for purposes sub- 1957
servient to agriculture or for pasture, and therefore _The Commissioner_
exempt from pre-emption under s. 4 of the Punjab _0_ _1_ _Income-tax,_
- _West Bengal,_
Pre-emption Act, 1905. . _Calcutta_
There was no discussion of any legal principles in _Raja_ Ben~y _Kwnar_
that decision but when we come to the next case of _Sahas_ _Roy_
_Province_ _of Bihar_ v. _Maharaja Pratap_ _Udai_ _Nath Sahi_ _Bh';lfwati_ _J._
_Deo_ (1) which was a case under the Bihar Agricultural
Income-tax Act (Bihar VII of 1938), we find the ratio
of these decisions laid down in clear terms. The
assessees there derived their income from "Bankar"
and "Phalkar". "Bankar" was income derived from
the sale of wood from virgin jungles or jungles not
actually cultivated; and "Phalkar" was income derived
from the fruits of wild jungle trees and bushes. The
question was whether this income was agricultural
income within the meaning of the term as defined in
the Act. Harries C.J., who delivered the judgment of
the Court observed :
_"Bankar" :_ It appears that this head of income
was derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not
actually cultiv'.'.ted. A few forest guards appear to
have been employed to protect the property, but it
cannot be said that the trees have grown as the result
of cultivation. They appear to have grown naturally
in the jungles without the intervention of the human
agency, and in my view the growth of these trees
cannot be said to result from the cultivation of the soil.
In fact, it was the absence of cultivation that permitted the area to develop into a jungle ................ "
_"Phalkar" :_ This is income derived from wild
jungle fruits, and it cannot be said that the fruit
gathered is the result of the cultivation, but, on the
contrary, it is the result of the absence of cultivation.
Trees and bushes yielding these fruits grow not on
cultivated soil but on the land not under cultivation
and frequently the more neglected and wild the land
is the thicker grow these wild bushes and trees yielding
such crop. Practically in all cases the crop is the result
of want of cultivation and not the result of cultivation.
(1) [1941) g I.T.R. 313, 328.
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
1957 In my judgment it is _1_,ot established lhat the income
_The Commissioner_ described as _phalkar_ in these cases is income
_01 Income-tax,_ derived from land used for agriculture or from agri_**West Bengal,**_ - - 1 J
_Calcutta_ culture and is, therefore, not assessable to agncu turn
income-tax."
_R_ _**a..1a**_ [. ] **·** _[B ]_ _**enoy**_ [v. ] [x· ] _**umar**_
_Sahas Roy_ In _Raja Mustafa Ali Khan_ v. _Commissioner_ _of_
_BhagwatiJ._ _Income-tax,_ _U.P._ _&_ _C.P._ ( [1] ) which went up to the
Privy Council, the Oudh Chief Court held that income
from the sale of forest trees growing on land naturally
and without the intervention of human agency even
if the land was assessed to land revenue, was not agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1)(a) of the
Income-tax Act. The court followed an earlier decision
given by it in the case of _Maharaja_ _of_ _Kapurthala_ v.
_Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax. C.P._ _&_ _U.P._ (2) in
which the court had discussed the meaning to be
ascribed to the term "agriculture" and observed at
page 93:
"A fiscal statute should no doubt be construed strictly,
and, if there be any doubt about its construction,
the subject must be given the benefit. But we do not
feel any doubt that the expression "land used for
agricultural purposes" in the Income-tax Act does not
extend to forests of spontaneous growth, where nothing
is done to prepare the soil for trees to be planted therein, and where the growth of the trees is not fostered
by tillage. We should not be justified in giving the
taxpayer the benefit of the dictionary definition when
it is not disputed that the meaning of the term
"agricultural" cannot be extended for the purpose of
the Income-tax Act to all the secondary implications
therein suggested. We therefore construe the term in
its primary sense. We accordingly hold that income
from the sale of forest trees of spontane0us growth
growing on land which is assessed to land revenue is
not agricultural income within the meaning of section
2(1) (a) of the Income-tax Act."
_Yuvarajah_ _of Pithapuram_ _&_ _Anr._ v. _Commissioner_
_of Income-tax, Madras_ (') was also a case where the
(1) [1945] 13 l.T.R. 9U. (g) [1946] 14 I.T.R. g>, 99·
(2) [ 1945] 13 l.T.R. 74, 93.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 133
assessee derived income from forests of spontaneous 1957
growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other _The_ _Commissioner_
usufruct of trees minor forest produce and licence fees _0_ _1_ _I11come-1ax,_
' - - _West Be11ga!,_
and from trees that had grown wild m non-forest areas. _catcutta_
The Zamindari of Pithapuram was a permanently _R_ . Bv.,.,.
S l R ul _a1a_ _e11oy_ _n.11mar_
sett e estate un er t e ermanent ett ement l d d h P [. ] eg a- _sahas Roy_
tion (Regulation XXV of 1802) and it was contended
. f . _Blzagwati_ _J,_
that the imposition of income-tax in respect o income
other than agricultural income derived from a permanently settled estate would not be a breach of
Regulation XXV of 1802 relating to permanent settlement. Reliance was placed in support of this positiun
on the decision in _Chief Commissioner of Income-tax_ v.
_Zamindar_ _of_ _Singampatti_ (1). It was, however., held
that the case was impliedly overruled by the decision
of the Privy Council in _Probat Chandra_ _Barua_ v.
_King Emperor_ (2) and the Court proceeded to consider
whether income derived from forests of spontaneous
growth by the sale of wood, bark, leaves, other
usufruct of trees, minor. forest produce and licence
fees and from trees which have grown wild in nonforest areas was agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Income-tax Act. The Court
observed :
"There is ample authority for holding that income
derived from trees which have grown wild is not
agricultural income but without the aid of authority,
we should have no hesitation in saying that to describe
it as such would involve a distortion of the meaning
of the word 'agriculture'.
and such income was accordingly held to be ~.ot agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the
Act. (It may be noted that the appellant preferred an
appeal to the Privy Council against this decision but
the same was dismi~sed vide _Yuvarajah_ _of Pithapuram_
_&_ _Anr._ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax, Madras_ (3).
_Benoy Ratan Banerji_ v. _CC'mmissioner_ _of Income-tax,_
_U.P., C.P._ _&_ _Berar_ (4) was another case in which the
assessee derived income from the sale of timber from
(1) (1922) ILR 45 Mad. 518 (FB) (3) (1949) 17 ITR 445
(2) (1930) LR 57 IA 228 (4) (1947) 15 ITr.. 98
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 the Zamindari on which there had been for many
_The_ _commissioner_ years, a number of forest trees, khar and wild plants.
_of Income-tax,_ There was no evidence on the record to show that the
_West Bengal, Calcutta_ grow th f h o t e trees m question was t e resu t o any · - h 1 f
_Ra_ _B/·_ _Ku_ actual cultivation by the assessee at all. The various
f~,,.;"'l,y _mar_ trees which he sold were of spontaneous growth, not
having grown as a result of actual cultivation. The
_**Bhagwati**_ _**J.**_ Court held that in order to come within the definition
of "agricultural income", the income had not only to
be derived from land which was used for "agricultural
purposes" but such income had also to be derived by
the process of "agriculture". The Court observed
that being trees of spontaneous growth, to the production of which the assessee had made no contribution
by way of cultivation, no question could arise either
of the land on which they grew being "used for agricultural purposes" or of the trees themselves and the
income they produced being the result of "agriculture".
The Court accordingly held that the income from the
sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth, growing on
land naturally and without the intervention of human
agency, was not agricultural income within the
meaning of s. 2(1) (a) of the Income Tax Act even if
such land was subject to a local rate assessed and
collected by officers of the Crown as such and such
income was not exempt from income-tax under s. 4(3)
(viii) of the Act. .
A decision of the Nagpur High Court in _Beohm·_
_Singh Raghubir Singh_ v. _Commissioner of Income-Tax,_
_U.P._ _&_ _C.P. and Berar_ (') (delivered on September 4,
1946, but reported in 1948) may be noted here. There
also the income in question was derived by the assessee
from the sale of forest produce such as timber, tendu
leaves, mohua flowers, harranuts, etc., derived from a
forest which was not a cultivated one but was of
spontaneous growth. The question was whether such
income was agricultural income and as such exempt
from taxation under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Indian Incometax Act. The Court considered the dictionary meanings
of the term "agriculture" which included forestry
within its compass but observed that the essence of
(1) [1948] 161.T.R. 433.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT **REPORTS** 135
agriculture even when it was extended to include 19 [57 ]
"forestry", was the application of human skill and _The Commissioner_
labour; without that it could neither be an art nor a _ot,IncoBme-tax_
_1,_
science an - d h t at was accor d' mg to t em t e h h d eter- _"est Calcutta enga'_
mining factor in such class of cases. The Court then _R_ . _Bev._ _[(,_
referred to the various decisions referred to above and a;sa,::~oyumar
cited with approval the following passage from the _Bliagwati_ _J._
Judgment of the Federal Court in _Meghraj_ v. _Allah_
_Rakhia_ (1).
"Their Lordships confirmed a decision of the Punjab
Chief Court to the effect that land used as a tea garden
was used for "agricultural purposes". In the judgment of the Chief Court (which was generally approved
by their Lordships) it was observed that the term
"agricultural land" is used in the Act of 1905 in its
widest sense to denote all land which is _tilled"_ ....... .
The Chief Court had held that land covered by a
natural forest was not agricultural land, and this view
also would seem to have been confirmed by the Judicial
Committee,"
and they further proceeded to observe :
"We have underlined the word 'tilled" because,
in our opinion, that brings out the distinction which
we have sought to draw between an agricultural and
a non-agricultural purpose. The decisions referred to
are _Kaju Mal_ v. _Saligram_ and _Kajumal_ v. _Saligram_ (2)''.
The Court came to the conclusion that it was essential that the income should be derived from some
activity which necessitated the employment of human
skill and labour and which was not merely a product
of man's neglect or inaction except for the gathering
in of the spoils. Not only must the assessee labour to
reap the harvest, but he must also labour to produce
it and they accordingly held that the income in question
was not agricultural income and was not
exempt from taxation under s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian
Income-tax Act.
We now come to the decision of the Privy Council
111 _Raja Mustafa_ _Ali_ _Khan_ v. _Commissioner_ _of_
(1) [1942] F.C.R. 5:1· _62._
(2) [1919] P.R. Nn. 19 p. _237_ and (192:J) l.L.R. 5 Lah. 50.
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
1957 _Income-tax, U.P., Ajmer and Ajmer-Merwara_ ('). It will
_The Commissioner_ be recalled that the Oudh Chief Court had in _Raja_
_0_ _1_ _Income-tax,_ _Mustafa Ali_ _Khan_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income Tax,_
01
- _U.P._ & _C.P._ (2) decided that income from the sale of
w'C~,::~!
I [•. ] _[Bevn.o ]_ _[K nar ]_ [forest trees growing on land nautrally and without the ]
_[1]_
I
_"'_ _[1]_ _" saiias Roy YUi_ mtervent1on o _•_ - fh uman agency even 1 t 'fl 1e Id an was
_Bhagwati_ _J._ assessed to land revenue was not agricultural income
within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The appellant took an appeal to the
Privy Council against this decision and the main
question for consideration before their Lordships was
whether the land was used for agricultural purposes
and the income derived therefrom was agricultural income. Their f.,ordships of the Privy Council observed
that the income in question
"was derived from the sale of trees described as
forest trees growing on land naturally and the case
has throughout proceeded upon the footing that there
was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on
any regular operations in forestry and that the jungle
from which trees had been cut and sold was a spontaneous growth. Upon those facts the question is whether such income is (within section 2(1)(a) of the Act)
rent or revenue ...... or alternatively .... whether
such income was, within section 2(1)(b), income derived
from _such_ land by agriculture.
It appears to their Lordships that, whether exemption is sought under section 2(l)(a) or section 2{l)(b).
the primary condition must be satisfied that the land
in question is used for agricultural purposes; the
expression "such land" in (b) refers back to the land
mentioned in (a) and must have the same quality. Jt
is not then necessary to consider any other difficulty
which may stand in the way of the assessee. His case
fails if he does not prove that the land is "used for
agricultural purposes". Upon this point their Lordships concur in the views which have been expressed
not only in the Chief Court of Oudh but in the High
Court of Madras (see _Yuvarajah_ _of Pirhapuram v._
(2) (1~~5] 13 l.T.R. !)!<.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS B7
_Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras('),_ and the High 1957
Court of Allahabad (see _Benoy Ratan Banerji_ v. _Com- The_ _c;;;;,issioner_
_0_
_missioner of Income Tax, U.P., C.P_ & _Berar_ (2) and _{1.nco7-tax,_
_1_
elsewhere in India. The question seems not yet to c!1cut~~a'
have been decided whether land can be said to be used _R 010_ . Bev. _JG_ _0_
for agricultural purposes within the section, if it has _sah':! Ro";'_ _'_
_010_ _0_
for agricultural purposes within the section, if it has _sah':! Ro";'_ _'_
been planted with trees and cultivated in the regular
course of arboriculture, and upon this question their _Bhagwari_ _J._
Lordships express no opinion. It is sufficient for the
purpose of the present appeal to say (1) that in their
opinion no assi'ltance is to be got from the meaning
ascribed to the word "agriculture" in other statutes
and (2) that, though it must always be difficult to draw
the line, yet, unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour
upon it, it cannot be said to be used for agricultural
purposes within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax
Act. In the present case their Lordships agree with
the High Court in thinking that there is no evidence
which would justify the conclusion that this condition
is satisfied."
It may be noted that the Privy Council also proceeded upon the footing that there was nothing to show
that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry and these observations are patient
of argument that if any regular operations in forestry
had been carried on the land they might have made
a difference to the result. Their Lordships also did not
express any opinion on the question whether land can
be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the
section if it has been planted with trees and cultivated
in the regular course of arboriculture. They were,
however, definite in their opinion that unless there is
some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it, the land cannot be
said to be used for agricultural purposes within the
meaning of the Act. Agricultural operations are thus
defined by them to be operations where there was
some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it. If these conditions
were satisfied in regard to any particular land, then
(1) [ 1946) 14 I.T.R. 92, 99. (2) [ 1946) 15 I. T.R. 98.
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
!95 [7 ] such. land can be said to be used for agricultural
_The c.;;;;;;,,ioner_ purposes and the income derived therefrom constitute
0~"":"JJ:"'"",· agricultural income within the meaning of s. 2(1) (a) of
c:i~utta _nga'_ the Act. The term "agriculture" for the purposes of
_v_ the Indian Income Tax Act was thus in effect defin_R •1•_ [. ] _sahas_ _[n ]_ _enoy aumar_ [v. ] _Roy_ e d b y t e!f h · L d h' or s 1ps to mean some measure o cu f ) · t1
vation of the land and some expenditure of skill and
_**Bhagt''ali**_ _**J.**_ labour upon it and unless the operations, whether they
be agricultural operations or forestry operations conformed with those definitions, they could not be styled
agricultural operations so as to constitute land on which
they were performed land used for agricultural purposes.
One should have thought that this decision of the
Privy Council would put an end to all controversies
with regard to the connotation of the term "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes". That was, however, not to be. The words used by their Lordships in
their judgment were cryptic and the controversy arose
immediately thereafter as to whether, "some measure
of cultivation of the land" and "some expenditure of
skill and labour upon it" were used by them as cumulative or in the alternative. Considerable ingenuity
was exercised in determining what were regular operations in forestry and whether they could be assimilated
to agricultural operations which could have the effect
of constituting the land upon which they were pe1formed land used for agricultural purposes within the
meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act so that income
derived therefrom could fall within the definition of
"agricultural income" contained therein.
The first case which came up for considerati0n after
the above decision of the Privy Council was the case of
_Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Beng'll_ v.
_Raj_ _Jagadislz_ _Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb_ (') before ~he
Calcutta High Court. The assessee was the Zamindar
of Chilkigarh in the district of Midnapore the western
part of which contained jungle mahal. The income in
question was derived from the sale of Sal trees which
grew in the forest. The forest was not an uncared for
virgin forest. The assessee maintained a staff of one
forester, 6 guards and 24 Chaukas to look after the
(1) [1940] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT **REPORTS** 139
forest and for the proper cultivation of the same. The 1957
Sal trees were generally sold off in blocks when about _The commissioner_
15 years old. Annually blocks of about 1,000 acres _of Income-tax,_
_West_ _Bengal,_
were sold up. All the trees in the bl k oc s so ld up were _Calcutta_
cut down by the purchasers for sale as fuel and house _R_ . _B_ ~· _K,_
posts. During the rainy season from the stumps of the a~"w,:S ;~Y _umar_
trees cut down, new shoots come out which grew into
mature trees in 15 years, to be cut own again. In d _Bhagwati_ _J,_
order to prevent damage to the young shoots in the
early stages of their growth the areas cut down were
closely guarded for one year at least from the time
when the block in question had been completely
denuded of trees, in order to keep cattle and men off
from the lands so that they may not damage the
young growing shoots. In order to promote the
growth of shoots, the ground was also kept free from
undergrowth jungle. This was not cleared at the
arsessee's expense but the villagers were allowed to
clear the grounds of the undergrowth and take the
same away free of cost. The existing Sal trees in the
forests and the Sal trees which had been sold off in
1350 B.S. had been grown in the same manner as described ab.:we. From the above facts it was clear that
human "are and skill had been utilised for promoting
the growth of the Sal trees from Which the income was
derived in 1350 B.S.
The Court discussed the dictionary meaning of the
term "agriculture" and following the decision of the
Privy Council in _Raja Mustafa Ali_ _Khan_ v. _Com-_
_missioner_ _of_ _Income-Tax,_ _U.P.,_ _Ajmer_ _&_ _Ajmer_
_Merwara_ (1) came to the conclusion that income from a
virgin forest or forests of spontaneous growth was
not agricultural income. The view that the tilling of the
soil was the _sine qua_ _non_ for bringing a pursuit within
the term agriculture was also held to have been
exploded and it was observed at p. 440 :
"Whether a particular forest is one of spontaneous growth or not has to be decided on one
important consideration as indicated by the Judicial,
Committee in that decision _i.e.,_ whether there has
been 'some expenditure of skill and labour upon it'."
(1) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330 ..
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_19s1_ Reliance was placed upon the further observations
_111e_ _commissioner_ of the Privy Council that, whether there were "any
_ofw. Inco;;:-"j·_ regular operations in forestry" would be a material
~!1cu1:':a fact for consideration and it was observed :
_Raja_ sen!~ _Kumar_ "To put it in another form; the introduction of
_Sallas Roy_ human agency and the application of human efforts
_Bhagwati_ _J._ would be the criteria for consideration"
and after discussing several cases on the subject the
Court observed at p. 441 :
- "On a careful analysis of the reasons given by the
learned Judges in the various decisions referred to
above it will be apparent that the facts of each
particular case must be considered for determining
whether there has or has not been sufficient application of human efforts before it can be determined
whether the income from a particular forest is
agricultural or otherwise".
On the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal in
the case before them the Court was of opinion that the
forest in question was not either a virgin forest or
containing trees which grew spontaneously and
naturally without any human intervention whatever.
The circumstance that there was felling of the trees,
the new shoots appearing during the rainy season
without any human intervention guarding of the new
shoots from either being trampled under foot or being
browsed by animals and the removal of under!P'owth
of fallen leaves were considered regular operations in
forestry in the forest in question which required the
application of human efforts sufficient to include them
under the head agricultural income. It was further
observed :
"If the view of the Judicial Committee were to
exclude all kinds of income from the category of
agricultural income unless there was actual cultivation
of the soil, reference to "regular operations of forestry"
would have been unnecessary. Not that there must
always be "some measure of cultivation of the land"
and "some expenditure of skill and labour upon it"
but that the proof of either would be sufficient to bring
the case within either clause (a). or (b) of section 2(1) of
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 141
the Act. "Regular operations in forestry" do require 1957
expenditure of skill and labour upon the land on _The_ C~ioner
which the forest grows." _of lnr.onw-tox,_
_West_ _Bengal,_
The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that in _Calcutta_
the special circumstances as disclosed in the case, there _Raja Bev,;,y Kumar_
were regular operations in forestry and the income _Sahas Roy_
derived from forests in question was agricultural _Bhagwatl_ _J._
income within the meaning of s. 2 (1) (a) of the Bengal
Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944.
_Jyotirindra Narayan .Sinha Choudhury_ v. _The State_
_of_ _Assam_ (1) arose under the Assam Agricultural
Income-tax Act, 1939 and the question for the consideration of the Court was whether the amounts
realised by the assessee from the sale of Sal trees
growing in the forest was agricultural income within
the meaning of s. 2 (1) of the Act. There was no
evidence to show that these Sal trees were of spontaneous growth. Even though the possibility of
the fotests originally having been of spontaneous
growth was recognised, it was an admitted fact that
forest trees were protected and fostered in growth by
the application of human labour and skill. In these
forests, operations in forestry such as clearing jungles,
creepers and climbers, thinning by removal of less
healthy trees from thickly grown areas, removal of
unsound, crooked and diseased trees, burning of leaves
to fertilise the ground, cutting of trees at special
heights reservation of blocks by turns and their operation in cyclic order, preservation of mother trees for
the spread of seed, protection of forests from fire, etc.,
were regularly carried on and regular operations were
thus being undertaken for their growth, preservation
and regeneration. The Court held that as extensive
operations in forestry were employed in the forest of
Sal trees, the income from the sale of such trees would
be agricultural income as defined in the Assam
Agricultural Income-tax Act. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court relying on the various dictionary
meanings of the term "agriculture" observed at
p. 390:
(r) [1950) 19 I.T.R. 379.
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_19s1_ . "in spite of the diversity as to the scope and
_The commissio11er_ purpose of agriculture as revealed by the different
_ow.if_ _IncBome-tax_
_1_ [• ] [definitions, there ] [is ] [one feature which ] [is ] [essentially ]
_est calcutta enga'_ common to a o t 11 f h ese. Thi · s 1s t e app h I" 1cat10n . - f
_K_ human skill and labour without which there can be
_R_ _**a1a**_ [. ] [Bv. ] _**enoy**_ _**umar**_ . ],,
_Sahas Roy_ no agf!CU ture.
The Court then referred to the decision of the
_**Bhagwati J.**_ Privy Council in _Raja Mustafa Ali_ _Khan_ v. _Commis-_
_sioner_ _of Income_ _Tax(')_ and after quoting the passage
from the judgment above referred to proceeded to
observe :
"Their Lordships have not laid down that some
measure of cultivation is absolutely necessary before
it can be said that land is used for agricultural
purposes. In fact "some measure of cultivation" is
placed on a par with "some expenditure of skill and
labour". If either of the two conditions exists, the
land could be said as being used for agricultural
purposes. Tillage or actual cultivation would not in
their view be an essential pre-requisite of "agriculture" in its wider implication".
After referring to a decision of the Calcutta High
Court in _Hedayat_ _Ali_ v. _Kamalanand Singh_ (2) and
_Commissioner_ _of_ _Agricultural Income-Tax_ v. _Jagadish_
_Chandra Deo Dhahal Deb_ (3) the court observed:
"The review of the authorities considered above
leads to the conclusion that purpose within the meaning of the Assam Act can be agricultural even if its
achievement does not involve actual cultivation of the
.soil. In the words of their Lordships of the Privy
Council in the case of receipts from the sale of forest
trees, the income would be agricultural if there is some
expenditure of skill and labour upon it. Regular
operations in forestry necessarily involve expenditure
of skill and labour. Where therefore, such operations
take place, the income from the sale of trees in the
forest would be within the ambit of agricultural income
as defined in the Assam Act."
In _Pratap Singh Ba/beer Singh_ v. _Commissioner_ _of_
_Income-Tax, U.P., C.P._ & _Berar_ (4), however, the
(1) [1948] l~ I.T.R. 330. (3) [ 19491 17 l.T.R. 426, 438.
(2) [1913] 17 C.L.J. 411. (5) [1952) 22 I.T.R. I.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 143
High Court of Allahabad struck a different note. The 1957
assessee there derived the income from the sale of _The commissioner_
forest trees growing on land naturally and spontane- _of Income-tax,_
ously without the intervention of any human agency wc!r!~'/!01•
but carried on forestry operations working the forest . v.
for at least some time on scientific lines in accordance ~~fa~'1o;umar
with a sch.eme of making profits. There was a regular
working plan and the assessee was deriving regular _Bhagwati_ _[1]_ _·_
income from the forest and spending money to increase
the profit. The Court held that the ''agriculture"
and "agricultural purposes" with reference to land
clearly implied that some operations must be carried
on on the land itself; human skill and labour should
be used for the purpose of ploughing the land, manuring
it, planting the trees or some similar process; and that
mere weeding care and preservation of forest trees·
which grew spontaneously were not operations on the·
land which were necessary to constitute the process a
process of agriculture. · In the course of the judgment,
the Court interpreted the above passage from the
judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in
_Raja Mustafa Ali_ _Khan_ y. _Commissioner_ _of Income-_
_tax_ (1) as under :
"It is quite clear that their Lordships were of
the view that, for income to be agricultural income,
the essential element that must exist is that there
should be "some measure of cultivation of the land" or
"some expenditure of skill and labour upon it". The
language used by their Lordships of the Privy Council
shows that the expenditure of skill and labour must be
upon the land and not merely on the trees which are
already growing on it as a result of spontaneous
growth."
Mere regeneration and preservation of trees could
not be said to be expenditure of human skill and
labour upon the land itself and the land could not
under the circumstances be held to be used for agri·
cultural purposes nor could it be held that any process
of agriculture was being carried on. The Court
observtld that planned and scientific exploitation of a
forest of spontaneous growth, though it might yield
(1) [1948) 16 I.T.R. 330.
M2SC-10
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)
_19s1_ regular inco~e, would not .be income from agriculture
Tire _Commissioner_ as no operations were earned out and no human skill
0{J~B':':J· and labour was expended in such a case on the land
_c:ieu11':_ . itself.
_Raja Be,;:,·_ _Kumar_ _Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy_ v., _Commissioner_ _of_
_sa1rtu_ _)i.y_ _Income-tax,_ _West Bengal_ (') the Judgment under
appeal before us here struck a middle path. The
_Bhagwati_ _J._ Tribunal had found that except the sowing of seeds, the
operations carried out, though equally necessary for
the maintenance and upkeep of any forest of
spoataneous growth, did not involve such expenditure
of human labour and skill as to constitute them operations in agriculture. The sowing of seeds were "few
and far between" and the normal process by which
the forest grew again after a part of it had been cut
down, was by the growing out off-shoots from the
stumps left, the operations were therefore in the main
only operations for the "maintenance, preservation,
nursing and rearing", of the forest. It was urged
before the High Court on behalf of the as~essee that
the exemption from agricultural income-tax determined
in _Commissioner_ _of_ _Agricultural_ _Income-tax, West_
_Bengal,_ v. _Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb_ (')
covered the case and it was submitted that the facts
here were if at all far stronger in favour of the assessee.
The decision of the Privy Council in _Raja Mustafa_ _Ali_
_Khan_ v. _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax,_ _U.P.,_ _Ajmer_
_and Ajmer-Merwara_ (') was considered and the Court
observed at p. 87:
"I do not think that when the Privy Council said
that there must be "some measure of cultivation on
the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon
it", their Lordships intended to say that the expenditure of skill and labour must always be in the form of
cultivation. The word "or" introduced by the Allaha
bad High Court between the two phrases does not
occur in the original, but I think it is implied. The
idea, it seems to me, is that if the land has been left
to the forces of nature to grow what products such
forces could, there is no agriculture and there can be
11} [1953] 24 I.T.R 70, 87. (3) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330.
(2) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 426, 438.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 145
agriculture only if the labour and ~kill of man has 1957
operated on the land to cause or aid the growth of _The Commissioner_
certain products. All that is necessary is that the _0_ _f_ _Income-tax,_
. l "h . t _WestBe11Kal,_
Ian s ou d h ldb e active y exp 1 01te [. ] [d ] wtt a view - pro- _Calcutta_
curing growth or better growths from the soil bu~ it _Rafa_ _Be,,;;. Kumar_
does not seem to be also necessary that the explo1ta- _Sahfu Roy_
tion should be by dllage." _Bhagwati_ _J._
The Court accordingly came to the conclusion-that
even though tillage was thus not essential, human
labour and skill must be expended on the land itself
and not merely on the growth from the land. When
income is derived from the natural growths from the
land, it is derived from land but not derived from land
by the process of agriculture. It is derived from land
by agriculture only when the land is subjected to the
Jabour and skill of man, whether in the form of cultivation or otherwise, in order to produce or the
improvement of the produce which yields the income.
On the facts before them the learned Judges were of
-0pinion that if forest of natural growth was taken over
and then the land was regularly weeded and cleared,
if it was supplied with moisture, necessary for the
nourishment of the trees, by the cutting of channels
across it and by the distribution of rain-water through
them and if the land was dug, and ·sown with seeds
whenever bare patches appeared and while all this was
done, if elaborate subsidiary arrangements . were. also
maintained for the protection of the trees and the
tending of new shoots springing from the stumps of
old trees cut down till they themselves grew into new
trees, it might well be said that operations in forestry
involving agricultural operations were carried on on the
forest land and that income derived from the land
was derived from agriculture.
_Sir Kameshwar Singh_ v. _Commissioner of Income-tax,_
_Bihar_ & _Orrissa_ (1) which is the subject-matter of C.A.
Nos. 112 to 117 of 1956 before us also was a case under
the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922). It was found
by the Appellate Tribunal that the Sal and ebony trees
which grew in the forest were conserved by allowing
each a circle of 15 feet, that there was cutting down
(1) [1954) 26 I.T.R. 121.
146 SUPREME COURT. REPORTS (195 8:}
_19s1_ of the trees and jungles which fell within that circle
_The commissioner_ leaving sufficient space for growth and that forest
_of Income-tax,_ conservancy staff was maintained to look after the
w~:.i::.%01• forest. The Court construed the· observations of the
Privy Council in _Raja Mustafa Ali Khan's case_ (') to
### R a1anoyumar [. ] [Be"-] [ K. ] h"" d h h. ·.
_sahas_ _Roy_ mean t at m or er to s ow t at an mcome 1s agn
cultural income within the meaning of the definiJion,
_**Bhacwati**_ _**J,**_ it must be found that the land itself was cultivated
and that there was some expenditure of skill and
labour upon it." The Court held that even conceding
that the two conditions laid down by the Privy Council
in _Raja Mustafa Ali Khan's case_ were to be read as
alternative conditions, there was no material on which
to hold that there was any expenditure of skill and
labour upon the land and therefore the income from
the sale of forest trees was not agricultural income.
In _Jyotikana Chowdhurani_ v. _Commissioner_ _of_
_Income-tax, Assam_ (2) which is also under appeal before
us in Civil Appeals Nos. 57 to 62, a Special Bench of
the Assam High Court considered whether income
derived by the assessees from the sale of trees of
spontaneous growth where there was no planting or
sowing or employment of any human agency for the
purpose of tilling the land but operations in forestry
were carried on by the assessee involving considerable
expenditure of human skill and labour was agricultural
income within the meaning of s. 2 (!)(a) of the Indian
Income-tax Act_ The majority of the Court consisting
of Sarjoo Prasad C.J_ and Ram Labhaya J. (Deka J_
dissenting) held that even though there was no tilling
of the land or planting of seed or saplings and the trees
were of spontaneous germination the operations carried
on by the assessees were conducive to the growth and
development of the trees and in essence involved the
expenditure of human skill and labqur on the land
itself. Those operations were "agricultural operations"
and the land on which the trees stood was being used
for "agricultural purposes" and, therefore, the income
from the sale of the trees was "agricultural income"
and was exempt from taxation under s. 4(3) (viii) of the
Income-tax Act.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 147
Sarjoo Prasad C.J. explained the test laid down in 1957
_Raja Mustafa Ali_ _Khan_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income- The co-;;;;;;;ssioner_
_tax_ (1) in the manner following : _of Income-tax,_
_West Bengal,_
"The contention of Mr. Iyengar is that the exp- _Calcutta_
ression "some expenditure of skill and labour upon _Raia_ Be~~Y _Kumar_
it" is used merely in further clarification of the ex- _Sahas_ _Roy_
pression "cultivation of the land" and, therefore, all _Bhagwati_ _J._
that their Lordships held was that cultivation of the
land was necessary. I do not concede that the word
"cultivation" is necessarily synonymous with ploughing or tillage. But even if it were, I am unable to
accept the argument for the simple reason that if
precision is the hallmark of Privy Council decisions,
as I think it is, then their Lordships would have stopped short with the phrase "some measure of cultivation
of the land". This, in itself, was quite expressive and no further expressions were needed to. clarify
the matter. Therefore, when they proceeded to add
after a comma, the phrase "some expenditure of skill
and labour upon it", they evidently intended to signify
something more than mere cultivation. There is, of
course, no c.onjunctive phrase between the two
expressions, but in the context the meaning seems to be
plain."
Ram Labhaya J. expressed himself in the test laid
down by the Privy Council in these words :
"A test however was laid down for finding out
when land may be said to be used for agricultural
purposes. The test requires that there must be some
measure of cultivation of the land; some expenditure
of skill and labour upon it. It has however to be
borne in mind that their Lordships when stating the
facts did point out that the case had proceeded on the
footing that there was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry.
This statement has an important bearing on the interpretation of the test. Such operations in forestry are
carried on in forests. They involve the use of human
labour and skill on the soil. They aim at stimulating
growth and could easily satisfy the requirements of the
(1) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 330.
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
1957 test evolved by their Lordships. Due importance,
_The commissioner_ therefore, has to be given to the absence of operations.
_of Income-tax,_ in forestry in _Raja Mustafa Ali Khan's case_ (') when
_West_ _Bengal,_ - - h l "d d h -,,
_Calcutta_ mterpretmg t e te~t a1 own t erem.
_Ra'a_ Ben~y _Kuma'_ _Vikram_ _Deo_ _Varma_ v. _Commissioner_ _of Income-tax,_
_1 sahas Roy_ _Bihar_ & _Orissa_ ( [2] ) is the last case of this series. The
_Bhag1rati_ _J._ assessee derived income from extensive forest areas in
the impartible estate of which he was proprietor. Over
several decades the whole of the forest area had been
subjected by hill tribes to a process of "podu" cultivation-setting fire to the trees and cultivating the
forest lands and raising crops thereon--so that it was
impossible to say that there was any virgin forest left.
Through a huge forest establishment considerable
amount of human labour and skill was spent (i) in
fostering the growth of trees and preserving them from
destruction by men and cattle; (ii) in cultivation of the
soil by felling and burning trees from time to time;
(iii) in planned exploitation of trees by marking out the
areas into blocks; (iv) in systematic cutting down of
trees of particular girth and at particular heights;
(v) in planting new trees where patches occur; and
(vi) watering, pruning, dibbling and digging. The
Tribunal had held that as there was no forest cultiva-.
tion or tilling as such the income was not due to•
agricultural operations and therefore not exempt
under s. 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. In
the course of the judgment the learned Judges referred to the obsi;rvations of their Lordships of the Privy
Council in _Raja Mustafa Ali Khan's case_ (') but
observed that their Lordships did not lay down what
the measure of that cultivation should be or what the
nature of skill and labour expended should be, in order·
to bring the operations within the meaning of the
expression "agricultural purposes" as used in the
definition section. The question to be determined in
each case should, therefore, be whether the land out of
which the rent or revenue was derived was used for·
"agricultural purposes". Unless the land was subject
to some measure of cultivation or there was some
expenditure of human skill and labour on it in order to
**(1)** **[1948)** **16** **I.T.H ..** '.i3'>· (1) (1955] ~q **I:r.R.** ifi.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 149
derive the rent or revenue, the purpose would not be 1957
agricultural. It was observed that the cultivation was _The co;;;;;issioner_
not mere tilling but the science and art of cultivating _l(,.Inco;:-1ax,_
_01_
the soil may depend upon the nature of the soil the _c!1cu1':!_ _•_
atmosphere and various other factors. It was there- _R_ . _B_ v. _g;_
_010_
fore idle to regard "tilling" as the sole or indispensable _Sah':!Ro;mar_
test of agriculture. On the facts before it, the Court _Bhacwati_ _J._
held that the operations . carried on by the assessee
through the forest establishment showed that there had
been both cultivation of the soil as well as the application to human skill and labour upon the land as well as
on the trees themselves, and that therefore the income
derived from the forest was exempt from taxation
under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act.
Before parting with these cases it may be apposite
here to note the following observations of Vishwanatha
Sastri J. in _Commissioner_ _of_ _Income-tax, Madras_ v.
_K.E._ _Sundara_ _Mudaliar_ (1) at page 277:
"In _Commissioner_ _of_ _Agricultural Income-tax_ v.
_Raja_ _Jagdish_ _Chandra_ _Deo·_ _Dhabal_ _Deb_ (2) it was
held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
that income derived from the sale of _sal_ trees growing
spontaneously in forest and not planted by man was
"agricultural" income within the meaning of s. 2(1) of
the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act. There was
no digging or ploughing of the land. nor planting of
trees but there were "operations in forestry" such as
guarding the forest trees to keep away cattle and
allowing leaves and undergrowth to be removed by
people of the locality. There was no breaking up of
the soil, no sowing or planting or watering or fencing.
Whether the decision is correct or not can only be
authoritatively declared by the Supreme Court of
India. It seems to rest on an undue extension of the
principle laid down by the Judicial Committee in _Raja_
_Mustafa Ali Khan's_ _case_ (3) and goes much further
than our decision in the present case."
It appears from the above survey that there has
beett a divergence of opinion amongst the various
(t) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 259, 271. (2) (1949] 17 1.T.R. 426,438.
(~) [ 194!1) 16 I.T.R. 330.
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
t9S [7 ] Courts not only in regard to the connotation of the
_The conumssloner_ terms "agriculture" and "agricultural purposes" but
0{v_ln~me-tf, also in regard to the nature of forestry operations
'C:.ici~~a performed in the forest which can be styled agricul_R_ Bev. _x;_ tural operations so as to constitute the "land used for
0~':.Jias _nor,y"mar_ agricultural purposes" within the definition of agricul
0{v_ln~me-tf, also in regard to the nature of forestry operations
tural income as given both in the Indian Income-tax
_**BhagwatrJ.**_ Act and in the several Agricultural Income-tax Acts
passed by the various States.
It may be noted at the outset that the definition of
"agricultural income" given in s. 2( 1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act is in identical terms with the definitions
of that term as given in the various Agricultural
Income-tax Acts passed by the several States. It will
be idle therefore to treat "Taxes on Agricultural
Income" which fall within tl:\e legislative competence
of the State 1-::gislature as having no relation at all to
the corresponding provisions of the Indian Income-tax
Act. Once it is determined that the income in question is derived from land used for Agricultural purposes
by agriculture, it would be agricultural income and as
such exempt from tax under s. 4(3) (viii) of the Indian
Income-tax Act and would fall within the purview of
the relevant provisions of the several Agricultural
Income-tax Acts passed by the various States. The
result of this determination would be that the assessee
would not be liable to assessment under the Indian
Income-tax Act but he would have to pay the Agricultural Income-tax which would be levied upon him
under the relative Agricultural Income-tax Acts. The
only enquiry which would therefore be relevant is
whether the income in question is agricultural income
within the terms of the definition thereof and that
would have to be determined in each case by the
Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the particular case before it.
In order that an income derived by the assessee
should fall within the definition of agricultural income
two conditions are necessary to be satisfied and they
are : (1) that the land from which it is derived should
be used for agricultural purposes and is either assessed
for land revenue in the taxable territories or is subject
S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT REPORTS 151
to local rates assessed and collected by the officers of t957
the Government as such; and (ii) that the income _The commissioner_
should be derived from such land by agriculture or by _if;.,_ ~ncyte-'f·
one or the other of the operations described in els.; (ii) e~a1c!7faa'
and (iii) of s. 2 (I) (b) of the Indian Income-tax Act. _R_ . _B_ v. ...
_a1a_ _enoy n.umar_
It was at one time thought that the assessment of _SahasRoy_
the land to land revenue in the taxable territories was _Bhagwati_ _J._
intended to exempt the income derived from that
land from liability for payment of income-tax
altogether and that theory was based on the assumption that an assessee who was subject to payment of
land revenue should not further be subjected to the
payment of income-tax, because if he was so subjected
he would be liable to pay double taxation.
It is interesting to note at this stage the genesis of
the provision exempting agricultural income derived
from the lands assessed to land revenue as understood
by the Courts. Vishwanatha Sastri J. in this context
observed in the _Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras_ v.
_K.E. Sundara Mudaliar_ (') at page 270 :
"I shall briefly advert to the genesis of the provision exempting agricultural income derived from
lands assessed to land revenue, as I consider that the
subject matter with which the Legislature was dealing,
and the facts existing at the time with respect to which
the legislation was made, are legitimate topics for
consideration in ascertaining the object and scope of
the exemption from income-tax conferred on agricultural income. This exemption, it would be noticed,
has been a persistent feature of the Income-tax legislation of this country from 1867 onwards, and nothing
like it is found in the English Income-Tax Acts. Even
at a time when there was no provision like Section 100
of the Government of India Act, 1935, with Federal
and Provincial Lists and there was no incompetency
on the part of the Central Legislature to levy a tax on
agricultural .income, the Income-tax Acts passed from
time to time by the Central Legislature including the
existing Act of 1922, exempted from income-tax the
agricultural income of land assessed to pu?lic revenue.
(t) (19501 1H LT.IC 259, 271
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)
1957 This exemption was granted for no other reason than
_The Commissioner_ the justice and equity of exempting from further
_of Income-tax,_ burden income which had already paid its toll to the
_West Bengal_ - f .
_Calcutta_ ' State m the shape o land revenue either as a
~lJa ._. _8_ _enoy_ v, _n.11111ar_,, permanently f fixed peishkush under Regulation No. . .
_SahasRoy_ XXV o 1802 or as an assessment penod1cally fixed
under the ryotwari settlement. Under what may be
_Bltagwati_ _J._ called the common Jaw in India, the State had the
immemorial prerogative right to collect, a share of the
produce of the land from its owner, the latter having
the full right to enjoyment of the land and its produce,
subject only to the aforesaid contribution to the State.
Land revenue is collected annually from the proprietor
of the land and is presumably exigible from the income
of the land. Cash payment in lieu of a share of the·
produce due to the State was substituted long ago to
facilitate collection of revenue. Income derived from
the produce of the land having been subjected to the
payment of the annual land revenue, it was thought
inequitable to subject the same income again to annual
income-tax. Hence the exemption of the agricultural'
income of assessed lands or lands whose revenue had
been remitted either in whole or in part, as in the case
of the inams. Mines, minerals, and quarries having
been reserved by the State, at any rate in respect of
lands other than those comprised in a permanently
settled estate, income derived from such sources was
not exempted from income-tax. The revenue assessment was based on the quality of the soil and the income
derived from the produce of the lands, and therefore the exemption from income-tax was limited
to agricultural income derived from assessed lands.
Such is the reason for exemption from income-tax of
agricultural income."
Whatever may have been the gensis of the exemption of agricultural income from income-tax, the·
liability to pay land revenue or fixed peishkush under
Regulation XXV of 1902, was not considered by
Rankin J. as a deterrent against the levy of incometax in appropriate cases, even on certain classes of
income derived from the permanently settled estates,
if that was tlie clear intention of the legislature. The
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 153
learned Judge observed in _Emperor_ v. _Probhat Chandra_ 1957
_Barua_ (1): _Tlze Commissio11er_
"Some reference was made at the bar to the _01 I 11_ _come-tax,_
_West Bengal,_
practice of the Revenue Authorities since 1886 as _Calcutta_
regards fisheries in permanently settled estates but _R_ . _B_ v. _K_
. . h . "f _**a1<1**_ _**enoy**_ _**u1nar**_
t ere h 1s no agreement as to what t at practice-1 . _Sahas_ _Roy_
there be any practice-has been. Assuming that it
would have been open to us to place some degree of _Bltagwatil._
'reliance upon an interpretation settled by practice as
_contemporanea expositio_ we are in fact without any
such assistance.
_Bltagwatil._
- "Some reference was also made to what has been
called a "presumption against double taxation". In
_M anindra Chandra N andi_ v. _Secretary of State_ (2), royalties from a coal mine were held liable both to cess
under the Cess Act, 1880, and to income-tax under the
Act of 1886, but it was said that "it may be considered
that courts always look with disfavour upon double
taxation, and Statute will be construed, if possible, to
avoid double taxes." Reference was made to certain dicta of American Courts and to the English case of
_Carr_ v. _Fowle_ (3)-But the only observation in this case
was to the effect that the statute presumably did not
intend that a vicar should in effect pay the same tax
(land tax ) twice on the same hereditament. This is
plain enough. Thus the income-tax is one tax, and
income assessed under one schedule cannot be assessed
all over again under another. That there is any legal
presumption of a general character against "double
taxation" in any wider sense is a proposition to which
I respectfully demur as a principle for the construction
of a modern statute. In _Manindra Chandra Nandi_ v.
_Secretary_ _of State_ (2) it did not avail to cut down
clear, though absolutely general language."
This view of Rankin **J.** was upheld by the Privy
Council in _Prabhat Chandra Barua_ v. _King Emperor_ (4).
In the later case of _Yuvarajah_ _of Pittapuram_ v. _Com-_
_missioner of Income-tax, Madras_ (5) the Privy Council
held that the imposition of Income-tax in respect of
income derived from the permanently settled estate.
(1) [1924] I.L.R. 51 Cal. 504. (4) (1930) L.R. 57 IA 228
(2) (1907) ILR H Cal 257, 287 (5) [1g~(ll 1i ~TR 445,
(3) (1893) I Q.B. 251.
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]
_19_ _[5]_ _1_ would not be a breach of the Madras Permanent Settle_nie c,;mmissio11er_ ment Regulations No. XXV of 1802. The assessment
_"!Income-tax,_ of land to land revenue or its being subject to local
_**West Bengal,**_ ffi
_Calcutta_ rates assessed and collected by the o cers of the
. .
_K_ Government as such is merely an indication that the
_11_ [v. ]
_11_
""F\a~:':! Ro~mar land is an agricultural land as distinguished from land
which can be used for agricultural purposes but carries
'''""""'"'; _J._ the matter no further.
We have, therefore, to consider when it can be said
that the land is used for agricultural purposes or agricultural operations are performed on it. Agriculture
is the basic idea underlying the expressions "agricul
tural purposes" and "agricultural operations" and it is
pertinent therefore to enquire what is the connotation
of the term "agriculture". As we have noted above, the
primary sense in which the term agriculture is understood is agar-field and cultra--cultivation, i.e., the
cultivation of the field and if the term is understood
only in that sense, agriculture would be restricted only
to cultivation of the land in the strict sense of the term
meaning thereby, tilling of the land, sowing of the
seeds, planting and similar operations on the land.
They would be the basic operations and would require
the expenditure of human skill and labour upon the land
itself. There are however other operations which have
got to be resorted to by the agriculturist and which
are absolutely necessary for the purpose of effectively
raising the produce from the land. They are operations to be performed after the produce sprouts from
the land, e.g., weeding, digging the soil around the
growth, removal of undesirable undergrowths and all
operations which foster the growth and preserve the
same not only from insects and pests but also from
d..:predation from outside, tending, pruning, cutting,
harvesting, and rendering the produce fit for the market.
The latter would all be agricultural operations when
taken in conjunction with the basic operations above
described, and it would be futile to urge that they are
not agricultural operations at all. But even though
these subsequent operations may be assimilated to
agricultural operations, when they arc in conjunction
with these basic operations, could it be said that even
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 155
though they are divorced from these basic operations 1957
they would nevertheless enjoy the characteristic of _The_ Commissione~
agricultural operations? Can one eliminate these basic operations altogether and say that even if these basic o~nco~e-tai, c!1c:r~!0 '
0
operations altogether and say that even if these basic c!1c:r~!0 '
operations are not performed in a given case the mere _R_ . _B_ v. _K_
performance of these subsequent operations would be 01asahn::Ro;ma~,
performance of these subsequent operations would be 01asahn::Ro;ma~,
tantamount to the performance of agricultural operations on the land so as to constitute the income _Bhagwati_ _J,_
derived by the assessee therefrom agricultural income
within the definition on that term?
We are of opinion that the mere performance of
- these subsequent operations on the products of the
land, where such products have not been raised on the
land by the performance of the basic operations which
we have described above would not be enough to
characterise them as agricultural operations. In order
to invest them with the character of agricultural operations, these subsequent operations must necessarily
be in conjunction with and a continuation of the basic
operations which are the effective cause of the products
being raised from the land. It is only if the products
are raised from the land by the performance of these
basic operations that the subsequent operations attach
themselves to the products of the land and acquire the
characteristic of agricultural operations. The culti-·
vation of the land does not comprise merely of raising
the products of the land in the narrower sense of the
term Ii ke tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting, and similar work done on the land but also
includes the subsequent operations set mit' above all of
which operations, basic as well as subsequent, form
one integrated activity of the agriculturist and the
term "agriculture" has got to be understood as connoting this integrated activity of the agriculturist~
One cannot dissociate the basic operations from the
subsequent operations, and say that the subsequent
operations, even though they are divorced from the
basic operations can consitute agricultural operations
by themselves. If this integrated activity which constitutes agriculture is undertaken and performed in
regard to any land that land can be said to have b.-:en
used for "agricultural purposes" and the income
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958J
1957 derived therefrom can be said to be "agricultural
_The commissioner_ income" derived from the land by agriculture.
_of Income-1ox,_ In considering the connotation of the term "agri_**1Yesr**_ _**Bengal,**_ _**.r**_ h - - f
_calc1ma_ culture" we have so iar thoug t of culhvat1on o land
" . v. _K_ in the wider sense as comprising within its scope the
_**-..a**_ _**[1]**_ _**a**_ _sahasRoy_ _8_ _**eno''**_ _**u1nar**_ b · as1c as we II as t e h su b sequent operations escn e · d 'b d
above, regardless of the nature of the products raised
_**Bltagwati**_ _**J.**_ on the land. These products may be grain or vegetables or fruits which are necessary for the sustenance
of human beings including plantations and groves, or
grass or pasture for consumption of beasts, or articles
of luxury such as, betel, coffee, tea, spices, tobacco
etc., or commercial crops like cotton, flax, jute, hemp,·
indigo etc. All these are products raised from the
land and the term "agriculture" cannot be confined
merely to the production of grain and food products
for human beings and beasts as was sought to be done
by Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in _Murugesa Chetti_ v.
_Chinnathambi Goundun_ (') or Sadashiva Ayyar J. in
_Rajah_ _of Venkatagiri_ v. _Ayyappa Redi_ (') but must be
understood as comprising all the products of the land
which have some utility either for consumption or for
trade and commerce and would also include forest
products such as timber, _sal_ and _piyasa/_ trees, casuarina
plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc.
The question still remains whether there is any
warrant for the further extension of the term "agriculture" to all activities in relation to the land or having
connection with the land including breeding and rearing
of livestock, dairy-farming, butter and cheese making,
poultry-farming etc. This extension is based on the
dictionary meanings of the term and the definitions of
"agriculture" collated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, as
also the dicta of Lord Cullen and Lord Wright in
_Lean_ _&_ _Dickinson_ v. _Ball_ (') and _Lord Glaneley_ v.
_Wightman_ (4) quoted above.
Derbyshire C.J. in _Moolji_ _Sicka_ _&_ _Co.,_ _!11_ _re_ (')
treated tendu plants growing on the soil as part of the
soil and therefore considered the pruning of the shrub
(<) (1901) l.L.R. 24 Mad. 421, 423. (4J [19331 A.C. 618 (H.L.) G:Jfl.
(2) (1913) l.L.R. 38 Mad. 73B. 15) I 19391 7 l.T.R. 493.
(3) **(192:;) 10** **'fax** (;as. :1+1.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157
as cultivation of the soil in a legal and technical sense 1957
and this extension of the term "agriculture" was also _The commissioner_
approved by Vishwanatha Sastri J. in _Commissioner_ _0-'.Jnco}f'"'';d·_
-0/ _Income-tax,_ v. _K.E._ _Sundara Mudaliar_ (1). We are 'i!!ncu~~! '
however of opinion that the mere fact that an activity _R_ . _B_ v. _K_
_010_ _1110_
has some connection with or is in some way dependent _s::!R0;_ _'_
-on land is not sufficient to bring it within the scope of
. f h, . l, _Bltagwati_ _J._
the term and such extension o t e tem1 ' agncu ture'
is ·unwarranted. The term "agriculture" cannot be
<lissociated from the primary significance thereof which
is that of cultivation of the land and even though it
-can be extended in the manner we have stated before
both in regard to the. process of agriculture and the
products which are raised upon the land, there is no
warrant at all for extending it to all activities which
have relation to the land or are in any way coµnected
with the land. The use of the word agriculture in
regard to such activities would certainly be a distortion
-of the term.
A critical examination of the definition of "agricultural income" as given ins. 2(1) of the Indian Incometax Act and the relevant provisions of the several
Agricultural Income-tax Acts of the various States also
lends support to this position. In the first instance, it
is defined as rent or revenue derived from land which
is used for agricultural purposes; and it is next defined
as income derived from such land by agriculture or by
the activities described in els. 2 and 3 of·s~ 2(1) (b) of the
Act. These activities are postulated to be performed by
the cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of such land
in regard to the products raised or received by him
which necessarily means the produce raised on the land
either by himself or by the actual cultivator of the land
who pays such rent-in-kind to him. If produce raised.or
received by the cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind is
thus made the subject-matter of els. (ii) and (iii) in s. 2
(l)(b) of the Act, the term "agriculture" used in cl.(i) of
s. 2(1 )(b) must also be similarly restricted to the performance of the basic operations on the land and there
is no scope for reading the term "agriculture" ·in the
still wider sense indicated above.
(1) [1950) 18, I.T.R; 2590 271.
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958}
195
7 If the term "agriculture" is thus understood as
_The Commissioner_ comprising within its scope the basic as well as sub
0-{t:;,m;:-,:;~· sequent operations in the process of agriculture and
_Calcutta_ ' the raising on the land of products which have some
_Raja_ Ben~y _Kumar_ utility either for consumption or for trade and
_Sahas Roy_ commerce, it will be seen that the term "agriculture"
_Bhagwati_ _J._ receives a wider interpretation both in regard to its
operations as well as the results of the same. Nevertheless there is present all throughout the basic idea
that there must be at the bottom of its cultivation of
land in the sense of tilling of the land, sowing of
the seeds, planting, and similar work done on the land
itself. This basic conception is the essential _sine qua_
_non_ of any operation performed on the land constituting agricultural operation. If the basic operations
are there, the rest of the operations found themselves
upon the same. But if these basic operations ai:e
wanting the subsequent operations do not acquire the
characteristic of agricultural operations.
All these operations no doubt fequire the expenditure of human labour and skill but the human labour
and skill spent in the performance of the basic operations only can be said to have been spent upon the
land. The human labour and skill spent in the
performance of subsequent operations cannot be said
to have been spent on the land itself, though it may
have the effect of preserving, fostering and regenerating the products of the land.
This distinction is not so important in cases where
the agriculturist performs these operations as a part of
his integrated activity in cultivation of the land.
Where, however, the products of the land are of
spontaneous growth unassisted by human skill and
labour, and human skill and labour are spent merely
in fostering the growth, preservation and regeneration
of such products of land, the question falls to be considered whether these subsequent operations performed
by the agriculturist are agricultural operations and
enjoy the characteristic of agricultural operations.
It is agreed on all hands that products which grow
wild on the land or are of spontaneous growth not
involving any human labour or skill upon .the land are
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 159
not products of agriculture and the income derived _19s1_
therefrom is not agricultural income. There is no _The_ _Commissioner_
process of agriculture involved in the raising of these _of Income-tax,_
products- from the land. There are no agricultural Wes~afc~':f:1
operations performed by the assessee in respect of the v.
same, and the only work which the assessee performs R<d'S:h::'Ro~"mar
here is that of collecting the pro.duce and consuming - .
and marketing the same. No agricultural operations _BhagwatiJ._
have been performed and there is no question at all of
the income derived therefrom being agricultural income
within the definition given in s. 2(1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act. Where, however, the assessee performs subsequent operations on these products of land
which are of wild or spontaneous growth, the nature of
those operations would have to be determined in the
light of the principles enunciated above.
Applying these principles to the facts of the present
case, we no doubt start with the finding that the forest
in question was of spontaneous growth. If there were
no other facts found, that would entail the conclusion
that the income is not agricultural income. But, then,
it has also been found by the Tribunal that the forest
is more than 150 years old, though portions of the
fore st have from time to time been denuded, that is to
say, trees have completely fallen and the proprietors
have planted fresh trees in those areas, and they have
performed the operations for the purpose of .QUrsing the
trees planted by them. It cannot be denied that so
far as those trees are concerned, the income derived
therefrom would be agricultural income. In view of
the fact that the forest is more than 150 years old, the
areas which had thus become denuded and replanted
cannot be considered to be negligible. The position
therefore is that the whole of the income derived from
the forest cannot be treated as non-agricultural income.
If the enquiry had been directed on proper lines, it
would have been possible for the Income-tax authorities to ascertain how much of the income is attributable to forest of spontaneous growth and how much to
_trees_ planted by the proprietors. But no such enquiry
had been directed, and in view of the long lapse of
time, we do not consider it desirable to direct any such
M2SC-11
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]
_19s1_ enquiry now. The expenditure shown by the assessee
_The_ _commissioner_ for the maintenance of the forest is about Rs. 17,000
_ot,t.nco;e-1;,_ as against a total income of about Rs. 51,000. Having
_c:Uc:':fa·._ regard to the magnitude of this figure, we think that a
_R_ _B_ •· ~ substantial portion of the income must have been
"1"sJ::~oyumar derived from trees planted by the proprietors them
selves. As no attempt has been made by the Depart_**Bhagwatt J.**_ . h .
ment to establish whic portion of the income is
attributable to forest of spontaneous growth, there are
no materials on which we could say that the judgment
of the court below is wrong.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
_Appeal dismissed._