High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed with costs.

The Amalgamated Electricity Co., Ltd. v. Bathena

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 361 of 1958

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Jaffer Imam
  • A. K. Sarkar
  • K. Subba Rao
Judgment Date
1959-02-13
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • The Amalgamated Electricity Co., Ltd.

Respondents

  • I. N. Bathena
  • (the plaintiff in the suit)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. M. Gharekhan
  • • J. N. Shroff

Counsels for Respondents

  • • D. D. Chawla
  • • G. Gopalakrishnan

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is Civil Appeal No. 361 of 1958 arising from a suit filed in Belgaum by Bathena against The Amalgamated Electricity Co., Ltd., a licensee authorized to supply electricity in the area. The appellant (licensee) had applied for a stay of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, arguing that the dispute fell within Clause XVI of the Sixth Schedule to the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which prescribes arbitration by the Authority for disputes interpreting or arising from the Sixth Schedule. The respondent claimed refunds for alleged overcharges; the suit concerns a consumer billing dispute rather than a contract between licensee and the Government. The Mysore High Court had dismissed the stay, and the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The core issue was whether the Sixth Schedule arbitration clause is a statutory provision that binds a consumer and compels arbitration, thereby staying the civil suit. The Court held that Clause XVI is not a statutory provision enabling arbitration for disputes between any person and the licensee; the arbitration clause exists within a license, an engagement between the Government and the licensee, and it cannot bind a third party such as the consumer. Section 57(1) merely incorporates the Sixth Schedule into the license, not to create universal arbitration. Consequently, there is no stay under Section 34, and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948)Section 57Sixth ScheduleClause XVI of the Sixth ScheduleSeventh Schedule (Table)Indian Electricity Act, 1910Section 3 (of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910)Arbitration Act, 1940Section 34Section 46Seventh Schedule Table (as referred)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the dispute falls within Clause XVI of the Sixth Schedule to the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, providing arbitration by the Authority for disputes interpreting or arising under the Schedule. It argues that the stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is warranted if the clause constitutes a statutory provision applicable to disputes between any person. The licensing term, incorporated by Section 57(1), is an engagement between the Government and the licensee, and the arbitration clause prescribes arbitration only for disputes between those two parties, not for disputes with a consumer. Therefore, the suit should be stayed and referred to arbitration if applicable. The appellant relies on the statutory nature of the license and the potential operation of Section 46 of the Arbitration Act to support a stay.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent asserts that the arbitration clause in the licence is between the licensee and the Government and governs only those parties to the instrument. It argues that Clause XVI is not a statutory provision binding third parties (i.e., consumers) and that Section 57 incorporated the Sixth Schedule into the licence but did not create a general right to refer disputes involving consumers to arbitration. Hence, the dispute over alleged overcharges by the licensee cannot be referred to arbitration under Clause XVI, and Section 34 stay is unwarranted.

Diagnostic Tool

Beta

Does this judgment govern your specific facts?

Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against The Amalgamated Electricity Co., Ltd. v. Bathena and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

(2) S.C.R: SUPREME COURT REPORTS 213 THE AMALGAMATED ELE,CTRICITY CO., LTD. _r959_ . _v._ .: .., . '·· _February_ _IJ._ I .N .• S. BATHENA .. ' .,··· (JAFER IMAM, ·A. K. SARKAR and #### · · K. 'Su:BB.A RAo; JJ.) · · · _Arbitration_:_Arbit;ation_ claus~ _in_ ele~tricity _licence-Whether_ _binding on consumer_ _of_ _electricity-Electricity (Supply) Act,_ _r948_ _(54_ _of_ _r948);_ s. _57,_ _ct._ _XV I of Sixth Schedule._ The arbitration clause incorporated by s. 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, in a licence granted by the Government for the supply of electrical energy to the consumers is not· available for adjudicating upon a dispute between the licensee. and the consumer, for the licence is an engagement between the licensee and the Government and the arbitration clause in it refers only to disputes between them. Section 57(1) does not make the arbitration clause a statutory provision by virtue of which disputes between any and every person may be referred to arbitration. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 361 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 11, 1957, of the Mysore High Court in Civil Revision No. 702 of 1956, against the judgment and order dated August 10, 1956, of the Court of the Second-Extra Assistant Judge, Belgaum, in Misc. Appeal No. 36 of 1955, arising out of the order dated September 1, 1955, of the 1st Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Belgaum, in Regular Civil Suit No. 197 of 1955. _M. M. Gharekhan_ and _J._ _N._ _Shroff,_ for the appellant. _D. D. Chawla_ and _G._ _Gopalakrishna.n,_ for the respondent. _B. Sen_ and _T._ _M. Sen,_ for the intervener (AttorneyGeneral of India). 1959. February 13. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by #### SARKAR, J.-This is an appeal from the judgment passed by the High Court at Bangalore on a petition in revision. The question is whether a certain suit should be stayed under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. _Sarkar_ _J._ 214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. _, 959_ The appellant carries on business as a supplier of # -- electrical energy in Belgaum. It obtained a licence _The_ _Amalgamated_ from the Government under s. 3 of the Indian Elec_Electricity_ _co.,_ _Ltd._ tricity Act, 1910, authorising it to supply the energy Ba~ena in that area. The respondent, who is the plaintiff in the suit, obtained supply of electricity from the appel_Sarkar_ _J._ lant. The respondent felt that he was being overcharged by the appellant for the electricity so supplied. He thereupon filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Belgaum, on or about the 8th of June, 1955, claiming a refund of the amount paid in excess of what he thought was the legitimate charge. The appellant then applied under s. 34 of the Arbitration #### Act for a stay of the suit on the ground that the matter was referable to arbitration under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The application was dismissed by the Civil Judge and his decision was confirmed by the Extra Assistant Sessions Judge on appeal and lastly, by the High Court in revision. The appellant has now come to this Court. The appellant contends that this matter is referable to arbitration under the provision contained in cl. XVI of the Sixth Schedule of the Act of 1948. A few of the provisions of these Acts will now have to be referred to. Under the Act of 1910 the business of supplying electrical energy can be carried on only with the sanction of the Government. Section 3 of #### that Act makes provision for the grant of a licence for supplying electrical energy. The appellant obtained a licence in 1932. A form of the licence is set out in the rules framed #### under the Act of 1910 and that form prescribes the maximum limit which a licensee is entitled to charge a consumer for the electrical energy supplied. The Act of 1948 made a somewhat different provision with #### regard to these charges. It provided by s. 57 as follows: " _S. 57._ (1) The provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Table appended to the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a local authority, from the date of the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding #### (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 215 year of account, and from such date the licensee shall _x959_ comply therewith accordingly and any provisions of _Th_ _A_ 1 1 _[d ]_ such licence or of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, or _El:ctrici7;_ f;.~~ 1~. any other law, agreement or instrument applicable to v. the licensee shall, in relation to the licensee, be void _Bathena_ and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this section and the said schedule _Sarkar_ _]._ and Table. (2) ........................................................... " This section had therefore. the effect of incorporating in the licence the terms of these two Schedules and #### provided that they would prevail over the terms of any previously granted licence or the provisions of the Act of 1910, or any other law, agreement or instrument inconsistent with these Schedules. The Sixth Schedule mn,de ne\v provisions about the clmrges t ]rn,i; a licensee was entitled to realiRe for the current supplied. Clause XVI of that Schedule contains a provision for arbitration and it is on that that the appellant relies. That clause is in these terms: " Any dispute or difference as to the interpretation or any matter arising out of the provisions of this Schedule shall be referred to the arbitration of the Authority." The appellant contends that the dispute covered by the respondent's suit is one of the kind mentioned in this clause and therefore must be referred to arbitration under its terms. We will assume that the dispute is of the kind_mentioned in cl. XVI of the Sixth Schedule. We are #### however unable to see that it is a dispute which is ### referable to arbitration under that clause. It is not the appellant's case that cl. XVI is a clause in any contract between it and the respondent. That being so, the only other way in which it is possible for the appellant to contend that the respondent is bound to refer the dispute to arbitration under this clause is by showing that it is a·statutory provision for arbitration. No doubt if it were so, then in view of the provisions of s. 46 of the Arbitration Act the appellant would be entitled to apply for a stay of the suit under s. 34 of #### that Act. We are however wholly unable to agree that cl. XVI is such a statutory provision. The only 216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. _'959_ statutory provision that we find on the subject is that #### Th e A ma ganta e I t d [contained in ] l XVI d [s. ] [57 ] [and ] [its ] l [effect is ] . [that ] S. [the ] [terms ] [of ] _Electricity co., Ltd._ c . an the other c a uses m the 1xth Schedule v. are to be deemed incorporated in a licence granted by _Batkena_ the Government under s. 3 of the Act of 1910 and the #### licensee is to comply with the terms of that Schedule. Sarkar j. Therefore all that we get is that the licence which is granted by the Government to a supplier of electricity, like the appellant, is to contain a clause that certain disputes would be referred to arbitration. The licence is an engagement between the Government and the licensee, binding the parties to it to its provi### sions. It is unnecessary to decide whej;her this engagement is contractual or statutory, "for, in either case it is between the two of them only. An arbitratioi+ clause in an instrument like this can only be in respect of disputes between the parties to it. Such an arbitration clause does not contemplate a dispute between a party, to the instrument and one who is not such a party .. We are unable to reads. 57 as making #### cl. XVI in the Sixth Schedule a statutory provision by which certain disputes between any .and every person have to be referred to arbitration. . . ### It was said on behalf of the appellant that th~ licence is a statutory document. That, in our vie.w, is a loose way of putting the thing. By that the utmost #### that can be meant is that it is issued under the terms of a statutory provision and . must,qpmply with the provisions thei;eof. But that cannot convert it into a sti:ttutory provision for reference to arbitr.ation of disputes irrespective of the parties between whom the d~sputes may exist. . . - In our view, therefore, c.1. XVI of the . SJxth Sche'dule of the Act of 1948 contains no provision for, arbi'. trat.ion, statutory or otherwise, for reference o( t,he dispute of the nature we have b_efore us, between·.a licensed. supplier of electricity .and. a. consumer. of .it from' him. . . . . . .,,. . . ln the result, this appeal fails and is dismi~sed with costs. - ' #### _Appeal dismissed._