High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; conviction and sentence uphel...

Tara Chand v. Superintendent of Central Excise, Bombay

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1968
Neutral Citation:/null

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. M. Sikri
  • V. Bhargava
  • I. D. Dua
  • (JJ)
Judgment Date
1970-12-03
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; conviction and six-month minimum sentence upheld.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence upheld; the Collector’s authority to authorize prosecution was valid.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Tara Chand

Respondents

  • Superintendent of Central Excise, Bombay

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • V. Tarkunde
  • • R. Jethmalani
  • • N. H. Hingorani
  • • K. Hingorani

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S. P. Nayar

Case Synopsis & Summary

Tara Chand was apprehended on arrival in Bangalore on 16 November 1963 with 16 pieces of foreign-origin gold concealed in a pillow. Sanction to prosecute was obtained under s. 137(1) of the Customs Act and Rule 126Q of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, after which the Superintendent of Central Excise filed a complaint. The trial court acquitted him of an offence under s. 135 of the Customs Act for want of smuggling evidence. It also held that, under Rule 126P(2), the Government Notifications of January 10, 1963 and November 5, 1963 did not authorize the officers to delegate the power to institute prosecutions; hence the complaint by the Collector was defective. The High Court reversed this view, holding that the Collector was empowered to authorize the Superintendent of Central Excise to prosecute, and convicted Tara Chand with six months’ rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules and the two Notifications. It held that the notifications read together authorise the Collector to exercise the power in relation to prosecutions for offences punishable under Part XII-A and that after an initial decision by officials not inferior in rank to the Assistant Collector, further steps including drafting and presenting the complaint could be carried out by others. The Court noted that, though Gold Control Act, 1965 repealed Part XII-A, the case is governed by the law in force at the time, so the six-month minimum sentence applied. The appeal was dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Defence of India Rules, 1962 Part XII-ARule 126JRule 126XRule 126QRule 126P(2)Rule 126H(2)(d)Gold (Control) Act, 1965Customs Act, s. 137(1)Customs Act, s. 135Notifications of January 10, 1963 and November 5, 1963

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Plain reading of statutory provisions; construction of notifications in light of rule 1260 and Part XII-A.
  • Delegation/agency doctrine in prosecutorial powers (authorization and consent under Rule 126J/126X read with 126Q).
  • Temporal application of law at time of offence for sentencing (minimum six months under Rule 126P(2)(ii) applies despite later repeal).

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the prosecution was not lawfully instituted, as the officers who consented to prosecute were not empowered to do so under the January 1963 and November 1963 notifications; the Magistrate’s view that prosecution could not be instituted without explicit authority was correct. The charge was framed to reflect Rule 126P(2) and 126H(2)(d); the minimum six-month sentence under Rule 126P(2)(ii) must apply, and, despite the Gold Control Act 1965 repealing Part XII-A, the case must be governed by the law in force at the time of offence. The appellant further argued that the two notifications were not meant to confer authority to delegate prosecution to others and that the High Court’s interpretation would unduly strain statutory language.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents submit that the Collector of Central Excise was empowered to authorize the Superintendent to prosecute by the January 1963 notification, as amended in November 1963; the formal requirement of consent and the authority to prosecute are satisfied by Ex. P/5. The High Court correctly held that prosecution could be instituted by a person not inferior in rank to the Assistant Collector and that the charge properly framed disclosed the relevant facts; the sentence of six months was proper under the rules in force at that time.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

908 TARA CHAND _v._ SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY. _December_ 3, 1970 (S. M .. SIKRI, V. BHARGAVA AND I. D. DUA, JJ.] _Dtftne< of India Rules_ 1962 _rr._ 126J and _126X-Notificatnons under-_ _.if .enable Collector or Assistant Collector_ _to_ _delegate authority to institute_ _prostcution for offence_ _urtder_ _r._ _126-P(2)-Seni:ence-Jf minimum sentence_ _to_ _be_ _gaverned by provisions_ _of Rules_ _or_ b.v _Act_ 18 _of_ 1965 _when_ _Act in_ Fore~. The Appellant was searched on alighting from a plane at the H.A.L. Aerodrome, Bangalore, on November 16, 1963 and a quantity of Gold was found on and seized from him. After obtaining sanction from the Collector under section 137(1) of the Customs Act anp under Rule 126-Q of Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Superintendent of Central Excise filed a complaint against the Appellant. The Trial Court did not find any evidence establishing that the Gold had been smuggled and the Appellant was therefore acquitted of the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act. As regards the case against the Appellant under Rule 126-P(2), the Trial Court held that according to the Notification issued by the Govern· ment of India on November 5, 1963 in modification of the Notification dated January 10, 1963 issued under Rule 126-J read with Rule 126-X, either the Assistant Collector of Centra!•Excise or the Collector of Central Excise could,institute the ·prosecution; these officers were not authorised to delegate powers to institute prosecution. The Court, therefore, acquitted the Appellant on the view that the complaint was not filed by an Officer competontly authorised. The High Court in appeal disagreed with this view holding that the CoJlector was lawfully empowered to authorise the Superintendent of Central Excise to prosecute the a;ipellant. The Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment fct six **months.** Dismissing an appeal to this Court, HELD : The plain reading of the relevant entries in the Notification of January 10, !963 as amended by the ·Notification of November 5, 1963 dearly shows that it authorises the Collecter to exercile the power and function in relation to -the institution of prosecution for any offence punishal>le under Part XII-A of the Rules referred ·lo in r. 126Q. Keeping in view the multifarious activities of the higher officers of the Central Excise Department it seems clear that ·after the responsible officen of this Department not inferior in rank _)o_ the Assistant Collector had applied their m1, d and come to a decisron as to the desirability of starting the prosecution in a given case, further steps in the matter of actual prosecution including the drafting and presentation of the. complaint could be lawfully carried out by others. To hOld otherwise would not only mean unduly straining .the unambiguous statutolry language but would also tend to thwart, instead of effectuating, their real purpose. [915 C-FJ The're was no force in the contention that the charge levelled against the appellant was vague or in any way different from the one for which A B ##### c D E F G H A B ###### c D E # ' G H TARA CHAND \'. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE _(Dua. ],)_ 909 he was convicted. In fact the appellant had admitted all the relevant ·facts alleged by the prosecution. The facts alleged and proved clearly brought the appellant's case within the mischief of rule 126H(2) (d) and 126-P(2). Although under the new Gold (Control) "Act 18 of 1965. which had repealed Part XII-A of the Rules, there is no minimum sentence of imprisonment prescribed, the present case must be governed by the law in force at the time and therefore the minimum sentence of 6 :nonths under rule 126-P(2) (ii) must apply. [916 D, G] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1968. · Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 8, 19618 of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1966. _V._ _M._ _Tarkunde,_ _R._ _Jethamala11i,_ _N .._ _H._ _Hi11gora11i_ and _K._ _Hi11gorani,_ for the appellant. _S._ _P._ _Nayar,_ for the respondent. The Juogment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. This appeal by special . leav~ is directed against the judgment and order of the Mysore High Court· on appeal setting aside in part the order of the appellant's acquittal by a Second Class Magistrate and convicting him under r. 126P (2) of the Defence of India Rules as amended in 1963-hereafter called the Rules-and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for six months. The order of the trial court acquitting him of the offence under s. 135 of the Customs Act was upheld. The appella,nlt alighted from a service plane at H.A.L. Aerodrome, Bangalore on November 16, 1963 at about 12.45 in the aftembon. E. R. Fariman, Inspector, C.I.D. had prior incriminating information about the arrival of a person whose. description seemed to tally with that of the appellant. The Inspector and has staff who were on the look out waited for the appellant to take his baggage from the baggage counter. As soon as the appellant took delivery of a plastic bag and a hold-all the Inspector asked the appellant to accompany him to the Security Room. On being questioned the appellant gave his name as Tara Chand though he admitted that he had travelled under the name· of J. D. Shaw. In the Security Room in the 'Presence of _Panch-_ _watdars_ the platic bag and the holdcall were opened and examined. From a pi!l~w taken. out of the hold-all w~re found two tape bags contammg 16 pieces of gold with foreign markings. These tape bags had been put into the pillow which was then stitched. The appellant was then produced by ti» Inspector before his D. S. P. along with the articles seized from him. After obtaining sanction from the Collector under s.- 137 (I) of the 910 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 s.c.R. Customs Act and under r: 1260 of the Rules Sliri Rasool, A Superintendent of Central Excise (P.W. 3) filed the complai.nt. The learned Magistrate trying the appellant· found. the gold pieces to be of foreign origin. He, however, did not find any evidence establishing them to be smuggled with· the result that the appellant was acquitted of th.e offence u.nder s. 135 of the B Customs Act. The learned Magistrate did not draw any pre· sumption against the. appellant because the seizure of the gold pieces was not by the Customs authorities but by the police who thereafter handed over the gold pieces to' the office of the Collector of Sentral Excise. and Customs. ##### While _considering the case against the appellant under c r. 126P(2) of the Rules, the learned Magistrate observed that according to the relevant notification issued by the Government of India on November 5, 1963 in fuooification of the earlier one issued under r. 126J read with r. 126X of th.e Ru)i:s, it is either the Assistant Collector af Central ·Excise or the Collector of Central Excise who can institute prosecution, These officers are D not authorised to delegate the power to institute prosecution. According to the learned Magistrate the Collector of Excise had, therefore, no power to ddegate the right to insfiwte prosecutions with which he alone had been clothed. Exhibit P/5 was in the circumstances consid!!red· to be ineffective. On this reasoning the complaint having not been filed by the officer c<impetently E authorised the appellant was acquitted. \•· ,. On appeal by the Superintendent of Central Excise and Customs (the complainant in the case) the High Court disagreed with the view taken by the learned Magistrate: It may be point· -eel out that the appeal by . the complainant was confined . only to the acquittal under r. 126P(2) of the Rules and the appellant's acquittal under s. 135 of the Customs Act :was not questioned, it being conceded .that there was no evidence on the record to bring the appellant's case under s. 135 of the Customs Act. F The High Court relying on Ex. _PI_ 5 and the two notifications issued by the Government of India came to the conclusion G that the Collector was lawfully empowered to authorise the Superintendent of Central Excise to prosecute the appellant. That Court also arrived at the conclusion that the appellant, who was not a dealer or refiner, having a licence, was found in possession of gold, of which no declaration had been made under the law and, therefore, he was guilty of an offence punishable H under r. 126P(2) of the Rules. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the appellant convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six 11).0nths. A B #### c D E F G H TARA CHAND _v._ SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE _(Dua,_ J.) 911 In this Coun Shri Tarkunde assailed the legality of the view taken by the High Coun. According to him the trial court had rightly held the prosecution not to have been instituted by a duly authorised person. Let us see if the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions supports the learned counsel. Part XII-A of the Rules deals with Gold Control and it contains rules 126A to 126Z: This pan was inserted in the Defence of India Rules in January 1963. Rule 1260 provides: The word "Administrator" was substituted for the word "Board" in September 1963. We are informed that no Administrator as defined in r. l 26A (a) was appointed by the Central Government under wwer conferred on it by r. 126J ( 1). Under r. 126X the e1i!ntral Government is empowered to perform all or any of the functions of the Administrator and also by notification to ·exercise ail o~ any of the powers conferred on the Administrator by Pan XII-A if considered necessary or expedient in the public <interest to do so. The Administrator who is to take suitable measures : (a) to discourage the use and consumption of gold, (b) to bring about conditions tending to reduce the demand for gold and, ( c) to advise the Central Government on all matters relating to gold, is enjoined by r. 126!(3) to discharge his functions subject to the general control and directions of the Central .Government. Sub-rules 4 and _5_ of r. 126J provide : " ( 4) The Administrator may by general or special order authorise such person as he thinks fit to exercise all or any of the powers exercisable by him under this Pan and- different persons may be authorised to exercise different powers : Provided that no officer below the rank of Collector of Customs or Central Excise or Collector of a district shall be authorised to hear appeals under sub-rule (3) of rule 126-M. ( 5) Subject to any general or special direction given or condition attached by the Administrator any "(I) No prosecution for any offence punishable under this Pan shall be. instituted against any person except by, or with the consent of, the Adminis trator or any person authorised by the Adminstrator in this behalf. (2) 'Nothing in rule 154 shall apply to any contra vention of any provision of this Part or any order made thereunder." 912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1971] 2 S.C.R. person authorised by the Administrator to exercise any powers may exercise these powers in the same mariner and with the same effect as if if they had been confered on that person directly by ·this Part and not by way of authorisation." We may bear in mind the effect of sub-nile (5) on the scheme. ~ule 126H(2) (d) dealing with restrictions on possession and sale of gold by persons other than licensed holders lays down : "(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Part, A B ### c D E , \= ' ( d) no person other than a dealer licensed under this Part shall buy or otherwise acquire or agree to buy or otherwise acquire, gold, not being orna ment, except, (i) by succession, intestate or testamentary, or (ii) in accordance with a permit granted by the Administrator o'r in accordance with such authorisation as the Administrator may, by general or special' order ir.ake in this behalf : Provided· that a refiner may buy or accept gold from a dealer licensed under this Pai:t;" Turning now to the two notifications on the construction of which the fate of this case depends, we find that on January 10, 1963 the Central Government issued a notification in exercise F of the. powers confered on it by r. 126X read with r. 1261( 4) authorising. certain officers of the Central Excise Department to exercise any or all of the powers of the Gold Board in relation to certain matters specified therein. At sl. no. 10 of the Table ·contained in the notificatioru officers not inferior in rank to the Assistant Collector were authorised to exercise powers and func- G tions in relation to the matter of "according of sanctions for the prosecution of offences" with reference to r. 1260. We have reproduced the exact words of the entry in col ( 4) of the Table. This notification was amended in certain respects on November S, 1963. At sl. no. 10 of the amended Table officers not inferior in rank to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise H Department were authorised to exercise the powers and functions in relation to the matter of "institution of prosecution for any offence punishable under Part XII-A of the Defence of India G H A B D E F TARA CHAND _v._ SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE _(Dua,/.)_ 913 Rules" with reference to r. 1260. Here again we have reproduced the exact words used. According to Shri Tarkunde these notifications did not em· power the Assistant Collector to authorise the Super..ntendent of Central Excise and Customs to institute the present proceedings. The Assistant Collector, said the counsel, was· authorised.·· only himself to institute them and he could not lawfully accord con· sent for the institution of prosecution as he purported to do under Ex. PI 5. We are unable to accept this submission. The . actual wording of the rel11vant entries in all the columns of serial no. 10 in the Table of the later notification may here be reproduced. "l 0. Assis tart\ Collector of the Central Excise Department. 1260 Institution of prosecution for any offence punishable under Part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules, 1962". November _5,_ 1963. According to the opening part of the 1prin cipal notification- the officers not inferior in rank to the officer specified in col. 2 of its Table were authorised io · exercise any or all of the powers of the Gold Board in relation to the matters specified in the . corresponding entries in cols. 3 and 4. In .place of "Gold Board" we have to read the word "Admiilistra· tor" and since no Administrator was ever appointed, the powers and functions entrusted to him were at the relevant time being exercised by the Central Government. We· may point out that it was app4rently by oversight that the word ' 'Administrator" was not substituted for the expression "Gold Board" in the notification though in September 1963 such substitution had been effected by appropriate amendment in the relevant rules.. This was not controverted at the Bar and indeed no point was sought to be made on this ground. It would thus be seen that in determining the scope and extent of the powers of the officers autho This has to be read .along with the opening part of the earlier notification dated January 10, 1963 which remains the principal notification and was amended only in certain particulars · on November _5,_ 1963. According to the opening part of the 1prin rised in the Table of the Notification to exercise the powers and functions of the Administrator,· actually exercised . by the Central Government (there being no Adminstrator appointed under the rules), we have to see the nature of the power and function mentioned in col. 4 and examine it by reference to the rule mentioned in col. 3 in the light of the expression "in relation to the matters specified" in the notification which, in our ·opinion, to some extent. widens the scope of the powers and functions de###### legated by the notification. t6-L694 SupCl/7-I 914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl971]2 S.C.R. Under r. 126Q as read in the light of the. entries at serial A no. 10 of the notification prosecution for an offence punishable under Part XII-A can, in our opinion, be instituted by or with •the consent of an officer not inferior in rank to the Assistant • Collector of the Central Excise Department. In Ex. P/5 dated September 4, 1964 Shri V. Parthasarathy, Collector of Central Excise accorded his. sanction to the prosecution of the appellant B as required under :r. 126Q of the,Defence of India Rules: He did so in exrcise of. the powers conferred on him by the two notifications mentioned above. ·The offence for which the consent was given was described in this document as under : "WHEREAS Shri Tarachand s/,o Deviraj (Devichand) Room No. 4, Mistry Bungalow, Duncan Road, Bombay-4 was found to have acquired gold not being ornament except by succession, intestate or testamentary or in accordance with the permit granted either by the Administrator or by the Deputy Secretary in tire office of the Gold Control Administrator, Bombay, duly authorised in this behalf by the Government of India _vide_ their notification No. · F. 1/8/63-GC dated 20-10-1963, 16 pieces of gold of 10 tolas each bearing markings as to. its origin and purity contrary to the provisio.ns of rule 126H(d) of the Defence of India Amendment Rules. WHEREAS any person having in his possession or in his control any quantity of gold or buy or otherwise acquires or accepts gold in coruravention of any provisions of Part XII-A of the Defence of India Rules renders himself liable for punishment · under Rule 126P(2). And on careful study of the material placed before me and satisfying myself tj:lat the said Shri Taiachand is liable to action under.rule 126P(2) of the Defence of India Amendment Rules, 1963 for reasons men.tioned above, I. V. Parthasarathy, Collector of Central Excise, Mysore Collectorate, Bangalore, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the Government of India in their Notification F. No. 2511/63-GCR dated 5-11-63 issued under Rule 126J read with Rule 126-X of the Defence of India Amendment Rules do hereby accord consent for the institution of prosecution of the said Shri Tarachand as required under Rule 126:0 of the Defence of India Amen(iment Rules, 1963." #### c D E F G H A B ### c D E F G H TARA CHAND _v._ SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE _(Dua,_ _J.)_ 915 This authority, in our opinion, quite clearly falls within the notification read as a whole and the High Court was right in so construing it. The submission that these notifications must be construed strictly because by these instruments the authority to prosecute is delegated and so construed the~ should be held to confer power only to prosecute but not to accord consent to the appellant's prosecution by some other person or authority has not impressed us. The attempt by the appellant's· learned. co11nsel in this con· nection to equate .these notification with powers of attorney does not carry ·the matter any further. The plain reading of the relevant entries in die notifications leaves no doubt in our mind as to its meaning, scope· and effect. It quite clearly authorises the Collector to exercise power and function in relation to the matter of institution of prosecution for any offence punishable under Part XII-A of the Rules referred to in r. 1260 .. Keeping in view the multifarious activities of the higher officers of the Central Excise Department it seems to us that after the responsible officers of this Department not inferior in rank to the Assistant Collector had applied their mind and come to a decision as to the desirability of starting the prosecution in a given case further steps in the 'matter of actual prosecution including the drafting and presentation of the complaint can be lawfully carried out by others. That this is l.he real object and purpose of the notifications is clearly brought out on plain reading of their language. To hold otherwise, as desired by Shri Tarkunde, would not only mean unduly straining the unambiguous statutory language but would also tend to thwart, instead of offectuating, their real purpose. We are thus in agreement with the view talc.en by the High Court. The couruel next submitted tliat the charge levelled against the appellant was different from the one for which he has been convicted. In any event the charge framed, according to the counsel, was vague and it has caused him prejudice in his defenee. Here again, we are unable to agree. In the complaint all the relevant facts were stated quite clearly and it was emphasised that the appellant had been found in possession of 16 pieces of gold with foreign markings ingeniously concealed inside long tabular pouches, in tum hidden inside a pillow case. He was stated tci be guilty _inter alia_ of offences punishable under r. 126P(2). The second charge framed by tlte court was as follows : a~out 12.45 hours at H.A.L. Aerodrome, Bangalore, "That you on or about the 16th November, 1963 at ahght~d from the plane No. 105 which arrived from Bomay and when you and your articles were searched, l 7-L694 Sup Cl/71 916 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1971] 2 s.c.R. you were found in possession of 16 pieces of gold each A bearing markings as to its foreign origin and ·purity weighing 10 tolas each, having illegaily imported into India in contravention of prohibition imposed by the Ministry of Finance Notification No. 1211 Fl/48 dated 25th August, 1948, and without permit issued by the Gold Control Authorities as required under Rule 126H- B UI) under the Defence of India Amendment Rules, 1963· and thereby committed an offence under Rule 126P(2) r/w 1261(10) of the Defence of India Amendment Rules, 1963 relating to Gold Control and within my cognizance." The appellant never complained that this charge wa& vague or outside the complaint. Indeed in his statement in court the appellant bas admitted all the relevant facts alleged by the prosecution. The facts alleged and proved cleariy bring the appel lant's case within the mischief of rr. 126H(2) (d) and 126P(2). Rule 126H(2) (d) has already been reproduced earlier. Under ###### c r. 126P(2) (ii) whoever has in. his possession or under his control D any quantity of go)d in contravention of any provision of Part XII-A is punishable with imprisonment for a ·term of not Jess than six months and not more than two years and also with fine. All the relevant salient facts alleged by the prosecution having been admitted by the appellant there can hardly be any question of prejudice having been caused to him by the wide language E of the complaint and the charge, assuming the language to be wde. This argument is accordingly repeiled. E Lasily the counsel contended that the sentence imposed was two severe. The entire gold seized from him having been confiscated the sentence undergone should, according to the sub mission, be held to serve the cause of justice. We have already noticed that under r. 126P(2) (ii) the minimum period of imprisonment prescribed is six months. According to the appellant the law bas since lieen amended and under the Gold (Control Act 18 of 1965 which bas repealed Part XII of the Rules there is no minimum sentence of imprisonment prescribed. In our Qpinion this case must be governed by the law as in fo"ce prior to the enforcement of the Gold (Control) Act, 1965. Our attention has not been drawn ·to any provision of law nor to any principle or precedent which would attract the provisions of the Gold (Control) Act of 1965 to this case in regard to the question of sentence. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. R.K.P.S. _Appeal dismissed._ F G H