T. M. Leela v. Balan, Chellan, Thankamani, Harisuthan, Surendran and State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS** **TUESDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF MAY 2016/2ND JYAISHTA, 1938** ## **Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 395 of 2006 ( )** **-------------------------------AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CRLA 169/2000 & 175/2000 of ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE, FAST TRACK NO.II, PALAKKAD DATED 28-10-2005** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC 116/1996 of J.M.F.C.-II,PALAKKAD DATED 11-08-2000** ## **REVISION PETITIONER(S)/DEFACTO COMPLAINANT::** **---------------------------------------------------------------------------** **T.M. LEELA, D/O. MANIKKAN, SOUPARNIKA, TENUR P.O, PARLI,, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS.SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU SRI.PRASUN.S** ## **RESPONDENT(S)/APPELLANTS/ACCUSED 2,3,4,22,29 & STATE:** **------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------** **1. BALAN, S/O. CHAMI, VATTAPPALAM VEEDU, THENUR P.O., PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **2. CHELLAN, S/O. MAYANDI, KUNDUMAIL VEEDU, THENUR P.O.,, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **3. THANKAMANI, S/O. KRISHNAN, EDAKKADU VEEDU, THENUR P.O.,, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **4. HARISUTHAN, S/O. MANICKAN, KURUMKADU LAKSHAM VEEDU COLONY,, THENUR P.O., PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **5. SURENDRAN, S/O. SUBRAMANIAN, PALLATH VEEDU, THENUR P.O.,, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.** **6. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,, ERNAKULAM.** - **R1 TO R5 BY ADV. SRI.C.C.THOMAS (SR.) R6 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.P.V.ELIAS.** **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 23-05-2016, ALONG WITH CRRP. 428/2006, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** ## ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. ================== ## Crl.R.P.Nos.395 & 428 of 2006 ================== Dated this the 23[rd] day of May, 2016 O R D E R The six revision petitioners are among the 6 out of the 67 accused in Calendar Case, C.C.No.116/1996 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-II, Palakkad, which arose of out Crime No. 58/1996 of Mankara Police Station, registered offences under Secs. 143, 147, 148, 447, 427, 506(ii) read with Sec. 149 of the I.P.C. The brief of the prosecution case is that on 28.4.1996, at about 11.45 p.m. in the night, the 67 accused persons mentioned in the final report formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and after having full knowledge that each of them are members of such unlawful assembly had trespassed into the residential compound of CW-1 (PW-1) and committed rioting by carrying deadly weapons and also committed mischief therein and criminally intimidated CW-1 (PW-1) and members of her family in the furtherance of their common object of the unlawful assembly, thereby causing loss to the tune of Rs.10,000/- to CW-1 and that Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 2 :- these 67 accused persons are therefore alleged to have committed the aforestated offences. The case against absconding accused Nos.36 and 46 was split up and was re-filed as Calendar Case, C.C.No.79/2000 by the trial court. The case as against the 65 remaining accused including the six revision petitioners, was taken on file as the instant Calendar Case, C.C.No.116/1996 on the file of the above said Magistrate's court. The accused pleaded not guilty. In the trial the prosecution adduced evidence by examining PWs 1 to 7 and had marked Exts.P-1 to P-7 documents and MO-1 series and MO-2series were identified and marked. On the side of the defence, witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2 were examined. Exts.D-1 to D- 2 were marked. Exts.C-1 and C-2 are the court exhibits. After conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered the judgment on 11.8.2000 in C.C.No.116/ 1996 holding that sufficient proof has been made out only as against the involvements and A-1 to A-4 and A-22 and A-39 and that all the other remaining accused are entitled for acquittal. A-1 to A-4 and A-22 and A-39 were convicted for offences under Secs.143, 147, 148, 227 and 447 read with Sec.149 of the I.P.C. and those accused were however not convicted for offences under Sec. 506(ii) of the I.P.C. Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 22 and 39 were thus convicted and sentenced to undergo Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 3 :- rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.500/- for the offence under Sec.143 I.P.C., rigorous imprisonment (R.I) for a period of two years and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- for the offence under Sec.147 of the I.P.C., R.I. for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence under Sec.148 of the I.P.C., R.I. for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs.500/- for the offence under Sec.447 I.P.C. and R.I. for a period of two yeas and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence under Sec. 427 of the I.P.C. The trial court also ordered above said sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently and that if the fine amount is not paid, the said accused 1 to 4 and 22 and 39 shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month on each count and also directed that 50% of the fine amount as cost shall be paid as compensation under Sec.357(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the defacto complainant (PW-1). Aggrieved by the abovesaid conviction and sentence, accused Nos.2, 3, 4, 22 and 39 had filed Crl.Appeal 169/2000 before the Sessions Court concerned and convicted accused No.1 had filed Crl.Appeal No.175/2000 before the Sessions Court concerned. The appellate court rendered a common judgment on 28.10.2005 in Crl.Appeal Nos.169 and 175 of 2000, whereby the conviction as against all the six accused was Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 4 :- reversed and they were acquitted of the offences alleged against them. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of accused No.1, the defacto complainant has filed Crl.R.P.No.428/2006 before this Court and as against the acquittal of accused Nos.2, 3, 4, 22 and 39, the defacto complainant has preferred Crl.R.P.395/2006. These Criminal Revision Petitions have been instituted by the defacto complainant by resort to the provisions contained Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking this Court's revisional interference challenging the legality, correctness and propriety of the said judgment of acquittal rendered by the appellate court. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners (defacto complainant), the learned counsel appearing for respondent accused Nos.1 to 4 and 22 & 39 and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State authorities. 3. It would be pertinent to bear in mind the limited scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on this Court as per the provisions contained in Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also to bear in mind the key principles regarding the exercise of such revisional powers in respect of a judgment of acquittal. The well-known judicial rulings in this regard are cases as in Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju V. Bonapalli Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 5 :- Peda Appadu reported in 1975 (4) SCC 477, Akalu Ahir v. Ram Deo Rao reported in 1973 (2) SCC 583, Mahendra Pratap Singh V. Sarju Singh reported in AIR 1968 SC 707, K.Chinnasaamy Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788, Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas reported in AIR 1951 SC 316, etc. In the celebrated ruling in Akalu Ahir v. Ram Deo Rao reported in 1973 (2) SCC 583, the Apex Court has illustrated the following categories of cases, which would justify the High Court in interfering with the acquittal in a revision and also further held that those categories are merely illustrative and there could be other cases of similar nature, which can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal. The categories of cases delineated therein are as follows:- - “i) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still admitted the accused ; - ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out the evidence which prosecution is to produce ; - iii) where the Appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which is admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible ; - iv) where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or the Appellate Court or the acquittal is based on compounding of the offense which is invalid under the law.” It was also held by the Apex Court in various rulings that the appraisal of evidence by the Criminal Court concerned may not be Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 6 :- perfect or free from flaw and the Court of Appeal may have felt justified in disagreeing with the conclusions of a trial court and but that from this, it does not follow that on revision by a defacto complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of Appeal and then order a re-trial. In the case in Vimal Singh V. Khuman Singh reported in 1998 (7) SCC 223 it was held as follows in para 9 thereof:- “9. Coming to the ambit under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court against the revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with the admission of the acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. Interference in the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases where it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality that has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where a material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court could be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub Section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus the High Court could not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High court in exercise of its revisional power, can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes during the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal to an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order for re-trial.” Considering the applicability of the aforementioned rulings, the Apex Court has held in the case in Venkateshan V. Rammaiya and another reported in 2013 (14) SCC 207 that the aforecited rulings would clearly go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 7 :- Court, while examining the order of acquittal, is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases, where the trial court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked or ignored relevant and material evidence, whereby causing miscarriage in justice. That re-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The cardinal aspect of the matter that the scope of revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court does not extend to re-appreciation of evidence and that interference called for in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court only if the acquittal is vitiated by manifest perversity and unreasonableness is discernible from many rulings as in the case in SHLOK BHARDWRAJ V. RUNIKA BHARDWRAJ reported in (2015) 2 SCC 721. The cardinal principle is that in the absence of any manifest illegality or perversity and serious miscarriage of justice, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction merely on the ground that after re-appreciation of evidence, it is found that the testimony of a key prosecution witness is found to be reliable when the impugned judgment of acquittal had taken an opposite view, etc., Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 8 :- has been laid down in BINDESHWARI PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR reported in (2002) 6 SCC 650. It may also be relevant to note that even in an appeal against acquittal, the Apex Court in many cases as in Pudhu Raja and another v. State reported in (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 430, has held that, “ _The Appellate court can interfere only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse. The Appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's order of acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence_ ”. In the case State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh @ Darshan Lal reported in 2012(4) Supreme 72, the Apex Court has held as follows:- “ _In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence._ ” 4. It would be relevant to note the instant cases on hand before this Court are revision petitions preferred by the defacto complainant against the order of acquittal granted by the appellate Sessions Court reversing the conviction imposed on the 6 of the 67 accused by the trial court. Therefore, this Court has to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of the impugned judgment of acquittal, bearing in mind the limited scope of interference in a revision preferred as against a judgment of acquittal. Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 9 :- 5. Though the appellate court has dealt with various aspects of the matter to arrive at the conclusion that there is no safe basis for sustaining the order of conviction, which led to the reversal of the trial court's judgment, after extensive hearing all the parties concerned, this Court is convinced that the examination of two major aspects dealt with by the appellate court would fully justify the order of acquittal rendered by the appellate court and at any rate, in that view of the matter, this Court is convinced that the appellate court's judgment of acquittal is not in any manner vitiated by manifest perversity or unreasonableness or that the appellate court has not overlooked crucial and material evidentiary aspects of the matter. 6. The first aspect is the clear finding in the impugned judgment of acquittal that there has been unexplained and unreasonable delay in institution of the first information report and that this is a serious and fatal flaw in the instant Police chargesheeted case. The second aspect is that from the very commencement of the first information statement, the consistent version of PW-1 (defacto complainant) was that there were about 150 persons, who participated in the offence in question which occurred in midnight and out of that she could identify only four Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 10 :- persons namely, accused 1 to 4, whereas the final report and the evidence of major prosecution witnesses before the trial court was to the specific version that there are only 67 accused persons, who were involved in the offence in question (and not 150 as originally projected) and that PW-1, at the time of the incident itself could properly identify all those charge-sheeted persons, including the six convicted. The appellate court has approached this with a strong caution that this cannot be safe basis for sustaining an order of conviction as against those six persons, especially when no identification parade was conducted at any point of time to identify all or any of the 67 accused persons. In the light of the facts and circumstances of this case, and keeping view the limited scope of the revisional interference available with this Court while entertaining the present challenge against the order of acquittal, this Court is examining only those two major aspects of the matter. 7. The specific and cogent case of the prosecution is that the incident in question happened on 28.4.1996 at 11.45 p.m. in the night and that PW-1, her husband (PW-3) and their two major sons were in their house and that, because of the presence of large number of persons, they were afraid to go outside the house and they were all inside their locked up house and that PW-1 and PW-3 Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 11 :- had witnessed the participation of these accused persons by opening one of their windows and that this incident of destruction of the compound wall had happened on the western boundary of their house. Version of PW-1 is that electricity connection to their house was then forcibly disconnected by the accused persons, but that electricity connection to the other remaining residential houses was available and that the accused persons could be identified in the moon light and by virtue of the torch lights that were being used by the accused persons during the course of the incidents, which had happened between 11.45 pm. in the night and 2.30 a.m. It is not in dispute that Ext.P-6 FIR pursuant to Ext.P-1 FI statement was registered by the Police only on the next day, viz., 29.4.1996 at 6 p.m. in the evening. PW-1 would depose that after the wanton destruction of their property, their family members were all frightened and that they had not dared to go out from their house and that on the next day morning they waited one of their family friends (one Sri.Sivadas), to come to their house so as to seek his guidance for preparing the complaint to the Police authorities. PW-1 would also depose that her husband, PW-3, had therefore gone on the morning on the next day, 29.4.1996, to meet Sri.Sivadas and seek his help and that her husband (PW-3) and Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 12 :- Sri.Sivadas had reached their house at about 10 a.m. on 29.4.1996. On a specific query as to what was the further delay in preferring the petition/first information before the Police authorities after 10 am. on 29.4.1996, the version of PW-1 is that her husband and Sri.Sivadas had again gone outside and had come back only at about 1 pm in the after noon and that Ext.P-1 petition was prepared and was signed by PW-1. That later PW-1 and her husband, PW-3, went to the Police Station at about 2.30 p.m. on 29.4.1996 and that as the Sub Inspector of Police was not then available in the Police Station, they had waited and that the Sub Inspector of Police had turned up in the Police Station only at 6 p.m. and that it was only thereafter that Ext.P-6 FIR could be registered on 29.4.1996 at 6 p.m. pursuant to Ext.P-1 first information statement. This is major explanation given by PW-1 (defacto complainant). PW-3 does not give such graphic details of these various events narrated above so as to give their version for the delayed registration of the FIR, but would concur with the broad aspects of the version given by PW-1. It may be noted that the instant case is a Police charge-sheeted case as it was one investigated by the Police and, therefore, it is essentially for the officials (Police officials) who conducted the investigation to give cogent and convincing reasons before the trial Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 13 :- court so as to convince the court that there is no unexplained or unreasonable delay in the initiation of the impugned FIR. Ext.P-7 final report/charge sheet has been submitted by PW-7 (Sub Inspector of Police) before the court below and therefore the version projected by the prosecution is that it was PW-7 (SHO), who was the investigating officer in this case. But in his evidence, PW-7 would candidly confess that he (PW-7) had only verified the investigation conducted by PW-6 (Head Constable) and therefore it is clear that it was Head Constable (PW-6), who conducted the investigation and that PW-7 (SHO) had only verified the said investigation. PW-6 does not give any proper reasons in his deposition so as to justify the delay in the initiation of the FIR. In the chief examination PW-6 would even venture to depose that Ext.P-1 petition/first information statement was given by PW-1 (defacto complainant) on 29.4.1996 at 11 a.m. in the morning. Whereas in his cross examination, he fully admitted that the incident happened in the mid night of 28.4.1996 and that Ext.P-1 first information statement was given by PW-1 only on the next day, 29.4.1996 at 6 p.m. in the evening and that he does not know the reasons for the delay in the submission of Ext.P-1 F.I. statement and that he has not conducted any investigation to find out the reasons for such delay in the Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 14 :- submission of Ext.P-1 statement. Therefore, in this crucial aspect itself, the major prosecution witnesses have contradicted themselves inasmuch as PW-1's specific submission was that she had arrived at the Police Station along with Ext.P-1 petition on 29.4.1996 at around 2-2-30 p.m. in the afternoon, whereas the version of the investigating officer (PW-6) is that PW-1 had actually submitted Ext.P-1 FI statement only at 6 p.m. in the evening of 29.4.1996. PW-6 does not give any evidence in his deposition as to whether PW-1 and her husband had actually arrived at the Police Station at about 2-2-30 p.m. in the afternoon on that day and that she was asked to wait due to the non availability of the Station House Officer and that the SHO (PW-7) had actually thereafter arrived at the Police Station only at about 6 p.m. in the evening on that day as suggested by PW-1 and that these are the aspects, which justify the delay in the registration of Ext.P-6 FIR. It is not in dispute that the Police Station is hardly six kilometers away from the place of occurrence. PW-7 (SHO) has also not given any explanation in his evidence so as to even attempt to give any justification for the delayed registration of Ext.P-7 FIR and he has not ventured to give any evidence that he was not available in the Police Station concerned between 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. on that day and that he had Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 15 :- arrived at the Police Station only at 6 p.m. in evening on 29.4.1996 and that he could understand that PW-1 and her husband (PW-3) were waiting in the Police Station from 2 p.m. onwards for giving Ext.P-1 petition, etc. More crucially, PW-7 also has not given any evidence whatsoever to justify the delay in the registration of the FIR. Therefore, even the very version given by Ext.PW-1 is seriously contradicted by the Police witnesses themselves inasmuch as her version that she had actually come to the Police Station along with Ext.P-1 petition at about 2 p.m. on 29.4.1996 is contradicted inasmuch as the specific version of PW-6 is that she had submitted Ext.P-1 only at 6 p.m. on 29.4.1996. Moreover, the versions of PW-1 and her husband (PW-3) are not in any manner corroborated by the versions of official Police witnesses, PW-6 and PW-7 regarding the crucial aspects in the matter of delay in the registration of the FIR. The appellate court has come to the considered conclusion that there has been unexplained and unreasonable delay in the initiation of the FIR and that this is fatal to the case in hand. That there has been unexplained and unreasonable delay in the initiation of FIR as found by the appellate court is certainly a reasonable view of the matter and it cannot be in any manner branded by this Court as manifestly perverse or Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 16 :- unreasonable. 8. It may also be noted that it had come out in evidence that PW-1 has two major sons and the excuse projected by PW-1 that her husband, PW-3 required the assistance of one Sri.Sivadas for preparing a complaint before the Police authorities and that her husband and Sri.Sivadas had arrived at the house at about 10 a.m. in the morning on 29.4.1996, etc. are all aspects which are to be taken with a pinch of salt inasmuch it is not known as to why the assistance of Sivadas was required in such a case when there were three male members in the family consisting of PW-1's husband and their two sons. That apart, PW-1's further version that immediately after the arrival of PW-3 and Sri.Sivadas in the house at 10 a.m. on that day, both of them had again gone to some other place and had returned back only in the afternoon after 1 p.m. are also not very credible inasmuch as no reasons are even suggested as to what prompted them to again go out of the house after 10 a.m. Sri.Sivadas is also not examined as a witness in this case. The credibility of his version is not seen investigated by the Police inasmuch as the Police has not made any inquiry with Sri.Sivadas regarding this aspect and Sri.Sivadas is not even cited as a witness in this case. Therefore, the very version projected by PWs 1 and 3 Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 17 :- regarding the factual aspects, which prompted the delay, appears to be not very credible. 9. The next aspect is regarding the credibility and believability of the version projected by PW-1 and her husband (PW3). In Ext.P-1 FI statement, the specific and cogent version projected by PW-1 is that there were actually about 150 persons, who had participated in the incidents relating to the offence in question and that she could identify only four accused persons among such 150 persons and that those four persons are accused 1 to 4. However, it is the case of the investigation that pursuant to the investigation conducted by them on the questioning of PW-1, they have accepted the version of PW-1 that there were in fact only 67 persons, who participated in the incidents in question, which led to the offence and that those 67 persons are the 67 accused persons who have been charge sheeted as per Ext.P-7 final report. No evidence has been given either by PW-6 or PW-7 as to how they could filter and properly come to the considered conclusion so as to justify the reduction of the number of accused from 150 to 67 and as to how they could be convinced about the proper identity of each of the 67 persons. It has been admitted by all the prosecution witnesses that no test identification parade has been conducted in Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 18 :- the instant case so as to identify all or any of the 67 accused persons. The version of the prosecution witnesses is that during the course of the investigation, PW-1 had identified these 67 accused persons in the Police Station. When the initial assertion of the first informant PW-1, was to the specific effect that the total number of accused comes to about 150 persons, the appellate court found it extremely unsafe to rely on the version of the prosecution witnesses when they had drastically changed their prosecution version in projecting a case that there were only 67 persons as per the charge sheet. As to how the prosecution witnesses like PWs 1 and 3 could properly identify all these 67 persons when they clearly admitted that they had never gone outside the house to witness the events and they could only see the events by opening one of the windows, etc. is not very clear. From a reading of the appreciation of the evidence made by the appellate court, it appears that the appellate court was not convinced of the version given by PWs 1 and 3 that they could witness the participation of these 67 accused persons in the incidents that have happened during the mid night for about two and a half hours, in the moon light and in the torch lights used by the accused persons themselves. It is only reasonable to assume that when such crimes are being conducted by such persons, they Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 19 :- would have taken the minimal prudence to ensure that torch lights are being used in such a manner so as not to facilitate their easy identification. It has come out in evidence that Ext.D-1 mass petition was submitted by the some of the accused before the Panchayat authorities complaining that the steps taken by PW-1 in the construction of the compound wall would create problems in the widening of the pathway that was being undertaken at the behest of the Panchayat authorities and that PW-1 was attempting for such reconstruction of the compound wall without proper permission from the Panchayat authorities and that her construction activities should be stopped by the Panchayat authorities, etc. Accused No.1 is the member of the Panchayat committee concerned, who was also the chairman of its standing committee. Accused No.2 happens to be the convenor of the road's committee formed by the members of the public for widening of the pathway by the Panchayat. The trial court has curiously placed reliance on Ext.D-1 for finding the culpable involvement of these accused. This approach was not found in favour by the appellate court. It appears that the accused had marked Ext.D-1 as a defence document only to show that the relationship between PW-1 and some of the accused perrsons was not good in the light of Ext.P-1 objections and that presumably they Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 20 :- wanted to highlight some possibility for false implication in the criminal case. When that was the situation, it was not reasonable and proper for the trial court to use Ext.D-1 itself as an incriminating circumstance against the defence. Accused Nos.2 and 4 are persons against whom PW-1 had obtained an order of injunction from the civil court as per Ext.P-2, on a previous occasion. The evidence also shows that the accused persons have suggested that the relationship was also not cordial in view of the incidents involving one Rugmini, who was the servant of PW-1. Suffice to say that the approach of the appellate court, that in the light of this spoiled relationship between some of the accused and PW-1 and her family, there needed some more cogent and assuring materials for safely sustaining the conviction as against these accused, is certainly an aspect, in which the appellate court cannot be found fault with by this Court by exercising powers of revision. Therefore, in the light of these aspects, the insistence by the appellate court that there needed some more credible and cogent circumstances for safely relying on the evidence of PW-1 and her husband, PW-3, for sustaining the conviction against the accused, is a reasonable view of the matter and at any rate, it cannot be branded as perverse. Therefore, in the absence of any cogent and Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 21 :- convincing evidence on record for justifying the proper identification of these accused persons and in the light of the absence of a test identification parade, the appellate court was well justified in coming to the conclusion that the version projected by PW-1 and PW-3 cannot be a credible and safe basis for imposing conviction on these accused. At any rate, the said view taken by the appellate court cannot be considered to be perverse or unreasonable. 10. Even the trial court comes to the considered conclusion that it is not safe to rely on the testimony of PWs-1 and 3 for convicting any of the 67 accused persons other than these six accused persons. Though PW-1 has given her evidence for alleging the involvement of all the 67 accused persons, the trial court was prepared to accept the testimony only for convicting these six persons (A-1 to A-4, A-22 and A-39). Even the trial court says that there are many accused persons having the same name like Radhakrishnan (A-11 and A-29), Balan (A-2 and A-36) and Velayudhan (A-13, A-14, A-20, A-21, A-25, A-26, A-27, A-32, A- 46, etc.) and on this basis the trial court is not prepared to convict A-11 and A-29 as both the accused have the same name viz., Radhakrishnan. A-2 (Balan) is said to be previously known to PW-1 Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 22 :- and A-36 is also having the same name viz., Balan, the trial court still preferred and prepared to convict A-2. This approach is also not found in favour of the trial court. In the light of the serious divergence in the version of PW-1 in reducing the initial number of accused from 150 to 67 and also due to serious possibilities for confusion in the identification of the accused persons as the event had taken place on a midnight. The situation may have been different if due to the non-conduct of the test identification parade the prosecution had charge-sheeted only the four specifically named persons in the first information statement. The drastic reduction of the number of accused from 150 and the inclusion of 67 accused persons in the final report was found to be highly suspicious by the appellate court, so as to affect the believability of even the implication of the six convicted accused including the four persons initially named. The drastic reduction of the number of accused as per the varying versions of PW-1 from 150 to 67 appears to have created strong suspicion and doubts in the mind of the appellate court about the believability of the defacto complainant's version regarding even the implication of the initially four named accused persons. Since the investigation officials have not given the reasonable basis as to what exactly was the reasonable basis which prompted them to filter and Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 23 :- properly identify the evidence (except by their bald version that PW1 had identified these accused persons in the Police Station), the appellate court was having serious doubt about the approach of the trial court in convicting even these six accused persons. Viewed from the angle that there was previous bad relationship between these rival parties and the fact that the event has taken place in the middle of a night when PW-1 and her family were all inside a locked up house and absence of any reasonable and filtered process for proper identification of such vast number of accused persons, the appellate court cannot be found fault with for entertaining the serious doubts in the version of prosecution witnesses even for sustaining the conviction as against these accused persons. In the light of the facts and circumstances which have clearly emerged in this case, the above said cautious approach of the appellate court cannot be said to be an unreasonable view in the appreciation of the evidence in the matter and at best, the revision petitioner can contend that another reasonable view could be possible in the given facts and circumstances of the case. It has to be borne in mind that in view of the embargo engrafted in sub-sec.3 of Sec.401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court in exercise of its powers of revision cannot convert an order of acquittal to one of Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 24 :- conviction and at best, if material and crucial relevant evidence are shut out or overlooked by the judgment of acquittal, the revisional court can order only for retrial. It has also to be borne in mind that the appraisal of evidence by the criminal court concerned may not be free from flaw and in such cases, the court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with the considered conclusions of the trial court. But, from this, it does not follow that on revision by a defacto complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and that order for re-trial. The narrow compass which should guide the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is as to whether the material and crucial relevant evidence has been shut out or blatantly overlooked by the impugned judgment of acquittal or whether there is manifest perversity or unreasonableness in the appreciation of evidence made in the said impugned judgment of acquittal. On an assessment and appraisal of the aforesaid two crucial relevant aspects regarding the delay in instituting FIR and credibility or otherwise of the prosecution witnesses in implicating the accused in the light of the various aspects mentioned hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the cautious approach made by the appellate court in not sustaining the conviction based on the Crl.R.P.395/06 & c.c - : 25 :- evidence of prosecution witnesses, cannot be said to be a view that is tainted by manifest or palpable, perversity or unreasonableness. The appellate court has made an overall re-appraisal of the evidence and has come to the considered conclusion that the approach made by the trial court in selectively convicting six out of the 67 persons is not a safe basis for legally justifying the conviction of those accused persons, given the various constraints that have emerged in the facts and circumstances proved in this case. In this view of the matter, this Court has no other option but to hold that the defacto complainant has not been successful in persuading this Court to interfere with the impugned appellate judgment of acquittal in exercise of the powers of revision. Accordingly, the aforecaptioned Criminal Revision Petitions stand dismissed. Sd/ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE ///True copy/// P.S. To Judge. sdk+ bkn/