Susha Muthu T.S. and Others vs Kerala State Warehousing Corporation and Others

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** **THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE P.V.ASHA** **WEDNESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2017/29TH AGRAHAYANA, 1939** **WP(C).No. 30239 of 2017 (D)** **----------------------------** ## **PETITIONERS:** **-------------** ## **1. SUSHAJ MUTHU T.S** **S/O. SURENDRAN, AGED 41, THAREPARAMBIL, AROOR P.O., CHERTHALA, ALAPPUZHA.** ## **2. PRIYA M.R** **D/O. T.P.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR, AGED 41, MULLIAYIL HOUSE, ERAMALLIKKARA P.O., ALAPPUZHA.** ## **3. PREETHA L** **W/O. BABU K., AGED 45, VELLAKKATTU HOUSE, KADAKARAPALLY P.O., CHERTHALA.** ## **4. SANTHOSHKUMAR G** **KALIEEKKAVADAKKETHIL, KOYPALLYKARAYMA, OLAKETTYANMAM P.O., MAVELIKKARA - 690 510.** ## **5. MOLLY JOSE** - **ETTATHOTTU HOUSE, VAZHOOR EAST P.O., 19TH MILE, PONKUNNAM.** ## **6. SUNIL KUMAR B** - **S/O. BHISHAKSENAN NAIR, AGED 40 YEARS, NULAKKONNAM, MANCHAVILAKOM P.O., TRIVANDRUM - 695 503.** ## **7. SANDHYA K** - **W/O. BHUVANACHANDRAN, AGED 38, JAYAREKHA CLRA 83, CHEPPIL LANE, SREEVARAHAM, TRIVANDRUM - 9.** ## **8. FAUD F** - **S/O. M.H.FAROOK SAIT, ASHIYANA, ARA - 132TC48/542, KALLATTUMUKKU, MANACADU P.O., TRIVANDRUM - 695 009.** ## **9. UDAYABHANU R.K** - **S/O. NARAYANAN NAMBIAR, AGED 48 THIYANCHERY HOUSE, NUCHIYOD P.O., ULLIKKAL, KANNUR - 670 705.** **BY ADVS.SRI.ATHUL SHAJI SRI.T.A.SHAJI (SR.)** **(2)** ## **WP(C).No. 30239 of 2017 (D)** **----------------------------** ## **RESPONDENTS:** **--------------** **1. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING ROAD, ERNAKULAM, COCHIN - 682 016.** **2. KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING ROAD, ERNAKULAM, COCHIN - 682 016.** **3. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS** - **KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR KERALA STATE WAREHOUSING ROAD, ERNAKULAM, COCHIN - 682 016.** **4. STATE OF KERALA** - **REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.** **R1-R2 BY ADV. SRI.MAJNU KOMATH, SC, R3 BY ADVS. SRI.S.P.ARAVINDAKSHAN PILLAY SMT.N.SANTHA SRI.K.A.BALAN SRI.V.VARGHESE SRI.PETER JOSE CHRISTO SRI.S.A.ANAND SMT.K.N.REMYA SMT.L.ANNAPOORNA SMT.B.ANANJANA** **R4 BY ADV. SRI.RANJITH THAMPAN,ADDL.ADV.GENERAL R4 BY SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER, SMT. MARY BEEN JOSEPH** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 20-12-2017, ALONG WITH WPC. 30217/2017, WPC. 30232/2017, WPC. 30312/2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ## **(3)** **WP(C).No. 30239 of 2017 (D)** **----------------------------** ## **APPENDIX** **PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS** - **----------------------EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT CORPORATION DATED 17.10.2005.** - **EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF ONE OF THE CANDIDATES APPOINTED ALONG WITH THE PETITIONERS DATED 01.3.2006.** - **EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF TERMINATION DATED 10.05.2010 ISSUED TO ONE OF THE ASSISTANTS.** - **EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTION DATED 12.4.2006 OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT.** - **EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 24.11.2009 IN WPC NO. 4280 OF 2007 AND CONNECTED CASES.** - **EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.5.2010 OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT.** - **EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 13.7.2010 IN WPC NO. 18395 OF 2010 AND CONNECTED CASES.** - **EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 26.8.2013 IN WRIT APPEAL 1320 OF 2010 AND CONNECTED CASES.** - **EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22.8.2014 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 8379-8382/14 AND CONNECTED CASES.** - **EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 13.6.2014 IN WPC NO. 15537 OF 2013 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.** - **EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 11.5.2015 OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT APPOINTING THE 1ST PETITIONER.** - **EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 16.6.2017 ISSUED TO THE 1ST PETITIONER.** - **EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF REPLY TO THE QUERY UNDER THE RTI ACT EVIDENCING THE STAFF POSITION AS ON 01.11.2016.** - **EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 09.6.2016 FORWARDING THE PRO-FORMA TO THAT EFFECT IN THIS RESPECT OF THE 6TH PETITIONER.** - **EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE EXPLANATION DATED 01.7.2017 SUBMITTED BY THE 1ST PETITIONER.** - **EXHIBIT P16 TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED 16.9.2017 OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT.** **(4)** **WP(C).No. 30239 of 2017 (D) ---------------------------RESPONDENT(S)' EXHIBITS -----------------------** |**EXHIBIT.R2(a)**|**TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN W.A.No.1918/2017.**| |---|---| |**EXHIBIT.R2(b)**|**TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(MS)No.111/1991/AD DATED**| ||**19.03.1991.**| |**EXHIBIT.R2(c)**|**TRUE COPY OF THE RESOLUTION No.2455 DATED**| ||**15.09.2003.**| |**EXHIBIT.R2(d)**|**TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER No.1138/PU2/09/AD DATED**| ||**04.12.2009 SENT BY THE SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT TO THE**| ||**MANAGING DIRECTOR KSWC.**| |**EXHIBIT.R2(e)**|**TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER No.99958/F.I.W.D2/14/**| ||**FINANCE DATED 28.09.2015, SENT BY THE ADDITIONAL**| ||**CHIEF SECRETARY (FINANCE) TO THE MANAGING DIRECTOR**| ||**KSWC.**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(a)**|**TRUE COPY OF G.O.(MS)No.111/1991/AD DATED**| ||**19.03.1991**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(b)**|**TRUE COPY OF GOVERNMENT LETTER DATED 04.12.2009.**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(c)**|**TRUE COPY OF G.O.(MS)No.29/09/AD DATED 05.02.2009.**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(d)**|**TRUE COPY OF RESOLUTION No.2455 DATED 15.09.2003.**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(e)**|**TRUE COPY OF RESOLUTION DATED 27.12.2014.**| |**EXHIBIT.R4(f)**|**TRUE COPY OF RESOLUTION DATED 22.12.2015.**| ## **//TRUE COPY//** ## **PA TO JUDGE** **rk** ## **P.V.ASHA, J.** ## **W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017** ## **Dated this the 20[th] day of December, 2017** ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioners in all these cases were working as Assistants/Marketing Assistants in the Kerala State Warehousing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). These writ petitions are filed challenging the orders terminating their services. The parties and documents referred to in this judgment are as described in WP(C) No.30239 of 2017, unless otherwise specified. 2. The Corporation had as per Ext.P1 notification issued on 17.10.2005 invited applications against 50 posts of Assistants. Qualification prescribed was pass in SSLC with preference to those with computer knowledge. A written test was conducted on 30.12.2005 through an outside agency viz. Productivity Council. It was followed by an interview held during 14.2.2006 to 22.2.2006. A rank list was published thereafter in which petitioners were included. As per Ext.P2 and similar proceedings dated 1.3.2006 of the Managing Director, 99 Assistants including the petitioners were appointed. Petitioners have produced Ext.P4 which shows that “ratification of creation of 99 posts of Assistants” were placed before the Board of Directors in its 240[th] meeting held on 15.03.2006 as per additional ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :2: agenda notes. Stating that there was requirement of additional staff and that was already placed before the 173[rd] and 174[th] meeting of the Executive Committee, which resolved to approve the creation of 73 posts, the Board of Directors as per decision no.2520 resolved to ratify the action of the executive committee to create 73 additional posts of Assistants. The minutes of the meeting held on 15.03.2006 was approved in Ext.P4 minutes of 241[st] meeting held on 12.04.2006. 3. While petitioners were continuing as such, there was a change in Government as well as in the Director Board. The 242[nd] meeting of the Board of Directors held on 13.11.2006 found that the executive committee had no power to create posts and thus the creation of 73 posts by the Executive Committee was null and void and directed the Managing Director to take action to terminate the services of irregular appointees. The Board of Directors found that the notification for appointment against 50 vacancies was issued at a time when there were only 12 vacancies of Assistants available in the Corporation against which 10 applicants were waiting for appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme. It was further stated that the Executive Committee which is not competent to create any post in the Corporation as per the Staff Regulations, decided to create 40+33 posts in the meeting held on 27.1.2006 and 28.2.2006. The decision of ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :3: the executive committee was declared null and void by the Board of Directors by its resolution No.2538 on 13.11.2006. It was stated that the proceedings dated 1.3.2006 appointing 99 Assistants by the then Managing Director which was signed by the then General Manager (Marketing & Personnel) was without any authority. More over it was found that 99 appointments were made against the 50 posts which were notified. It was also stated that the appointment was made on 1.3.2006, when the code of conduct for election to the Kerala Legislative Assembly had come into force, disregarding the order of election commission. Apart from that, 9 among the appointees had crossed the upper age limit for recruitment. It was also stated that the selection was conducted without giving due publicity to the notification. Thereupon on 03.02.2007, the Managing Director issued orders terminating the services of the appointees like petitioners. The petitioners approached this Court challenging the orders terminating their services. This Court by Ext.P5 judgment dated 24.11.2009 directed that the orders of termination issued to petitioners on 3.2.2007 would be treated as show cause notices, permitting the petitioners to submit their objections against the said notices to the Managing Director of the Corporation and the Corporation was directed to pass orders after examining their representations. Thereafter Ext.P6 ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :4: order was issued on 10.5.2010 after hearing the petitioners and others whose services were terminated. The 254[th] meeting of the Board of Directors held on 26.4.2010 after considering the objections submitted by the petitioners resolved to authorise the Managing Director to confirm the termination of services of the petitioners and accordingly the services of the petitioners were terminated on 10.5.2010 w.e.f. 6.2.2007 as per Ext.P6 order. 4. Petitioners again approached this Court. By Ext.P7 judgment dated 13.7.2010 in WP(C) No.18395 of 2010 this Court, relying on the judgment in W.A.No.1918 of 2007 held that the executive committee did not have any power to create posts and therefore the appointment of petitioners against non-existent vacancies was without any authority. Therefore the ratification of the decision of the executive committee by the Board of Directors was held to be of no help to the petitioners. The petitioners took up the matter in appeal and by Ext.P8 judgment dated 26.8.2013 in W.A.No.1320 of 2010 the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the judgment Ext.P7. The contention of the petitioners that the executive committee was competent to create posts, was rejected. This Court found that operation of Section 25(3) of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 was subject to the general or special directions of the Board of Directors and that when the staff ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :5: rules were approved by Government such rules should be scrupulously followed and no resort can be made to section 25(3) of the Act. Even though the petitioners pointed out that the executive committee was having sufficient powers under section 25(3) of the Act, it was held that conferment was only to facilitate the smooth functioning of the day to day affairs. The petitioners took up the matter before the apex court filing SLP. After arguing the SLP, the Senior Counsel who was appearing for the petitioners sought leave to withdraw the Special Leave Petition reserving liberty to move appropriate proceedings including by way of representation to the Corporation. The SLP was therefore dismissed as withdrawn as per Ext.P9 order, on 22.08.2014, without expressing any opinion as to the nature of remedy or the maintainability of any petition. 5. In the meanwhile, one of the candidates whose services were terminated had approached the 1[st] respondent with a representation seeking re-appointment. She thereafter approached this Court in W. P. (C) No. 15537 of 2013 and this Court as per Ext.P10 judgment dated 11.4.2014 disposed of that writ petition directing the 1[st] respondent to consider the said representation. On the basis of the said direction, the 1[st] respondent considered her request and issued Ext.P11 order on 11.05.2015, reappointing her as Assistant on the basis of the decision ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :6: of the Board of Directors dated 23.4.2015 in the 214[th] meeting of the executive committee. All the petitioners got re-appointment similarly. In Ext.P11 order it was stated that the Board of Directors had in the 274[th] meeting held on 27.12.2014 resolved to appoint persons in 36 existing vacancies of Assistants, Typist-Clerk, and Senior Typist-Clerk from the retrenched employees as Marketing Assistants after conducting a selection consisting of interview on 4.3.2015 and published a rank list. Thereafter the petitioners and others joined duty on the basis of Ext.P11 order. 6. While so Ext.P12 and similar show cause notices were issued to petitioners proposing termination of their services again. Petitioners submit that even though Ext.P12 was styled as a show cause notice, a reading of the notice would show that the respondents were determined to terminate their services, especially when it was stated that the notice was issued after getting legal opinion from the Additional Advocate General. Therefore according to them calling for explanation by issuing the show cause notices is an empty formality. Writ petitions were therefore filed at this stage, without submitting any explanation. They approached this court challenging the show cause notices filing W.P.(C) No.21716 of 2017 and connected cases. During the pendency of the writ petitions, they submitted Ext.P15 and similar ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :7: replies to the show cause notices. Thereafter Ext.P16 and similar orders were issued on 16.09.2017, terminating the services of the petitioners. Petitioners are challenging Ext.P16 and similar orders. 7. According to the petitioners, the show cause notice as well as the termination of their services are arbitrary. Their initial appointments were only irregular and not illegal. They were not appointed through back door. The only ground for the termination was that the executive committee did not have the authority to create posts; they are in no way involved in creation of the posts. According to them even at that time when their services were sought to be terminated, 10 employees appointed on compassionate grounds were allowed to continue, though they were not entitled to be appointed against open vacancies and their appointment could have been made only against one out of 10 vacancies. It is their contention that their appointments which were made against open vacancies were not liable to be interfered with, that too at the stage when their probation were declared/going to be declared. 8. The respondents have filed counter affidavits. It is their case that there were only 12 posts of Assistants when Ext.P1 notification was issued. The number of vacancies available for direct recruitment at that time was only 2, because 10 out of the 12 vacancies were set ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :8: apart for compassionate appointment. It was at that stage that the Executive Committee created 73 posts, without authority and made 99 appointments. Even after reckoning the posts unlawfully created there would have been only 85 vacancies. When the petitioners were continuing on the basis of the appointments made in March 2006, the new Board of Directors took charge and it was found that appointments were made against posts created without any authority and against 50 vacancies notified 99 appointments were made, far in excess of the number of existing posts as well as the notified vacancies. Therefore the services of all the 99 Assistants were terminated on 02.03.2017. It is stated that the notification Ext.P1 itself was issued against non-existent vacancies. Though the initial order terminating the services was issued without notice, the subsequent termination ordered as per Ext.P6 order on 10.5.2010 was upheld in Ext.P7 judgment and was affirmed in Ext.P8 judgment of the Division Bench and the apex court has not interfered with it. Thereafter petitioners were appointed in the year 2015 without issuing any notification inviting applications. Even assuming that there were vacancies, such vacancies could have been filled up only after a due process of selection after inviting applications with due publicity. The appointments made otherwise have resulted in denial of opportunity to ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :9: all qualified hands for being considered for employment under the State; rank list prepared in 2006 cannot be used for making appointments in the year 2015. The vacancies of Assistants are to be filled up in accordance with Regulation 7(1) of the General & Staff Regulations, 1963, according to which vacancies in Class III posts are to be filled up after notifying the vacancies in leading news papers, along with the qualification requisite also. It is stated that there was nothing in Ext.P10 judgment directing the respondents to make appointments contrary to rules or regulations or to appoint those whose services were terminated. But the respondent appointed 15 persons under the guise of the judgments. It is further stated that show cause notices were issued seeing the illegal appointments and orders of termination were issued after considering the reply submitted by petitioners. It is stated that the staff pattern of 2[nd] respondent was approved by Government as per Ext.R2(b) order dated 19.03.1991. As per the staff pattern, there is ratio of 1:2 between Senior Assistants and Assistants and between Senior Typists and Typists and there is no post of Marketing Assistants. The Board of Directors met on 15.09.2003 had as per Ext.R2(c) resolution no.2455 resolved to follow the rules approved by Government. It is further stated that the Government had as per Ext.R2(d) letter dated 04.12.2009 refused ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :10: permission to convert the post of Typist Clerk as Junior Computer Operator. The 2[nd] respondent has stated that the same Managing Director Sri.Mohandas himself who made the appointment of petitioners in 2006 has made the appointments in 2015, as a part of the crooked method he formulated. It is stated that petitioners were appointed after merging the posts of Senior Typist Clerks with Typist Clerks and thereafter converting that post as that of Marketing Assistants, which is not available in the Corporation as per the staff pattern. Ext.R2(e) is produced stating that the illegalities committed by the then management was objected in the inspection report of Finance Inspection Wing. It was found that appointments were made in 2015 after converting the posts of 9 Senior Typists and 19 Typist Clerks creating a total number of 36 posts of Assistants illegally and that as per the order dated 05.02.2009, prior permission from Government is necessary for creation or conversion of posts. 9. In W.P.(C) No.30312 of 2017, the 2[nd] respondent has filed I.A. No.18730 of 2017, producing Ext.R2(f) resolution no.3294 of the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 22.08.2017, by which the provisional decision communicated to the petitioners in the show cause notice was confirmed. It was stated that the 2[nd] respondent issued the order of termination as authorised by the Board of Directors in its ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :11: meeting held on 22.08.2017. 10. The 4[th] respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that the appointments and service conditions of the employees of the Corporation are governed by the Kerala State Warehousing Corporation (General & Staff) Regulation 1963, framed under Section 42(1) of the Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962 and that the staff pattern in the Corporation was approved by Government as per Ext.R4 (a) order dated 19.03.1991. As per the staff pattern there is no post of Marketing Assistant. It is pointed out that the staff pattern continues to be Ext.R4(a) and that Ext P13 produced by the petitioners is only the staff position as on 1.11.2016. Creation of posts, change in terms and conditions of service and even re-designation of the existing posts require prior approval from Government. It is stated that as per Ext.R4 (b) order Government had rejected the request for conversion of posts and as per Ext.R4(c) order Government had clarified that no new post can be created without direction from Government. The Board of Directors had on 15.09.2003 had resolved that there shall not be any deviation from the existing staff pattern without prior approval of Government. It is stated that the 274[th] meeting of the Director Board held on 27.12.2014 as per Ext.R4(e) resolution resolved to convert 18 posts of Typists and 9 posts of Senior Typists and to create 27 posts of ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :12: Marketing Assistants, contrary to the staff pattern and without getting permission from Government. Appointment was made to such newly created posts without following the procedure prescribed in Rule 7 of the Regulations, styling the petitioners and others whose appointments were canceled, as retrenched employees. The Director Board then resolved to create 36 posts of Marketing Assistants and constituted an interview Board to make appointments from among the 99 'retrenched hands' who were included in the rank list of 2006 for appointment as Assistants. Thereafter they conducted an interview issuing call letters to all the 99 persons and after preparing a rank list from among such persons, they appointed 29 persons. It is stated that 7 vacancies of Assistants arose in the Corporation during the period between 27.12.2014 and 22.12.2015, consequent to promotion as Senior Assistants. Those 7 posts were also converted as Marketing Assistants by Ext.R4(f) resolution dated 22.12.2015. Thereafter 14 more appointments were made to the 7 out of the 36 already converted and against the 7 converted on 22.12.2015, making the total appointments of Marketing Assistants as 43. It is alleged that all these were done after Sri.Mohandas who was the Managing Director of the Corporation who appointed the petitioners in 2006, rejoined the Corporation in 2013. It is stated that the Accountant General (E&RSA) ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :13: submitted a draft complaint audit report pointing out the illegalities in the action of the Board in making appointments. The Finance Inspection Wing also conducted inspection and submitted its inspection report with respect to the illegal appointments. In the light of the reports of the Accountant General, Government as per letter dated 11.05.2017 directed the Managing Director to rectify the irregularities, based on which the show cause notice was issued which led to the termination. 11. It is stated that the termination of the services of petitioners was already upheld by this Court. Thereafter petitioners should not have been appointed against the vacancies of 2015, without advertising the same. According to the respondents the very appointment itself was a nullity and therefore petitioners do not get any right for re-appointment and they cannot be treated as retrenched employees. Alternatively it is contended that the appointments under the Corporation cannot be given on pick and choose method, at a time when there are innumerable candidates waiting for selection and appointment. Apart from that it is the case of the respondents that the appointments were made even in the absence of vacancies after converting the posts of Typists and Senior Typists as Marketing Assistants without amending the staff pattern. It ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 **==> picture [20 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** is in the above circumstances, that the orders of termination are issued. 12. I heard M/s.Sugunapalan, Nandakumara Menon, Dr.K.P.Satheesan and T.A.Shaji, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in the respective writ petitions, the learned Addl.Advocate General Sri.Renjith Thampan and Sri.Jafar Khan, the learned Government Pleader for the 4[th] respondent, Sri. Majnu Komath, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillai, the learned Counsel for the 3[rd] respondent. 13. The learned Senior Counsel argued that Ext.P16 and similar orders of termination issued on 16.09.2017 are not issued by the appointing authority; the Managing Director does not have the authority to terminate their services. It is also their case that there is no decision of the Board of Directors. According to them the only authority which is competent to terminate their services is the Executive Committee. In the absence of such a decision or order by the competent authority, the order Ext.P16 is liable to be set aside. 14. The contention of the petitioners regarding the authority of Managing Director to issue Ext.P16 order is baseless because 2[nd] respondent has stated in the order that the services are terminated in W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :15: the light of the Board Decision cited under reference no.7 of that order. He has stated: _“283[rd] meeting of the Board of Directors held on 19.05.2017, discussed in detail the correctness of the decision to reappoint Assistants whose services are terminated earlier and finding their re-appointment to be illegal, resolved as per resolution no.3250 to authorise the Managing Director to take further steps.”_ _It is further stated that in implementation of that decision taken vide resolution no. 3250 of the 283[rd] BOD meeting held on 19.05.2017, show cause notice was issued. Further it is stated: that Board considered in detail the contentions raised in the reply submitted by all the 42 Assistants/Marketing Assistants ----”_ 15. Therefore it is clear that the 2[nd] respondent issued the order on due authorisation from the Board of Directors which is permissible under the provision of subsection 3 of Section 20 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (“the Act” for short). Moreover it is clear from Ext.R2(f) resolution of the Board of Directors produced along with I.A.No. 18710 of 2017 in one of these writ petitions-W.P.(C) No.30312 of 2017. Section 33 of the Act provides that a Warehousing Corporation may by general or special order in writing delegate to the Secretary or other officer of the Corporation, subject to such conditions and limitations if any as may be specified in the order such of its powers and functions under this Act as it may deem necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. Section 20 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Board on which the general ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :16: superintendence and management of the affairs of the Corporation vests. Subsection 3 of Section 20 provides that the Managing Director shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Board of Directors or the Corporation may entrust or delegate to him. 16. Another contention is that when the appointing authority is the executive committee, the order passed on the basis of the decision of the Board of Directors is again without authority. It is true that as per Regulation 3(k) of Kerala State Warehousing Corporation Staff Regulations, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations'), the appointing authority means the executive committee of the Corporation in respect of class I, II and III employees of the Corporation. Regulation 12(2), provides that the services of an employee who has completed the period of probation can be terminated by the Board of Directors after giving 3 months' notice or pay in lieu of notice. As per Section 20, the Board of Directors shall consist of 5 Directors nominated by the Central Warehousing Corporation of whom one shall be nominated in consultation with the State Bank and one should be a non-official: five directors nominated by State Government and Managing Director appointed by State Government. Chairman of the Board of Directors is to be appointed by the State Government from among the Directors. Section 25 of the Act ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :17: provides that the executive committee of the Corporation shall consist of the Chairman of the Board of Directors; the Managing Director and three other Directors chosen in the prescribed manner of which one shall be a Director referred to under clause (a) of Section 20(1). Subsection 3 of Section 20 provides that subject to any general or special directors as the Board of Directors may from time to time give, the Executive Committee shall be competent to deal with any matter within the competence of the Corporation. Therefore all the members of the executive committee are the members of Board of Directors also or in other words it is a part of the Board of Directors without any outsider. Therefore it cannot be said that there is any illegality in the action taken by the larger body, even if the appointing authority is the Executive committee which is part and parcel of the Board of Directors. Therefore I am unable to accept this contention also. 17. As pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the apex court in _**Government of A.P and another V N. Ramanaiah : (2009) 7 SCC 165**_ , held that there is no jurisdictional error in the order for the reason that the order of dismissal is passed by a higher authority. I have also in my judgment in _**Anu S. Nair V University of**_ _**Kerala : 2017 KHC 289 : 2017(3) KLT 337**_ held so while upholding the selection conducted by the syndicate when the selection is to be ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :18: made by the selection board, which is to be constituted from among the members of the syndicate. 18. Yet another contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the sole defect in their initial appointments made in the year 2006 was that posts against which they were appointed, were created by the executive committee which did not have any authority for the same. As per the provisions contained in the General and Staff Regulations, 1963 framed under section 42 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 the power to create posts vests with the Government. Except for that technical defect, the appointments would not have been canceled; the appointments were made after observing all the formalities on the basis of their merit from the rank list prepared after a regular process of selection, conducted through an outside agency; there was no illegality in their appointments; there was only an irregularity, which was not on account of any fault on their part. According to them the appointment's were not made through backdoor and that the reappointment was made after considering a representation submitted by them, on the basis of a direction from this Court in a writ petition filed by one of the candidates. It is their further case that their case can in no way be compared with the Supreme Court judgment in _**Umadevi**_ ' _s_ case which is referred to in the show ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :19: cause notice and the order of termination. The learned Senior Counsel relying on the judgment in _**State of J&K V District Bar Association,**_ _**Bandipora : (2017) 3 SCC 410**_ , argued that their appointments suffered from only an irregularity and it never transformed to an illegality. It was argued that the appointment of petitioners happened to be set aside on a technical reason. Therefore they were entitled to be re-appointed. It is relevant to note in this context that the judgment in _**Jammu Kashmir**_ case also recognised only those appointments which were made against sanctioned posts, as can be seen from paragraph 19 of that judgment, following judgments in _**State of Karnataka V M.L. Kesari : (2010)9 SCC 247**_ and _**Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra V State of Orissa : (2014)4 SCC 583**_ . The relevant portion of the judgment in _**State of J&K V District Bar Association, Bandipora: (2017)3 SCC 410**_ case reads as follows: _19. The judgment in Renu[Renu V District & Sessions Judge (2014)14 SCC 50] does not preclude, as a principle of law, the framing of an appropriate scheme of regularisation in appropriate situations meeting the norms spelt out in Umadevi (3) and the decisions which have followed. Dealing with a scheme framed for regularisation, this Court in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa (2014)4 SCC 583 held as follows: (Amarendra Kumar case, SCC pp. 607, 609 & 610, paras 38, 43 & 45) “38. Equally important is the fact that even after declaring the true legal position on the subject and even after deprecating the practice of appointing people by means other than legitimate, this Court felt that those who had served for ten years or so may be put to extreme hardship_ W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :20: _if they were to be discharged from service and, therefore, directed the formulation of a scheme for their regularisation. This was no doubt a one-time measure, but so long as the appointment sought to be regularised was not illegal, the scheme envisaged by para 53 of the decision extracted above permitted the State to regularise such employees. xxxxxx._ _* * *_ _43. As to what would constitute an irregular appointment is no longer res integra. The decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari(2010)9 SCC 247, has examined that question and explained the principle regarding regularisation as enunciated in Umadevi (3) case. The decision in that case summed up the following three essentials for regularisation: (1) the employees have worked for ten years or more, (2) that they have so worked in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal, and (3) they should have possessed the minimum qualification stipulated for the appointment. Subject to these three requirements being satisfied, even if the appointment process did not involve open competitive selection, the appointment would be treated irregular and not illegal and thereby qualify for regularisation. Para 7 in this regard is apposite and may be extracted at this stage: (M.L. Kesari case, SCC p. 250)_ _‘7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against “regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi (3), if the following conditions are fulfilled:_ _(i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years._ _(ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular._ _**Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts** or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such ’ appointments are considered to be irregular._ ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :21: Therefore the reliance on the above case is misplaced. 19. In this case the petitioners were re-appointed describing them or treating them as retrenched employees. It is necessary therefore to examine whether persons like petitioners whose services were terminated because of their appointment in non-existent posts or because the posts in which they were appointed were created without authority can be treated as retrenched employees so that there can be re-appointment i.e appointments without undergoing another process of selection, in accordance with the regulations. 20. It is true that the appointments of the petitioners were made in March 2006 after conducting a regular process of selection. Their services were terminated initially in February 2007, seeing that the posts in which they were appointed were created without authority. Though this Court had in Ext.P5 judgment dated 24.11.2009 directed to treat the orders of termination as show cause notice, petitioners were already ousted from 2/2007 onwards. Thereafter this Court by Ext.P7 judgment, upheld Ext.P6 order of termination. It was affirmed in Ext.P8 judgment of the Division Bench. The order Ext.P6 terminating their services, was issued on 10.05.2010 after considering their explanations. The order of termination was upheld accepting the ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :22: contention of the respondents that the appointments in non-existent posts/posts created without authority were illegal. From Ext.P9 order, it is clear that petitioners did not get any favourable orders from the apex court. In the judgments Exts.P7 or P8 or even in Ext.P9, no protection is given to petitioners for re-appointment. There is no finding that they were retrenched from service. From the pleadings it is seen that either there was no claim for declaring their status as retrenched employees or that such claim was denied. At any rate that was a claim which the petitioners could have claimed in the first writ petition. It is after more than 7 years of the judgment and after about 8 years of the ouster, that the petitioners were re-appointed in the year 2015. The appointments as per Ext.P11 and similar orders are stated to have been made against vacancies which arose in the post of Assistants as well as the vacancies created by conversion of the posts of Typist Clerks/Senior Typist Clerks. 21. It is admitted that no notification was issued inviting applications, before filling up the vacancies of Marketing Assistants or even of Assistants, which post was created on conversion or otherwise. Though an interview was conducted and a rank list was published before the so called re-appointment, from Ext.P11 order it is clear that the interview or selection was conducted only for the persons like ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :23: petitioners describing them as retrenched employees, restricting the zone of consideration to those who were appointed in 2006 and terminated from service as the very appointments against non-existent posts were held illegal. That would show that their appointments were not made in accordance with the provisions contained in the Staff Regulations, which insists that appointments to class III posts shall be made after publication in Newspapers having wide circulation. Relying on the judgment of the apex court in _**Union of India V Rajesh:2003 (3) KLT 392(SC)**_ , the Senior Counsel for the petitioners argued that they are entitled to re-appointment since their selection was regular in all respects except for the absence of post. But I find that the apex court was considering the question relating to the cancellation of selection in the background of allegations of malpractices in the process of selection. The special committee which enquired into the allegations found infirmities with respect to only 31 candidates and no infirmity was found with respect to the selection of the petitioners therein. The apex court found that cancellation of entire selection was not necessary as the tainted selection could be weeded out. I am unable to find any of the findings or observations in the judgment would be helpful to the petitioners herein. 22. Petitioners were given re-appointment styling them as ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :24: retrenched employees, against vacancies which arose/created in the year 2015 on the basis of a selection which was conducted in the year 2005. Though it is true that the first appointment of the petitioners cannot be termed as backdoor appointments, as all the procedural formalities were observed in tune with the Staff Regulations, their appointments were held illegal. Once it is found that there were no posts for their appointment, they are not entitled to any benefit out of such appointments and hence for the benefit available to retrenched employees and hence for re-appointment also. 23. Moreover while upholding the termination of the services of petitioners in Exts.P7 and P8 judgments or even in Ext.P9 order, they were not conferred the status of retrenched employee and this Court did not reserve any right of re-appointment to them. Petitioners who did not raise any claim for re-appointment or for treating them as retrenched employees cannot be heard to seek any such claim or benefit which they did not raise in the first case which resulted in Ext.P5 judgment. The claims which they could have raised and reliefs which they could have sought in the first writ petition cannot be raised or sought in the 2[nd] writ petition, as it is hit by constructive resjudicata. 24. An appointment in the absence of a post, can only be a ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :25: nullity. Petitioners could not have been featured as retrenched employees also. The fact that the petitioners had undergone a selection process and came out successful in the year 2005 cannot confer on them any right for a re-appointment contrary to the provisions contained in the regulations. That being so re-appointment as well as subsequent orders if any declaring their probation will not in any way improve their status and cannot stand in the way of cancellation of their appointment when it is found to be illegal. 25. Section 42 of the Warehousing Corporation Act enables a State Warehousing Corporation to make Regulations, with the previous sanction of the Government, by notification in the gazette, to provide for the matters enumerated in the Section. Clause (a) of Subsection 2 provides for framing regulations providing for the conditions of service of the officers and other employees of the Corporation. The Kerala State Warehousing Corporation Staff Regulations, 1963 provides for the conditions of service of officers and employees of the Corporation. Regulation 7 provides that all posts available for direct recruitment in the Corporation shall be given due publicity and appointment in respect of posts under Class I, II and III in the Corporation shall be made after issuing an advertisement incorporating the qualifications and experience in leading newspapers. Such a provision is made in ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :26: order to provide opportunity to all the qualified candidates for being considered for appointment in the Corporation. Therefore any vacancy which arose in the Corporation ought to have been filled up only in accordance with the Regulations, after issuing notification in leading news papers and after considering all the qualified hands. The fact that petitioners have once undergone the selection process will not be sufficient, to appoint them in the year 2015, without any fresh process of selection, as long as there is no such direction in the judgments Exts.P7 and P8, upholding the termination of their services. If at all any fresh vacancies arose, the Corporation ought to have filled up the same, after following the procedure prescribed in Regulation 7. 26. Petitioners, whose services terminated in the year 2007, were given appointment against the vacancies which arose/created in the year 2015, after conducting an interview of only 99 candidates, who were appointed in non-existent posts and without conducting a selection in accordance with the Regulations after inviting applications from qualified candidates by issuing a notification with due publicity. During the interregnum several candidates who passed out from the Colleges/Schools would have become qualified who would be in search of employment. Therefore any appointment if at all could be made, should have been only after inviting applications by proper ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :27: advertisement and after conducting selection. The petitioners do not have any right for re-appointment and they cannot be termed as retrenched employees as stated in the proceedings of their reappointment. 27. The appointments in these cases were made against Marketing Assistants, a post which is not seen in the approved staff pattern. Those posts itself were created by converting/merger of posts of Typists and Senior Typists without permission from Government. 28. As rightly contended by Sri.Jafar Khan, the learned Government Pleader, relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in _**Nagendra Chandra V State of Jharkhand: (2008)1 SCC 798, State of Orissa and another v. Rajkishore Nanda and others : (2010) 6 SCC 777, Mahesh Chandra Verma and Others V State of Jharkhand & others: (2012)11SCC 656, Renu and Others V District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari and another: (2014)14 SCC 50**_ etc. appointment to any post under the State including the Public Sector Undertakings can be made only after inviting applications with due publicity after affording opportunity to all the qualified hands to offer their candidature for the same. Appointments made against non-existent posts, even if made after observing the formalities for regular selection in the year 2006, cannot be equated to a selection ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :28: after posts are sanctioned in the year 2015, when it is made without inviting applications after sanctioning of the posts. Re-appointment made after a period of 8 to 9 years without conducting any further process of selection is illegal and the candidates appointed by adopting such a procedure will not get any right to continue in service. In _**Mahesh Chandra Verma's**_ case, the apex court while considering the validity of appointments of Additional District Judges in excess of sanctioned posts and notified vacancies after the list had come to an end after filling up the notified number of vacancies it was held that the select list gets exhausted on appointment of the notified number of vacancies. The High Court had found that 10 names were recommended in October 2001 for making appointments against nonexistent posts. The contention of the appointees who were appellants therein was that they had already undergone the entire process of selection comprising preliminary test, main written test, viva voce test and orientation course successfully, as in the case of 17 persons who were working as District Judges in the cadre and therefore they shall not be subjected to undergo any more tests; their appointments were held illegal after more than 8 years of continuous service as Additional District Judges, in Fast Track Courts (FTCs); they were practising as Advocates at the Allahabad High Court, till their appointments on direct W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :29: ## recruitment from the Bar **,** In paragraph 43 it was held as follows: _43. Since a select list of 27 persons was duly notified as per the Rules of 2001, after candidates from Sl. Nos. 1 to 17 were appointed as regular Additional District Judges on 1512-2001 the select list came to an end because as per the affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court though vacancies were not mentioned in the advertisement only 13 posts of Additional District Judges were available on the date of advertisement i.e. on 23-5-2001 and 17 posts of Additional District Judges were available on the date of recommendation i.e. on 20-10-2001. On the appointment of 17 regular Additional District Judges, the selection process for appointment of regular Additional District Judges came to an end. The unexhausted select list was wrongly used for appointment of 10 FTC Judges. Again, out of the list of unsuccessful candidates, 15 persons were appointed as FTC Judges. Their names were not there in the select list. The whole procedure was irregular. Reliance placed by the High Court on the impugned judgment of this Court in Rakhi_ _Ray v. High Court of Delhi[20] and Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab[31] is apt. It must be mentioned at the cost of repetition that on 23-5-2001 when the advertisement was issued, the posts for FTCs were not sanctioned. Therefore, these posts were not even in contemplation. They cannot be termed as vacancies contemplated or anticipated by the High Court. Undoubtedly, the correspondence between the Law Ministry and the High Court indicates that the High Court was informed about the need for creation of FTCs and that Fast Track Court Scheme may be brought into action in Jharkhand but, till the posts for FTCs were sanctioned, there was no question of taking into account any anticipated vacancies. When advertisement is for specific number of posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised. The select list gets exhausted when all the advertised posts get filled. In Rakhi Ray[20] and in a long line of other cases to which reference need not be made, this Court has clarified that appointments beyond the number of post._ However it was directed to consider their cases in the light of the directions in _**Brij Mohanlal's case.: (2012)6 SCC 502**_ . In the present case there was no direction from this Court to consider the ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :30: cases of petitioners against future vacancies. What was found was that the termination of their services was legal and proper. 29. The Apex Court had in _**Nagendra Chandra's**_ case (supra) while considering the validity of termination of services of Constables after 14 years of their appointments, as it was found that appointments were made without advertising the vacancies as provided in Rule 663(d) of Bihar Police Manual, it was held that the appointments made in infraction of rules would be a nullity. In _**Rajkishore Nanda's**_ case (supra) the apex court was considering the validity of appointments to the posts of Junior Clerks in Orissa, made against vacancies in excess of notified number. It was held that there cannot be any recruitment to vacancies in excess of the notified, as it will be a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 10 of the judgment the Apex Court held as follows: _“10. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as “the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Art.14 read with Art.16(1) of the Constitution”, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to “improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some_ W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 **==> picture [20 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** _rational”, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, not permissible in law. (vide State of Bihar and others v. The Secretariat Assistant S.E.Union 1986 and others AIR 1994 SC 736; Prem Singh and others v. Haryana State Electricity Board and others, 1996 (4) SCC 319, Ashok Kumar and others v. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board and others AIR 1996 SC 976; Surinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1998 SC 18; and Rakhi Ray and others v. High Court of Delhi AIR 2010 SC 932”._ Therefore filling up of the vacancies from a rank list was found to be improper exercise of power and impermissible, once the vacancies which were notified were filled up, as any appointment in excess of those notified would be in violation of the constitutional right of candidates who acquired eligibility in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of the vacancies. 30. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the respondents had allowed 2 of the candidates who were appointed along with them to continue in service even after termination of their services along with them. It is admitted on both sides that the said retention is in tune with the directions contained in the judgment dated 26.02.2015 in W.P.(C) No. 15079 of 2010. On a perusal of the judgment, it is seen that petitioner in that case was rank no.2 in the select list for appointment of Assistants in the Corporation; her services were terminated as per order dated 05.02.2007 along with the petitioners. She along with others challenged it in W.P.(C) No.4258 of 2007 and ## W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :32: her case also was disposed of along with the connected cases by judgment dated 23.11.2009, when this Court directed to treat the orders of termination as show cause notices. The Managing Director had issued orders confirming the proposal and rejecting her objections. She filed the writ petition challenging that order. This Court found that when notification was issued for appointments against 50 vacancies, there were 12 vacancies in existence out of which 10 were to be filled up by compassionate appointment. It was found that petitioner therein being rank no.2 in the list was liable to be appointed against one of the two vacancies which remaining after setting apart 10 for compassionate appointment and that the specific contention raised by her in the objection was not considered by the respondents. The case of the petitioner therein therefore stands on a different footing. The cases filed by the petitioners challenging similar orders of termination were dismissed and that dismissal was upheld by this court and by the apex court. Petitioners who could not succeed in their writ petitions cannot claim any parity with her. 31. The Corporation is a statutory body which is governed by the Warehousing Corporations Act and the appointments in it are governed by the General and Staff Regulations 1963. No appointment made other than in accordance with the regulations can be said to be W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :33: valid. When the re-appointment is found illegal, declaration of probation thereafter will not help the petitioners. A statutory corporation which is an authority under State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot be permitted to fill up the vacancies otherwise than in accordance with the Regulations. As held by the apex court in _**State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale : (1983) 3 SCC 387,**_ any appointment under the Government as well as a Public Sector Undertaking is the property of the nation, which has to be shared equally among the qualified hands _._ Nation's wealth in the form of employment under the Corporation has to be distributed among the qualified hands, after inviting applications from all eligible hands, strictly in accordance with the constitutional norms. 32. As I have found that re-appointments of the petitioners were illegal, I do not find it necessary to go into the question whether the Board of Directors had any authority to convert/merge the posts of Assistants/Typists/Senior Typists etc. as Marketing Assistants contrary to staff pattern without permission from Government. It is left open. In the above circumstances, I do not find any illegality in the W.P.(C) Nos.30239, 30232, 30312 & 30217 of 2017 :34: impugned orders Ext.P16 and similar orders terminating the services of petitioners. Therefore the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. Sd/- **P.V.ASHA JUDGE** rkc