High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal allowed; trial court decree set aside; s...

Sunny Thomas and Joby Jacob v. Sabu Andrews

Case / Petition Number:RFA No. 85 of 2012

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • SATHISH NINAN
Judgment Date
2023-07-27
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The decree and judgment of the trial court are set aside. The suit is decreed in favor of the first plaintiff to recover ₹23,14,680 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of suit till payment, and costs throughout.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; trial court decree set aside; suit decreed in favor of plaintiffs for ₹23,14,680 with 6% interest from the date of suit and costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Sunny Thomas
  • Joby Jacob (Power of Attorney Holder)

Respondents

  • Sabu Andrews

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri M. Narendrakumar
  • • Smt. Laya Simon
  • • Sri P. B. Pradeep

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri Nandagopal S. Kurup
  • • Sri G. Sreekumar Chelur

Case Synopsis & Summary

The Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 85 of 2012) before the Kerala High Court challenges the decree in OS 411/2009 of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam, which dismissed a suit on a promissory note. The first plaintiff Sunny Thomas, represented by his power-of-attorney holder Joby Jacob, alleges that on 04.08.2005 the defendant borrowed ₹21,55,200 and executed Ext. A2 in the plaintiff’s favor. The defendant admitted executing Ext. A2 but contends it was given as security for earlier loans (₹10 lakh in Aug 2004 and ₹5 lakh in Mar 2005) and disputes the underlying transaction. Partial repayments—₹2,00,000 via cheque (10.07.2007) and ₹7,00,000 (01.07.2008)—were made, and the suit was filed on 11.08.2009. The trial court held Ext. A2 not proved and that the suit was time-barred. The appellate court, however, found that Ext. A2 was admitted and that the payments constituted an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, thus interrupting the period. Relying on Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, the court held the suit timely and decreed ₹23,14,680 with 6% interest from the date of suit and costs, reversing the trial court. The decision highlights the effect of acknowledgments and the permissible scope of pleadings under limitation law.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 19 of the Limitation ActOrder VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Acknowledgment of liability by payment extends the period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
  • Partial discharge of liability constitutes acknowledgment of the debt for purposes of Section 19.
  • Proviso to Order VII Rule 6 CPC allows the court to permit exemption from limitation on a ground not inconsistent with the pleaded grounds.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contend Ext. A2 was admitted by the defendant and was executed to secure a liability and not a separate transaction. They rely on Section 19 of the Limitation Act, arguing that payments on 10.07.2007 (₹2,00,000) and 01.07.2008 (₹7,00,000) amounted to partial discharge of the debt, constituting an acknowledgment that interrupts the limitation period. They cite Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla (AIR 1967 SC 1118) to support the principle that such acknowledgments extend the period and render the suit timely. They also argue that the proviso to Order VII Rule 6 CPC permits exemption from limitation where a ground is not inconsistent with pleaded grounds, as supported by Sajan Varghese v. Kerala State Electronic Development Corporation Ltd. and related jurisprudence, and that the plaint had adequate standing in this regard.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the suit is barred by limitation and the claim rests on a transaction different from Ext. A2. They argue that the plaint failed to plead an acknowledgment or a recognition of liability, and rely on the lack of direct proof of Ext. A2 and the pre-existing loans securing the debt. They further challenge the need to examine the first plaintiff and to produce originals of the cheques, arguing procedural deficiencies.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal AgarwallaAIR 1967 SC 1118PositiveUsed to affirm that payments under cheques constitute acknowledgment under Section 19, making the suit timely.
Sant lal Mahton v. Kamla PrasadAIR 1951 SC 477Mentioned OnlyCited in arguments by respondents; not relied upon for the decision.
Sajan Varghese v. Kerala State Electronic Development Corporation Ltd.2010 (1) KHC 721PositiveCited to support the proposition that proviso to Order VII Rule 6 CPC can permit limitation exemption not inconsistent with pleaded grounds.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN** **THURSDAY, THE 27[TH] DAY OF JULY 2023 / 5TH SRAVANA, 1945** **RFA NO. 85 OF 2012** **AGAINST THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT IN OS 411/2009 OF PRINCIPAL SUB COURT,** ## **KOTTAYAM** **-----** ## **APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS:** 1 SUNNY THOMAS, AGED 62 YEARS, S/O THOMAS, THETTIVILAYILAYA SHALOM HOUSE, ERIKADU KARA, PUTHUPPALLY PO., PUTHUPPALLY VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM TALUK – REP. BY POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER JOBY JACOB, AGED 30 YEARS. 2 JOBY JACOB, AGED 30 YEARS, S/O JACOB ELDHOS, THETTIVILAYILAYA SHALOM HOUSE, ERIKADU KARA, PUTHUPPALLY PO., PUTHUPPALLY VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM TALUM. BY ADVS. SRI.M.NARENDRA KUMAR SMT.LAYA SIMON SRI.P.B.PRADEEP ## **RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:** SABU ANDREWS, AGED 49 YEARS, S/O ANDREWS, AMBATTU HOUSE, PUTHUPPALLY VILLAGE, PUTHUPPALLY KARA, KOTTAYAM TALUK, PIN-686594. BY ADVS. SRI.NANDAGOPAL S.KURUP SRI.G.SREEKUMAR CHELUR THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 27.07.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ## **SATHISH NINAN, J.** **= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = RFA No.85 of 2012** **= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 27[th] day of July, 2023** ## **J U D G M E N T** The suit for money based on a promissory note was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiffs are in appeal. 2. The 2[nd] plaintiff is the power of attorney holder of the 1[st] plaintiff. It is the plaintiffs’ case that, on 04.08.2005 the defendant borrowed an amount of ` 21,55,200/- from the first plaintiff. Undertaking to repay the amount with interest, the defendant executed Ext.A2 promissory note of the same date, in favour of the first plaintiff. In partial discharge of the liability, the defendant paid an amount of ` 2 lakhs as per cheque dated 10.07.2007 and a further amount of ` 7 lakhs as per another cheque dated 01.07.2008. Alleging that in spite of demand the balance amount is not paid, the suit was filed. **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 2 :- 3. Though the defendant admitted the issuance of Ext.A2 promissory note, he denied the transaction as pleaded by the plaintiff. It was contended that, on 25.08.2004 the defendant borrowed an amount of ` 10 lakhs and a further amount of ` 5 lakhs in March, 2005 from the first plaintiff. The debts were secured through sale deed executed in favour of the first plaintiff's wife. Subsequently, portion of the debt was repaid on two occasions as stated by the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff demanded additional security, Ext.A2 promissory note was issued to him. Thus, the defendant denied the plaint claim. 4. The trial court found that, though Ext.A2 promissory note was denied, its execution was not proved by the plaintiff. It was also held that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Heard learned counsel on either side. 6. The following points arise for determination in the appeal. **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 3 :- _(i)_ Is the finding of the first appellate court that the execution of Ext.A2 has not been proved, sustainable on the pleadings and evidence? _(ii)_ Is the finding of the trial court that the suit is barred by limitation, correct? 7. The trial court has proceeded as if the execution of Ext.A2 promissory note is denied by the defendant. However, at paragraph 5 of the written statement the defendant has categorically admitted the execution of Ext.A2 promissory note. Ext.A2 is dated 04.08.2005. His contention is that it was issued as an additional security for two loans of ` 10 lakhs and ` 5 lakhs which were availed in August, 2004 and March, 2005 respectively from the plaintiff. However, there is no evidence to show that there was any transaction between the parties prior to the date of Ext.A2 promissory note. When Ext.A2 promissory note, the execution of which is admitted by the defendant, is dated 04.08.2005, it was for the defendant to prove that it was issued in the **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 4 :- circumstances as pleaded by him to secure a previous transaction different from that borne out by Ext.A2. There is absolutely no evidence with regard to the same. The defendant has not adduced any evidence. Incidentally, it is relevant to note that though in Ext.A5 notice issued by the plaintiff specific reference was made to the cheques, in Ext.A7 reply notice send by the defendant the defence as is set up in the written statement was not even hinted. Therefore, on the admission of the defendant of having executed Ext.A2 promissory note, and on his failure to prove the transaction at variance therefrom, Ext.A2 promissory note is only to be upheld. The finding of the trial court regarding the genuineness and execution of Ext.A2 promissory note is thus liable to be interfered with and I do so. 8. It is the contention of the defendant that the plaint claim is barred by limitation. To contend that the suit is not barred by limitation, the plaintiff **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 5 :- relies on Section 19 of the Limitation Act. Section 19 of the Limitation Act reads thus:- _“_ _**19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy** .―Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made ;_ _Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1[st] day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.”_ It is the plaintiff's case that, towards partial discharge of the liability, the defendant paid an amount of ` 2 lakhs as per cheque dated 10.07.2007 and an amount of ` 7 lakhs as per cheque dated 01.07.2008. The defendant in the written statement has admitted both the payments. That payment under a cheque of a debtor constitutes acknowledgment in terms of Section 19 of the Limitation Act has been held by the Apex Court in **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 6 :- ## _**Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwarlal Agarwalla, (AIR 1967 SC 1118)**_ . The case sought to be set up by the defendant with regard to a transaction different from the one claimed by the plaintiff and evidenced by Ext.A1, has already been found against supra. Therefore, it could only be held that the payments under the two cheques were in partial discharge of the liability under Ext.A2 promissory note. The said payments constitute sufficient acknowledgment of the liability in terms of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The cheques being dated 10.07.2007 and 01.07.2008, the suit filed on 11.08.2009 is well within the period of limitation. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent-defendant would strenuously argue that, it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to specifically plead about the acknowledgment and limitation. The plaint lacks such a plea, it is contended. The learned counsel referred to Order VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in support of his argument. He also relied on the judgment **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 7 :- of Apex Court in _**Sant lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad AIR 1951 SC 477**_ and of this Court in _**Sajan Varghese v. Kerala State Electronic Development Corporation Ltd. 2010 (1) KHC 721**_ . The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff would on the other hand refer to the proviso to Order VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure and contend that, the court can permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from limitation on a ground even if it is not set out in the plaint if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds already pleaded. On a reading of the plaint it is seen that specific reference is made to the acknowledgment of the liability under the cheques dated 10.07.2007 and 01.07.2008. The repayments under both the cheques, with the details of the cheques, have been specifically mentioned in paragraph 8 of the plaint while dealing with the accounts. So also, in paragraph 6 of the plaint, the dates of the cheques have been specifically mentioned as part of the cause of action. This constitutes sufficient compliance with the **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 8 :- requirements of pleading regarding limitation. Hence the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is liable to be repelled. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent would argue that the non-examination of the first plaintiff, who was the person who had entered into the transaction, and also the non-summoning of the originals of Exts.A3 and A4 cheques are to have a telling effect on the plaint claim, both with regard to proof of Ext.A2 promissory note and with regard to acknowledgment of liability. In the light of the specific case set up by the defendant in his written statement, the nonexamination of the first plaintiff and the non-summoning of the originals of the cheques become insignificant. 11. On the findings as above, the suit is liable to be decreed. Considering the prevailing rate of interest in banking transactions, grant of interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the suit is considered to be just and reasonable. **RFA No.85 of 2012** -: 9 :- In the result, this appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the trial court are set aside. The suit is decreed allowing the first plaintiff to recover an amount of ` 23,14,680/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till date of recovery, from the defendant and his assets. The plaintiff shall be entitled for costs throughout. Sd/- **SATHISH NINAN JUDGE** kns/- //True Copy// P.S. to Judge