Sugandhi Raju v. Shini Joy and State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS** **TUESDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF NOVEMBER 2017/30TH KARTHIKA, 1939** ## **Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 1541 of 2014 ()** **-------------------------------CRL.A.NO. 133/2013 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS COURT, MUVATTUPUZHA ST.NO. 4659/2010 OF JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT, KOLENCHERRY** **------------------** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:** **----------------------------------------------------------------------** **SUGANDHI RAJU, D/O.CHANDRAN,AGED 38 YEARS, RESIDING AT ABBILY NIVAS, THURUTHIKARA P.O., MULANTHURUTHY.** ## **BY ADV. SRI.PAUL K.VARGHESE** ## **RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT:** **--------------------------------------------------------------------------** ## **1. SHINI JOY, W/O.JOY, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, M.E.EDAAKUZHYIL HOUSE, PAZHOOR P.O., PIRAVOM, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT - 686 120.** ## **2. STATE OF KERALA,** **REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031** ## **R1 BY ADVS. SRI.S.SHARAN SRI.A.D.SHAJAN** **R2 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.SAIGI JACOB PALATTY** **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 21-11-2017, ALONG WITH CRL.R.P. NO. 486/2015, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** **sts** ## **ALEXANDER THOMAS, J.** ---------------------------------------Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014 & Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015 ----------------------------------------- Dated this the 21[st] day of November, 2017 ## _**O R D E R**_ The first respondent/complainant in Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015 is the mother of the first respondent/complainant in Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014. The complaint in relation to the matter in Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015 has been filed through the power of attorney holder of the said complainant, who is none other than her daughter who happens to be the aforesaid first respondent/complainant in Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014. The factual nature of the defence set up by the accused in both these cases has some common grounds in both these complaints. The revision petitioner/accused in both these matters is the same person. Hence for the sake of convenience, these two Criminal Revisions are disposed of with this common order. Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015 2. The revision petitioner is accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in S.T.No.4658 of 2010 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kolencherry, instituted on the basis of a complaint filed by the first respondent therein. Exhibit-P1 dishonoured cheque therein dated Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:2::** 16.7.2010 is for Rs.1,50,000/-. The trial court, as per the impugned judgment rendered on 23.2.2013, has convicted the petitioner for the abovesaid offence and has sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs.1,50,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and the fine amount so remitted or recovered was directed to be disbursed as compensation to the complainant in terms of Section 357(1) of the Cr.P.C. The said conviction has been affirmed by the appellate court concerned (Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha), as per the impugned judgment dated 3.2.2015 in Criminal Appeal No.132 of 2013. But, the appellate court has modified the substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for three months by reducing the same to imprisonment for one day and also confirmed the fine amount of Rs.1,50,000/- with the rider that the default sentence clause would stand enhanced from one month to two months' simple imprisonment. The abovesaid conviction and sentence relatable to S.T.No.4658 of 2010 is the subject matter of the challenge made by the petitioner in Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015. 3. Heard Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused in these cases, Sri.A.D.Shajan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/complainants in these two cases and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned prosecutor appearing for Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:3::** ## R2/State. 4. The gist of the complaint in S.T.No.4658 of 2010 (relatable to Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015) is that the accused had borrowed an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant therein (who is the mother of the complainant in the other matter) and in discharge of the said liability, the accused had issued Exhibit P1 cheque dated 16.7.2010 for Rs.1,50,000/-. The cheque when presented for encashment resulted in dishonour on the ground of ‘ _insufficiency of funds’_ . Thereupon the statutory formalities including issuance of demand notice was complied with and the complaint was filed. The complaint was filed not directly by the first respondent/complainant, but through her daughter on the basis of a power of attorney. 5. During trial, the complainant has given evidence through PW1 (power of attorney) and PW2 (complainant) and has marked Exhibits P1 to P8 documents. The accused has given oral evidence as DW1 and has marked Exhibits D1 to D3 documents. 6. Among the various contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner/accused, Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused, has given emphasis on the following arguments : A) The complaint is conspicuously silent about the nature of the transactions, the day on which the borrowal transaction has taken place, the day on which the cheque was handed over, etc. All what is Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:4::** stated in paragraph 2 of the complaint is that the accused had owed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- and in settlement of this debt, the accused had issued the cheque dated 16.7.2010 for Rs.1,50,000/- which when presented resulted in dishonour. None of the other rudimentary aspects relating to the nature of the proximity of the relationship between the parties, etc. are not even remotely mentioned anywhere in the complaint. Hence, it is argued that due to the suppression of crucial and material facts in the complaint, the accused is entitled for the benefit of acquittal in the light of the legal principles laid down by this Court in _**K.K.Divakaran v. State of Kerala**_ reported in _**2016 (4) KLT 233**_ . It has been held by this Court in the abovesaid decision in _K.K.Divakaran_ 's case (supra) that in a criminal case, the accused should be informed before the trial not only of the nature of the offence, but also regarding the material particulars of the transaction which are necessary for him to effectively meet and rebut the case against him. But, unscrupulous complainants very often refused to do so with the ulterior objective of denying the accused a fair trial, which is a fundamental right guaranteed to him under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that the accused in a complaint case filed under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is also entitled to know before the trial the particulars of the accusation and the allegations against him. Suppression of these particulars in the complaint alone is sufficient to order his acquittal. It Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:5::** will be profitable to refer to paragraphs 18 and 20 of the decision of this Court in _K.K.Divakaran_ 's case (supra), which read as follows. “ _18. Before she filed the complaint the second respondent sent Exhibit P4 statutory notice to the revision petitioner informing him about the dishonour of the cheque and demanding payment of the amount covered by it. Neither the nature, nor the date of the transaction between the parties nor the date of issuance of the cheque was disclosed in it. There was only a bald statement that the revision petitioner issued a cheque bearing the date 11.1.1999 for Rs.2,55,000/- in discharge of a debt. There is no explanation why these material facts were not disclosed in the statutory notice. Suppression of material facts relating to the alleged transaction in the notice issued before filing the suit or the complaint is an artifice used by certain litigants, the intention of which is very clear. They want to develop a story after knowing the defence that may be set up by the opposite party. The doors of the court should be closed to such fortune seekers._ ## _19. xxxxxx_ _20. In a criminal case the accused should be informed before the trial not only of the nature of the offence but also the particulars of the transaction which are necessary for him to effectively meet the case against him. But unscrupulous complainants refuse to do so with the object of denying the accused a fair trial, which is a right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. An accused in a complaint case filed under Section 142 of the Act also is entitled to know before the trial the particulars of the accusation against him. Suppression of these particulars in the complaint alone is sufficient to order his acquittal.”_ In the light of these aspects, it is strongly urged by Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the accused is entitled for the benefit of acquittal in view of the serious suppression of facts made by the complainant in the complaint. B) The complaint is filed not directly by the complainant, but through her daughter on the basis of a power of attorney said to have Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:6::** been executed by the complainant in favour of her daughter. It is further pointed out that there are no averments anywhere in the complaint or in the power of attorney that the said power of attorney has direct knowledge about the transactions which led to the liability and also about the aspects relating to the execution and dishonour of the cheque. It is pointed out that the Apex Court in the decision in _**Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra**_ reported in _**(2014) 11 SCC 790 = 2013 (4) KLT 21 (SC)**_ that a power of attorney holder could be allowed to file, appear and depose for and on behalf of the complainant. But an explicit assertion as to the direct knowledge of the power of attorney holder about the transaction in question must be clearly specified in the complaint. The power of attorney cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can institute the criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal. (i) Filing of a complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act through power of attorney is legal and competent. (ii) The power of attorney can depose and verify on oath before the court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions. (iii) It is required on the part of the complainant to make an explicit and specific assertion in the Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:7::** complaint as to the direct knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction and the power of attorney holder who has no direct knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness in this case. It is further pointed out that it has been also been reiterated by the Apex Court in _**Narayanan.A.C. and another v. State of Maharashtra and others**_ reported in _**AIR 2015 SC 1198 = 2015 (1) KLD 217 (SC)**_ that the power of attorney should have direct knowledge about everything in the transaction in question, etc. On the basis of the abovesaid decision, it is strongly argued by Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/accused, that since there are no averments in the complaint asserting that the power of attorney holder has a direct knowledge about the entire transaction, the complaint was liable to be thrown out on this ground alone. C) There are no averments in the complaint and no evidence is made out either in the chief examination or cross examination as to the nature and proximity of the relationship between the parties which induce the complainant to part with such a huge amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to the accused without insisting for any security, receipt, documentation, etc. and without charging any interest. In the absence of such justifying circumstances, the courts below went wrong in not coming to the considered conclusion that strong suspicions and doubts Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:8::** are lingering about the very nature of the case set up by the complainant. It is further pointed out that the Apex Court in the decision in _**Vijay v. Laxman**_ reported in _**(2013) 3 SCC 86 = 2013 (1) KLT 157 (SC)**_ has held that if the very case set up by the holder of the cheque/complainant is dubious, then the initial presumption under Section 138 itself will come to an end. Further it has also been held by this Court in decision as in _**Bhaskaran Nair v. Mohanan**_ reported in _**2009 (2) KLT 897**_ that where the material produced disclose of suspicious circumstances surrounding the transaction and if no satisfactory explanation is tendered by the holder of the instrument to dispel such suspicions, then no conviction is legally permissible, solely banking upon the statutory presumption and a criminal court is expected to examine whether the transaction covered by the cheque is genuine and _bona fide_ , etc. In the light of these aspects, it is argued by the counsel for the accused that the courts below egregiously erred in convicting the petitioner and not raising serious suspicions and doubts about the very credibility and believability of the version projected by the complainant. At any rate, the courts below should have come to the conclusion that the evidence on record does not disclose a safe and reliable basis for convicting the accused in this case. D) The basic defence set up by the accused was that there Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:9::** was no transaction whatsoever in the complaint and that she had some previous transactions with the complainant's daughter and the amount in that regard was substantially paid and that the complainant's daughter had come to the ration shop of the accused and had created a request and in order to avoid delicacy before the public, who were witnessing the scene, the accused in order to pacify the complainant's daughter had parted with two cheques, one of which has been misused by the complainant's daughter by filing the abovesaid S.T.No.4659 of 2010 and the other cheque has been misused by the present complainant by instituting the instant complaint. In the light of the said specific defence set up by the accused that there was no transaction whatsoever with the complainant, the complainant was obliged in law to dispel all suspicions and doubts which has naturally arisen in the facts and circumstances as stated herein above and so long as the said doubts and suspicions have not been properly dispelled by the safe and reliable evidence tendered by the complainant, the courts below should have come to the considered conclusion that at least on the basis of preponderance of probability, the accused has been able to rebut the statutory presumption. In such a case, the statutory presumption itself has disappeared and then the complainant was under the heavy burden to prove her case beyond reasonable doubt about the entire transactions which led to the liability and also about the crucial facts relating to the Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:10::** execution and issuance of the cheque and dishonour, etc. The only course of action open to the courts below was to acquit the accused. 7. Per contra, Sri.A.D.Shajan, learned counsel for the complainant, would argue that no prejudice has been caused to the accused due to the non disclosure of some of the aspects in the complaint and that the evidence of the complainant is credible and believable and could be the safe basis for convicting the accused. Further it is stated that though it is not asserted in the complaint about the direct knowledge of the power of attorney holder, apart from the power of attorney holder who has deposed in evidence as PW1, the original complainant herself has tendered evidence as PW2 and therefore, the abovesaid second contention raised by the accused is not tenable, etc. 8. On an anxious consideration of the rival pleas, this Court is of the considered view that the abovesaid contentions raised by the revision petitioner/accused deserves a serious re-look at the hands of the courts below and that the courts below have not appreciated the matter in its perspective in respect of the abovesaid contentions now advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. Instead of remitting the matter to the trial court, which would entail unnecessary delays, this Court is of the view that the ends of justice could be met by remitting the matter to the appellate court for consideration of the appeal Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:11::** afresh and to consider the abovesaid contentions raised by the parties. In this view of the matter, the impugned appellate judgment dated 3.2.2015 rendered by the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha, in Criminal Appeal No.132 of 2013 is set aside. Resultantly, it is ordered that Criminal Appeal No.132 of 2013 will stand restored to the file of the said appellate court. The appellate court will decide the appeal afresh after hearing both sides and in particular should consider the abovesaid contentions and any other contentions that may be raised by both sides. Both parties will be at liberty to file argument notes which will form part of the records. The counsel for the appellant/accused and the counsel for the respondent/complainant shall appear before the appellate court at 11 A.M. on 20.1.2018, on which day the said court shall fix up a date convenient to both sides and then proceed with the hearing and disposal of the appeal. Having regard to the long pendency of the matter, it is ordered that the appellate court will take all reasonable measures to ensure the early disposal of the appeal, preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall produce the certified copy of the order before the appellate court for necessary information. With these observations and directions, Crl.R.P.No.486 of 2015 will stand finally disposed of. Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014 Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:12::** 9. The petitioner in Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014 is also the accused for the same offence in S.T.No.4659 of 2010 on the file of the same Magistrate Court, instituted on the basis of a complaint filed by the first respondent therein, (who happens to be the daughter of the complainant in S.T.No.4658 of 2010). Exhibit-P1 dishonoured cheque therein dated 11.7.2010 is for Rs.1,25,000/-. The trial court as per the impugned judgment rendered on 23.2.2013 has convicted the petitioner for the abovesaid offence and had sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs.1,25,000/- with default sentence clause of simple imprisonment for two months with further direction that the fine amount so recovered or remitted should be disbursed as compensation to the complainant in terms of Section 357(1) of the Cr.P.C. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner had preferred Criminal Appeal No.133 of 2013 before the appellate court concerned (Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha). The appellate court as per the impugned judgment dated 12.6.2014 has confirmed the conviction, but has modified the substantive sentence of simple imprisonment for three months by reducing the same to simple imprisonment for a day i.e., till the rising of the court and to pay fine of Rs.1,25,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month with the rider that the fine amount so remitted or recovered will have to be disbursed as compensation to the complainant Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:13::** in terms of Section 357(1) of the Cr.P.C. It is challenging these verdicts of both the courts below that the petitioner has filed the abovesaid Criminal Revision Petition No.1541 of 2014 before this Court. 10. The brief of the case of the complainant is that the accused had borrowed an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- from the complainant on 3.5.2010 with the promise that the accused could repay the said amount on or before 5.7.2010 and that the complainant had later demanded the money on 5.7.2010, upon which the accused had issued Exhibit-P1 cheque dated 11.7.2010 for Rs.1,25,000/- drawn from her account, which when presented resulted in dishonour. 11. The complainant has given evidence as PW1 and has marked Exhibits-P1 to P7 documents. The accused has given oral evidence as DW1 and has marked Exhibits-D1 to D4 documents. 12. The basic defence set up by the accused is to the effect that she had borrowed an amount of about Rs.1,00,000/- from the complainant and she had substantially made repayments of the said borrowed money and later the complainant came to the ration shop which was run by the accused and had threatened the accused and in order to avoid further scene, she was compelled to hand over two cheques and one of the said cheque has been misused in the present complaint and the other cheque has been misused by the present complainant’s mother in another complaint referred to herein above. Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:14::** Whereas the main argument of the complainant was to the effect that Exhibit-P7 promissory note would prove the transaction between the parties and that the defence set up by the accused is bereft of any merit. Various arguments have been made by both sides. Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would strongly argue that serious suspicions and doubts arise about the very believability and credibility of the case set up by the complainant in as much as the genesis of this case is intrinsically connected to the matter in the other complaint which has been filed by the present complainant’s mother. Further that in view of the suspicions and doubts, the courts below should have insisted for credible evidence on the part of the complainant to dispel such suspicions and doubts and in the absence of such credible evidence, the courts below should have clearly held that the statutory presumption, if any, has disappeared and that in such a situation, the complainant was under the heavy burden to prove her case beyond reasonable doubt which is fully lacking in the facts and circumstances of this case. The petitioner’s counsel has relied on the abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court regarding the duty of the criminal courts to deal with situations wherein strong suspicions and doubts arises about the very credibility of the version projected by the complainant. More particularly, Sri.Paul.K.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused, would also Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:15::** pertinently argue that Exhibit-D1 document would demolish the substratum of the prosecution case. From a reading of the cross examination of PW1, it is seen that Exhibit-D1 was admitted by the complainant (PW1). The explanation of the complainant (PW1) is to the effect that Exhibit-D1 is in relation to the transactions conducted by her regarding sale of saris to the people in the locality and that people who purchased such saris are given the facility to pay back the amounts concerned through instalments and that Exhibit-D1 reflects the instalment payments made by the accused in relation to the sari sale conducted by the complainant, etc. Exhibit-D1 is a printed card which has 99 instalments and about the first 52 days therein has been noted as if payments have been made on those days @ 250/- and the printed heading in that document is “Cash fund Deppathi” which is bearing date 10.9.2009. A pertinent question was asked to PW1 as to how PW1 is given the name “Cash fund Deppathi” when the case of the complainant is that the said document only deals with the instalments paid for the purchase of sari. To another question as to whether the scheme for purchase of sari on instalment basis conducted by the complainant is given the name “Cash fund Deppathi”. The trial court has noted that the complainant has conspicuously remained silent and has not given any answer. It is relevant to note the abovesaid portion in the cross examination of PW1, which reads as follows : Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:16::** “§çMÞZ µÞÃßºî µÞVÁßæÜ ²Mí ®æaÏÞÃí marked as Ext.D1. Ext.D1 ÄáÃß ÕÞBßÏÄßæa instalment ÄáµÏíAí ÈWµßÏÄÞÃí. Cash fund, Deppathi ®KÞçÃÞ ÄáÃßÏß¿ÉÞ¿ßæa çÉøí ? No answer. Witness Adds. Éâ ÉÜßÖÏíAí ÈWµßÏÄßæa Äßøߺî¿Õßæa card ¦Ãí Ext.D1 ®Ká ÉùÏáKá ? ÖøßÏÜï.åÈßB ç{Þ¿í 1,25,000/_ øâÉ dÉÄß ÉÜßÖAí ÕÞBß ®Kᢠ¥ÄßW 1,00,000/_ øâÉ Î¿Aß ÄKá ®KᢠÌÞAßÏáU 25,000/_ øâÉÏßW 250/_ øâÉ ©U 100 ÆßÕØæJ ¥¿ÕÞÏßøáKá ®KᢠÉùÏáKá? ÖøßÏÜï.å¦ÏÄßW 52 ÆßÕØB{ßW dÉÄß 250/_øâÉ ÕàÄ¢ ÄKÄÞÏßåExt.D1 çø¶ æµÞIí µÞÃáKá ®Ká ÉùÏáKá? ÖøßÏÜï.å12,500/_ øâÉ ÎÞdÄ¢ µßGÞÈáU ÈßBZ dÉÄßÏáæ¿ çù×X µ¿ÏßWæºKí ÌÙ{¢µâGáµÏᢠÍà×ÃßæM¿áJáµÏᢠæºÏíÄÄßæa ËÜÎÞÏß dÉÄßAí ÄçøI æºAí ÆáøáÉçÏÞ·¢ æºÏñí ÙÞ¼øÞAßÏÄÞÃí ®Ká ÉùÏáKá? ÖøßÏÜï.å¾ÞX èdÉÕxí ¦Ïß ÉÃÎß¿ÉÞ¿í È¿JáKßÜï.” A reading of the said evidence of PW1 as well as the reading of the impugned judgments would show that no appreciation whatsoever has been made by both the courts below regarding the abovesaid evidentiary aspects borne out in the cross examination of PW1. On this basis, it is argued by the counsel for the petitioner/accused that the statutory presumption, if any, has been strongly rebutted by the accused in view of the aspects borne out from Exhibit-D1, more particularly from the evidence of PW1 in her cross examination as stated herein above. 13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ complainant, would argue that the evidence tendered by PW1 is credible and believable and further that no adverse circumstances has been brought out on the basis of Exhibit D1 and that PW1 has given a credible explanation in respect of the matters covered by Exhibit-D1. Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:17::** 14. On a consideration of these rival pleas, this Court is of the view that the matter requires serious look at the hands of the courts below. It is very pertinent to note that the abovesaid evidentiary aspects borne out from the cross examination of none other than PW1 (complainant) has not been considered by both the courts below. Such omission to consider the crucial and relevant aspects of the matter is certainly an illegality and impropriety in the rendering of the judgments of both the courts below. 15. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that the ends of justice could be met by remitting the matter to the appellate court concerned, as it need not be proper for this Court to appreciate these aspects which has not been considered by both the courts below. In this view of the matter, the impugned appellate judgment dated 12.6.2014 in Criminal Appeal No.133 of 2013 will stand set aside and resultantly, it is ordered that Criminal Appeal No.133 of 2013 will stand restored to the file of the said court for consideration of the appeal afresh. The appellate court should consider all the contentions raised by the rival parties, more particularly, the abovesaid aspects referred to herein above. Both sides will be at liberty to submit argument notes in the matter which shall then form part of the records. The counsel for the appellant-accused and the counsel for the respondent/complainant shall appear before the trial court at 11 A.M. on 20.1.2018 on which day Crl.R.P.Nos.1541/14 & 486/15 : **:18::** the said court will fix up a date of hearing convenient to both sides and then proceed with the hearing and disposal of the appeal, so that the main appeal itself is disposed of without much delay preferably within a period of 3 to 4 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall produce the certified copy of this order before the appellate court for necessary information and action. With these observations and directions, Crl.R.P.No.1541 of 2014 will also stand disposed of. It is made clear that though both the revision petitions have been disposed of as per this common order for the sake of convenience, the appellate court should ensure that the abovesaid appeals are separately considered and separately disposed of through separate judgments. ## **ALEXANDER THOMAS JUDGE** csl