Sudhir Lalchand Nagpal v. Shammi Nagpal and State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS** **FRIDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF APRIL 2019 / 22ND CHAITHRA, 1941** **Crl.MC.No. 4445 of 2015** ***(AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC 241/2015 of CHIEF JUDL.MAGISTRATE, ERNAKULAM )** ## **PETITIONER/ACCUSED:** **SUDHIR LALCHAND NAGPAL, AGED 56 YEARS S/O. LALCHAND M, 32, MEHERDAD, CUFFEPARADE, MUMBAI - 400 005.** **BY ADVS. SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU (SR.) SRI.M.REVIKRISHNAN SRI.VIPIN NARAYAN** ## **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT & STATE:** **1 SHAMMI NAGPAL, AGED 57 YEARS 7D, BLOCK B, CHACKOLA HABITAT, THEVARA FERRY ROAD, KOCHI - 682 013.** - **2 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** **BY ADVS. SRI. SUKUMAR N.OOMMEN SRI.K.R.SAJITH SRI.P.RAVINDRA NATH** Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 2 ## **SRI.SHERRY SAMUEL OOMMEN** ## **OTHER PRESENT:** **PP- E.C.BINEESH** **THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 25.02.2019, THE COURT ON 12/4/2019 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** *** (THE NAME OF THE COURT IS CORRECTED AND SUBSTITUTED AS “ADDL.CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE(ECONOMIC OFENCES), ERNAKULAM” AS PER ORDER DATED 29/9/2015 IN CRL.M.A.NO.7263 IN CRL.M.C. NO.4445/2015)** Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 3 ## **O R D E R** The petitioner is the sole accused in CC No.241/2015 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam for offence punishable under section 494 IPC. 2. The crux of the allegations of the defacto complainant, who is the first respondent herein, in her private complaint is as follows. She is the lawfully wedded wife of the accused. She is a Hindu by birth and religion, and continues to profess Hindu religion. While she was employed as an Air Hostess in an Airline Company, she met the accused in June 1986. They fell in love. Accused was already married to one Aditi Joshi. It was informed by him that his matrimonial relationship was strained and it was on the verge of divorce. He promised to marry her after obtaining divorce from Aditi. He obtained divorce on 29/4/1987 and that thereafter got engaged to the complainant on 25/6/1987. They got married on 1/9/1987 at Mumbai, in accordance with the Hindu vedic rites and rituals. It was followed by a lavish party attended by several guests. Marriage was also registered under the Hindu Marriage Act. 3. It was stated by the complainant that accused was a wealthy hotelier having substantial shares valued at about INR 44 Crores in a company which owned a chain of luxury hotels. He also owned substantial shares in several other companies and was leading a very luxurious life. According to the complainant, relationship of the accused with his family was not very cordial. However, she supported him, got him involved actively in the business and to help Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 4 him, she got herself employed. They moved to a flat in Mumbai in 1995. In 2006, they commenced renovation work in the flat and hence they shifted to a hotel. According to the complainant, in April 2006, accused started exhibiting some behavioral changes and the matrimonial relationship got strained. In June 2006, he expressed his desire to seek divorce and asked the complainant to leave his company. On 10/8/2006, accused shifted to his hotel, while she was abroad. All her belongings were also removed. After completion of renovation work of the flat, she alone shifted to the flat. Respondent refused to communicate to her thereafter. Since there was no financial support to her from the respondent, she had to search for for a new job. 4. In March 2007, accused filed A/210/2006 before the Family Court, Bandra, Mumbai, under the Hindu Marriage Act, with a prayer to annul the marriage, on the premise that complainant herein was a practicing Christian and hence the marriage purported to have been solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act was void. He alternatively sought for divorce. Complainant filed objection. By order dated 24/10/2007, the above application was dismissed. On 18/3/2008 while she was abroad in connection with her employment, she got an information that all her furniture, books and valuable personal collections kept in her flat were clandestinely removed by the accused in 180 containers and removed to an unknown place. He also canceled their joint credit card, bank account which rendered her without any money. In the meanwhile, she lost her job Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 5 also. While so, accused filed A/491/2013 before the Family Court, Mumbai seeking restitution of conjugal rights. Maintainability of the above petition was challenged under the Hindu Marriage Act, in the light of the preliminary objections and in the light of the earlier findings of the family court in A/210 of 2006. The court below upheld the objections and dismissed the application. This is pending as Appeal No. 30/2016 before the Bombay High Court. The complainant, shifted to Kerala permanently in 2015 and started residence in a rented house at Thevara in Ernakulam. 5. In the meanwhile, complainant got information that the accused had married one Beryl Fernandes, who was his employee. Hence, she filed CMP No. 991/2015 before the ACJM, Ernakulam, invoking section 494 of IPC against the accused. She alleged that the accused has committed offence punishable under section 494 IPC and was liable to be convicted. 6. Heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the first respondent. Parties are referred to as complainant and accused in accordance with their status before the court below. 7. Assailing the criminal prosecution, the learned senior counsel contended that the Sine Quo non for a prosecution under section 494 IPC was the existence of a legal marriage. It was contended that, earlier proceedings established that complainant was not legally wedded to the accused. She was not a Hindu and there was no legal marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. He had Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 6 only a business relation with her. It was further contended that, they had no relationship since 2006 and consequently the application was barred by limitation. Yet another contention was that, the complainant was residing in Singapore, that no cause of action had arisen at Ernakulam and that the ACJM, Ernakulam had no jurisdiction to try the matter. It was further contended that, Annexures C and D orders in A210/2006 and A491/2013, passed by the Family Court, Mumbai, in proceedings between the parties, have finally settled the non existence of a valid marriage between the parties and those findings would operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceeding between parties. 8. It is not in dispute that the parties have undergone a form of marriage on 1/9/1987 preceded by a ceremony of engagement, on 25/6/1987. It is also not in dispute that , they lived together till 2006. It is also borne by record that the specific contention of the accused was that, there was no legal marriage between the complainant and the accused, since she was a Christian by birth and the petitioner was a Hindu. However, in the complaint, first respondent has specifically affirmed that she was a Hindu by birth and professed Hindu faith. It is also not in dispute that the marriage was solemnised in accordance with Hindu vedic rites and rituals, as insisted by the parents of the petitioner. 9. Evidently, relationship between the parties got strained. Accused herein had filed petition A/210 of 2006 before the Family Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 7 Court, Bandra, Mumbai under sections 5 B(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and the relevant provisions of the Family Court Act. In that petition, he had admitted that he had married the petitioner on First September 1987 according to the Hindu vedic rites and rituals. He further admitted that, thereafter they had lived together and cohabited at Mumbai and Singapore. It was also admitted that matrimonial relationship got strained in 2006 and that they started living separately. In the above application filed, he had asserted that the petitioner was a Syrian christian and was baptised in a church. Consequently, he claimed that the form of marriage which they had undergone on 1/8/1997 was not a marriage recognised by the Hindu Marriage Act and consequently there was no marriage in the eye of Law. He sought to declare the marriage as null and void or in the alternative, to dissolve the marriage. 10. Complainant appeared before the Family Court and contended that the allegation that she was a Christian and that the marriage under Hindu Marriage Act was void, was not tenable. The Family Court held that in the light of the admitted facts, marriage was not valid. The court held that accused ought to have sought his reliefs under the Special Marriage Act and he was directed to make necessary amendments to the petition. It is evident from the order of the Family Court that, he stuck to his claim under the Hindu Marriage Act. Consequently, A/210 of 2006 was held to be not tenable under the Hindu Marriage Act and was dismissed. 11. It is also admitted that, thereafter the complainant filed Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 8 A/491/2013 before the Family Court, Bandra seeking restitution of the conjugal rights. Maintainability of that petition was challenged by the accused on the ground of issue estoppel and constructive res-judicata. It was contended that plea of restitution of conjugal rights was not sustainable in the light of the order in A/210 of 2006. Specific contention set up was that in the light of the admission of the complaint in A210/2006 that, since she was a practicing Christian, there was no marriage in the eye of Law under the Hindu Marriage Act and consequently finding of the Family Court in A/210 of 2006 on those issues will estop the petitioner from raising that contention again, by applying the principle of issue estoppel . 12. Both sides exhaustively relied on several decisions of various courts regarding the status of the spouses in a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. Under section 2(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act, any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, domiciled in India, is governed by the Hindu Marriage Act. Under section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for a valid marriage, one of the essential condition was that, the parties to the marriage shall be Hindus. Relying on this proposition, learned senior counsel for the accused contended that, petitioner was a Christian by birth and continued to profess that religion and hence, the marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act was null and void. Learned counsel relied on the decision in **Gullipilli Sowria** ## **Raj v. Bandaru Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani ((2009)1 SCC 714).** In that case, marriage of a Hindu with a person professing a Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 9 different faith, although solemnized in accordance with Hindu customs, was held to be void. It was held that registration of such marriage under section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, will not validate the same. In **Vijayakumari v. Devabalan (2003(3) KLT 695)** the Division Bench of this Court held that a marriage by a Christian with a Hindu is not a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. It was held that, Hindu law has no application to a child who was so born. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the complainant relied on the decision reported in **Perumal Nadar represented by Legal Representative v. Ponnuswami Nadar (1970 KHC 429)** to contend that, even in the case of a person born and professing any religion other than Hindu, if converted to Hindu and embraces Hinduism, any marriage thereafter with a Hindu can only be governed by the Hindu law. To contend that, no formal ceremony of purification or expiation is necessary to effectuate conversion, learned counsel relied on the decision in Perumal Nadar represented by Legal Representative v. Ponnuswami Nadar (supra). In **Kailash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi ((1984)2 SCC 91)** the question arose whether a person born to convert Christians, baptized and grown up as a Christian, if later embraces his original caste, would revive his earlier caste and whether the views of the members of the community has greater significance in deciding his status. In that decision, it was held that, although the views of the members of the community would be an important factor, their Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 10 views should not be allowed to a complete denial of caste to which that person belonged. In **S.Anbalagan v. B.Devarajan and Ors. ((1984)2 SCC 112)** , it was held that, ordinarily a person who had embraced another religion regains his caste unless the community does not accept him. For re-conversion to Hinduism, no particular ceremony such as expiatory rites need be performed, unless the practice of the caste makes it necessary. The Honourable Supreme Court in **Dhannulal and Ors. v. Ganeshram and Another (AIR 2015 SC 2382),** held that, a strong presumption in favour of the validity of the marriage and legitimacy for the child can be drawn, if the relationship of parents is recognized by all persons concerned. 14. The Division Bench of this Court in **Betsy and Another v. Nil (2009(4) KHC 560)** had held that, regarding the validity of a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act between persons, one of whom was alleged to be not a Hindu by birth, the question to be determined was the religion and status of the wife during her marriage. It was held that, the decision of the Family Court, rejecting the application, holding that, there was no valid marriage in existence, was not justified, since court should have given an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence regarding the religion and status of the wife at the time of the marriage. 15. The above decisions clearly show that, both parties should be Hindus at the time of marriage. In the case at hand, there is no dispute that the marriage took place in accordance with Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 11 the Hindu Religious rites. Thereafter, it was got registered under the Hindu Marriage Act also. Evidently, the crucial question was the actual status of the wife at the time of marriage. 16. Family Courts, in A210 of 2006 and A491 of 2013 had held that, the marriage was not governed by the Hindu Marriage Act. The Family Court in the first proceeding, which is, A210 of 2006, had proceeded on the basis that the complainant herein had admitted that, she was a Christian. In A491 of 2013, the Family Court relied on the order in A210 of 2006 and concluded that, in the light of the earlier finding in A210 of 2006, wife was precluded from raising a contention to the contra, in the light of principle of issue estoppel and res judicata. The Family Court in A491 of 2013 further proceeded to consider the materials placed by the accused herein. Court noted that, complainant was born in Thiruvananthapuram,and the birth certificate showed that parents were Christians. She was baptized in a Church in Thiruvananthapuram. Her Christian name was Sara and confirmation was held during her childhood, in a Church at Bandra, Mumbai. The school admission certificate also showed that parents had made statements to the effect that, she was a Christian. Based on these materials and applying the principle of issue estoppel as well as principle of resjudicata, on the basis of earlier decision, the Court concluded that the marriage was not held under the Hindu Marriage Act. Evidently, the question as to what was the status of the complainant at the time of marriage was not considered by Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 12 both the Courts. It is also to be noted that the decision of the Family Court in A491 of 2013 has not become final, since it is stated to be pending in appeal before the High Court of Mumbai. 17. The specific contention of the complainant herein was that, she had never admitted that, she was a Christian. She contended that she had professed Hinduism. She also asserted that, even in the proceeding in A210 of 2006, she had not admitted that, she was not a Hindu. According to her, both the decisions proceeded on a wrong premise that, she had admitted that she was a Christian. In fact, she did not admit in the objection that, she was a Christian. It was also contended that, both the Family Courts did not answer the real issue as to what was the status of the petitioner at the time of her marriage and proceeded on a tangent. It was also contended that the above issues were not considered by the Family Court in A 210/2006 on merits, nor adjudicated upon and hence, the principle of issue estoppel and resjudicata cannot apply to the facts of this case. 18. The Family Court in A210 of 2006 exclusively relied on the objection filed by the complainant herein in that proceeding. Court proceeded to hold that, she had indicated that, she was a Christian. In A210 of 2006, the accused herein had moved the proceeding under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act and sought for a declaration that the marriage was null and void. Complainant herein filed an objection based on which, Family Court proceeded to hold that she was a Christian. To substantiate the contention Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 13 that she had never admitted that she was a Christian, the complainant placed before this Court a copy of the objection filed in A 210/2016 in the form of an application for preliminary hearing on the issue of maintainability. A perusal of it shows that, she had stated that the accused herein had contended that, she was a Christian and hence, marriage was void. She had stated in the objection that, sections 2 to 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act will apply only if the parties to marriage were both Hindus. She requested for a preliminary hearing on the maintainability. The above pleadings do not show that the complaint had specifically, impliedly or categorically admitted that, she was a Christian. 19. In fact, even in the order in A210 of 2006, the Family Court did not say that she admitted that, she was a Christian. This is further clear from the order of the Family Court in A491 of 2013 wherein the Family Court at page 6 of the order, had stated that, complainant herein never admitted that, she was a Christian. However, Family Court further held that, she remained silent and that silence amounted to an admission that she was a Christian. Evidently, it was based on presumptions. A perusal of the order in A210 of 2006 shows that the Court proceeded to hold that, from the admitted facts, it was patent that the marriage was not valid. The Court opined that the petitioner ought to have claimed a declaration under the Specific Relief Act r/w section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act that the marriage was void. Court proceeded to record that though it had suggested to the accused to make Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 14 necessary amendments in the petition, he refused to apply for amendment and stuck up to the position under the Hindu Marriage Act. Hence, the Court held that petition was not tenable under the Hindu Marriage Act. It clearly shows that, Court's view was that, relief ought to have been sought under the Specific Relief Act, r/w section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Since the view of the Family Court was that relief as sought was sustainable only under the specific reliefs Act, court could not have gone into the merits of the case and the petition was dismissed as untenable. Evidently, there was no decision on the status of the complainant herein at the time of the marriage. Hence, the above decision cannot be said to be one on merits and no conclusive decision on the question of status of the parties during marriage was rendered. Apparently, it seems that petition was dismissed at threshold on technical grounds. That was not pursued by the accused herein and hence it is binding as against him also. 20. A perusal of the order in A491 of 2013 shows that, court below essentially relied on the observations in A210 of 2006. Though it referred to certain documents, it proceeded to hold that there was no conclusive decision regarding the status of the complainant as on the date of marriage. Hence, the decision of the Family Court in A491 of 2013 also cannot be held to be a conclusive decision on the status of complainant at the time of marriage. Even other wise, that judgment has not become final, since it is pending consideration before the trial court. Suffice to say that, Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 15 both the decisions are not conclusive decisions on the issue of status of the complainant as on the date of marriage. 21. Honourable Supreme Court in **Mohammad Safi v. the State of West Bengal (AIR 1966 SC 69)** had occasion to consider the question of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit. It was held that, one of the essential ingredient was that, it will apply, if there was a final adjudication of an issue by a competent court, which will act as an estoppel against the subsequent trial on the same issue. In **Dr.S.S.Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna and Another (AIR 1983 SC 595)** the question arose whether consequent to the dismissal of the complaint against one of the persons complained against, subsequent proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C on the same material will be barred on the principle of issue estoppel. It was held that an inquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C was not in the nature of a trial, for, there can be in law only one trial in respect of any offence and that a trial can commence only after the process is issued to the accused. It was held that, having regard to the nature of proceedings under section 202 Cr.P.C, it may be difficult to hold that there is a legal bar based on the principle of issue estoppel to proceed against a person complained against, on the same material, if the Court had dismissed the complaint under section 203 Cr.P.C. 22. In **Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 1975 SC 856)** the question of issue estoppel was considered in detail. It was held that, there was an issue estoppel, if it appeared from the record itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the point was Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 16 determined in favour of a person in a previous criminal trial, which was brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same person. It was held that, to draw the rule of issue estoppel, not only the parties in the two trial must be the same, but also the fact in issue proved or not, in the earlier trial must be identical with what was sought to be reagitated in the subsequent trial. This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in **Jatinder Singh and Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur (AIR 2001 SC 784)** . It was held that, if a dismissal of the complaint was not on merit, but on default of the complainant to be present, there was no bar in the complainant moving the magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under section 203 of Cr.P.C was on merits, situation would be otherwise. 23. A discussion of the above decisions clearly show that the principle of issue estoppel can be set up only if there was an adjudication of the issues involved on merits. Both the Family Courts had rejected the applications on technical ground. The decisions were not on merits. The Family Court did not also consider the question of status of the complainant as on the date of marriage. Hence, the contention on the basis of principle of issue estoppel is liable to be rejected. The defence that there was no valid marriage between the parties is still open to be agitated by the accused. 24. Learned senior counsel for the accused vehemently contended that on merits also, the allegation against the petitioner Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 17 cannot survive. It was contended that the accused has been falsely implicated in the above crime. It seems that the first respondent has specifically alleged in the complaint the various details of the the incidents of domestic violence. In the light of the observation made above, I find that the accused has not made out any valid ground for attack on merit also 25. Admittedly, parties have been living together since 1987. What was the relationship between the parties at the time of marriage and after the formality of marriage was performed is to be explained by the accused. Certificate of marriage is also a prima facie evidence in favour of the complainant. According to the defacto complainant, accused had married one Beryl Fernandes. One document filed by her before the Registrar of Companies evidencing that she was the wife of the accused is also on record. Petitioner has not specifically denied this. Hence, the matter is one of evidence. Consequently, contention of the accused relying on the decision in **Reema Aggrawal v. Anupam and others(AIR 2004 SCC 1418)** and **Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India and others (AIR 1995 SC 1531)** that an offence under section 494 IPC can be sustained only if there is definite proof of marriage cannot be accepted at this stage. 26. Next ground of attack was that MC was not sustainable since ACJM, Ernakulam lacked the territorial jurisdiction to try the matter. It was contended that none of the cause of action had arisen in Kerala. It was contended that the complaint herein did not have a Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 18 permanent residence at Ernakulam and she was permanently settled in Mumbai. It was contended that only Mumbai court had jurisdiction and all the other proceedings were initiated in various courts in Mumbai. She had no permanent residence at Ernakulam and residence now claimed has been artificially created for the purpose of initiating litigation at a place of her choice, after having failed in her attempts to get relief from the courts in Mumbai. It was also contended that, she was a permanent resident of Singapore and was issued with Singapore ID card. She was conducting business at Singapore. All the legal proceedings initiated by her show her address at Mumbai and the proceedings initiated by the accused herein was defended by her from her Mumbai address. 27. Complainant had specifically pleaded that since she was economically exhausted and completely drained of her resources, due to the hostilities from the respondent, including the removal of her movables and continued harassment by the accused, she was forced to shift to Kerala permanently in 2015. It was specifically pleaded by her that she took a house on rent at Thevara in Ernakulam, in February 2015. She had given the detailed address of her Ernakulam residence along with the statement of facts in Crl.M.C. No.5305/2015. A copy of the rent deed was also produced. The rent deed dated 11/2/2015 showed that building was let out for her residence. Along with the document, she has also produced her telephone bills issued to her in the above residence from February 2015 onwards. Postal envelops were also produced by her to Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 19 evidence that she had received them in her address at Thevara. It was pleaded by her that, she had stopped business at Singapore and she had no other source of income. 28. It is pertinent to note that accused has no case that complainant is not residing in Thevara now. It seems that she is staying at Thevara and all the proceedings after 2015 seems to have been initiated in Kerala. It is true that, she had initiated several proceedings and contested several proceedings at various courts in Mumbai. However, all were during the period prior to 2015. Accused also could not point out that she was staying at any place other than Thevara after 2015. It seems that there are sufficient materials to indicate prima facie that she has set up her residence within the jurisdiction of Ernakulam Court. 29. It was contended by the learned senior counsel for the accused that mere residence or even a temporary residence, at a place was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction in any court. However, this contention does not apply in the present case, since from the nature of her residence, prima facie it appears to be a case where she has set up something more than a temporary stay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Smt.Jeewanti Pandey v . Kishan Chandra Pandey(1981 KHC 712)** has held that in order to give jurisdiction on the ground of residence, something more than a temporary stay is required. It must be more or less of a permanent character, and of such a nature that the court in which the respondent is sued, is his natural forum. The expression “resides' means “to make an abode Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 20 for a considerable time” “to dwell permanently for a length of time “ “to have a settled abode for a time”. It is the place where a person has a fixed home or abode. 30. The above principle was considered by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Jagir Kaur and Another v. Jaswant** **Singh(1963 KHC 649).** The apex court held that the word “resides” cannot be given a meaning different from the meaning from the word “resided” and therefore a wider meaning for the term residence has to be given. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ## **Rupali Devli v. State of Utter Pradesh(CA No.71/2012 and** **connected cases)** dated 9[th] April 2019 that where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from matrimonial home, on account of cruelty of husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging ofence under section section 498A IPC, is relevant in the facts of the above case. Hence, the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot survive and the court below has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Having considered the above, I am not inclined to quash the proceedings at the thresh hold. Accordingly, Crl.M.C.fails and is dismissed. ## **Sd/-** ## **SUNIL THOMAS** dpk ## **JUDGE** Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 21 ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** - **ANNEXURE A** - **A - TRUE COPY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINT PREFERRED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, ERNAKULAM AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED, NOW PENDING AS CC NO. 241/2015 ON THE FILES OF THAT COURT.** ## **ANNEXURE B** - **B - TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION PREFERRED BY THE PETITIONER HEREIN BEFORE THE FAMILY COURT NO.IV, BANDRA, MUMBAI AGAINST THE 1ST RESPONDENT HEREIN.** - **ANNEXURE C C - TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DT. 24.10.07 IN PETITION NO. A/2010 OF 2006 (WRONGLY SHOWN AS A/210 OF 2007 IN THE ORDER).** - **ANNEXURE D D - TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DT. 09.10.14 IN APPLICATION NO. A-491/2013 PASSED BY THE FAMILY COURT, BANDRA, MUMBAI.** - **ANNEXURE E** - **E - TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DT. 03.6.15 IN CRL.M.P NO. 991/2015 PASSED BY THE COURT OF THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE (ECONOMIC OFFENCES) ERNAKULAM.** ANNEXURE R4: TRUE COPY OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF RESPONDENT IN APPLICATION A 210 OF 2006. ANNEXURE R5: COPY OF ORDER DATED 24/10/2007 IN APPLICATION A 210 OF 2006 OF FAMILY COURT NO. 4 MUMBAI. ANNEXURE R6: COPY OF APPLICATION A 491 OF 2013 OF RESPONDENT BEFORE FAMILY COURT NO. 7 MUMBAI. ANNEXURE R7: COPY OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF PETITIONER IN APPLICATION A - 491 OF 2013 ANNEXURE R8: COPY OF ORDER DATED 9/10/2014 IN APPLICATION A - 491 OF 2013 OF FAMILY COURT NO. 7 MUMBAI. ANNEXURE R9: COPY OF OBITUARY NOTICE PUBLISHED IN “TIMES OF INDIA” AROUND 18/4/2013. ANNEXURE R10: COPY OF DECLARATION OF 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE ROC MUMBAI. ANNEXURE R 11: COPY OF COMPLAINT IN CC NO. 241/2015(WITHOUT ITS ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS) ON THE FILES OF THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL CHIEF Crl.M.C.No.4445/2015 22 JUDICIAL ERNAKULAM. * ANNEXURE A: SUBSTITUTED AS ; **ANNEXURE A:** TRUE COPY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINT PREFERRED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT AGAINST THE PETITIONER ALLEGING OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 491 IPC AS PER ORDER IN CRL.M.A. NO. 7043/2015 DATED 29/7/2015.