High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeRSA dismissed; CMA No.2/2024 dismissed.

Sudheesh Babu.S.Sugeeth v. Biji Roy

Case / Petition Number:RSA No.614 of 2024
Neutral Citation:2025:KER:23097

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • M.A. Abdul Hakhim
Judgment Date
2025-03-18
Court Decision / Holding
C.M.Appl.No.2/2024 dismissed; R.S.A.No.614/2024 also dismissed. The court held that there is clear laches and no sustainable reason to condone the delay; the appeal is decided on merits by dismissing the condonation application and the Regular Second Appeal itself.
Final Disposition
RSA dismissed; CMA No.2/2024 dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Sudheesh Babu S. Sugeeth

Respondents

  • Biji Roy

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Shibu Joseph
  • • Ajith Viswanathan
  • • Sayed Mansoor Bafakhy Thangal
  • • Haira
  • • Aman Manzoor
  • • Vrinda Babu
  • • Sarath Viswanathan

Counsels for Respondents

  • • John Joseph Vettikad
  • • C. Joseph Johny

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No.614 of 2024) arises from a 2018 First Appellate Court judgment in AS No.155 of 2016, which itself stems from OS No.131 of 2014 before the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor. The appellant, Sudheesh Babu S. Sugeeth, challenges the appellate order and seeks to condone an extended delay in filing the appeal via C.M.Appl.No.2/2024. The delay is alleged to be 2111 days, with 715 days excluded on account of COVID-19, leaving 1,396 days in dispute. The appellant argues that the appeal has merit and deserves consideration on merits if the delay is condoned; he relies on authorities including Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji and Others, M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam, and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy to show that denying condonation can defeat substantial justice and that merit should prevail when delay is excused. The respondent contends laches and significant delay, arguing there is no sufficient justification for condonation. The court notes that the impugned judgment was passed on 12.07.2018 and the appellant learned of proceedings only on 18.01.2024, with long inactivity by the appellant’s counsel. Citing a recent Supreme Court dictum on litigants’ duty to be vigilant, the court finds laches and refuses condonation. Consequently, CMA No.2/2024 is dismissed, and the Regular Second Appeal is also dismissed.

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The law comes to the help of only those who are vigilant in prosecuting the rights and not to the help of those who sleep over their rights.
  • The purpose of the law of limitation is to attain finality of the litigation.
  • The Courts shall not allow substantial justice to be defeated on account of delay.
  • A litigant owes a duty to be vigilant about his own rights and cannot rely solely on counsel for progress of the case.
  • The lis should be considered on merits and not be sacrificed for technical delays.
  • Courts should adopt a justice-oriented approach in considering condonation of delay, avoiding rigid adherence to delay rules.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicant contends that after excluding COVID-related delays, the period effectively delayed filing is 1,396 days and the appeal has substantial merit; relies on established authorities to show that refusing condonation can throw meritorious matters out at the threshold and denies substantial justice; argues that liberal, justice-oriented consideration should prevail if delay is not deliberate.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent asserts laches and an inordinate delay with no adequate justification; highlights the long interval (2018 to 2024) without inquiry into progress; contends that condonation should not be granted where delay is unexplained and prejudices the other side.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst.Katiji and Others[1987 KHC 911]PositiveUsed to illustrate that denial of condonation can defeat substantial justice, leading to meritorious cases being excluded from consideration.
M.K.Prasad v. P.Arumugam[2001 KHC 1132]PositiveCited to support the proposition that failure to condone delay can deprive a meritorious case of adjudication on merits.
N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy[1998 KHC 1163]PositiveCited to emphasize the duty of a litigant to be vigilant and not attribute delay solely to counsel.
Nitin Mahadeo Jawale v. Bhaskar Mahadeo Mutke[2024 KHC OnLine 6660]PositiveDeprecates blaming counsel and stresses the litigant’s responsibility to monitor proceedings; used to frame accountability in delay.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

**==> picture [57 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` 2025:KER:23097 ``` ## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM ``` ``` TUESDAY, THE 18[TH] DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 27TH PHALGUNA, 1946 ``` ``` RSA NO. 614 OF 2024 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.07.2018 IN AS NO.155 OF 2016 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT – V, KOTTAYAM ARISING OUT OF THE JUDGMENT DATED IN OS NO.131 OF 2014 OF MUNSIFF COURT, ETTUMANOOR ``` ## **`APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:`** ``` SUDHEESH BABU.S.SUGEETH AGED 60 YEARS ``` ``` S/O T.K.DAMODHRAN T.C.15/729, INDOTECH ENGINEERS C.S.M NAGAR HOUSE NO 11(1),SASTHAMANGALAM THIRUVANATHAPURAM 695010 NOW RESIDING AT S.F.S PARK VILLA NO 50 PEYAD KATTUVILA THIRUVANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695 573 ``` ``` BY ADVS. SHIBU JOSEPH AJITH VISWANATHAN SAYED MANSOOR BAFAKHY THANGAL HAIRA AMAN MANZOOR VRINDA BABU SARATH VISWANATHAN ``` **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 2 2025:KER:23097 ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF:`** ``` BIJI ROY AGED 51 YEARS PROPREITRIX PAN STRUCTURAL SYSTEM, 1 ST FLOOR ,VI /542 PANDARAKULAM BUILDING, ATHRIRAMPUZHA P.O KOTTAYAM, PIN – 686 562 ``` ``` BY ADVS. JOHN JOSEPH VETTIKAD C.JOSEPH JOHNY ``` ``` THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.03.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 3 2025:KER:23097 ``` ## **JUDGMENT** ## **C.M.Appl.No.2/2024** 1. This is an application to condone delay of 2111 days in filing the appeal. The application is opposed by the respondent by filing counter affidavit. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant Sri.Shibu Jospeh and the learned counsel for the respondent Sri. John Joseph Vettikad. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant pointed out that even though the delay is shown as 2111 days, 715 days, which was permitted to be excluded on account of COVID pandemic, is excluded, the delay is only 1,396 days. 4. The learned counsel invited my attention to the merits of the matter to substantiate the point that the applicant has a meritorious case in the appeal, and hence, the delay is liable to be condoned. The learned counsel for the applicant relied on the cited the **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 4 2025:KER:23097 ``` decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst.Katiji and Others [1987 KHC 911], M.K.Prasad v. P.Arumugam [2001 KHC 1132]** and **N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998 KHC 1163]** to substantiate the point that that refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated; that as against this, when the delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The learned Counsel contended that in the present case, if the delay is not condoned, it would defeat the substantial justice in the matter as the appellant is fully entitled to succeed in the first appeal. **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 5 2025:KER:23097 ``` 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that, there is clear laches on the part of the applicant in filing the appeal and it is the cause of huge delay involved in the matter. 6. I have considered the rival contentions. 7. On going through the affidavit in support of the application, it is seen that the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court was passed on 12.07.2018, and the application for the certified copy was submitted on the very next day on 13.07.2018, and the same was delivered on 21.08.2018. The reason stated in the affidavit is that the Advocate Clerk attached with the Office of the Counsel for the appellant omitted to inform the appellant regarding the receipt of judgment and decree from the First Appellate Court and he came to know about the disposal of the appeal only on 18.01.2024, when he received notice in E.P.No.237/2019 from the Munsiff’s Court, Thiruvananthapuram to execute the decree passed by First Appellate Court. **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 6 2025:KER:23097 ``` 8. The aforesaid facts itself would reveal that, for the long period from 21.08.2018 to 18.01.2024, the Appellant did not make any enquiry with his counsel about the progress of with the appeal entrusted by him. In the recent decision **Nitin Mahadeo Jawale v. Bhaskar Mahadeo Mutke [2024 KHC OnLine 6660],** the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated the growing tendency of the part of the litigants in throwing the entire blame on the head of the advocate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made a categorical finding that _'even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief'_ . In view of the above dictum of the Hon'ble **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 7 2025:KER:23097 ``` Supreme Court, the appellant shall not be permitted to put the blame on the counsel who appeared for him in the Trial Court or his clerk. When a litigant has entrusted a case with a counsel, the litigant has a duty to verify the progress of the proceedings from the counsel from time to time. Even if the counsel fails to inform the party regarding the disposal of the case, it could not be taken as a ground to condone the delay. Here, the delay involved in the matter is 1336 days, even after excluding the period of 705 days on account of COVID pandemic. The aforesaid facts would clearly indicate that, there is clear laches on the part of the Appellant in not enquiring the progress of the appeal for long period. 9. True, there could not be any straight jacket formula for general application. The discretion has to be exercised liberally to advance substantial justice by allowing the _lis_ to be considered on merits and the Courts should not stick on to the rigid rule of law in the matter of condonation of delay. The Courts shall not **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 8 2025:KER:23097 ``` allow substantial justice to be defeated on account of delay. The Courts shall adopt a justice-oriented approach while considering the question of condonation of delay. The question is whether the party has satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for the delay in the facts and circumstances of the case. The well-accepted principle is that the law comes to the help of only those who are vigilant in prosecuting the rights and not to the help of those who sleep over their rights. The purpose of the law of limitation is to attain finality of the litigation. If undue lenience and misplaced sympathy are shown in favour of persons who have been sleeping over their rights, it is against the principle underlying the law of limitation. When the delay is not sufficiently explained by the Appellant, the delay is not liable to be condoned, even if there is merit in the appeal. The delay involved is inordinate amounting to 1336 days. No sustainable reason is made out. Even if a liberal view is taken in the **==> picture [58 x 58] intentionally omitted <==** ``` R.S.A.No.614 of 2024 9 2025:KER:23097 ``` matter, it could not be stretched to condone the inordinate delay involved in the matter. I do not find any ground or reason to condone the delay, the C.M.Application is dismissed. 10. **R.S .A.No.614/2024** In view of the dismissal of C.M.Appl.No.2/2024, the Regular Second appeal is also dismissed. Sd/- **M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM JUDGE** mus