Subair and others v Abdul Jaleel and others

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN`** ``` & ``` ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR`** ``` FRIDAY, THE 2[ND] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2022 / 11TH BHADRA, 1944 ``` ``` R.C.REV.NO.156OF 2022 ``` ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 23.12.2021 IN R.C.A.NO.25 OF 2019 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE- IV), KOZHIKODE ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 30.11.2018 IN R.C.P.NO.123 OF 2013 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF-I), KOZHIKODE ``` ## **`REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS:`** - **`1 SUBAIR, AGED 52 YEARS, S/O.ABDULLA KOYA, 10/307A, LIGHT HOUSE, GH ROAD, MUTHALAKULAM, NAGARAM AMSOM DESOM, KOZHIKODE - 673 001.`** - **`2 NOUSHAD, AGED 56 YEARS, S/O.ABDULLA KOYA, 20/58 AHABAN, PANNIYANKARA, KALLAI POST, KOZHIKODE - 673 003.`** - **`3 SAREENA A.V., AGED 52 YEARS, D/O.ABDULLA KOYA, 12/371, ASFAB HALWA BAZAR, KOZHIKODE - 673 001.`** - **`4 MUSTHAFA A.V., AGED 49 YEARS S/O.ABDULLA KOYA, 30/2388, FATHIMA MAHAL, PUTHIYANGADI, KOZHIKODE - 673 021.`** - **`5 ROSHINA A.V., AGED 45 YEARS, D/O.ABDULLA KOYA, 11/5 DARUL MADEENA, NEAR RAILWAY STATION ROAD, KATTILANGADI ROAD, THANOOR, MALAPPURAM - 676 603.`** ``` BY ADVS.V.T.MADHAVANUNNI ANAND V.S ``` -2- RCR No.156 of 2022 ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:`** - **`1 ABDUL JALEEL, AGED 41 YEARS S/O.MANAKKAL MEETHAL KUNHABDULLA, KOTTAPPILLI AMSOM, CHEMMARATHUR DESOM, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKODE - 673 104.`** - **`2 MUHAMMED RASHID S/O.MANAKKAL MEETHAL KUNHABDULLA, AGED 32 YEARS, KOTTAPPILLI AMSOM, CHEMMARATHUR DESOM, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKODE - 673 104`** - **`3 ABHIDA AMEENATH, AGED 30 YEARS S/O.MANAKKAL MEETHAL KUNHABDULLA, KOTTAPPILLI AMSOM, CHEMMARATHUR DESOM, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKODE - 673 104.`** - **`4 HANNATH, AGED 28 YEARS D/O.MANAKKAL MEETHAL KUNHABDULLA, KOTTAPPILLI AMSOM, CHEMMARATHUR DESOM, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKODE - 673 104.`** - **`5 RAMLA, AGED 51 YEARS W/O.MANAKKAL MEETHAL KUNHABDULLA, KOTTAPPILLI AMSOM, CHEMMARATHUR DESOM, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKODE - 673 104.`** ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 02.09.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` -3- RCR No.156 of 2022 ## **ORDER** ## Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioners are the respondents-tenants in R.C.P.No.123 of 2013 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Principal Munsiff-I), Kozhikode, a petition filed by the respondents herein-landlords under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenants from the petition schedule shop room. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the 2[nd] respondent herein to start a readymade and fancy shop in the petition schedule shop room and the adjacent shop room. In the Rent Control Petition, it is averred that the 2[nd] petitioner is having no employment or income. The tenants entered appearance and filed an objection in the Rent Control Petition, opposing the order of eviction sought for. Before the Rent Control Court, the 2[nd] respondent herein was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A6 were marked on the side of the landlords. On the side of the tenants, the 1[st] petitioner herein was examined as RW1 and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked. After considering the pleadings -4- RCR No.156 of 2022 and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide; that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application on the facts of the case; and that the tenants are not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. By the order dated 30.11.2018, the Rent Control Court allowed R.C.P.No.123 of 2013 in part by directing the tenants to put the landlords in vacant possession of the petition schedule building under Section 11(3) of the Act, within 30 days. The order of eviction sought for under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act was declined. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act, the tenants filed R.C.A.No.25 of 2019 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-IV), Kozhikode, under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 23.12.2021, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act. Challenging the order dated 30.11.2018 of -5- RCR No.156 of 2022 the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.123 of 2013 and the judgment dated 23.12.2021 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.25 of 2019, the tenants are before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitionerstenants. 4. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below under Section 11(3) of the Act, invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would contend that the finding of the authorities below that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide, is perverse and patently illegal, which requires interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. During the course of arguments, the -6- RCR No.156 of 2022 learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would confine arguments only on the above aspect. 6. Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on -7- RCR No.156 of 2022 ## such trade or business. 7. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to -8- RCR No.156 of 2022 convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 8. In **Nalakath Saidali Haji v. Kalluparamba Musthafa and others [2015 (4) KHC 815]** a Division Bench of this Court relied on the law laid down in the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra. The Division Bench also noticed the law laid down by the Apex Court in ## **Kizhakkayil Suhara v. Manhantavida Aboobacker (dead)** **by Lrs. [(2001) 8 SCC 19]** that, not merely the need of the landlord but also the need of the dependants for whom eviction is sought, should be established to be bona fide. On the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench noticed that, neither the Rent Control Court nor the Appellate Authority has considered the need put forward by the landlord in accordance with the principles laid down in the decisions referred to supra and in the manner in which, the same ought to have been considered. Both the authorities were influenced by the fact that the landlord was holding an employment visa. The Division Bench noticed that, there is absolutely no evidence available on record regarding the nature of the employment -9- RCR No.156 of 2022 visa that the landlord was holding or the terms subject to which the said visa has been issued to him. The conclusions of both the authorities below are based on the admission made by the landlord, while he was cross-examined as PW1. Nothing precludes the landlord from going abroad for employment. The case of the landlord in the Rent Control Petition is that, he has left his employment abroad and has come back to his native place. The fact that he is still holding an employment visa, does not militate against the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord. 9. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. 10. In **Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016** **(2) KLJ 164]** a Division Bench of this Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal** **[(2001) 5 SCC 705]** , wherein the Apex Court held that, in order to order eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the -10- RCR No.156 of 2022 landlord, the statutory requirement is that there must be an actual pressing need, not a mere whim or fanciful desire; it must be in praesenti and also the landlord must not be in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. In the said decision, the Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in **Shiv Sarup Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** , wherein it was held that, the term 'bona fide' or 'genuinely' refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of Legislative intent is an outcome of a sincere and honest desire, in contra distinction with a mere desire, by the Rent Control Legislation. In **Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the landlord has clearly admitted in his evidence that vacant rooms are in his possession, he has to attribute special reasons for not occupying it, as the need mentioned under Section 11(3) of the Act cannot be a mere desire. On the facts of that case, since there was no sufficient opportunity given in the absence of plea, the Rent Control Petition was remitted to the Rent Control Court to enable the -11- RCR No.156 of 2022 landlord to adduce evidence on that aspect and for fresh consideration by the Rent Control Court. Therefore, if there is admission on the part of the landlord of coming into possession of vacant rooms, unless special reason is given for not occupying the same, the need cannot be said to be bona fide and he is not entitled to get an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. 11. In **Gireeshbabu T.P. v. Jameela and others [2021 (5) KHC SN 30]** a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us (Anil K. Narendran, J) was a party, held that, in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Once, on the basis of the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled to an -12- RCR No.156 of 2022 order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act but, of course, subject to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3). 12. In **State of Kerala v. V. P. Joseph [2016 (2) KHC 260]** a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the court below rejected the bona fide need projected by the landlord as not genuine on two grounds, i.e., the landlord is a wealthy person getting sufficient income by way of rent and also getting a good pension and as such there is no necessity for him to start a business; and the landlord has no prior experience in conducting the business. The Division Bench noticed that, in the decision in **Abdul Rub v. Jobby Tharian [2003 (3) KLT 733]** it has been held that law does not require that impecunious (poor) landlord alone can think of starting an income generating activity in order that need set up will pass through the test of bona fide. Law does not insist that a landlord having other source of income shall not carry out another income activity or venture to start a new business. Further the mere difficulty for the tenant to shift his business to new premises and difficulty in collecting -13- RCR No.156 of 2022 the amounts due from the customers is not a ground for denying the order of eviction on the ground of bona fide need. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would contend that, since the 2[nd] respondent herein is having other sources of income from the partnership business, who is holding 25% share in the partnership business of M.M. Fruits Company, as borne out from Ext.A4 partnership agreement, and he is also having share in the partnership business of Manakkal Trading Company, as borne out from Ext.A3 partnership deed. ## 14. In **Gireeshbabu T.P. [2021 (5) KHC SN 30]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, a reading of the provisions under Section 11(3) of the Act makes it explicitly clear that, the landlord can approach the Rent Control Court seeking an order of eviction, directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. The bona fide need projected in a Rent Control Petition seeking eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, for own occupation of the -14- RCR No.156 of 2022 landlord or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him, need not be for the livelihood of the landlord or any member of his family dependent on him. Therefore, the fact that the landlord is an affluent person is of no consequence, if he proves the bona need for own occupation projected in the Rent Control Petition, for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. In **Ismail v. Kesavan [2004 (2) KLT 56]** a Division Bench of this Court, in the context of S.11(3) of the Act, held that dependency does not mean financial dependency, but dependency for the building which belongs to the landlord. Therefore, the fact that the dependent family member of the landlord is an affluent person is of no consequence, if the landlord proves the bona need projected in the Rent Control Petition for occupation of any member of his family dependent on him, for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. On the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench held that, since the bona fide need projected in a Rent Control Petition seeking eviction of the petition schedule shop room under Section 11(3) of the Act, for starting jewellery business by the landlords need not be for -15- RCR No.156 of 2022 their livelihood, the fact that the landlords, namely, Kuzhichalil Abdurahiman and his wife Jameela have extensive landed property and getting considerable rental income is of no consequence, if they prove the bona need for own occupation projected in the Rent Control Petition. Therefore, the Division Bench found no merit in the contention of the tenant that, since the landlords have extensive landed property and getting considerable rental income they have no genuine need for vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room and therefore the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition is only a ruse to evict the tenant from the petition schedule shop room. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would contend that the area where the petition schedule shop room is situated is not suitable for conducting a readymade and fancy shop. Admittedly, the petitioners-tenants are conducting business in electrical goods in the petition schedule shop room. It has come out in evidence that the area where the petition schedule shop room is situated is a commercial area having several shop rooms. -16- RCR No.156 of 2022 16. In **Sait Nagee Purushotham and Co.** **Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal [(2005) 8 SCC 252]** the Apex Court held that, it is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlords and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. 17. The landlord is the best judge of his need or requirement and the manner in which he should conduct his affairs. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms as to which premises will be suitable or not for the proposed business of the landlord, or to advice the landlord what he should do and what he should not do. Neither the tenant nor the court can thrust upon its opinion or wisdom on the landlord and dictate terms in this regard. 18. In the instant case, the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act stands proved by the oral testimony of the 2[nd] respondent herein, who was examined as PW1. After analysing the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below concurrently found that the need -17- RCR No.156 of 2022 projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide and the tenants are liable to be evicted from the petition schedule shop room. The findings of the authorities below, while granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, are neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that while arriving at such a finding they have committed any material error, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 19. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section -18- RCR No.156 of 2022 (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 20. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean - that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not -19- RCR No.156 of 2022 on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 21. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. ## 22. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings -20- RCR No.156 of 2022 (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled - to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re- -21- RCR No.156 of 2022 appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 23. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 24. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma** -22- RCR No.156 of 2022 **Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 25. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that no interference is warranted in the judgment dated 23.12.2021 of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.25 of 2019 confirming the order dated 30.11.2018 of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.123 of 2013. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would submit that considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, the tenants may be given at least one year time to give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants -23- RCR No.156 of 2022 would submit that the tenants are prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and they shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till they give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlords. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is dismissed, declining interference on the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the impugned order of the Rent Control Court; however by granting six months' time to the petitioners-tenants, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the respondents-landlords, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that they will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioners-landlords within six months -24- RCR No.156 of 2022 from the date of this order and that, they shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule building and further they shall conduct any business in the petition schedule building only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/ consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; (ii) (iii) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; Needless to say, in the event of the respondentstenants in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioners-landlords in the Rent Control Petition will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. ## **Sd/-** ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** **Sd/-** ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** AV/6/9