High CourtDivision BenchConviction restored; High Court’s acquittal set...

State of Rajasthan v. Parthu

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2002
Neutral Citation:[2007] 9 S.C.R. 932

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. B. Sinha
  • Harjit Singh Bedi
Judgment Date
2007-09-13
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The conviction based on the dying declarations is upheld, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. The respondent Parthu is to surrender to serve out the sentence. Bail bonds are cancelled.
Final Disposition
Conviction restored; High Court’s acquittal set aside; State’s appeal allowed; accused to serve remaining sentence; bail bonds cancelled.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Rajasthan

Respondents

  • Parthu

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Aruneshwar Gupta
  • • Naveen Kumar Singh
  • • Shashwat Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Ranbir Singh Yadav
  • • V.K. Pandita
  • • H.M. Singh

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a criminal appeal in which the State of Rajasthan appeals against the Rajasthan High Court’s acquittal of the husband, Parthu, for the murder of his wife by setting her on fire. The prosecution relies on two dying declarations recorded shortly after the incident, Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14, which allege the wife was burnt by the husband. The trial court convicted under Section 302 IPC primarily on these dying declarations. The High Court reversed, holding that no reliance could be placed on the dying declarations since there was no medical witness who certified that the deceased was in a fit state to make the statements and because a magistrate’s endorsement alone could not validate the declarations. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court, holding that a conviction can be based on a dying declaration alone if true and voluntary, with other circumstances scrutinized to ascertain truth or voluntariness. It emphasized that a doctor’s later attestation that the declaration was made in the presence of the doctor suffices for authenticity and does not require a contemporaneous medical certificate of fitness. The Court found that the two dying declarations were consistent and corroborated by the surrounding circumstances, including the accused’s presence in the house, absence after the incident, and the timing. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the conviction reinstated, with the respondent to surrender to serve the sentence."

Provisions of Law Cited

Penal Code, 1860, s. 302Penal Code, 1860, s. 307CrPC, s. 313Evidence Act, 1872, s. 32Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 106

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • A conviction can be based on a dying declaration alone if true and voluntary, with other circumstances examined to test voluntariness.
  • Court may consider surrounding circumstances to test the truth or voluntariness of a dying declaration.
  • Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with proof of facts within the knowledge of a person unable to testify; medical certification is not strictly mandatory for dying declarations.
  • Presence of a doctor during recording and subsequent attestation of the dying declaration supports admissibility even in absence of a contemporaneous certificate of fitness.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The prosecution argued that the dying declarations (Exhibits P-6 and P-14), recorded in the presence of a doctor, are reliable and sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when corroborated by surrounding circumstances. The High Court’s requirement for independent medical certification of fitness should not negate the probative value of the dying declarations, given the timing, consistency, and the accused’s conduct (absent after the incident and the fact that he was in the house at the time of the incident). The Court should apply the principle that a conviction can be based on a dying declaration alone if true and voluntary, with the court evaluating voluntariness through surrounding facts and circumstances; reliance on the doctor’s attestation, though not a formal certificate, suffices.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contested that without a medical certificate stating the deceased was fit to make the declaration, and without a magistrate’s independent endorsement, the dying declarations cannot form the basis of a conviction. The High Court’s acquittal rested on the lack of explicit medical certification by Dr. Avdesh Mathur regarding the deceased’s fitness to depose before the I.O. The defence argued that the two declarations, though similar, should be treated with caution, particularly given the time gap before death and the absence of a clear, contemporaneous medical or magistrate endorsement. The defense relied on precedent requiring stricter medical certification such as Paparambaka Rosamma’s reasoning (distinguished) and the need for reliable corroboration under Section 106.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar v. State of Bihar(2007) 1 SCALE 19PositiveCited to support the proposition that courts may rely on dying declarations in appropriate circumstances and consider surrounding evidence under Section 106.
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram(2006) XI SCALE 440PositiveCited to support application of Section 106 and evaluation of surrounding circumstances.
State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh(2003) 11 SCC 271PositiveCited as part of the established jurisprudence on dying declarations and circumstantial evidence.
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra[2002] 6 SCC 710PositiveCited to illustrate that medical certification of fitness, while helpful, is not strictly mandatory.
Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab/PositiveCited to support the view that magistrate’s satisfaction, in presence of a doctor, can suffice for admissibility of the dying declaration.
Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P./DistinguishedHeld not correctly decided; current judgment departs from its hypertechnical stance on medical certification.
Kofi Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat/PositiveAffirmed the principle previously laid down, reinforcing admissibility of dying declarations with doctor presence.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A ## ST A TE OF RAJAS THAN _v._ PARTHU ## SEPTEMBER 13, 2007 B ## IS.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDl,JJ.1 ## _Penal Code, 1860:_ _s.302-Deceased died of burn injuries-Dying declaration that husband_ C _poured kerosene oil and lit the fire-Conviction by trial_ court~et _aside by High Court-On appeal, held: judgment of conviction can be recorded on basis of dying declaration alone subject to satisfaction of court that same was true and voluntary-For ascertaining same, conrt to look at the circumstances-Husband was alone with deceased when incident took piace-_ D _After incident he was not found-It was for him to show as to how death of deceased took place-In the absence of sufficient and cogent explanations in that behalf, trial court correctly considered same as circumstances against him-Evidence Act, 1872-s.32._ ## _Evidence Act, I 872:_ E _s.32-Dying declaration-Made in presence of doctor PW-IO and IODoctor attested thumb impression as also statement of deceased before 10Conviction by trial court by placing reliance on dying declaration-Acquittal by High Court on the ground that no-statement made by doctor that deceased was in fit state of mind to make statement-Correetness of-Held: Not_ F _correct-By attesting statement of deceased, doctor meant that statement was made before 10 in his presence and same was correctly recorded by himPenal Code, 1860-s.302._ Prosecution case was that the wife of appellant had received serious burn G injuries. On receipt of the information, Head Constable PW-6 reached the spot and took her to the hospital. PW-6 recorded her statement which was treated as dying declaration wherein she disclosed that she was burnt by her husband. PW-9, SHO also recorded the statement of the deceased on 8.6.1995. II Deceased died on 19.6.1995. Trial Judge relying on the dying 932 933 ## STATEv. PARTHU declarations, held the respondent guilty of commission of offence u/s. 302 A IPC. On appeal, High Court recorded judgment of acquittal holding that no reliance could be placed on the dying declarations as no statement had been made by P.W.10-Dr. 'A' that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a statement before the Investigating Officer P.W.6. Hence the present appeal. ## Allowing the appeal, the Court B HELD: 1.1. Similar statements in regard to nature of offence have been made in the two dying declarations; although the dying declaration recorded by the Investigating Officer PW-9 on 8.6.1995 is a bit more detailed one. It has been recorded by both the Courts below that Dr. 'A' PW-10 was present when the dying declaration was recorded. It is true that in the said dying C declaration, no certificate to the effect that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to have such statement, was subscribed but after recording of the dying declaration was over, the Doctor attested her thumb impression as also her statement before the Investigating Officer. [Para 9) (935-G, ff; 936-A) D 1.2. The High Court commented thereupon opining that there could not be any attestation of such statement. Technically the High Court may be right but what was meant by P.W.10-Dr. 'A' by issuing such a certificate in the· dying declaration was that the statement of the deceased was made by her before the Investigating Officer in his presence and the same has correctly been recorded by the latter, P.W.10-Dr.'A' is a Medical Jurist. He himself E also had inquired about the incident in question from the deceased. She had revealed that a quarrel had taken place between the husband and wife whereafter he had poured kerosene on her and lit the fire. [Para 10) [936-B;C) 2. A judgment of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying F declaration alone subject of course to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was true and voluntary. For the purpose of ascertaining truth or voluntariness of the dying declaration, the Court may look to the other circumstances. Apart from the fact that the homicidal nature of death was not disputed by the respondent and furthermore as he in his statement under G Section 313 had raised a positive defence that she died of an accident, the High Court adopted a wrong approach. It is not disputed that the deceased and the appellant were living separately from their family. It has also not been disputed that at the time when the incident occurred, the respondent was in his house together with the deceased. It is furthermore not in dispute that H [2007] 9 S.C.R. 934 ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS A after the incident took place, the respondent was not to be found. He was arrested only on 20-6-1995. If the deceased and the respondent were together in their house at the time when the incident took place which was at about 10 O'clock in the night, it was for the respondent to show as to how the death of the ~eceased took place.- In the absence of sufficient or cogent explanations in that behalf the Court would be entitled to consider the same as the B circumstances against the accused. (Paras 13 and 14) [937-C, D, E, F, G] _Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar_ v. _State of Bihar,_ (2007) l SCALE 19; _State of Rajasthan_ v. _Kashi Ram,_ (2006) (XI) SCALE 440 and _State of Punjab_ v. _Karnail Singh,_ (2003) 11 SCC 271, relied on. c CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2002. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.4.2001 of the High C~urt of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 37of1997. D _ Aruneshwar Gupta, Naveen Kumar Singh and Shashwat Gupta for the Appellant. Ranbir Singh Yadav, V.K. Pandita and H.M; Singh for the Respondent. E > The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. SINHA, J. I. The Officer In-charge ofHannirgarh Police Station received a telephonic message that one Smt. Lali wife of Parthu, respondent herein has received bum injuries and was lying in a se_rious condition. An entry to that effect was made in the Rojnamcha register whereafter Head F Constable P.W.-6 Narayan Singh along with some other police personnel proceeded to the spot. They took her to Mahatama Gandhi Hospital at Bhilwara for treatment. The said Narayan Singh recorded her statement which was treated as dying declaration wherein she disclosed that she was burnt by her husband. On the oasis of the said statement a First Infonnation Report for an offence under Section 307 l.P.C. was recorded by P. W.9- Shankar Singh, G SHO Police Station Hamirgarh. He took up the investigation in relation to the said incident. P.W.9- Shankar Singh also recorded the statement of the deceased on 8.6.1995. H 2. Lali died on 19.6.1995 whereafter Section 3021.P.C. was added in the First Information Report. STATEv.PARTHU[SINHA,J.] 935 3. Before learned trial Judge eleven prosecution witnesses were examined. Some of the prosecution witnesses who were relatives of the deceased turned hostile. 4. Respondent, however, in his cross-examination under Section 313 stated that the death of Lali was an accidental one, as when she had been pouring kerosene in the stove and lit the match stick, suddenly the fir~ broke B out. 5. Learned trial Judge relying on or on the basis of the aforementioned two dying declarations, which were marked as Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14 respectively, held the respondent guilty of commission of the said offence. C The High Court, however, on an appeal having been preferred thereagainst by the respondent was of the opinion that as no statement had been made by P.W.10-Dr. Avdesh Mathur that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a statement before the Investigating Officer P.W.6.- Narayan Singh and furthermore in view of the fact that he had not treated the deceased, was sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that no reliance could be placed on the D said dying declarations. 6. The High Court was furthermore of the opinion that keeping in view the fact that the incident took place on 27.5.1995 and the death took place on 19.6.1995, the dying declarations of the deceased should have been recorded by a Magistrate. E' 7. On the finding, the High Court recorded a judgment of acquittal. The State of Rajasthan, is thus, before us. 8. We may at the outset notice that the High Court itself has proceeded on the basis that the 'homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is not F' in dispute'. The fact that she had died of bum injuries is also not in dispute. The short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the aforementioned two dying declarations could be relied upon or not. 9. We have gone through the said two dying declarations Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14. Similar statements in regard to nature of offence appear to G, have been made in the said two dying declarations; although the dying declaration recorded by the Investigating Officer- Shankar Singh PW-9 on 8.6.1995 is a bit more detailed one. It has been recorded by both the Courts below that Dr. Avdesh Mathur PW-10 was present when the dying declaration(Exhibit P-14) was recorded. It is true that in the said dying H [2007] 9 S.C.R. 936 ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS A declaration, no certificate to the effect that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to have such statement, was subscribed but after recording of the dying declaration was over, the Doctor attested her thumb impression as also her statement before the Investigating Officer. IO. The High Court commented thereupon opining that there could not B have any attestation of such statement. Technically the High Court may be right but what was meant by P.W.10-Dr.Avdesh Kumar by issuing such a certificate in the dying declaration was that th.e statement of the deceased was made by her·before the Investigating Officer in his presence and the same has correctly been record by the latter, P.W.10-Dr. Avdesh Kumar is a Medical C Jurist. He himself also had inquired about the incident in question from the deceased. She had Tevealed that a quarrel had taken place between the husband and wife whereafter he had poured kerosene on her and lit the fire. 11.' We may notice that P.W.10-Dr. Avdesh Kumar had in his crossexam.ination categorically stated: D > 11 No note had been put on the report exhibit P6 to the effect that deceased is in fit condition to give statement, but she was in a fit condition to give statement. It is incorrect to say that the deceased was not in a position to give statement and when she was i~ the condition, she was not in her consciousness. II E 12. We may notice that in _Laxman_ v. _State of Mahrasthra-_ [2002] 6 SCC · 710, this Court opined as under: F G > 11 5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relief upon the decision of this Court in _Harjit Kaur_ v. _State of Punjab_ wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained · an endorsement to that effect and merely because· an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasQns already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this court in _Paparambaka Rosamma_ v. _State of A.P.,_ (At SCC p.701 para 8) to the effect that H " in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of STA TE _v._ PAR THU [SINHA,J.] 937 A ## making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating B the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that he patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in _Paparambaka Rosamma_ v. _State of A.P._ must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in C _Kofi Chunilal Savji_ v. _State of Gujarat."_ 13. It is now a well settled principles of law that a judgment of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone subject of course to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was true and voluntary. For the purpose of ascertaining truth or voluntariness of the dying declaration, the D' Court may look to the other circumstances. Apart from the fact, as noticed hereinbefore, that the horn icidal nature of death was not disputed by the respondent herein and furthermore as he in his statement under Section 313 had raised a positive defence that she died of an accident, we are of the opinion the High Court adopted a wrong approach. It is not disputed that the deceased and the appellant were living separately from their family. It has also E not been disputed that at the time when the incident occurred, the respondent was in his house together with the deceased. It is furthermore not in dispute that after the incident took place, the respondent was not to be found. He was arrested only on 20-6-1995. If the deceased and the respondent were together in their house at the time when the incident took place which was F at about 10 O'clock in the night, it was for the respondent to show as to how the death of the deceased took place. 14. In the absence of sufficient or cogent explanations in that behalf the Court would be entitled to consider the same as the circumstances against the accused. (See _Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar_ v. _State of Bihar,_ (2007) 1 G, SCALE 19). 15. This Court in a large number of decisions in a case of this nature had also applied the principles of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. (See _State of Rajasthan_ v. _Kashi Ram_ (2006) XI SCALE 440 and _State of Punjab_ H [2007] 9 S.C.R. 938 ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A v. _Karnail Singh,_ [2003] I I SCC 271. 16. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. The rt:spondent who is on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bonds are cancelled. B D.G. Appeal allowed. -