High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed

STATE OF M.P. v. MANI SH & ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 860 of 2015
Neutral Citation:[2015] 8 S.C.R. 723

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Fakkir Mohammed Ibrahim Kalifulla
  • Uday Umesh Lalit
Judgment Date
2015-07-06
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The impugned order quashing the FIR and related proceedings is set aside. The High Court is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law, and the private respondents are to face trial for the offences under IPC Sections 307, 294 read with 34 and Arms Act Sections 25 and 27.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Madhya Pradesh

Respondents

  • Mani Sh
  • Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • C.D. Singh
  • • Darpan Bhuyan
  • • Vikas Bansal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Lakhan Singh Chauhan
  • • Binay Kumar Das
  • • K.P. Singh
  • • C Varinder Kumar Sharma

Case Synopsis & Summary

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mani Sh and Others concerns the legality of quashing an FIR and related proceedings under the inherent powers of the High Court (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) on the basis of an out-of-court settlement. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had in Misc. Criminal Case No. 4013/2013 quashed Crime No. 512/2012 (police station Thatipur, Gwalior) for offences under IPC Sections 307, 294 and 34, along with the Arms Act Sections 25 and 27, on the ground that the dispute had been amicably settled and the private complainant did not wish to prosecute. The State challenged this order in the Supreme Court. The Court reaffirmed that Section 482 powers are wide but must be exercised in light of the ends of justice and the prevention of abuse of process, citing Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Deepak v. State to emphasize that offences with a public character or serious nature typically cannot be quashed solely because parties have settled. It held that offences under IPC 307, 294 read with 34 and Arms Act 25, 27 are not private offences and cannot be extinguished by private agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, directed that the trial proceed in accordance with law, and allowed the appeal. The case clarifies the limits of quashing criminal proceedings in the context of compromise.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 340Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 320Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 307, 294, 34Arms Act, Sections 25 and 27

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are wide and not statutorily limited, but must be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
  • No fixed category can be prescribed for quashing; the decision depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
  • Heinous and serious offences (e.g., murder, rape, dacoity) cannot be quashed even if the parties have settled; offences of a private or civil flavour may stand on a different footing for quashing, especially where there is scope to end the case with justice and equity.
  • Power to quash is distinct from power to compound under Section 320 Cr.P.C.
  • Quashing should consider whether continuation would be unfair or contrary to justice or would amount to abuse of process despite settlement; the ends of justice may warrant ending the criminal proceedings in suitable private-dispute contexts.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The State contends that offences in question—IPC sections 307 (attempt to murder), 294 and 34, along with Arms Act sections 25 and 27—are of serious public concern and cannot be extinguished by private settlement. The High Court erred in treating the dispute as private and invoking inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash. Relying on Gian Singh (2012) and its progeny, the State argues that the ends of justice and prevention of abuse of process require continuation of proceedings for such offences. The State emphasizes that quashing would undermine public interest, justice, and societal safety, and that private compromise cannot substitute for a fair trial to determine guilt or innocence.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the de facto complainant did not wish to prosecute and the disputes had been amicably settled; the matter concerns private civil-type disputes where a settlement can be considered to end the criminal case. They argue that, in offences of predominantly civil flavour or private dispute context, High Courts may exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash to avoid oppression in prolonged litigation, particularly when the settlement resolves the grievance. They rely on Gian Singh to justify ending the case where continuation would be oppressive and to acknowledge that certain private settlements are compatible with ends of justice; the fact that arms-offences were left untouched should be seen in light of the settlement rather than a blanket rule.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another2012 (8) SCR 753; (2012) 10 SCC 303PositiveUsed to establish the principle that the inherent powers under 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised to secure ends of justice and prevent abuse, with the understanding that private settlements do not automatically justify quashing serious public offences.
State of M.P. v. Deepak and Others(2014) 10 SCC 285PositiveSubsequently followed in line with Gian Singh to support the view that quashing should not be based solely on private settlements in cases involving grave offences; reinforces the caution against private-compromise quashing in public-interest offences.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

. _. :i :, ..._ [2015] 8 S.C.R. 723 STATE OF M.P. . A ## v. MANI SH & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No.860 of 2015) JULY 06, 2015 B [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.] - _Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.340, 482 Whether based on out of Court settlement alleged to have_ C _been reached between the private parties, the offences of the nature falling u/ss.307, 294 and 34 /PC which are not covered by s.320 can be taken note of and such orders of quashing of the proceedings can be passed in exercise of_ 0 - _powers u/s.482 Held: Offence ulss.307, 294 and 34 /PC along with_ ss. _25 and 27 of the fvms Act cannot be held to be an offence_ as _between the private parties simpliciter- Since such offences have a serious impact on the society at large, the private respondents will have to necessarily face trial and_ E _come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence- Trial Court directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law_ - - - _Compromise Compounding of offence Penal Code, 1860-ss. 307, 294 and 34._ F _Gian Singh v._ State _of Punjab and another2012_ (8) SCR 753: (2012) 10 SCC 303; State _ofM.P. v. Deepak and Others_ (2014) 10 sec 285- relied on. Case Law Reference G 2012 (8) SCR 753 relied on. Para 5 (2014) 10 sec 285 relied on. Para 5 723 H 724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R. A CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 860 of 2015 From the Judgment and Order dated 25.06.2013 in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 4013 of 2013 of the High B Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior. C.D. Singh, Darpan Bhuyan, Vikas Bansal for the Appellant. Lakhan Singh Chauhan, Binay Kumar Das, K.P. Singh, C Varinder Kumar Sharma forthe Respondents. The Order of the Court was delivered ## **ORDER** ## D 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents. E 3. The appellanUState of Madhya Pradesh seeks to challenge the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 25.6.2013 passed in Misc. Criminal Case No.401312013, in and by which the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. by taking into accountthe stand of the de F facto complainant, who was present before the Court, that she did not wish to prosecute the respondents herein as the disputes have been amicably settled between them, curiously proceeded to quash the FIR in Crime No.512/2012 registered at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior for offences under G Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC as well as the subsequent criminal proceedings being Criminal Case No.2602/2013 for the same offences pending before the Court. The High Court, however, made it clear that the proceedings pending against the private respondents herein in relation to the offences under H Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act were not quashed by the Court. STATE OF M.P. v. MANISH & ORS. 725 4. Therefore, the moot question that arises for A consideration is whether based on out of Court.settlement alleged to have been reached between the private parties, the offences of this nature falling under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC which.are not covered by Section 320 Cr.P.C. can be taken note of and such orders of quashing cifthe proceedings B can be passed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. 5. The question is no longer res integra, inasmuch as the Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 which C has been subsequently followed in a number of other decisions including the recent decision in State of M. P. v. Deepak and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 285, clearly sets out as to in what circumstances and in what type of cases such exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked D de hors Section 320 Cr.P.C. for recognizing such· out of Court settlement for the purpose of quashing of criminal proceedings. 6. The Three-Judge Bench decision in Gian Singh (supra) is an illuminating judgment on this issue. In paragraph 61 E ultimately the position has been set out in clear terms as under:- "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a crimi'nal proceeding or FIR or complaint in F exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorv limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline enqrafted in G such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court .. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.l.R may be exercised where! the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and H 726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 8 S.C.R. A B c D E F G H circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However. before exercise of such power. the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravitv or offences like murder. rape. dacoitv. etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on societv. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc; carinot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases. the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view. because of the compromise ' between the offender and the victim. the possibility of conviction is reniote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim STATE OF M.P. v. MANISH & ORS. 727 and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of A justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." B (emphasis added) 7. When we apply the principles set down therein, it can be stated that when it comes to the question 'of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC along with C Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, by"no stretch of imagination, it can be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. Inasmuch as such offeoces will have a serious impact on the society at large, it runs beyond our comprehension to state that after the commission of such 0 offence the parties involved have reached a settlement and, therefore, such settlement can be given a seal of approval by the Judicial Forum. · 8. In the circumstances, the High Court unfortunately having E failed to appreciate the said legal position, the impugned order cannot be sustained. We are, therefore, convinced that in a situation where the private respondents herein are facing trial for offences under Sections 307, 294 read with 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, the cases pending F trial before the Court in Criminal Case No.2602 of 2013, as the offences are definitely as against the society, the private respondents will have to necessarily face trial and come _out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence;•ffhe impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the Trial Court is directed to G proceed with the trial in accordance with law. 9. With the above observations and directions, the appeal stands allowed. Devika Gujral Appeal allowed. · H