High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; bail granted to the respondent ...

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 669 of 1989

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • M. Fathima Beevi
  • A. M. Ahmadi
Judgment Date
1990-01-16
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is allowed; the order releasing the respondent on bail is set aside. Bail granted to the respondent is cancelled, without prejudice to his right to move the Designated Court at any subsequent stage.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; bail granted to the respondent is cancelled; matter to proceed before the Designated Court as appropriate.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Anand Chintaman Dighe

Respondents

  • State of Maharashtra

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General
  • • S. V. Tarkunde
  • • A. M. Khanwilkar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • U. R. Lalit
  • • V. N. Ganpule

Case Synopsis & Summary

State of Maharashtra v Anand Chintaman Dighe concerns bail under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The respondent, a Shiv Sena leader, was implicated in the murder of a city corporator and was arrested under Section 3(1) of TADA 1987, along with offences under Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Designated Court, during investigation, released him on bail. The State appealed, contending that Section 20(8) of TADA requires the court to record reasons and to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the respondent is not involved in disruptive activities; the court’s powers under Sections 437 and 438 CrPC are not unfettered. The Supreme Court held that the lower court misapplied the statute, focusing on the accused’s political stature rather than the gravity of the offense or the materials before it. It emphasized that bail in grave crimes is not automatic and should be refused unless the necessary grounds exist, including the seriousness of the offense, the nature and strength of evidence, circumstances peculiar to the accused, the possibility of his non-appearance, and the risk of witness tampering and public interest. The Court set aside the bail order and allowed the appeal, underscoring that bail must be grounded in relevant materials and statutory considerations, not status or influence.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 437 and 438Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Section 20(8)TADA: Section 3(1)Indian Penal Code: Sections 148, 149, 120-B, 302

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail; each case must be decided on its own merits.
  • In grave crimes, bail decisions must consider the nature and seriousness of the offense, the strength of the evidence, circumstances peculiar to the accused, possibility of the accused not being present at trial, potential tampering with witnesses, and the larger public interest.
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of TADA requires the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not involved in disruptive activities; bail shall ordinarily be refused otherwise.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The State contends that Section 20(8) of TADA requires the court to record reasons and be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not involved in disruptive activities; the court’s discretion under CrPC Sections 437 and 438 is bounded by this statute. The lower court allegedly granted bail on irrelevant considerations such as the accused’s political stature, without properly evaluating the stage of investigation and the materials on record, including case diary and statements collected during investigation.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contends that bail should be permissible in light of the investigation's status and the absence of direct, conclusive evidence linking him to the offenses; the defense would emphasize that as a political leader, he should not be subjected to irreversible restrictions absent compelling grounds.

Diagnostic Tool

Beta

Does this judgment govern your specific facts?

Don't risk relying on a distinguishable precedent. Enter your facts or proposition below. We will test it against STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE and instantly map out authorities that support, challenge, or govern your position.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

STATE OF MAHARASlITRA _v._ ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE JANUARY 16, 1990. A _,).,_ \, [M. FATHIMA BEEVI AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] B _Code of Criminal Procedure,_ _1973:_ _Sections 437 and 438-Bail-_ _Gram of-Factors_ _to_ _be considered._ _Terrorist_ _and_ _Disruptive_ _Activities_ _(Prevention)_ _Act,_ _1987:_ _Sec-_ _lion 20(8)-0ffences under 1he Act-Accused-When could be granted_ (' _bail._ The respondent was a member of a political party. Consequent upon the defeat of the party in Mayoral elections held in March, 1989, the party felt that there was cross-voting and there were traitors among them and the respondent made a declaration that such traitors would _D_ not be spared. Thereafter the respondent was arrested In connection with the murder of one of the Corporators. He was accused of having committed offence under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, besides offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 120.B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The designated court released the respondent on ball while the investigation E' was pending. This appeal by the State is against the order of the designated court. Allowing the appeal, this Court, F HELD: 1. Sub-Sectinn (8) of Section 20 of the Act clearly pro· vides that unless the court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded that there are reasonable grounds to b~lieve that the respondent Is not involved in disruptive activities bail shall ordinarily be refused. Even under the provisions of Section 437 and 438 of the Code of, \G Criminal Procedure, the powers of the Sessions Judge are not unfet• .,,,;~ tered. [7SFf 2. Where the offenee is of serious nature the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of sueh considerations as tbe nature and seriousness of offence, character or the evidence, clrcums- H 73 ## **J** ##### _J_ A B c D E 74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] I S:C.R. lances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such similar other consideration. [768-C] 3. In the instant case, the salient principles in granting bail in grave crimes have not been taken note of. The Court was obsessed by the fact that lhe respondent was associated with a political party and was oblivious of the nature of the allegations made against bim and the relevant materials indicating that the respondent had been making utterances inciting violence. [76DJ 4. This court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and relevancy of materials on record, this Court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice. [7SG-H; 76A) CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 669 of 1989. From the Judgment and Order dated 18.5.1989 of the Designated Court, Poona in Cr!. Bail Application No. 11of1989. G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S.V. Tarkunde and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Appellant. U.R. Lalit and V.N. Ganpule for the Respondent. p The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FA THIMA BEE VI, J. By the impugned order dated the 18th May, 1989 the Designated Court, Pune directed the respondent to be **released** **on** **baiL** **The respondent was accused** **of** **having committed** offence under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities G (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') besides the offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent was the member of the Shiv Sena Party and the Chief of the Thane District Unit. In consequence· of the defeat of the If party in Mayoral election held on 20th March, 1989 the party felt that STATE OF M.P. _v._ A.C. DIGHE. [FATHIMA BEEVI, J.] 75 there was cross-voting and there were traitors among them. There had A been a declaration by the respondent that such traitors would not be spared. The respondent was arrested in connection with the murder of one of the Corporators Shridhar Khopkar on 21.4.1989 on registering Crime No. 1348/89. B In releasing the respondent on bail while investigation was pend ing, the Designated Court appears to have been influenced by the fact r [-] that respondent was the leader of Political Party. The court assumed f that respondent was the leader of Political Party. The court assumed that as a leader, he would not be involved in such crimes and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is not guilty of any offence under the Act. c Having heard both the sides, we feel that the whole approach by the learned Judge was misconceived and the order is unsustainable. _,;., We have been taken through the entire proceedings. We find that the learned Judge has not noticed the relevant provisions of the Act which restrict the powers of the Court in granting bail. The learned Judge D had also refused to consider the materials placed before it for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed the offence. In the course of the investigation witnesses have been questioned and their ~· statements have been reduced to writing. The learned Judge refused to consider the statements recorded in the course of the investigation for E the simple reason that such statements had not been read out in open Court though the Court was empowered to peruse the case diary for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the stage of investigation and the nature of the evidence that had been collected. ~ Sub-Section (8) of Section 20 of the Act clearly provides that # l,, F ~· the purpose of satisfying itself as to the stage of investigation and the nature of the evidence that had been collected. ~,, Sub-Section (8) of Section 20 of the Act clearly provides that F ... unless the Court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent is not involved in disruptive activities, bail shall ordinarily be refused. Even under the provisions of Sections 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the powers of the Sessions Judge are not unfettered. The salient principies in granting bail in grave crimes have not been taken note of. G ######,. the lower court This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the **accusation and relevancy of materials on record, this Court would not** H A B c D E F G H 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R. hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice. There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Where the offence is of serious nature the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offence, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such similar other considerations. In the present case the learned Judge observed that it is a case of respectable person of a big political organisation, his freedom cannot be curtailed if he is entitled to bail. His liberty cannot be curbed if enlarged on bail and, therefore, no kind of condition is required to be imposed. The Court also observed that being a leader of the big politi· cal organisation one cannot expect that the respondent will commit any offence if enlarged on bail and he cannot be called to be a criminal. The learned Judge was obsessed by the fact that the respondent was associated with a political party and was oblivious of the nature of the allegations made against him and the relevant materials indicating that the respondent had been making utterances inciting violence. The respondent gave repeated statements to the Press saying that the traitors' life will be made difficult and probably they will be killed. This was published in Marathi Daily 'Navakal' on 22.3.89. He repeated his threat and this appeared in an interview given to the reporter of'the Weekly Magazine 'Lokprabha' in its issue of 9.4.1989. In an interview in daily 'Urdu Times' dated 16.4.1989 the respondent asserted that he knew the names of the traitors but could not disclose the same. He also asserted that the punishment for traitors is death and they would be killed and this dt:cision has not been taken by him in anger. In the backdrop of such assertions, it was necessary for the Court to consider the further materials collected by the investigating agency by recording statements of witnesses. The court below misdirected itself in refusing to look into such statements and concluding that it is a case for granting bail taking into account only the position held by the respondent in the party. The court clearly erred in disposing of the application for bail. #### _j_ _)_ STATE OF M.P. _v._ A.C. DIGHE [FATHIMA BEEVI, J.] 77 In view of what has been stated above, we set aside the order of **A** the Designated Court and allow the appeal and cancel the bail granted to the respondent, without prejudice to his right to move the Designated Court at any subsequent stage. G.N. **Appeal** allowed. **B** ### **l-**