State of Kerala v. Hamsu (Death Sentence Reference No. 5 of 2009)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT :** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PIUS C.KURIAKOSE** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.GOPINATHAN** **THURSDAY, THE 11TH NOVEMBER 2010 / 20TH KARTHIKA 1932** **Death Sentence Ref..No. 5 of 2009** **------------------------------------------------** **[S.C.NO.96/2009 OF THE SESSIONS COURT, THRISSUR]** **....................** **COMPLAINANT:** **-----------------------** **STATE.** **BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. S.U. NAZAR.** **RESPONDENT:** **----------------------** **HAMSU.** **BY ADV. SRI. PRAVEEN.K.JOY, (STATE BRIEF),** **THIS DEATH SENTENCE REFERENCE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11/11/2010, ALONG WITH CRL.A NO. 1017 OF 2010, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** PIUS C.KURIAKOSE & P.S.GOPINATHAN, JJ. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = **==> picture [315 x 76] intentionally omitted <==** ## _**J U D G M E N T**_ **-** ## **P.S.Gopinathan, J.** The Sessions Judge, Thrissur in Sessions Case No.96/2009 convicted the respondent in DSR for offence under Section 511 of 377 and 302 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years for offence under Section 511 of Section 377 IPC. For offence under Section 302 IPC, the respondent was ordered to be hanged by neck till he is dead. The death sentence was submitted to this Court confirmation under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of which the DSR was registered. Assailing the conviction and sentence, the convict has preferred the Criminal Appeal (hereinafter the convict is referred to as the appellant). 2. The appellant was prosecuted by the Circle Inspector of Police, Chavakkad, who was examined as PW22, alleging offences under Section 377 and 302 IPC. It was with an allegation that on 27.10.2008, deceased Nisamudeen, aged 12 years, son of PW10 went to Panchavdi Sankaranarayana Temple at Edakkazhiyoor Village where festival was celebrated. The appellant, a local man, consumed liquor from a local bar by _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 2 name Samudra Bar and went to the temple compound. Somehow or other, the appellant got acquainted with the deceased boy who was enticed by offering toys. By about 9 p.m., the deceased was taken to a Causuarina cluster, a little away from the temple compound and committed unnatural offence by having carnal intercourse against the order of nature and thereafter he murdered the deceased by throttling. On the next day at about 8 a.m, PW1, Hamsa, a neighbour, went to the Causuarina cluster to answer the calls of nature. He saw the child lying dead. He shouted aloud. People gathered and identified the deceased as the son of PW10. He rushed to the Chavakkad Police Station, wherein PW20 was the Sub Inspector of Police and gave Ext.P1 Fist Information Statement. PW20 recorded Ext.P1 statement and registered a case as crime No.851/2008 under Section 306(1) (c)(UN) by Ext.P1(a) First Information Report. Express message was conveyed to the Circle Inspector of Police Chavakkad. PW22 was on court duty at Thiruvananthapuram. PW21, the Circle Inspector of Police, Kunnamkulam was in charge of the Circle Inspector of Police, Chavakkad. PW21 rushed to the spot of occurrence and prepared Ext.P9 inquest report. MO1 shirt worn by the deceased, MO2 pants, which was lying near the dead body and MO3 underwear, which was found lying a little away from the dead body, were seized. The body was sent for postmortem examination. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 3 Postmortem examination revealed that it is a case of unnatural offence and murder. Consequently, Ext.P13 report was filed to incorporate Sections 377 and 302 of the IPC and to proceed with investigation. The material objects seized were forwarded to the court along with Ext.P14 property list. On the next day, PW22 took over the investigation. The appellant was arrested and interrogated. He recovered the clothes worn by the appellant. He questioned the witnesses and recorded their statement. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed for the above offences before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Chavakkad. Learned Magistrate took cognizance and proceeded as C.P. 116/2008. Having found that the offence alleged is exclusively triable by a court of session, by order dated 22.1.2009, the case was committed to the court of Sessions, Thrissur. 3. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance and issued production warrant to cause the production of the appellant who was in judicial custody. The appellant was not defended by a lawyer. Advocate Sri.C.I.Edison was appointed to defend the appellant at State cost. After hearing the appellant and the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge framed charge for the above said offences. When read over and explained, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Hence, he was sent for trial. Prosecution examined PWs1 to 22. Exts.P1 to 27 and MOs1 to 12 were marked. After _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 4 closing the evidence for the prosecution, the appellant was questioned under Section 313 (1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant denied the incriminating evidence. He took a plea of alibi also and further stated that the offence was committed by some criminal gang and he had to confess before the police because of torture by the police and that he is a fisherman seeking his bread by fishing. Thereafter, the prosecution and the appellant were heard. On finding that the appellant was not entitled to be acquitted under Section 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was called upon to enter his defence. No defence evidence was let in. The prosecution and the appellant were again heard. The learned Sessions Judge, on appraisal of the evidence, arrived at a conclusion of guilt. The appellant was again heard regarding sentence. He stated that he had to maintain parents, wife and two children and that though he had another case it was compromised and prayed for leniency. The learned Sessions Judge after referring to various decisions of the Apex Court including Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1980 SC 898] arrived at a finding that the case on hand would come within the rarest of rare category. Accordingly, the appellant was sentenced as above. 4. We heard Sri.Rajith, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.S.U.Nazar, the learned Public Prosecutor. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 5 5. The evidence of PW1 would show that while he went to the Causuarina cluster at 8 a.m. on 28.10.2008 he saw the half naked dead body of a boy. He shouted aloud. People gathered and the dead body was identified as that of Nizamudeen, the son of PW10. The boy was wearing only a shirt, half of which was rolled upwards. The pants was lying near the legs. A little away, an underwear was lying. PW1 rushed to the Chavakad Police Station and lodged Ext.P1 First Information Statement. The shirt, pants and the underwear were identified as MOs 1 to 3. The First Information Statement was identified and marked as Ext.P1. 6. PW10 would depose that deceased Nizamudeen is her son and that on 27.10.2008 by about 6.p.m, Nizamudeen had gone for the festival at Panchavady temple. He didn't return even by night. Her husband made a search during the night. But the child was not found. The husband returned stating that Nizamudeen was not found out and would be watching TV in some of the neighbourhood. During the early hours of the day, she had a bereavement. Her brother-in- law was dead. PW10 along with her husband went to the bereaved family and returned by 8.30.a.m. By about 9.a.m., it was known that Nizamudeen was lying dead amidst the casurina cluster. PW10 identified MOs 1 and 2 as the shirt and pants worn by Nizamudeen while he went to the temple. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 6 7. PW2 deposed that he was a fisherman and that he had gone to Panchavady temple for the festival along with one Kabeer. After the pooram performance, he along with Kabeer had been to the beach where certain rituals were performed in connection with the temple festival. By about 9. p.m. he saw the appellant going along with the deceased to the Causuarina cluster. PW2 had further deposed that he had seen the appellant passing over something to the child. He had also identified MO1 shirt and MO2 pants as that of the child. He had further deposed that a little more than one hour, the appellant was found returning alone. He identified the shirt and lunky worn by the appellant at the time. The clothes were marked as MOs 4 and 5. PW2 had further deposed that on the next morning, he knew that the child was lying dead amidst the Causuarina cluster. He went there and identified the dead body as that of the child who went to the Causuarina cluster along with the appellant. 8. PW20 deposed that while he was working as Sub Inspector of Police, Chavakkad Police Station, at 9.30 am. on 28.10.2008 PW1 arrived at the Police Station and gave Ext.P1 First Information Statement on the basis of which a case as Crime No.851/2008 was registered under Section 306(1) (c)(UN) for unnatural death and that Ext.P1(a) is the First Information Report and that express message was conveyed to superior officers. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 7 9. PW21 would depose that on 28.10.2008 he was in charge of the Circle Inspector of Police, Chavakkad and that he took over the investigation, went to the spot of occurrence and prepared Ext. P9 Inquest Report. He had further deposed that at the time of inquest, he had seized a toy, pants, a blue coloured underwear, a match box and yet another toy from the pocket of the shirt worn by the deceased. Certain material objects found at the spot where the dead body was lying were seized with the help of a Scientific Assistant, who was examined as PW15. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination. Postmortem examination revealed a case of murder. Accordingly, he filed Ext.P13 report incorporating Section 377 and 302 of the IPC. The material objects seized were forwarded to the court along with Ext.P14 property list. 10. PW19 would depose that he was working as Assistant Professor in Forensic Medicine and Deputy Police Surgeon at Govt. Medical College, Thrissur and that on 28.10.2008 he conducted autopsy on the body of Nizamudeen aged 12 years involved in Crime No. 851/2008 of Chavakkad Police Station. He noted the following antemortem injuries. - “1. Abrasion 0.9x0.8 cm. on right side of the front of neck, 5cm. outer to middle and 5.5cm. below lower jaw margin. - 2. Abrasion 1.2x1cm. on right side of front of neck, 1cm. in front and 0.5cm below the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 8 - injury No.1. 3. Abrasion 0.4x0.3cm. on right side of front of neck, 0.5cm. in front of injury No.2. 4. Abrasion 0.3x0.2cm. on right side of front of neck, 1.5cm. below injury No.1. 5. Abrasion 0.7x0.3cm. on right side of front of neck, 0.8cm. above injury No.1. 6. Curved abrasion 1x0.2 cm. with convexity upwards and slightly inwards on left side of front of neck, with its lower, inner end 5 cm outer to midline and 4cm. below lower jaw margin. 7. Curved abrasion 1x0.2cm. on left side of front of neck, 1 cm. above and 0.5cm. inner to the injury No.6 (less prominent). 8. Abrasion 1.5x0.8cm. on left side of front of neck, 7 cm. outer to midline an 1cm. below the lower jaw margin. 9. Abraded contusion 0.8x0.4x0.2cm. on left side of front of neck, 1 cm. below injury No.8. 10. Curved abrasion 1x0.2 cm. convexity upwards on left side of front of neck, 10cm. outer to midline and 2cm below lower jaw margin. 11. Abrasion 1.8x1.cm. on under aspect of left side of shaft of penis just above coronal sulcus. 12. Abrasion 7.5x0.6cm. obliquely placed across the middle of front aspect of right leg with its lower inner end 14 cm. below knee. 13. Lacerated wound 1.3x0.8x0.3cm. on the tip of right second toe. The nail was found torn. 14. Lacerated wound 1x0.3x0.2 cm. on the back aspect of distal knuckle of left thumb. 15. Abrasion 1.2x0.5 cm. on right side of back of trunk 10 cm below top of shoulder and 4 _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 9 cm. outer to midline.” He had further deposed that he had taken swab and smears for detection of human semen and spermatozoa, if any. Swab from the skin surface (suspected site as a bite mark by the police) was also taken and preserved for detection of buccal epithelical cells, if any, and further opined that the death was due to throttling. Injury Nos.1 to 10 could be caused during attempted throttling. Injury Nos.11 to 14 could be caused on exertion of force or weight upon him on his back when the victim was prone on a rough surface and that the possibility of penetration or attempted penetration on the anal orifice could not be ruled out. It was further opined that the death could have occurred within the range of 18 to 24 hours prior to the commencement of the postmortem examination which commenced at 3.45 p.m. 11. PW15 would depose that she was working as Scientific Assistant at Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Thrissur. On 28.10.2008, she examined the scene of occurrence in Crime No. 851/2008 of Chavakkad Police Station. The scene of occurrence was found well guarded and kept intact. The dead body was found lying in a partially naked condition. The deceased was wearing a shirt. A black coloured pants was found between the legs of the deceased. Disturbance indicative of a _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 10 scuffle having taken place, was found at about 3 metres from the dead body. One blue coloured brief bearing printed writings “MGR/Marsal/90cm.” was found at the scene. She collected Cellophane pressings lifted from around the neck of the deceased ; swabs taken from the injury appeared like bite marks found on the right hand of the deceased and its control; hair like material collected from the inner thigh of the deceased; withered grass wetted by biological fluids collected from near the body of the deceased and its control and hair like material collected from the blue coloured brief found at the scene of occurrence. 12. By the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 21, it is revealed beyond doubt that the dead body of Nizamudheen was found amidst the Causuarina cluster as alleged by the prosecution. Evidence of PW10 would show that by about 6 p.m. on 27.10.2008 Nizamudheen had gone for the temple festival and he didn't return. Evidence of PWs1, 2, 20 and 21 coupled with Ext.P1 First Information Statement would show that the dead body was found at 8. a.m on the next day. The evidence of PW19 coupled with Ext.P12 would show that Nizamudheen had a homicidal death. It is very crucial to note that the above evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 21 that Nizamudheen was lying dead at the spot of occurrence was not at all challenged in cross examination. The cause of death deposed by PW19 _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 11 corroborated by Ext.P12 postmortem certificate also was not challenged in cross examination. Sri.Rajith, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that he is not assailing the homicide alleged by the prosecution. According to the learned counsel, the appellant is not the assailant. As we mentioned earlier, the appellant himself had admitted homicidal death when questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and further stated that it might have been committed by a criminal gang and he was falsely implicated. With the above evidence, we concur with the finding of the Sessions Judge that the deceased was murdered. 13. The question then arising for consideration is whether the appellant was the assailant or not. Against the allegation of the prosecution that offence under Section 377 was committed by the appellant, the learned Sessions Judge found that the prosecution had not succeeded to establish the commission of offence under Section 377 of the IPC. Whereas the prosecution had succeeded to establish attempt to commit offence under Section 377. Though the prosecution had a case that there was carnal intercourse against the rule of the nature, the prosecution had not succeeded to adduce any evidence in support of the plea of carnal intercourse. We notice that though the prosecution had not succeeded to establish the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 12 offence under Section 377 IPC, there is convincing evidence to come to a conclusion that there was sexual assault in attempt to commit carnal intercourse against the order of the nature. We had earlier mentioned that MO2 was identified as the pants of the deceased. PW10 had deposed that while the decease leaving home at 6.p.m on the previous day he was wearing MO2 pants. PW2 had deposed that while going along with the appellant, the deceased was wearing MO1 shirt and MO2 pants. The evidence of PW21 coupled with Ext.P9 Inquest Report also support the evidence of prosecution on that aspect. PW15, the Scientific Assistant, also would support the prosecution case that MO2 pants was lying amidst the legs of the dead body. She had also deposed that MO3 sheddy was lying a little away from the dead body. PW21 had seized MO2 and MO3 along with other material objects and later, through court, it was forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory along with Ext.P26 forwarding note. Ext.P27 was proved by PW22 as the report issued by the Assistant Director, Biology, attached to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. Ext.P27 would show that on examination of MO2 and MO3, human spermatozoa and semen were detected. The presence of spermatozoa and semen noted on MO2 and MO3 was also not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The presence of semen and _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 13 spermatozoa over MO2 pants is more than sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that the murder might have been in connection with the sexual assault. Sri.Rajith, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, advanced an argument that the semen and spermatozoa found on MO2 might be that of the deceased. As we stated earlier, the deceased was only 12 years old. It is crucial to note that no question was put to PW19 as to whether the deceased was grown enough to have the semen and spermatozoa. In the absence of oral evidence, we have no other option, but to search for authority. In Principles and Practice of Forensic Medicine by Dr.Umadethan, an experienced Forensic Expert, (First Edition 2008) at page 393, last but one para, it is opined - [I]n boys, pubic hair appears at 14 and darkens at 15. At this stage, penis and testicles enlarge and as a result, the scrotum become pendulous. Ejaculation also begins. Ext.P9 and P12 would show that the deceased had no pubic hairs. There is no suggestion to PW19 that the penis and testicles of the deceased were enlarged or the scrotum was pendulous indicating that the deceased was grown enough to ejaculate. In the above circumstance, in the light of the above authority, we find that the deceased was too young to ejaculate. There is no mention in the evidence of PW19 or in Ext.P12 that there was even _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 14 any trace of semen or spermatozoa at the genitals of the deceased or in the surrounding part of the body which might indicate the possibility of the deceased ejaculating. In this factual and physiological background, having due regard to the fact that the deceased was only 12 years, we rule out the possibility of having MO2 stained with the semen and spermatozoa of the deceased. Therefore, we find that the semen and spermatozoa detected as MO2 would in all probability be that of an adult person. 14. MO3 was produced by the prosecution as if it was the underwear worn by the appellant and he had abandoned the same after the offence alleged. PW6 was examined by prosecution to prove that MO3 was sold by him to the appellant. PW6 had deposed that he is a street vendor at Chavakkad and that two or three months before the incident the appellant, whom he knows earlier, had purchased two underwears from PW6 and he would remember the purchase by the appellant as there was some quarrel with regard to the value of the same. MO3 was identified as one of the underwear sold by PW6 to the appellant. 15. PW22 would depose that he arrested the appellant at 1.p.m on 29.10.2008. Ext.P15 is the arrest memo and Ext.P16 is the arrest intimation. He seized the underwear worn by the appellant at the time of arrest on the strength of Ext.P6 seizure mahazar, wherein PW13 is an attester. MO6 _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 15 underwear was identified as the one so seized. It was shown to PW6. PW6 had deposed that MO6 was the other underwear that PW6 sold to the appellant along with MO3. 16. In support of the case of the prosecution regarding offence under Section 377 IPC, the prosecution also would rely upon some pubic hairs found on the thigh of the deceased. PW15 had deposed that she had seized certain hairs found on the thigh of the deceased. The evidence of PW22 would show that the hairs so seized were forwarded to the Forensic Laboratory along with Ext.P26 forwarding note. Ext.P27 report would show that those hairs were found similar to that of the appellant. 17. The appellant has got a case that the hairs found on the thigh of the dead body are not that of the appellant. The learned counsel also submitted that for the reason that the hairs found on the thigh of the deceased were similar to that of the hairs of the appellant, is not at all a safe evidence to come to a conclusion that the hairs were that of the appellant. We shall deal with the above contention later. Now by the evidence of PW15 it is revealed that the hairs seized by her and sent for chemical examination by the Forensic Laboratory are not that of the deceased. The presence of hairs belonging to another on the thighs of the deceased would certainly amount to evidence that there was sexual assault. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 16 18. Adding to the above, the description of the dead body noted in Ext.P9 and pictured in Ext.P2 series photographs would show that in fact, there was sexual assault. Ext.P9 would show that the shirt worn by the deceased was rolled upwards. The pants was removed. The body was in prone position. Even it was alleged by the prosecution that injury Nos.11 to 14 found on the body of the deceased could be caused on exertion of force or weight upon him on his back when the victim was in prone position on a rough surface. We notice that injury No.11 was on the shaft of the penis. The opinion of PW19 regarding the possibility of causing injuries on exertion of force was not at all challenged in cross examination. If it was a simple case of throttling, the shirt worn by the deceased need not have been rolled upwards. His pants need not have been removed. So in our opinion, the evidence on record is more than sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that there was sexual assault. Since the prosecution could not establish the plea that there was anal penetration, the learned Sessions Judge rightly rejected the prosecution case regarding the commission of the offence under Section 377. But the reasons stated earlier are sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that there was attempt to commit unnatural offence. We find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Sessions Judge that offence under Section 511 of Section 377 IPC is established. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 17 19. The question then arises is whether the evidence on record is sufficient enough to implicate the appellant with the above offences. Going by the judgment impugned, we notice that the Sessions Judge had meticulously analysed the evidence and found that there are twenty circumstances established against the appellant. By a catena of decisions by the Apex Court it has been settled that in cases where prosecution relies upon circumstances to establish an offence, each of the circumstances should have been cogently established. The cumulative effect of the circumstances should form a chain of events which are complete and leads to a conclusion of guilt. Such circumstances shall unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and nothing else. Those circumstances shall be incriminating and the circumstances proved shall be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. In the background of the above settled position, it can be examined whether the circumstances found against the appellant by the Sessions Judge are well established and lead to the guilt of the appellant alone. The following circumstances were found by the Sessions Judge against the appellant. “1) On 27/10/08 after 7.30 p.m., the accused in a drunken mood went to the festival paramba of the Panchavadi Temple. 2) Deceased Nizamudeen, aged 12, son of PW10 also _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 18 went to the festival paramba by about 6 p.m. on 27/10/08, and did not return thereafter. 3) By about 9 p.m. the deceased was seen in the company of the accused, and that the accused took the deceased boy towards the casuarina cluster at the beach, and the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused. 4) While proceeding towards the casuarina cluster, the accused was telling the deceased boy that they had to return prior to the starting of the drama, and that the accused gave some toys to the deceased. 5) After about one hour the accused was seen returning alone without the deceased boy. 6) On the next morning the dead body of the deceased was found lying procumbent inside casuarina cluster, in an almost naked state. 7) 15 Ante-mortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased. 8) The post-mortem examination revealed that the deceased died due to throttling (manual strangulation). 9) The death of the deceased is proved to be homicidal. 10) MO3 sheddy belongs to the accused was found near the legs of the dead body. 11) The pubic hairs found in MO3 brief and the pubic hairs collected from the inner thigh of the deceased were similar to the sample pubic hair collected from the accused. 12) MO2 pants of the deceased, MO3 brief of the accused and MO5 lungi of the accused were found containing human spermatozoa and semen. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 19 13) Swabs taken from the injury appeared like bite mark on the right hand of the deceased was found containing human saliva. 14) MO6 brief was seized from the accused immediately on his arrest is just similar to MO3 brief, and are of same size, and the same were purchased by the accused from PW6. 15) The opinion regarding the approximate time of death of the deceased furnished by PW19 who conducted the autopsy is that the death could have occurred in between 3.45 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. on 27/10/2008. 16) The accused sustained a dislocation of his right thumb and it was set right by PW5 in the morning of 28/10/08. 17) On hearing about the news of Sniffer dog brought to the scene of occurrence by the police, the accused became perplexed, and he asked PW3 whether the sniffer dog could catch a person who had washed his hands and legs in running water after committing a murder. 18) Disturbance indicative of a scuffle having taken place was found at about 3 metres away from the dead body near the North-East direction. 19) A toy was found lying near the dead body and another toy and three batteries were found in the pocket of MO2 pants of the deceased. 20) According to PW19, who conducted the autopsy, injury Nos.11 to 14 noted in Ext.P12 could be caused on exertion of force or weight on the back of the victim when the victim is lying in a prone position on rough surface.” 20. PW8 had deposed that on 27/10/98, the appellant and PW8 were _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 20 travelling in a bus and thereafter they went to Samudra Bar and consumed liquor from the Bar. They got an autorickshaw driven by one Nouphal who was examined as PW7 and that the appellant alighted down near the temple by about 7.30 p.m. stating that he had been going for the festival. The evidence of PW8 on that aspect, though challenged by simply putting a question in cross examination that he had been telling lie, could not be impeached in cross examination. PW7 deposed that he was the driver of autorickshaw bearing Registration No.K8 J-2876 and that the appellant whom he knew had been a passenger on 27/10/08 at about 7.00 or 7.30 p.m. and that the appellant got down in front of the Kaja Company and went away stating that he had been going for the festival. The evidence of PW7 was also not shaken in cross examination. On the other hand, it was simply suggested to PW7 that he had been deposing as was requested by the Police. Going by the evidence of PWs.7 and 8, we find that the first circumstance found by the Sessions Judge against the appellant is established beyond doubt. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that he is not assailing the finding of the Sessions Judge on that aspect. According to the learned counsel, the appellant had also admitted that he had gone for the temple festival and travelled in the autorickshaw. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 21 21. PW10 had deposed that on 27/10/08 at 6.00 p.m. her son, Nizamudeen had gone for the temple festival and thereafter he did not return. Though her husband, who was cited as a witness, but not examined, made a thorough search during the night hours, Nizamudeen could not be found out and at 9.00 a.m on the next day, she came to know that Nizamudheen was lying dead at casuarina clusters. She had identified MOs.1 and 2 as the shirt and pants worn by deceased when he left home for the festival. That evidence of PW10 was also not challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge had correctly given reliance to the evidence of PW10 and found the second circumstance against the appellant. 22. Circumstance No.3 found by the Sessions Judge against the appellant is regarding the allegation that the deceased was last seen with the appellant. PW2 had deposed that on 27/10/08 at about 9.00 p.m. while he was sitting at the beach near the temple, he saw the appellant going along with the deceased to the casuarina clusters. At that time the deceased was wearing MO1 shirt and MO2 pants. The appellant was wearing MO4 shirt and MO5 lunki. A little more than one hour thereafter the appellant alone returned from the casuarina clusters. Though PW2 was subjected to searching cross examination no reason was revealed out to disbelieve him. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 22 According to the prosecution, while the deceased and the appellant were walking towards casuarina clusters, the appellant handed over a toy to the deceased. But PW2 did not support the case of the prosecution on that aspect. What he had deposed is that he had seen the appellant passing something to the hands of the deceased. Giving stress on that much evidence, the learned counsel for the appellant would argue that since PW2 could not identify as to what exactly was handed over to the deceased, his evidence to the effect that he had seen the appellant walking along with the deceased is to be disbelieved. On a careful reading of the evidence of PW2, we are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is to be noted that PW2 had no necessity to have a close watch on the appellant and deceased while they were walking so as to identify the object that was passed over to the deceased. Adding to the above, if the material object that had been passed over by the appellant to the deceased is one that could be contained in the hand, there is least possibility for PW2 clearly seeing the article that was handed over to the deceased by the appellant so as to identify it. Ext.P9 would show that even if it was a toy that was handed over to the deceased by the appellant it was not bulky enough as to enable PW2 to have a good look at it. In the above circumstances, on a careful scrutiny of evidence of PW2, we find little _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 23 reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW2 that he had seen the appellant walking along with the deceased through casuarina clusters and a little more than one hour the appellant returned alone. The learned counsel also argued that the appellant and the deceased were found going together about 11 hours prior to the noticing of the dead body. In between the appellant going along with the deceased and noticing of the dead body on the next day at about 8 a.m, according to the learned counsel, many things might have happened. It was also argued by the learned counsel that the spot of occurrence is an open place and since the temple festival was going on, there might be chances for so many persons passing through the spot of occurrence and the crime might have been committed by such persons. We have carefully gone through Ext.P3 scene mahazar prepared by PW22, wherein PW11 is an attester, along with Ext.P9 inquest report prepared by PW21 wherein PW16 as an attester. We notice that the spot of occurrence is purely a casuarina cluster 300 metres towards east from the beach. In-andaround the casuarina clusters there were bushes. The nearby residences are beyond 100 metres and from the spot of occurrence no residence could be seen. So also, we notice that there was no nearby pathway passing through the spot of occurrence. In the normal course, it is a lonely place. Being amidst casuarina clusters there is little light and normally any person _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 24 standing at the casuarina clusters will not be visible by persons standing at the beach or at the nearby residential properties. It is also noticed that the surface soil was covered with dry casuarina leaves except the signs of footprints indicating exertion of force for the commission of offence. The peculiar feature of the spot of occurrence revealed in evidence would establish that it was a lonely place. People seldom go there. It is pertinent to note that there is no suggestion to PW2 that on that day, PW2 had seen any person other than the appellant going to the spot of occurrence. That being the evidence on record, the argument advanced now in appeal is devoid of any merit. 23. The evidence of PW19 coupled with Ext.P12 would show that the postmortem examination commenced at 3.45 p.m. on 28/10/08. PW19 had opined that the death might have occurred within 18 to 24 hours. If calculated, the death might have been between 3.45 p.m and 9.45 p.m on 27/10/08. The evidence of PW2 which we had mentioned earlier would show that the appellant and the deceased went to the casuarina clusters by about 9'0 clock. If the evidence of PW19 is analysed in the light of the evidence of PW2, the death might have occurred within 45 minutes after the appellant and the deceased gone to the casuarina clusters. We notice that the possible time of death deposed to by PW19 was not at all challenged in _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 25 cross examination. In the above circumstances, we find no good reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW19. We, relying upon the evidence of PW19, arrive at a finding that the death might have occurred between 9.00 p.m and 9.45 p.m. The evidence of PW2 would also show that a little later than 10.00 p.m. the appellant had returned from the casuarina clusters. 24. So it is very evident that death might have taken place just before the appellant returning from the spot of occurrence. So there is not much time gap in between PW-2 seeing the appellant along with the deceased and the occurrence of the death. The evidence of PW-2 would show that if any other person had gone to the spot of occurrence after the appellant and deceased gone there and before the appellant returned, before which the death had occurred, PW.2 would have noticed it. It is in this factual situation that the non suggestion in cross examination regarding any other person going to the spot of occurrence assumes importance. There is no suggestion to PW-2 that through any other corner, there was access to the spot of occurrence. This being the evidence available on record, the only conclusion that could be arrived at is that at 9.00 p.m. the appellant and deceased together went to the spot of occurrence. Appellant alone returned after 10.00 p.m. The murder occurred between 9.00 P.M. and 9.45 P.M. The time-gap between the point of time when the appellant and deceased _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 26 were last seen alive and the homicide is so small that the possibility of any person other than the appellant being the author of the crime becomes impossible. No other person had gone to that spot before the appellant returning. If the evidence is analysed in this way, it can be safely concluded that the appellant alone is the assailant. The learned counsel had given reliance to the decision reported in Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy and another v. State of A.P. 2006 (10) SCC 172 and impeached the prosecution case that last seen theory cannot be applied to the case on hand. At paragraph 27 of the above decision it is held: "The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration". Going by the case on hand and the decision of the apex court we find that the facts of the case on hand is entirely different from the one in the reported case. The learned counsel had also given reliance to the rulings of the Apex Court reported in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & another, 2007 (3) SCC 755 and argued that the last seen theory cannot be applied to come to a conclusion of the guilt in the absence of other circumstantial evidence. At paragraph 38 the apex court has held: _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 27 "We have noticed the decision. However, the circumstances in the present case are not similar to the case where the event of the last seen together has very close proximity with the time and place of the commission of the crime and other circumstances also favour the hypothesis of guilt and consequently, the fact that no explanation or false explanation offered by the accused was taken as a link in the chain of circumstances. (See also Birbal v. State of M.P. (2000) 10 SCC 212), Raju v. State of Haryana (2001) 9 SCC 50) and Babu v. Babu (2003) 7 SCC 37) Thus, in the circumstances of the case, the accused persons not giving any explanation in their examination under section 313 Cr.PC could not be taken to be a circumstance pointing towards irresistible conclusion that they are involved in the commission of the crime". Bearing in mind the ratio of the above decision, we find that with the given set of facts in this case, the ratio of the above decisions has no application to the case on hand. In the case on hand, the evidence we discussed above would establish that the appellant and the deceased were found alive together very near to the place of death just 45 minutes before the homicide. Place of homicide is a lonely place. Appellant returned from the place of homicide 15-25 minutes after the homicide. During the time-gap between the appellant and the deceased going to the place of homicide which is a lonely place and the appellant returning alone, nobody had gone to the spot. the appellant has no explanation as to what happened to the deceased. Neither has he a case that any other person had come to the spot. Therefore, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case unerringly stare at the appellant alone and none else. In all probability, the death might have _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 28 occurred before the appellant left the spot. Therefore, rather than saying that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant, it can be said that the death had occurred when the deceased was along with the appellant. We shall examine the other circumstances urged by the prosecution and see whether the conclusion of guilt can be safely arrived at. 25. The fourth circumstance that the learned Sessions Judge found against the appellant is regarding the conversation made between the appellant and the deceased and regarding the handing over of toy to the deceased. This finding of the learned Sessions Judge was much assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Going by the evidence of PW-2 we see some merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge had found that by the evidence of PW-2 it is revealed that the appellant had handed over a toy to the deceased and it was that toy which was recovered from the spot of occurrence. We find that in the evidence of PW-2 there is no mention about the toy. PW-2 had deposed that he had seen something being passed over to the deceased by the appellant. He could not identify the material object. So the finding of the Sessions Judge on that aspect is not correct. However, whether it was a toy or anything else would not affect the other circumstance relied upon by the prosecution. It is argued that though the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 29 contention of the prosecution is that the appellant had handed over the toy to the deceased as part of enticing, regarding that aspect absolutely there is no evidence. But the evidence of PW-2 would show that the deceased was going along with the appellant voluntarily, whether it was on offer of toy or not, what was the reason that persuaded the deceased to go along with the appellant voluntarily is not revealed out. We find that it was a transaction that occurred between the deceased and the appellant. What prompted the deceased to go along with the appellant is only within the knowledge of the deceased and the appellant. Whether the appellant had enticed the deceased by handing over the toy or anything else or the deceased was influenced by the words or promises if any, made by the appellant is not known. The prosecution is not at all in a position to establish the circumstance that led the deceased to go along with the appellant as it is purely a matter within the knowledge of the appellant and the deceased. Though the prosecution didn't succeed in proving the manner of enticement, enticement is proved. 26. The fifth circumstance that was found by the Sessions Judge against the appellant is the fact that the appellant was found returning alone, without the deceased boy. The evidence of PW-2 would show that while the appellant and the deceased were going to the casuarina clusters the appellant told the deceased that they had to return after food before starting _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 30 the drama. According to the learned counsel, such talk between the appellant and the deceased is indicative that the appellant had no bad motive while going to the casuarina clusters. It is true that the conversation in between the appellant and the deceased would not indicate any bad motive. At the same time, we notice that if the appellant had only an intention to satisfy his lust somehow and to return back, there need not have any intention to commit any murder by throttling or otherwise. If the intention was only for carnal intercourse against the order of the nature that intention cannot be ruled out by the words spoken by the appellant to the deceased. In our opinion the words spoken by the appellant to the deceased while passing through the side of PW-2 is not of much consequence in the event the murder by throttling had happened when the deceased resisted against the sexual assault. Irrespective of the subject matter of the talk, the appellant was found returning alone, without the deceased. The evidence of PW-2 on that aspect could not be shaken in cross examination as we mentioned earlier. So the finding of the learned Sessions Judge on that aspect is based upon cogent evidence. 27. The sixth circumstance that was found against the appellant is that the dead body of Nizamudheen was found prone inside the casuarina clusters in an almost naked state. That finding is based upon evidence of _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 31 PWs-1, 15 and 21 supported by Ext. P1 first information statement and Ext. P9 inquest report. That finding was in fact not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 28. The seventh circumstance found against the appellant is the antemortem injuries found on the body of the deceased. Regarding that, there is the evidence of PW-19 and Ext.P12. That finding of the Sessions Judge was also not assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. We also notice that the evidence of PW-19 regarding the ante-mortem injuries sustained by the deceased was not at all challenged in cross examination. Probably it is taking note that the evidence of PW-19 was not assailed in cross examination, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he is not assailing the finding of the Sessions Judge regarding that aspect. The result is that the evidence of PW-19 remains unchallenged. We find no reason to disbelieve that evidence. 29. The eighth and ninth circumstances found against the appellant is the finding in the post-mortem that the deceased died due to manual strangulation and that the death was one of homicide. That finding is also based upon the unchallenged evidence of PW-19 supported by Ext.P12. We find no reason to disturb that finding. 30. Circumstance No.10 is the recovery of M.O.3 underwear _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 32 belonging to the accused from the spot of occurrence near the dead body. This finding, as we stated earlier, was heavily assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Circumstance No.14 found against the appellant is regarding the recovery of M.O.6 underwear worn by the appellant which is similar to M.O.3 and both were purchased by the appellant from PW-6. The ownership of M.O.3 and M.O.6 was implicated with the appellant on the basis of the evidence of PW-6. PW-6 had deposed that he who is a street vendor had sold M.O.3 and M.O.6 to the appellant about two or three months prior to the occurrence. He had also deposed that the appellant was known to him earlier and that he had gone to the spot of occurrence and saw the child lying dead. The evidence of PW-6 was assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant stating that the evidence of PW-6 is totally unbelievable. According to the learned counsel PW-6 might have sold so many undergarments to so many persons and therefore his evidence that M.O.3 and M.O.6 were sold by him to the appellant is totally artificial. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence of PW-6 we see that he was cross examined at length. In fact he had given good reasonings for remembering the brief sold by him to the appellant. We notice that the appellant was thoroughly interrogated by the investigating officer. Since M.O.3 was found near the dead body, it is quite natural that _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 33 the investigating officer might have investigated as to whom did M.O.3 belong to and how it happened to be there. It is also crucial to note that M.O.3 contain certain hairs. The evidence of PW-15 scientific assistant would show that she had detected out some hairs from M.O.3 and those hairs were separately sent for examination by the forensic laboratory. So there is nothing strange when the investigating officer targeted his investigation as to whom did M.O.3 belong. In the event the appellant was interrogated and in the event he had so stated there is every possibility of the investigating officer searching for the vendor and in that attempt if PW6 could be identified, there is nothing strange. We notice that the spot of occurrence and the place where PW-6 had been vending garments is not at all an urban area but a rural area. The evidence of PW-6 that the appellant was known to him was not at all challenged in cross examination. In the above circumstance, we find little reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-6 that M.O.3 and M.O.6 were sold by him to the appellant. 31. The learned counsel for the appellant advanced yet another argument regarding the reliability of M.O.3 and M.O.6 in evidence. According to the learned counsel, in Ext.P8 report prepared by PW-15, M.O.3 contained a print written “MG(R) Marsel/90cm.” In Ext.P9 inquest report the print was noted as “MG(R) Mareel 90 cms. As per Ext. P27, _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 34 M.O.3 contained label with letters 'MG(R) Margei 90 cms.' According to the learned counsel, the printing found on M.O.3 is differently noted in Exts.P8, P9 and P27. We find that submission to be correct. 32. M.O.6 was seized by the investigating officer from the appellant when he was arrested. In Ext.P6, the label on M.O.6 is recorded as MG(R) Marsel/90 cm. It is identical to the label on MO3 noted in Ext.P8. According to the learned counsel, since these labels vary it has to be found that the prosecution had implanted material objects and that the recovery of M.O.3 and M.O.6 are not at all a good piece of evidence against the appellant. It was further argued that even if the material object mentioned in Exts. P8 and P9 is one and the same, Ext.P27 being in respect of another material object with another label, it had to be concluded that the material objects examined in the laboratory were not those seized from the place of occurrence. Hence according to the learned counsel, Ext.P27 report is to be rejected. It was also argued that because of the variation in the label, the evidence of PW.6 is to be rejected in toto. We notice that PW.6 being a street vendor, he may be purchasing dresses from different stations. There are also instances in one manufacturing unit dresses are manufactured under different labels. The crucial aspect is whether the evidence of PW.6 regarding the sale is to be believed or not. There is yet another possibility _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 35 for having the investigating officer, the scientific assistant and the scientist in the laboratory getting minor error while reading the writings on a worn out dress. The crucial aspect is that M.O.3 was seized by PW.21 while preparing the inquest. PW.15 was also along with PW.21 at the time when the inquest was prepared. The evidence of PW.21 and PW.15 would show that there was only one underwear at the spot of occurrence. But they read the label in different way. M.O.6 was recovered by PW.21 when the appellant was arrested. PW.22 had deposed that the material objects seized were forwarded to the court along with separate property lists which were marked as Exts.P14 and Exts.P21 to P25. There is no suggestion to PW.22 in cross examination that between the seizure and forwarding of the same to the court; and from the court to the laboratory, there was any chance for substituting the material objects. There is not even a suggestion to PW.22 on that aspect. In the above circumstances, we find that the minor discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is because of the way in which the labels on the worn out dresses were read by PW.15, 21 and 22. Such a conclusion is more justified because variation is only in respect of two or three small alphabets. It is also relevant to note that PW.6 had given special reasons for remembering the material objects sold to the appellant. In cross examination, it was in fact put to PW.6 _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 36 regarding the special reason for remembering the material objects (underwear) sold to the appellant about three or four months prior to the occurrence and he had stated that at the time of sale, there arose dispute regarding the sale price. That reason appears to be convincing. In the light of the materials disclosed in cross examination, we find that PW.6 had withstood the cross examination and there is nothing artificial in his evidence. There is no good reasons to reject the evidence of PW.6 regarding the sale of M.O.3 and M..O.6 to the appellant. We find that the evidence of PW.6 is reliable to come to a conclusion that M.O.3 was belonging to the appellant. That is a strong circumstance against the appellant. 33. The 11th circumstance found against the appellant is the similarity of the pubic hairs collected from the inner thigh of the deceased and the public hair of the appellant. Ext.P27 would show that Item No. 6 forwarded for examination is the pubic hairs detected from M.O.3. Item No. 7 is the pubic hairs collected from the inner thigh of the deceased. Item No. 8(c) is the sample public hairs taken from the appellant. Regarding the hairs collected from the inner thigh of the deceased as well as from M.O.3 there is unimpeached testimony of PW.15. PW.22 had deposed that he arrested the appellant and before the appellant being produced before the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 37 court along with Ext.P20 remand report, pubic hairs of the appellant were collected as specimen and it was forwarded along with Ext.P21 property list. PW.13 Police Constable had deposed that at 4.30 p.m. on 29.10.2008, the pubic hairs of the appellant were got cut and taken as sample at the Taluk Head Quarters Hospital, Chavakkad and that Ext.P5 is the mahazar prepared for the same. Item No. 8(c) in Ext.P28 is the specimen pubic hairs of the appellant. Ext.P27 would show that the pubic hairs were also examined and found that the hairs found on the inner thigh of the deceased as well as on M.O.3 and those were taken as specimen from the appellant are similar in nature. Ext.P27 would certify that the three sets of sample hairs had an average diameter of 119 microns. The Medulla was continuous type and the average medullary index was 0.23. The cuticular scale pattern was irregular and annular and the average scale count was 128/mm. The learned counsel for the appellant heavily assailed Ext.P27 report and argued that the similarity in the hair sample cannot be a basis for entering conviction. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the better test that should have been done is the Neutron activation analysis test and blood typing of the appellant and in the absence of such examination and report thereon, Ext.P27 cannot be relied upon. In support of his argument, the learned counsel had given reliance to the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 38 decision reported in _**Fr. George Cherian v. State**_ (1989 (2) ILR 95). As against the said argument, the learned Public Prosecutor relied upon the decision in State of Kerala v. Baby Joseph (1992(2) Crl. L.J. 2257) and argued that the observation of the Division Bench in Fr. George Cherian's case (supra) is with respect to the given sets of facts and the observation of the Division Bench in that case was not even relied upon in Baby Joseph's case. (supra) Going by the above decisions, we find that as submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor, the finding of this Court in Fr. George Cherian's case is a precedent on facts. Adding to that, we find that the prosecution cannot rest solely on the similarity of the hairs collected from the dead body and material objects with that of the deceased. In this case, we notice that in the light of the evidence of PW.6 which we have discussed earlier, the ownership of M.O.3 is beyond doubt. Ext.P27 would show that the pubic hair found on M.O.3 is similar to the pubic hairs of the appellant. So also, the pubic hairs recovered from the inner thigh of the deceased is similar to that of the appellant. Since the hairs detected from the underwear recovered from the scene of occurrence belonging to the appellant are similar to the pubic hairs of the appellant as well as the pubic hairs detected from the inner thigh of the deceased, in the given set of facts, we find no reason to reject the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution on that _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 39 aspect. It is true that there is no evidence on record as to how common similarity in hairs may occur. But when the ownership of the material objects (M.O.3) from which the pubic hairs were detected vest with the appellant, the similarity of the pubic hair found on the material object as well as from the inner thigh of the deceased and the similarity of the sample hair taken from the appellant is a very strong circumstance to conclude that the pubic hair found on the dress belonging to the appellant belong to no person other than the appellant. In this view of the matter, there is nothing to doubt that the pubic hairs found on the inner thigh of the deceased are that of the appellant. Therefore, for the above reason, we find that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that Circumstance No.11 mentioned in the judgment supports the prosecution case requires no interference as it is based upon cogent evidence. 34. The Circumstance No.12 mentioned by the learned Sessions Judge is regarding the presence of the spermatozoa and semen on M.O.2 pants of the deceased, M.O.3 underwear that was lying near the dead body and M.O.5 lunki of the appellant. The evidence of PW.22 would show that he arrested the appellant and while interrogation the appellant stated that the lunki and shirt worn by him at the time of occurrence were kept hidden under the mat and he would take and hand it over. As led by the appellant, _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 40 PW.22 went to the house of the appellant and seized M.O.4 and M.O.5 shirt and lunki for the seizure of which Ext.P7 recovery mahazar, wherein PW.14 is an attester, was prepared. The evidence of PW.14 corroborates with the evidence of PW.22. In cross examination, the evidence of PW.22 regarding the recovery of M.Os. 4 and 5 was not at all challenged. PW.22 had further deposed that M.O.4 and M.O.5 were produced before the court along with Ext.P23 property list and later, those were forwarded to the Forensic Laboratory along with Ext.P26 forwarding note. Ext.P27 would show that M.O.5 lunki, on examination, was found containing spermatozoa and semen. M.O.3 seized by PW.21 at the time when Ext.P9 inquest report was prepared was produced along with Ext.P14 property list. The evidence of PW.22 would show that M.O.3 was also forwarded along with Ext.P26 forwarding note. Ext.P27 report would show that M.O.3 also contained human spermatozoa and semen. M.O.2 was also forwarded along with Ext.P26 as item 2. Ext. P27 would show that M.O.2 also contained human spermatozoa and semen. The above circumstances found against the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge is also supported by cogent evidence and it requires no interference. 35. Circumstance No. 13 is regarding the bite mark on the right hand of the deceased. The evidence of PW.15 would show that she had taken the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 41 swab from the bite mark appeared on the right hand of the deceased and that was also forwarded to the Forensic Laboratory. Ext.P27 would certify that no saliva was detected on Item No. 9 and 10. So, that circumstance mentioned by the prosecution was not at all established in evidence. 36. Circumstance No. 14 was already discussed with Circumstance No. 10. Circumstance No. 15 is regarding the time of death. We had earlier mentioned that the evidence of PW.19 would show that the death might have occurred between 3.45 P.M. and 9.45 P.M. on 27.10.2008. The evidence of PW.2 would show that the appellant and the deceased had gone to the spot of occurrence by about 9 P.M. and the appellant returned from the spot just after 10 P.M.. So the time of death revealed out by the evidence of PW. 19 is soon after the appellant and the deceased found going to the spot of occurrence and just before the appellant leaving the spot. That circumstance found in favour of the prosecution is fully based upon cogent evidence. 37. The 16th circumstance found against the appellant and in favour of the prosecution is the dislocation of the right thumb of the appellant. The evidence of PW.3 would show that he is a fisherman and that the appellant is well known to him and that the appellant used to go for fishing along with PW.3 and on the next day at about 10.30 P.M. when the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 42 appellant had been to the tea shop from where PW.3 had been taking tea, the appellant had dislocation of the right thumb and stated that it happened when his hand hit on the wall of the bath room while he waving the hand. The appellant requested PW.3 to reduce the dislocation. Since PW.3 was not experienced in reducing dislocation, he did not do it. PW.4 is a tea shop owner. He had deposed that on the next day when the appellant had been to the tea shop at 5 A.M. the appellant had dislocation of the right thumb. Though PW.4 was requested to reduce the same, he did not do it because he had no experience. PW.5 is yet another fisherman. He would also depose that the appellant had been going along with him for fishing and that on the next day when the appellant had been to the tea shop he had dislocation of the right thumb and that was reduced by him. It is true that PW.5 also had deposed that the appellant stated that he sustained the dislocation while he waved hands in the bath room. It is also true that the possibility for the appellant sustaining the dislocation otherwise cannot be ruled out. But we find that there is little possibility for sustaining dislocation to thumb alone without any sort of injury to any other finger while waving hand inside the bath room. According to the prosecution, the dislocation might have occurred while the appellant throttling the deceased. The possibility of having such dislocation of the right thumb cannot be ruled out because there _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 43 was corresponding injury found at the neck of the deceased. We are of the opinion that the dislocation alone cannot be taken as a circumstance in favour of the prosecution and against the appellant. That may be a corroborating circumstance if other circumstances support the prosecution case. 38. Yet another circumstance (No. 17) relied upon by the sessions Judge to find against the appellant is that the investigating officer had brought the Sniffer dog to the scene of occurrence and at that time the appellant, who was sitting in the tea shop of PW.4, asked a question to PW.3 as to whether the Sniffer dog could identify the assailant in the event the assailant washed his hands and legs in the running water. PW.3 replied that he is not aware of it, but the appellant was found startled. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the query of the appellant regarding the ability of the Sniffer dog to identify an assailant even after washing the hands and legs in running water and the startling of the appellant are indications of the guilty conscience of the appellant. Possibility cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant got startled only because of seeing the Sniffer dog and that the question put was only because of the curiosity. The appellant may have some curiosity and may startle seeing the sniffer dog. But it is _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 44 pertinent to note that the Sniffer dog was not at all brought to the tea shop or to the nearby place for the appellant to get startled. Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that the startling might be because of the fear that the sniffer dog might identify him. It is an expression of a guilty conscience. In this view of the matter, the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the said circumstance is against the appellant is quite appropriate and we find no reason to interfere with it. 39. Yet another circumstance (No. 18) found by the learned Sessions Judge is the foot prints found at the spot of occurrence and the disturbance of scene of occurrence. The appellant had gone to the spot just before the crime. The foot prints and the disturbed lie of the spot of occurrence is no doubt, a clear indication about the throttling of the deceased and attempted sexual assault. That finding is also quite appropriate. 40. Another circumstance found against the appellant is the seizure of the toy from M.O.2 pants as well as the recovery of another toy found lying near the dead body. Regarding that aspect, as we mentioned earlier, PW.2 did not support the prosecution case. So the presence of the toy near the dead body or in the pocket of M.O.2 pants is not at all a reason to find against the appellant. We disagree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge on that aspect. But that is not at all a reason to interfere with the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 45 conviction because the manner as to how the deceased got the toy is insignificant. It is nothing leading to the innocence of the appellant. 41. The last circumstance found against the appellant is regarding Injury Nos. 11 to 14 noted in Ext.P12. According to PW.19 those injuries could be caused when force or weight is exerted on the back of the victim on prone position. On that aspect also, the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge is absolutely correct. 42. For the foregoing reasons discussed earlier, though we have to disagree partially with Circumstance No.4 and 19, we find that there is a chain of events connecting the appellant with the crime alleged. These circumstances are inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the finding regarding the ownership of M.O.3 as well as the similar nature of the hair found on M.O.2 and on the inner thigh of the deceased. We had earlier mentioned about the defence advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the ownership of M.O.3 as well as the similar nature of the pubic hairs found on M.O.3 and on the inner thigh of the deceased. We had already found that regarding the ownership of M.O.3, the evidence of PW.6 is convincing. Regarding the conclusion based upon the similarity of the hairs, we find nothing in the evidence of PW.22 to suggest that PW.22 had got any axe to _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 46 grind against the appellant to falsely implicate him or that PW.22 had implanted any similar pubic hair either on M.O.3 or on the inner thigh of the deceased. In the light of the cumulative circumstances against the appellant, we are persuaded to arrive at a conclusion that the evidence on record is sufficient enough to arrive at a conclusion that the pubic hairs found on M.O.3 as well as on the inner thigh of the deceased are that of the appellant. To put it briefly, we find that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing that at 9 P.M. on 27.10.2008 the appellant and the deceased went to the casuarina cluster and the appellant returned a little after 10 P.M. on the same day. The death occurred in between 9 P.M. and 10 P.M. No evidence on record would suggest that there was any other person at the spot of occurrence. In all probability the crime alleged was occurred at the time when the appellant and the deceased were together at the casuarina cluster. The appellant had no good explanation at all. On the other hand, he had advanced a plea that at the alleged time, he was at his house. The appellant had not even made any attempt to establish the plea of alibi. If the appellant was at his house at the crucial time, he could have examined either his wife or any of the parents in support of the plea of alibi. It is also pertinent to note that the spot of occurrence is a secluded area and casuarina trees are standing clustered. There is not even a pathway passing by the _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 47 side of the spot of occurrence. In the above circumstance, we find that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the circumstances discussed earlier only lead to the conclusion of guilt and nothing else. 43. Going by the evidence on record, we find two other additional circumstances against the appellant. As we stated earlier, the spot of occurrence is a lonely place. There isn't even a pathway by the side of the spot. The appellant had no business to go there. The spot is not enroute the house of the appellant or the deceased. The deceased had also no good reason to go there. The deceased was not related or associated with the appellant. They are of different age. In this factual background, there is every possibility to presume against the appellant that he had gone to the lonely spot of occurrence along with the deceased at the untimely hours with the ulterior motive. The appellant who had been to watch the festival had gone to the causuarina clusters. The appellant had no good explanation for going there along with the deceased. The deceased, being a boy aged 12 years, wouldn't volunteer to go to the lonely area thickly planted with causuarina, that too, at the midst of night. Enticement is very evident irrespective of the failure of the prosecution as to how the deceased was enticed whether by giving toy or otherwise. _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 48 44. The second additional circumstance is the absence of explanation by the appellant as to for what purpose the appellant had gone there with the deceased and thereafter what happened to the deceased. To sum up, we find that the circumstances revealed out lead only to a conclusion of guilt. Though we had very critical analysis of the evidence, we find no reason to arrive at a divergent conclusion. The conviction under challenge is based upon cogent evidence. There is no good reason to interfere with the conviction. 45. Regarding the sentence, the learned Public Prosecutor would argue that the murder is of a brutal and heinous nature. The conscience of the civil society is shocked, according to the learned Public Prosecutor. It is also submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that the case on hand is of the rarest of the rare category. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the case on hand would not even come within the rare category and that the minimum sentence would suffice. We are not able to accept the argument. On an evaluation of the evidence, we have no doubt that the crime is of brutal and heinous nature. Definitely, it had caused shocking waves in the society. Minimum sentence would not be appropriate or just. Before the trial court, the appellant had stated that he has parents, wife and two children. Dependency or number of dependents is _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 49 not at all a reason to take a lenient view in a case of heinous or brutal nature. Going by the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was committed, we find that in fact it is a rare crime; but it is not at all the rarest among the rare. 46. The learned Sessions Judge had noticed that the appellant was involved in Crime No. 118/2003 of Chavakkad Police Station for offence punishable under Sections 450 and 420 I.P.C. According to the appellant, though there was such a case against him, it was later compromised. However, we notice that no document was in fact marked in evidence by the learned Sessions Judge to come to a conclusion regarding the antecedents of the appellant. Even if it is assumed that he was involved in such a crime, there is no legal proof in support of the prosecution. In awarding capital sentence, the learned Sessions Judge had taken guidance from the decision in State of Rajastan v. Kheraj Ram ((2003) 8 SCC 224), Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 898), Ediga annamma v. state of A.P. (AIR 1974 SC 799) and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470). Going by the dictum laid down and the facts of the case on hand, we are unable to agree with the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge. Adding to that, we find that this is a fit case in which PW. 10 is to be compensated. Instead of executing the appellant, he is to be _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 50 fined and PW.10 is to be compensated out of the fine. We also take note that the appellant is aged only 30 years and he has got wife, two children and parents. We can not rule out the possibility for he being reformed by the course of time. 47. In the above circumstances, we find that the capital sentence awarded against the appellant requires modification and reduction; but not to the minimum sentence, namely, the life sentence. Taking guidance from the decisions of the apex Court in Swami Shraddananda vs. State of Karnataka (AIR 2008 SC 3040), Subhash Chander vs. Krishnan Lal and others (2001(4) SCC 458), Prakash Dhawal Khairkar and others vs. State of Maharashtra (2002 (2) SCC 35), Anoop Singh v. State of Bihar (2002(6) SCC 686), Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra, (2001 (10) SCC 109) and State of U.P. vs. Maanmohan Nath Sinha (AIR 2010 SC 137) and on consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, we find that a sentence of imprisonment for a period of 25 years and a fine of Rs. ten lakhs would be just and appropriate. In the result, we decline to confirm the death sentence referred in DSR 5 of 2009. D.S.R. answered accordingly. The appeal is allowed in part and while confirming the conviction under challenge, the sentence for offence under Section 302 I.P.C. is reduced to imprisonment for a period of _**DSR 5/2009 & CRL. A. 1017/2010**_ 51 25 years and a fine of Rs. ten lakhs. In default of payment of fine, the appellant shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of five years. The sentence for offence under Section 511 of section 377 I.P.C. being just and appropriate, is confirmed. The substantive sentences shall run concurrently. We direct the State Government to take into account of the nature of the crime while considering parole and commutation, if any. The fine, on realization shall be paid to PW.10 as compensation. PIUS C KURIAKOSE, (JUDGE) P.S. GOPINATHAN, (JUDGE) knc/-