State of Kerala v. Binoy and Jorphyraj @ Ponnumon

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT:** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN** **TUESDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF JULY 2013/18TH ASHADHA, 1935** ## **CRL.A.No. 1753 of 2006 (F)** **-------------------------------------[AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE DATED 31/08/2006 IN S.C. NO.1/2006 OF THE COURT OF SESSIONS, KOTTAYAM DIVISION]** **.................** **APPELLANT/ACCUSED 1 & 2:** **------------------------------------------** **1. BINOY, S/O. BABY, KURICHIYIL HOUSE, KANNUKETTISSERY KARA, VAIKOM VILLAGE.** **2. JORPHYRAJ @ PONNUMON, S/O.JOY, OTTAPARAMBIL HOUSE, T.V.PURAM, VAIKOM.** **BY ADVS.SRI.V.K.SUNIL, SRI.T.A.SHAJI.** ## **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:** **--------------------------------------------** **STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** ## **BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. V.S. SREEJITH.** **THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26-06-2013, THE COURT ON 09--07-2013 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **Prv.** ## P. BHAVADASAN, J. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crl.Appeal. No. 1753 of 2006 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 9[th] day of July, 2013. ## JUDGMENT Three persons were prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 376(2)(g) read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Among them, third accused was found not guilty and was acquitted of all charges. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 452 of I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. They were acquitted of the charges punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. For the offences for which accused Nos. 1 and 2 were found guilty, they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years each and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 2 default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each for the offence punishable under Section 452 of I.P.C. Both of them were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each for the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently and set off as per law was allowed. 2. P.W.1 is the victim in this case. She is a casual labourer. In 1996 she developed relationship with one Appu, in which she had a female child. The child at the relevant time was 5 ½ years of age. The victim, i.e., P.W.1, her mother Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 3 and child were living together. Two months prior to the date of the incident, the mother of P.W.1 had left for house maid job somewhere in Thodupuzha. P.W.1 used to do house maid work. On 8.5.2003 by about 9 p.m. after dinner P.W.1 and her child had gone to sleep. Hearing the sound of someone moving around the door of the house, she woke up. She enquired who it was. The reply was that it was her class mate Binoy and he wanted to have sex with her and he was willing to pay her for that. She put on the lamp and asked him to go away and that if he persisted she would make noise to attract the attention of the neighbours. As per the allegations, the front door was pushed open and three persons entered into the room. The first accused pushed her on to the floor and when she cried aloud, her mouth was closed. The lamp was put off by the first accused and then she was ravished. The other two accused had gone out by then. After the first accused left the place, P.W.1 went to close the kitchen door. 4 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. She found the second accused standing there who forced himself into the room, carried her to the nearby garden land and ravished her. She returned after the incident completely exhausted and she was finding it hard to walk. When she reached home, she found the third accused standing there. He made advances towards her and on her plea, he left her alone and all the three of them left the place. The next day she went to the Government Hospital and after meeting the doctor got medicines for body pain and headache. Even though she thought of conveying the matter to her relatives, frightened by the threat meted out by accused Nos.1 and 2, she kept quite. While she was was labouring under depression, her uncle asked her about the same and on his persistence, she disclosed everything to him. Her uncle advised her to lay a complaint and therefore, on 20.5.2003, Ext.P1-First Information Statement was laid. P.W.12, the Sub Inspector of Police, recorded Ext.P1 FIS and registered crime as Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 5 per Ext.P1(a) FIR. P.W.1 was examined by P.W.8 on 21.5.2003 and he issued Ext.P11 certificate and Ext.P12 is the chemical analysis report received by him. Later, when she was in the Medical College Hospital, she was examined by P.W.13 who issued Exts.P3 and P3(a). She was examined by him on 18.6.2003. When P.W.13 examined her, it was found that P.W.1 was eight weeks and one day pregnant. In the meanwhile P.W.17 took over investigation. He prepared Ext.P7 scene mahazar. During investigation, it was found that the first accused was not involved and it was another person by name Anoop who was the actual culprit and therefore, he filed a report to that effect after taking the statement from P.W.1. Ext.D7 is the relevant report. He had seized M.Os. 1 and 2 as per Ext.P8 mahazar. Subsequent investigation was conducted by P.W.18 on a complaint filed by P.W.1 regarding the unsatisfactory manner in which P.W.17 was conducting the investigation. P.W.18 took over investigation on 3.12.2003. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 6 His investigation revealed that Anoop was not involved and it was the first accused who was the culprit and therefore, he filed a report to that effect. He recorded the statements of witnesses, completed investigation and laid charge before court. 3. The court, before which the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offences. Finding that the offences are exclusively triable by a Special Court, the JFCM Court, Vaikom committed the case to Sessions Court, Kottayam under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The said court, on receipt of records and on appearance of the accused, framed charge for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Sections 452 and 376(2)(g) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. To the charge, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, therefore, had P.Ws.1 to 19 examined and had Exts.P1 to P25 marked. Exts.D1 to D9 were marked 7 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. from the defence side. M.O.1 was got identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against them and maintained that they were innocent. First accused had stated that he was not involved in the incident and it was at the instance of somebody else, Anoop, the real culprit, was substituted by him. The second accused had stated that he had not committed any act which would constitute and offence. According to him, it was at the behest of P.W.4, the uncle of P.W.1 who had an axe to grind against him that he had been implicated. According to him, on Good Friday at about 7 p.m. he and his friend Anoop were standing by the side of the house of P.W.1. The two of them were standing in the courtyard of one Appachan, the neighbour of P.W.1. According to the second accused, Anoop called the victim, and then they saw P.W.4 coming out of the house of P.W.1, there Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 8 ensued an exchange of words between them and that ended in an altercation and Appachan intervened and separated them. Thereafter, P.W.4 used to harass him both at his house and at his place of work. P.W.4, who belonged to BJP, insisted that the second accused should go to the office of BJP and apologize to him and the second accused was not amenable to it and therefore, he was implicated. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 Cr.P.C., they were asked to enter on their defence. They examined D.W.1. 4. On an appreciation of the evidence in the case, the trial court found the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4 to be acceptable and taken along with the medical evidence, the court below came to the conclusion that the offences have been established as against accused Nos.1 and 2. Therefore, they were convicted and sentenced as already mentioned. The said conviction and sentence are assailed in this appeal. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 9 5. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the first appellant contended that the first accused had been falsely implicated and he had nothing to do with the incident. It was pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that even though the first accused was named in the FIS, P.W.17, who had taken charge of the investigation on the very next day, found the first accused Binoy was not involved and it was one Anoop who was the real culprit, and after obtaining the statement of P.W.1, he filed Ext.D7 report whereby the name of the first accused was deleted and the name Anoop was incorporated. However, for reasons best known to him, his successor-in-office, P.W.18, came to the conclusion that Anoop had nothing to do with the incident and it was the first accused Binoy who was the actual culprit and report was filed incorporating the name of the first accused as one of the accused in the case. It was pointed out that the prosecution Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 10 has no consistency in this regard and each investigating officer was doing things according to his whims and fancies. After having found that he was not involved, his reintroduction was with ulterior and oblique motive. Accused No.1 is only a casual labourer and it is inconceivable that he could have influenced P.W.17, the Circle Inspector of Police. 6. Learned Senior Counsel then contended that there is considerable delay in lodging the FIS and FIS was laid 11 days after the incident and no explanation is offered for the delay. There were several occasions that P.W.1 could have disclosed the incident to P.W.4. The first occasion was on the Good Friday when P.W.4 had arrived at the house and P.W.1 could have easily told as to what had transpired. Then on 16.5.2003, when P.W.4 has again said to have come to the house of P.W.1 and taken her to her sister's house. Thereafter, after reaching her sister's house also P.W.1 does not disclose the incident to P.W.4. Even assuming that in the first two Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 11 instances due to the threat meted out by the accused persons, P.W.1 was frightened to disclose the incident to P.W.4, at least when she was in the house of her sister, nothing prevented her from disclosing the incident to P.W.4 and others. She did not on reaching the house of her sister on 16.5.2003 disclose it to her mother and sister also. She waited till 20.5.2003 to disclose the incident and there is no justifiable and acceptable reason offered for this deliberate delay in lodging the FIS. The delay, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is fatal and for the said purpose he relied on the decision reported in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand ((2013) 3 SCC 791). 7. Learned Senior Counsel contended that it is rather surprising to note that the prosecution did not find that P.W.1 had conceived as a result of the incident and had undergone an abortion. It is more baffling, according to the learned Senior Counsel, that P.W.1 did not disclose the said fact to the Investigating Officer also. It was at the time of trial Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 12 that this aspect was brought out through P.W.1 and thereafter documents were summoned. The accused were surprised by the development made by P.W.1 to their prejudice. It shows that there was no proper investigation and that has caused considerable prejudice to the accused. If the documents relating to the pregnancy have been properly appreciated, it could have been seen that the story put forward by P.W.1 is totally false. In Ext.P1, P.W.1 says that she had gone to the Government Hospital and had met the doctor there and had taken medicines for headache and body pain. This stand in Ext.P1, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is given a go-by at the time of giving evidence and at that time she has given another story. She would say that though she went to the hospital, she could not meet the doctor and therefore, she left by buying medicines from a medical shop. Thus, there are glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1. The conduct of P.W.1 in first naming the first accused 13 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. as Binoy and later, on subsequent questioning she says that it was not the first accused, but it was Anoop who was the real culprit and thereafter, again reverting back to the first accused, shows the pliability of P.W.1 and her evidence is thoroughly unreliable. 8. Learned Senior Counsel contended that there can be no doubt that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be cogent, convincing and creditworthy, conviction can be based on the same without looking for corroboration. That principle is not available in the case on hand. It is quite unsafe to rely on the evidence of P.W.1 in the light of the inconsistencies, contradictions, embellishments, anomalies and developments made by P.W.1 at the time of evidence and also in the light of Exts.D1 to D4 contradictions. At any rate, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the first accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 14 9. Learned counsel appearing for the second accused though adopted some of the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the first accused, also contended that there is no proper identification of the second accused. The house name of the second accused is wrongly stated by P.W.1 even though P.W.1 clams familiarity with the second accused. There was no identification parade conducted by the investigating agency and the identification in court cannot be relied on. 10. It was highlighted that even going by the prosecution evidence, there are houses nearby and residents therein. If the incident as alleged had taken place, nothing prevented P.W.1 from raising alarm which would attract the attention of neighbours and the incident would not have occurred. Referring to Ext.P1 document, it was contended that the initial complaint of P.W.1 was that after the first accused had committed the assault, when he left, P.W.1 came to close Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 15 the kitchen door. Then the second accused is said to have pounced on her, carried her to the nearby garden land and sexually assaulted her. This version given in Ext.P1 itself is highly improbable. At the time of evidence, it was pointed out that P.W.1 had a different story to say. According to P.W.1, after the assault by the first accused, she had come out of the house and she was chased by the second accused and caught hold of her. Then she was carried to the nearby garden land and ravished. This inconsistency is a serious one and that shows that the evidence of P.W.1 is open to serious doubt. It suffers from material contradictions and inconsistencies and her evidence is intrinsically weak. 11. It was pointed out that in Ext.P1, the allegation was that the first accused alone had entered the house first. But at the time of evidence, P.W.1 came forward with a case that all the three of them pounced into the house in the first instance itself. The role of the third accused is spoken Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 16 differently by P.W.1 at the time of evidence than what is stated in Ext.P1. Her evidence at any rate is open to serious doubt. 12. It was then contended that the conduct of P.W.1 also makes her evidence unreliable. She has eloped with a man without marrying him and had begotten a child through him. Thereafter she was maintaining illicit relationship with P.W.4 as spoken to by P.Ws.11 and 19. Learned counsel appearing for the second accused also contended that it has come out that P.W.4 had a grudge against accused No.2 and it was at the behest of P.W.4 that the second accused was falsely implicated. 13. It was contended on behalf of the second accused that it was quite unsafe to rely on the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4 to enter a conviction without any corroborative items of evidence. P.W.1 had concealed many material facts and had given a false and distorted version in court. According to the learned counsel, this aspect has not been Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 17 noticed by the court below and that has resulted in a wrong conviction and sentence being passed. 14. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand very vehemently refuted the contention raised by the appellants. According to him, there is no merit in any of the contentions. As regards the first accused being deleted and Anoop being substituted, learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that a perusal of the evidence will show that it was a clever mischief made by P.Ws.17 and 18 with the motive to weaken the case. P.W.17 on the very next day of lodging the FIS, even without questioning the first accused, decided to remove him from the array of accused and came to the conclusion that Anoop was involved. P.W.1 had categorically stated before court that she was forced by P.W.17 to say that the first accused was not involved in the incident and it was Anoop who was the real culprit. Soon thereafter P.W.1 laid a complaint before the superior officer and investigation was Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 18 handed over to P.W.18. Learned Public Prosecutor drew the attention of this court to the fact that the first accused was very familiar to the victim as he was her school mate and class mate. Ext.P1 shows that when the door was attempted to be thrown open, P.W.1 had asked who it was, then the reply that was given was that it was Binoy who was her class mate and he wanted to have sex with her. The claim by P.W.1 that the first accused is her class mate is not seen challenged in cross-examination. Further, no reason is suggested to P.W.1 or established to falsely implicate the first accused. 15. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that Exts.D1 to D6, the so-called inconsistencies, are not regarding relevant aspects and are of insignificant nature. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the contradictions, developments and embellishments are bound to occur especially when the persons were being examined after a long time of the incident. It is also to be borne in mind, according Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 19 to the learned Public Prosecutor that there may be moral indignation on the part of the victim against the accused which may have prompted her to exaggerate to certain extent. But the court has to be extremely careful in analysing the evidence and found out whether these inconsistencies, contradictions and embellishments are regarding material aspects or not. A perusal of Exts.D1 to D6 would show that they do not relate to material aspects and have no significance. It was unkind on the part of the second accused to suggest an unholy relationship between P.Ws.1 and 4 especially when P.W.4 has stated that he treated P.W.1 as his own daughter and P.W.1 would say that she treated P.W.4 as her father. 16. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the delay in lodging the FIS is satisfactorily explained. Till the time P.W.1 and the child were left the house where the incident had occurred, they were under the mortal fear of attack at the hands of the assailants. Even after reaching the Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 20 house of P.W.1's sister, she was initially very reluctant to disclose the incident. But later, on the persistence of the inmates, she thought it proper to reveal. It was under these circumstances, the delay had occurred and the explanation offered is reasonable and just. 17. The evidence of P.W.1 and the medical certificates clearly show that P.W.1 was ravished. It is not shown that P.Ws.1 and 4 have any oblique motive to falsely implicate the accused. The lower court has considered all these aspects in considerable detail and no grounds are made out to interfere with the findings of the court below. 18. Before one goes into the evidence in the case, it will be first useful to refer to the principles regarding the appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a case of rape. The parameters are well settled by now. A victim of rape is not treated as an accomplice, but is akin to an injured witness whose evidence is entitled to considerable weight. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 21 Unless it is shown that the evidence of the victim suffers from serious infirmities, or she had an oblique motive to falsely implicate the accused persons, there is no justification for suspecting the evidence of the victim. If the evidence of the prosecutrix is seen to be convincing, cogent and creditworthy, certainly a conviction can be entered into on that basis. It is unnecessary in such circumstances to look for corroboration. But if it is found that the evidence of the prosecutrix is extremely weak or the other circumstances established in the case cast a doubt on her version, then as a matter of prudence, it will be only appropriate for the court to look for corroboration. One has to remember that a victim of rape is both a mentally and physically wreck. The incident affects not only her body but her mental status also. 19. In the decision reported in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi (AIR 2012 SC 3157) it was held as follows: Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 22 “'Sterling witness' should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it.” Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 23 20. Bearing the above principles in mind, the evidence of P.W.1 shall be looked into. 21. According to the evidence of P.W.1, she was living in a house by name Iswarya at the relevant time. The house is situated in four cents of land and it belonged to her. She along with her sister, mother and her daughter were staying in the house. On the date of the incident, she and the child alone were at home. Her mother had left for housemaid job to Thodupuzha. According to her, the incident had taken place on 8.5.2003. She says that after dinner, she and the child had gone to sleep. During the sleep, she happened to hear someone calling her name. She enquired who it was. The reply that was given was that it was her class mate Binoy. According to P.W.1, he said that he wanted to have sex with her. P.W.1 would say that she refused to open the door even though the first accused offered money to her. Saying so, he forced himself into the house. She was laid on the floor and Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 24 then after removing her clothes she was brutally ravished. Then she cried aloud and the first accused threatened her that if she continued to make sound, her child would be done away with. After the first accused left the scene, P.W.1 would say that she went to close the door, then she found the second accused standing there. He pushed the door and forced himself in and he took her outside. Even though she resisted, it was of no use. She was carried to the garden land on the south western side of her house and she was brutally raped. He also threatened her that if she disclosed the incident to anybody, she and her child would be done away with. When she returned home, she happened to see accused No.3 standing on the varenda. He too said that he wanted to have sex with her. P.W.1 says that she then told him that if he too indulged in the same act, she would be no more. All the three of them then left the place. The next day, due to body pain, she did not go for work. She went to the hospital at Vaikom Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 25 and got medicines. By about 10.30 a.m. P.W.4, her uncle, had called her over phone. She would say that P.W.4 was in the habit of calling her to enquire about the welfare of the child. P.W.1 would depose that she then asked P.W.4 to come down to her house. He promised to come after two or three days and he came on 16.5.2003 by about 9 p.m. He asked why P.W.1 was in a pensive mood. She complained of frequent harassment by some people in the locality and asked him to take them with him. On the next day, P.W.4 returned and took P.W.1 and her child to the house of the sister of P.W.1. Even after reaching the house of the sister of P.W.1, she did not disclose the incident. Finding her depressed mood and finding her crying, even though the sister of P.W.1 and her sister's mother-in-law enquired about the reasons, she did not disclose. Finally, P.W.4 was summoned and when he asked for the reason, she disclosed the entire incident. On that day, by about 5.30 p.m. she was taken by P.W.4 and her Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 26 sister to the police station where she laid the first information statement. She then identifies the clothes etc., which are not very relevant. 21. Before going into the criticism levelled against the evidence of P.W.1, it will be only appropriate to consider the contention regarding the involvement of the first accused. 22. One has to notice that at the time of laying Ext.P1 first information statement itself, the name of the first accused was mentioned. His name also appears in Ext.P11 wound certificate. True, soon after P.W.17 had taken up the investigation, he questioned P.W.1 on 21.5.2003, 22.5.2003 and on 16.6.2003. P.W.17 in his evidence deposed that during his investigation, it was revealed that the first accused had no role. What is shocking is that P.W.17 had not even questioned the first accused before deciding that the first accused had no role to play and it was Anoop who was the real culprit or 27 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. before deleting the name of the first accused. According to P.W.17, two persons whom he had examined had said that Anoop was seen with accused Nos. 2 and 3. He then questioned P.W.1 who admitted that it was Anoop. P.W.1 categorically denies having voluntarily said so. In this regard Ext.D2 is marked from the side of the defence. It is interesting to refer to Ext.D2. Ext.D2 which is the contradiction pointed out by the defence, in the statement taken on 22.5.2003, it is stated that from the very beginning she had a doubt about the involvement of the first accused and when she enquired, she came to know that it was Anoop, who used to be in the company of the second accused, who was the assailant. Ext.D1 is the statement dated 16.6.2003 wherein she identified the third accused as the person who had come along with accused Nos.1 and 2. Ext.D3 is dated 4.1.2005 wherein it is stated that on 7.10.2004 Anoop was shown to the victim and she admitted that it was he who had ravished her. On 28 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 16.6.2003 P.W.17 filed a report deleting the name of the first accused. 23. It is quite evident that the claim of P.W.17 that Anoop was involved is patently false. In Ext.P1 it is clearly stated that when hearing her name being called, P.W.1 woke up and asked who it was and the reply given was that it was Binoy, her class mate. That means, the person was very familiar to her. She had named him in the first information statement also. It is very funny to note that in Ext.D2 it is stated that soon after the incident, P.W.1 went on enquiring about who had ravished her and she came to know that it was Anoop and not the first accused. Obviously, the claim of P.W.17 in this regard is absolutely untrue. The conduct of P.W.1 as reflected in Ext.D2 does not stand to common sense and reason and can only be one manipulated to favour the first accused. P.W.1 has a consistent stand that it was Binoy, the first accused who was involved. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 29 24. The conduct of P.W.18 is even more reprehensible. The absolute indifference and casual attitude of P.W.18 is reflected in Ext.D9 where he goes even to the extent of saying that the first accused, Anoop, confessed. Later he filed Ext.P20 report saying that there are four accused. He then questioned P.W.1 again and it is seen that the statement of P.W.1 is taken under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Based on that statement and on further investigation being conducted, P.W.18 came to the conclusion that it was not Anoop and it was the first accused who was the real culprit and he filed Ext.P21 report. It is quite unfortunate that two senior officers of the police department should resort to such dubious methods in the investigation of the crime. On going through the evidence of P.Ws.17 and 18, it is clear that there is a conscious attempt to save the first accused and it could easily be seen that there is a deliberate attempt to see that the case ends up in an acquittal. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 30 25. The claim of the first accused therefore that he has been falsely implicated and it was not he who had committed he sexual assault on P.W.1 cannot be accepted. Merely because he is a casual labourer by profession though the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant very vehemently contended that the first accused is not in a position to influence the investigating officer, there may be other reasons which weighed with them to favour the first accused. Any how, it is very evident that the finding of P.W.17 that it was Anoop and not the first accused who had committed rape on P.W.1 seems to be quite an absurd one and is clearly unacceptable. 26. Coming to the evidence of P.W.1, true there are some inconsistencies and contradictions, but the inconsistencies and contradictions pointed out are insufficient to throw out her evidence as doubtful. Reliance is placed on the following aspects: Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 31 (i) In Ext.P1 it is stated that the first accused Binoy had entered the room first, while at the of evidence P.W.1 would say that all the three entered together. (ii) In Ext.P1 it is stated that after the first accused had completed the assault and left, P.W.1 had gone to close the door, then the second accused pounced on her and carried her to the nearby garden land. At the time of evidence, she would say that when she went to close the door, the second accused pushed open the door and forcibly took her out of the house and took her to the nearby garden land and ravished her. (iii) In Ext.P1 the role attributed to the third accused is that he was simply stood and after the acts of accused Nos. 1 and 2, when P.W.1 returned to her home, all the three left the room and the third accused did nothing. But at the time of evidence, Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 32 P.W.1 says that after the assault by the second accused, when she returned home, accused No.3 advanced towards her and said that he too wanted to have sex with her, and pleaded that she would not survive if another assault is made. The third accused retracted and he left with accused Nos. 1 and 2. (iv) In Ext.P1, next day P.W.1 claims to have met a doctor and got medicines. At the time of evidence, she would say that she had gone to the hospital, but she could not met the doctor since there was a large crowd of patients and she returned home after buying medicines from a medical shop. It is the above inconsistencies and contradictions which are highlighted by the counsel for the appellants and, which, according to them, make the evidence of P.W.1 extremely vulnerable and suspicious. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 33 27. A close look at the above inconsistencies and so-called contradictions will clearly show that they have no material bearing on the issue involved in the case. It is well settled that Ext.P1 first information statement need not be an encyclopedia of facts. One has to remember the plight in which a victim of rape is placed at the relevant time. The incident by no means is a pleasant memory and no victim would cherish to remember the same. Omissions and commissions at the time of giving evidence are bound to occur. P.W.1 has given evidence long after the laying of Ext.P1. It was imprudent under those circumstances for the court to look for meticulous evidence of P.W.1. The inconsistencies and contradictions pointed out in the evidence of P.W.1 are bound to occur and those are only natural. It is quite probable that a more clear picture of the incident would have emerged in the mind of P.W.1. Regarding the act committed by accused Nos.1 and 2 and the place where she 34 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. was assaulted, there is consistency in her evidence before court and in Ext.P1. Whether all the three had entered the house together or whether P.W.1 had gone out, accused No.2 chased her and carried to the garden land etc. have little significance in the context. 28. The evidence of P.W.4 who is said to be the uncle of P.W.1 shows that P.W.1 had gone out from her house. On 8.5.2003 he would say that as usual he called P.W.1 to find out about the welfare of the child and it is stated by him that after stating that the child was doing well, she was heard crying and she disconnected the phone. Feeling that the child may not be well, he telephoned her again and told her that he will come over to the house within two days. But he could go only on 16.5.2003. He reached the house of P.W.1 at 8.30 p.m. He found P.W.1 worried and on seeing him she started crying. When asked for the reason, she replied that 2 - 3 persons had knocked at their door in the night and she Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 35 insisted that P.W.4 take them with him or otherwise she may have to commit suicide. Finding that P.W.1 was very much disturbed, he decided to stay back on that day. In the night P.W.1 woke him up by saying that somebody was calling her. When he opened the door, he saw two persons running away. He chased them. They knocked against each other and one of them fell down. When they got up and started running again, P.W.4 says that he recognised one of them as accused No.2. The next day, he took P.W.1 and the child to the house of the sister of P.W.1. He returned to that house on 20.5.2003 when he received a phone call from the sister of P.W.1 and her mother-in-law asking him to go over to their house immediately. He reached the house at 1'o clock in the noon. They complained that P.W.1 was seen continuously crying and inspite of enquiries by them, she was not disclosing anything. P.W.4 would say that he asked P.W.1 as to the reason for her worry. Then P.W.1 revealed that accused Nos.1 and 2 and one Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 36 identifiable person had entered her house and ravished her. He would say that he along with P.W.1, P.W.1's sister and her mother-in-law went to the police station and the statement of P.W.1 was recorded. 29. It is alleged by the defence that his evidence is not trustworthy and he is the villain behind the whole issue. It is alleged that he is having illicit relationship with P.W.1. What is highlighted is that when the brother, sister and mother of P.W.1 had not come to her aid, P.W.4 had shown undue enthusiasm to help her. He too was of young age as of P.W.1. It was contended that he was instrumental in taking P.W.1 to the house of her sister, to the police station and to the hospital and had absolute control over P.W.1. According to the defence, these facts speak for themselves. The two contradictory portions in his evidence marked as Exts.D5 and D6 would show that he had told the police that on the last Good Friday he had reached the house of P.W.1 by 8 p.m. and Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 37 the other contradictory portion is that immediately thereafter he had taken P.W.1 to the police station to lodge the complaint. Ext.D5 is disowned by P.W.4. What he had stated is that he had gone along with his wife. He also denied having given a statement as Ext.D6. At the time of evidence, he has specifically stated that he had gone along with P.W.1, her sister and the mother-in-law of the sister of P.W.1. 30. The two contradictions highlighted suffer from legal infirmity. These contradictions are in respect of answers brought out in cross-examination. It is difficult to understand how statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used to contradict the statements brought out in cross-examination. In chief examination, P.W.4 had not spoken anything contradictory to Exts.D5 and D6. Therefore, strictly speaking, Exts.D5 and D6 do not arise for consideration at all. Even overlooking that aspect, there is no merit that Exts.D5 and D6 should be treated as falsifying the evidence of P.W.4. Those Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 38 contradictions have no bearing on the veracity of her evidence. Nor do they have any relevance to the issue involved in the case. They are too insignificant to be taken note of. 31. As regards the control exercised by P.W.4, the evidence disclosed that no one used to come to the help of P.W.1. It must be remembered that the evidence of P.W.4 is to the effect that P.W.1 had almost grown up in his house and if that be so, he will naturally have an affinity towards her. Under such circumstances, if in need P.W.4 provided the necessary help, it could not be looked upon with suspicion. One should recollect that P.W.1 had eloped with a person which might not have to the liking of other members of the family. They, therefore, might have stopped co-operating with her. Since P.W.1 had spent a major portion of her childhood in the house of P.W.4, it is only natural that P.W.4 goes to the aid of P.W.1 and that he had a soft corner for her. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 39 32. The evidence of P.Ws.11 and 19 are relied on in support of the claim of illicit relationship between P.Ws.1 and 4,. One of them speak about the incident that had occurred on the Good Friday. She would say that the second accused and Anoop had come in search of P.W.1 for, money was due to them. They called P.W.1 and then P.W.4 came out of the house and there ensued an altercation and that ultimately resulted in a scuffle between P.W.4 and the second accused. This incident spoken to by P.W.11 is highlighted as a reason for falsely implicating the second accused. 33. What is significant is that P.W.19 was called upon by the prosecution to prove the scene mahazar as he was a witness to the same. He went far beyond his purpose and spoke things which are irrelevant as far as he is concerned. Even assuming that he could be made to speak to the other aspects and also in cross-examination his assertion 40 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. regarding the illicit relationship and scuffle between P.W.4 and the second accused may not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the claim of shady relationship between P.W.1 and 4 is proved. One cannot omit to note here that P.W.4 is a responsible person with considerable amount of social status. Considering the tenor of the testimony of P.W.4, there is no reason to doubt his evidence. 34. As already noticed, most of the contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4 are with reference to answers elicited in cross examination. That has no legal sanction. Apart from the fact that they have no legal value, even assuming that there is such contradiction and inconsistency, they are totally insignificant and inconsequential and are of minor nature and do not affect the veracity of the testimony furnished by P.Ws.1 and 4. 35. In the decision reported in Himansbu v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2011 2 SCC 36), it was held that minor Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 41 inconsistencies and contradictions cannot be taken aid to doubt the testimony given by a witness. 36. Coming to the question of delay in lodging the FIS, considerable reliance was placed on the decision reported in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand ((2013) 3 SCC 791) wherein 11 days of delay in filing FIS was considered to be fatal. The defence calls in aid the above decision since the delay in this case is also of 7 days. But there ends the similarity between the decision and the case on hand. In the decision relied on by the defence, it was found that the evidence of prosecutrix herself is unnatural and improbable and does not inspire confidence in the mind of the court. 37. In the case on hand, there is nothing to doubt the version given by P.W.1 regarding the incident and the help given by P.W.4 as spoken to by him and P.W.1. It is significant to notice that P.W.1 was residing with her child and there was no male member in that house. There can be no manner of 42 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. doubt that the incident in which P.W.1 was ravished was a brutal and heinous one. The assailants had meted out serious threat to her in case she disclosed the incident to anybody. Under those circumstances, if she was frightened and had no courage to disclose the incident to anybody including P.W.4 who had on two occasions visited her, she could not be found fault with. Probably even after she reached the house of her sister, she had not lost the fear of the accused and therefore, she might have continued to be reluctant to disclose the incident. True, it was only on 20.5.2003 that the incident was disclosed by P.W.1. Here, one may recall the evidence to the effect that inspite of repeated enquiries by the sister of P.W.1 and her mother-in-law, P.W.1 did not reveal the incident. The sister and her mother-in-law had to get down P.W.4 to know about the reason which kept P.W.1 under worry and distress. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that the disclosure to P.W.4 and others was unduly delayed. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 43 38. The delay in disclosure of the incident to P.W.4 and others and so also informing the police cannot be taken aid of by the defence to create a doubt regarding the incident. It should be remembered that a victim of rape is both a mentally and physically wreck. Such a victim would be extremely reluctant to disclose the incident for the reason that it brings her no credit and only adds to her agony and humiliation. Moreover, it is quite understandable that she was in the place where the incident had taken place and the accused were of the locality, ordinarily the prosecutrix will be extremely reluctant to make the incident public. In the case on hand, even after reaching her sister's house, she was reluctant and apprehensive of the consequences of revealing the incident. She might have been worried also about the consequences of lodging the complaint to the police. It took much persuasion on the part of P.W.4 finally to make her to reveal the incident and then to lodge a complaint before Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 44 police. Considering the sequence of events and the consequences of the act committed on P.W.1, the laying of FIS on 20.5.2003 cannot be said to be unduly delayed. 39. In the decision reported in Satyapal v. State of Haryana (AIR 2009 SC 2190) it was held as follows: “20. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily the family of the victim would not intend to get a stigma attached to the victim. Delay in lodging the First Information Report in a case of this nature is a normal phenomenon. Both the courts below apart from relying on a part of the testimony of the prosecutrix found the evidence of PW-5 to be absolutely reliable. The medical evidence itself being a part of the evidence is required to be appreciated in the context of ocular evidence and other circumstances surrounding thereto.” 40. In the decision reported in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh (AIR 2009 SC 1010) it was held as follows: Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 45 “The delay in a case of sexual assault, cannot be equated with the case involving other offences. There are several factors which weigh in the mind of the prosecutrix and her family members before coming to the police station to lodge a complaint. In a tradition bound society prevalent in India, more particularly, rural areas, it would be quite unsafe to throw out the prosecution case merely on the ground that there is some delay in lodging the FIR.” 41. It was contended very vehemently by the counsel for both the appellants that the reluctance on the part of P.W.1 to reveal her pregnancy and abortion to the investigating officers and the failure on the part of P.Ws.17 and 18 to elicit the said fact from P.W.1 shows the tardy manner in which the investigation was conducted and also that P.W.1 had much to conceal. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 46 42. It is too much to believe that P.W.1 stood to gain anything by concealing the fact. She might not be aware of the relevance or importance or consequence of the pregnancy and her subsequent abortion with reference to the issue involved in this case. It was probably at the time of trial when the learned Public Prosecutor learnt that these things had happened, he thought that it was relevant and brought in the necessary evidence in that regard. 43. The evidence shows that on the basis of the test conducted by P.W.15, P.W.14, the doctor, informed P.W.1 that she was pregnant. P.W.13 also confirms this and that the foetus was eight weeks old and the abortion had taken place on 23.6.2003. 44. Relying on the age of the foetus, it was contended that the date of alleged sexual assault cannot be true. The evidence of P.Ws.13 and 14 would show that the LMP was on 25.4.2003. The evidence of P.W.1 shows that she Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 47 used to have menstrual period from 25[th] to 30[th] of every month. It is therefore, contended that the act committed on 8.5.2003 could not have caused for the pregnancy of P.W.1. The lower court has considered this aspect in considerable detail and has come to the conclusion that the claim of P.W.1 could be true. The trial court came to such a conclusion based on the evidence of P.Ws. 13 and 14 and it seems to be a logical and rationale conclusion. It is unnecessary to repeat the materials in this judgment which would show that the claim of P.W.1 could be true. The finding in this regard by the lower court is only to be accepted. 45. Again, even assuming that there has been latches on the part of the investigating officers and the flaws in investigation in not probing deep into the various aspects as later revealed in evidence cannot affect the prosecution case. It is true that P.W.1 was repeatedly questioned. But it seems that those were all of irrelevant matters. Neither P.W.17 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 48 nor P.W.18, the investigating officers found it necessary to elicit relevant and useful information from P.W.1. As already noticed, P.W.1 may be unaware of the consequences of her pregnancy and abortion. But no such allowance could be given to P.Ws.17 and 18. At any rate, their failure to elicit the above facts from P.W.1 has no material bearing on the issue involved in this case and it has not caused any prejudice to the accused persons. 46. It is true that P.W.1 admits that there were houses nearby to her house. Ext.P7 mahazar also indicates the said fact. It is therefore contended that if there was an incident as alleged, on her raising a cry, that would have attracted the attention of the neighbours and they would have come to the place. First of all, it is to be noticed that P.W.1 was put under threat and she was therefore frightened to make any sound. Further, there is nothing to show that there were residents in the nearby houses at the relevant time. The Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 49 claim that since P.W.1 did not shriek or did anything to attract their attention shows the falsity of the allegation cannot be accepted. She has given explanation and reason as to why she could not let out cries and call for help. There is no reason to disbelieve her. 47. In the decision reported in Narendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 7 SCC 171) it was held as follows: “21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial (sic circumstantial), , which may lend assurance to her testimony.” Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 50 48. Even assuming that there are some inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses, namely, P.Ws.1 and 4, it is for the court to sift the chaff from the grain and arrive at a conclusion. It may be useful to refer the decision reported in Jugendra Singh v. State of U.P. ((2012) 6 SCC 297) wherein it was held as follows: “40. At this juncture, we may remind ourselves that it is the duty of the court to sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. A testimony of the witness is required to inspire confidence. It must be creditworthy.” 49. The act of rape is never committed in public or on invitation. It was always done in secrecy. It is therefore imprudent on the part of the court to expect direct evidence in this regard except the version given by the prosecutrix. No doubt, it is true that the evidence of prosecutrix will have to Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 51 be subjected to close scrutiny. One has also to remember at the time of appreciation of evidence of prosecutrix that due to her moral indignation of the incident and her aversion for the accused might have made her to make embellishments, developments and exaggerations at the time of evidence. But it is the court's duty to analyse the evidence and find out whether the evidence furnished by P.W.1 contains a ring of truth. 50. The claim of benefit of doubt raised by the first accused has no basis. In the decision reported in Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (AIR 2012 SC 1979) as to what constitute a benefit of doubt was considered and it was held as follows: “26.Therefore, in such a case the paramount importance of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. The benefit of doubt particularly in every case may not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 52 destroy social defence. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.” 51. In the decision reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Awdhesh ((2008) 16 SCC 238), it was held as follows: “11. “22. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard.What degree of probability amounts to "proof" is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)] : Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 53 "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other." 23. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 54 doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 24. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal.” The above position was highlighted in Krishnan v. State (2003 (7) SCC 56).” 52. P.W.1 in her evidence has given convincing reasons as to how she happened to name Anoop as one of the Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 55 assailants which brought out a lot of confusion in the matter. She has clarified her position and her evidence in that regard appears to be quite convincing and consistent. Therefore, the plea of reasonable doubt cannot be treated in favour of the first accused. 53. It is significant to notice that there is no reason for P.W.1 to falsely implicate the first accused. There is no suggestion to P.W.1 in that regard also. The second accused would say that he had occasion to pick up a quarrel with P.W.4 and to wreak vengeance P.W.4 has used P.W.1 as a tool. 54. Apart from the fact that the contention is too far fetched, even assuming it to be so, one fails to understand as to why she should falsely implicate accused Nos. 1 and 3. Then again, it is extremely difficult to believe that P.W. 1 would allow herself to be utilized as a victim of rape for P.W.4 to wreak vengeance against the second accused. One has also to remember that the claim of P.W.1 was that the first accused Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 56 was her class mate. Therefore, the story of false implication falls to the ground. 55. None of the grounds urged by the appellants are sufficient to upset the finding of the court below. The court below has considered the evidence in considerable detail and the said court having the facility of watching the demeanor of the witnesses has chosen to accept the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 4 and had come to the conclusion that accused Nos.1 and 2 are guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 452 of I.P.C. It is significant to notice that the court below has considered the nature of the offences committed by the accused and has also formed the opinion that the allegation of gang rape cannot stand and that the first and second accused are responsible for their individual acts of rape and accordingly, found them guilty on those counts. That finding also does not appear to suffer from any infirmities. Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. 57 56. However, it needs to be noticed that the conviction under Section 3(1)(xi) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and the sentence passed consequent thereon cannot stand legal scrutiny. There is no allegation or evidence to the effect to show that the act was committed as a result of racial prejudice which is absolutely essential to attract the said provision. Merely because the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe may not be sufficient to hold the accused guilty of the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed and while confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the court below for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 452 of I.P.C., the conviction and sentence passed against the appellants for offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of Scheduled 58 Crl.Appeal. 1753/2006. Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is set aside. P. BHAVADASAN, JUDGE sb.