High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed; High Court’s direction to co...

STATE OF HARYANA v. RAM DIYA

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal Nos. 365 of 1986 and 245 of 1990
Neutral Citation:1990 SCR 431

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. Ratnavel Pandian
  • K. Jayachandra Reddy
Judgment Date
1990-04-10
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed. The Court upheld the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s direction to consider the respondents for premature release in accordance with the rules and executive instructions applicable during the relevant time frame, clarifying the prospective nature of Section 433A and rejecting the State’s stand that there is no entitlement without strict adherence to the newer 14-year rule.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed; High Court’s direction to consider premature release under applicable rules is affirmed; State’s reliance on post-1978 14-year rule is not upheld against the lifers who were decided pre-18-12-1978.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • State of Haryana
  • Anr.

Respondents

  • Ram Diya
  • Ram Saran

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Mahabir Singh (N.P.)
  • • Dalveer Bhandari

Counsels for Respondents

  • • A.K. Goel

Case Synopsis & Summary

This judgment concerns the premature release of life convicts whose death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment and the legality of executive directions governing such releases. The respondents, convicted for murder and sentenced to death, had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment and sought premature release under Punjab Jail Manual paragraph 516-B and later liberalised state policies. The Supreme Court traces the evolution of law: the 1978 amendment introducing Section 433A CrPC mandating a minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment for life convicts, and the predecessor Executive instructions from 1967, 1971, and 1976 that guided premature release; it holds that Section 433A is prospective and not to operate against cases decided before 18 December 1978, following the Maru Ram decision. A key finding is that no one has a vested right to premature release merely because the minimum 14 years’ actual imprisonment has been served; rather, premature release is subject to the Government’s orders and applicable rules or instructions in force during the relevant period. In the matter before them, the High Court had directed the State to consider the petitioners for premature release in light of those rules, which the Court affirms. It also notes the State’s failure to consider the respondents within the prescribed time frame and holds there is no infirmity in the High Court’s direction. The appeals are dismissed, upholding the High Court’s order and directing continued consideration under the applicable policy framework.

Provisions of Law Cited

CrPC 1973 Sec. 432CrPC 1973 Sec. 433CrPC 1973 Sec. 433ASection 54 IPCSection 55 IPCArticle 72 of the ConstitutionArticle 161 of the ConstitutionCrPC Amendment Act 1978 (45 of 1978) introducing Sec. 433A

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Life imprisonment is incarceration until death; no vested right to premature release merely because 14 years of actual imprisonment have been served
  • Section 433A is prospective in effect; lifers convicted before 18-12-1978 are entitled to consideration for release under earned remissions as per prevailing rules

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The State argued that life convicts (including those whose death sentences were commuted to life) should be considered for premature release only under the policy frameworks in force during their relevant period, particularly adhering to the 14-year minimum actual imprisonment after the 1978 amendment. It contended that the liberalisation of premature release through executive instructions did not apply to lifers not meeting the exact post-1980 criteria, and that there was no vested right to premature release absent an order under commutation or clemency.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents urged that Section 433A is prospective and does not affect pre-existing cases; lifers whose conviction predated 18-12-1978 are entitled to consideration for release under the Maru Ram framework and the then-existing executive instructions; they argued that the State should have acted promptly following this Court's 1980 order and that the liberalised policy should apply to them irrespective of the exact date of their conviction.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Kishori Lal v. EmperorAIR 1945 P.C. 64PositiveCited to support the proposition that a life sentence amounts to incarceration until death, and that there is no vested right to premature release.
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra and Others(1961) 3 SCR 440PositiveCited for the interpretation that a life sentence equates to confinement until death and to reinforce the lack of automatic entitlement to release.
Maru Ram Etc. Etc. v. Union of India & Anr.(1981) 1 SCR 1196PositiveConstitution Bench holding that Section 433A is prospective; lifers convicted before 18-12-1978 are entitled to consideration for release under earned remissions.
Kartar Singh v. State of Haryana(1982) 3 SCC 1Mentioned OnlyListed among authorities; its role in the decision is not central to the core holding here.
Sadhu Singh v. State of Punjab(1984) 2 SCR 741PositiveUsed to support the interpretation that 1976 liberalised instructions apply to lifers whose death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
Sant Ram et al. v. Union of IndiaW.P. Nos. 1252-64/80PositiveReferenced for the Court’s order directing consideration consistent with Maru Ram in the post-1980 batch of petitions.
Mehar Singh(citation in judgment)Mentioned OnlyCited in background; not a central binding authority in the present decision.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

_/ STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR .. _v._ A RAM DIYA ·APRIL 10, 1990 \ [S: RAT;'· ~'EL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA B REDDY, JJ.J _Codi' of Criminal Procedure,_ _1973:_ _Seciions 432, 433 and 433A-_ _Death sentence commuted to life sentence-'-Convictlon prior to_ _intro-_ _duction_ _of_ _section 433A-Premature_ _release_ _of such life_ _convicts-_ _Consideration_ _by° State Government-Compliance_ _with_ _Court's_ _direc-_ _tions._ C· _·Punjab Jail Manual: Paragraph 516-B-Executive instroctions-_ _Convicts whose sentence_ _of death commuted to· life imprisonment-_ _Conviction prior to amendment of Cr.P. C: in_ _1978-Premature release_ - ~-- _of-Applicability of the instructions._ - - D Paragraph 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual provides for premature release of prisoners, and is in the nature of executive instructions. The State Government modified the instructions in 1971 and 1976. The 1976 instruction was to the effect that cases or life convicts whose sentence bas been commuted should be considered for premature release only after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment. The State Government further liberalised its policy and decided that such cases might be reviewed by a state level committee and directed that cases of life convicts who have completed 8~ yearS substantive sentence and sentence of 14/10 years including remission be submitted to the Committee. Later on the State Government clarified that the liberalised policy would not be applicable to the life convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment. In 1978, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1~73 was amended introducing . section 433A providing that such life convicts · should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in jail. This Court declared that section 433A of the Code is prospective in effect and did not operate . against those cases which were decided by the trial court before 18.12.1978 _(Maru Ram etc. etc._ v. _Union_ _of India and Anr.,_ (1981] I SCR 1196). -. . . E F G . The cases of respondents were in fact covered by the said decision. H 431 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990j 2 S.C.R. A They have filed writ petitions before the High Court for premature , release and the High Court directed the State Government to consider their cases. The State Government has .preferred these appeals, by special leave, against the orders of the High Court. Dismissing the appeals, this Court, B HELD: 1.1. No one has gQt a vested right to claim pre-mature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual impri· sonment as prescribed under section 433A Cr.P.C. because a sentence ~ of 'imprisonment for life' is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period or convicted person's actual life. There is no questi<in ~ C . of releasing suth a lifer early in the absence of an order of commutation under section SS IPC by the appropriate Government, or under section 433(b) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 by the appropriate Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article 72 or ##### '161 of the Constitution oflndia. [43SE-F; G-Hl · ' · ~ D E F G ·: H ' . 1.2. In the instant case, the conviction of the respondents was recorded early to the introduction of section 433A and, therefore, as per · the ratio laid down in _Maru Ram's_ case, the two respondents are entitled for consideration of release by the appropriate Government 8s · per the prevailing rules or executive instructions. Further, admittedly, , the State Government did not take up the cases of the respondents for premature release within six months of the order of this Court tlated 10th December 1980 in _Sant Ram's_ case, (W.P. Nos. 1252-64/80 etc. etc.) and deferred the consideration of premature release till the ·respondents bad completed 14 years of substantive sentence. It has become obligatory for the State to conside~ the cases of premature release of the respondents in accordance with the rules or executive in5tructions prevailing and applicable to them at the relevant time _i:e._ between tlje period 10.12.1980 and 9.6.1981. The plea of the appellant that the premature release of the respondents was not considered since they have not completed 14 years of substantive imprisonment ls in violation of the d~ions of the order dated 10th December, 1980 of this Court and so the appellant cannot be permitted tO make such a plea on the stength of the executive instructions overlooking and ignoring the above directions. There is no hllmnity in the judgments of the High Court calling for interference. [436E-F; 437F; '!31!H; 439A-C] · _Kishori Lal_ v _.Emperor,_ AIR 194S P.C. 64; _Go pal Vinayak Godse_ v. _T.he_ _State of Maharashtia and Others,_ (1961] 3 SCR 440; _Maru Ram_ . _etc. etc,_ v. -- _Un!on of Jndifl_&_,-t~r., _ (1981) I ~CR 1~6; _Kartar_ Singh~ A B ###### c D E F G H ##### .., . ### "" --......__ ~ #### _>_ ).. _T_ STATE OF HARYANA _v._ RAM DJYA [PANDIAN, J.] 433 _Others v.State of Haryana,_ (1982] 3 SCC I and _Sadhu Singh_ v. _State of_ _Punjab,_ [1984] 2 SCR 741, relied on. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 365 of 1986 and 245 of 1990. From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 12.1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. Writ Petition No. 399 of 1983 and 251 of 1983 . Mahabir Singh (N .P.) and Dal veer Bhandari for the Appellants . A.K. Goel for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1158 of 1985. The State of Haryana has preferred these two appeals against the Judgment and Order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated 21.12.1984 in Writ Petition Nos. 399/83 and 251/83 respectively passing similar orders directing the State Government to consider the cases of the respondents for premature release. The facts which lie m a very narrow compass ~ay ~e-stated thus: The respondents were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kamal which sentence inflicted on each of them was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment on mercy petitions. It seems that the State Government issued various executive instructions from time to time either altering or amending the existing instructions by fresh executive instructions specifying the minimum period of actual detention to be undergone by a convict sentenced to life imprisonment before his case for premature release could be considered by the State Government. To appreciate the case:ofthe•respective parties it would be apposite to make reference to the relevant instructions. At the outset,. the instructions contained in paragraph 516-B of Punjab Jail Manual which are in the nature of executive instructions by way of guidance may be referred to which instructions are based on a Government of India resolution No. 159-167 dated 6th 434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R. A September, 1905. The aforesaid paragraph reads thus: "516-B(a) With the exception of females and who were under 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence, the cases of every convicted prisoner sentenced to: 8 ###### c (i) imprisonment for life (iv) ............................................... . (a) who has undergone a period of detenton in jail amounting together with remission earned to 14 years, shall be submitted through the Inspector General of Prisons, Punjab for the orders of the State Government". The substance of the above paragraph is that the case of a male D lifer who was above 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence sentenced to life imprisonment and who has undergone detention in jail amounting together with remission earned to 14 years, should be submitted to the State Government for consideration of his premature release. It further appears in the year 1971, the State E F G H Government after a considerable deliberation took a policy decision and issued instructions through its Memorandum No. 13311-6JJ-71/ · 39656 dated 10th of Novemper, 1971 providing that a period of actual sentence of 8 [1] /2 years in the case of adult life convicts and 6 years in the case of female convicts as well those male convicts below 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence should be regarded as the qualifying period of consideration for premature release. This memorandum was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their premature release in the light of the said policy decision with effect from 2nd November, 1971. Thereafter, in January 1976 the question of releasing prematurely life convicts whose death sentence has been commutted was again considered by the State Government and it took a policy decision that cases of such life convicts should be considered for premature release only after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment and in that behalf Memorandum No. 403-611-76/3456 dated 30th January 1976 containing the necessary instructions was issued by the State Government. It is culled out from the impugned judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1986 (arising out of Writ Petition STATE OF HARYANA _v._ RAM DIYA IPANDIAN, J.] 435 No. 399/83) that the State Government with a view to liberalise the A ~ policy of premature release of prisoners decided that such cases might ----.,..~ be reviewed by a State Level Committee comprising of four members inclusive of Minister for Prisons and directed the concerned Superintendent of Jail to submit cases of life convicts two months before they completed 81/2 years substantive sentence and sentence of 14/10 years including remission along with his comments to the Inspector General B of Prisons, Haryana who thereupon would put up all cases along with his recommendations for consideration before the Committee and further directed the Inspector General of Prisons to submit a copy of the decision taken by the said Committee along with the roll of each # • of Prisons, Haryana who thereupon would put up all cases along with his recommendations for consideration before the Committee and further directed the Inspector General of Prisons to submit a copy of the decision taken by the said Committee along with the roll of each # • prisoner to Government within one week. # .. Be that as it may, the Parliament introduced Section 433(A) by [c ] the code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978 (45 of 78) with effect from 18.12.1978. According to Section 433(A) that a .'person who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which D death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in jail. We are referring to Section 433(A) in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section, the life convicts falling within the purview of Section 433(A) has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of ##### ... actual imprisonment. It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one E has got a vested right to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433(A) because a sentence of 'imprisonment for life' is incarceration until death, that is, for the remaining period of convicted. ##, person's actual life vide Kishori Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Privy Council 64; _Go pal Vinayak Godse_ v. _The State_ _of Maharashtra and_ F _)-_ _Others,_ [1961] 3 SCR 440; _Maru Ram Etc. Etc._ v. _Union_ _of India_ & _Anr.,_ [1981] 1 SCR 1196; _Kartar Singh and Others_ v. _State of Haryana,_ [1982] 3 SCC I and _Sadhu Singh_ v. _State of Punjab,_ [1984] 2 SCR 741. There is no question of releasing such a lifer early in the absence of an order of commutation under Section 55 IPC by the appropriate G Government which term is defined under Section 55(A) IPC or under Section 433(b) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 by the appropriate Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article _T_ 72 or 161 of the Constitution of India. Incidentally, it may be stated that Section 54 empowers the appropriate Government to commute the sentence of death for any other punishment provided by the Indian H Penal Code. A . B ###### c D R F G 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990) 2 S.C.R. Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power to the appropriate Government either to suspend or to remit the sentences. The meaning of the expression 'appropriate Government' occurring in Section 432 and 433 is given under sub-section 7 of Section 432. . The Constitution Bench of this Court in _Maru Ram Etc. Etc._ v . _Union_ _of_ _India_ & _Anr.,_ [1981] 1SCR1196 after thoroughly examining the intendment of Section 433{A) concluded by formulating its various findings one of which is as follows: "We declare thats. 433A, in both its limbs (i.e. both types of life imprisonment specified in it), is prospective in effect. To put the position beyond doubt, we direct that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December 1978 (directly or ratro-actively, as explained in the judgment) when s. 433(A) came into force. All 'lifers' whose conviction by the Court of first instance was entered prior to that date. are **entitled to considera'tion by Govemineni for release on the** strength of earned remissions although a release can take place only if Government makes an order to that effect."· Now, coming to the facts of case on ha11d, admittedly the conviction of the respondents was recorded early to the introduction of Section 433{A) and, therefore, as per the ratio laid down in _Maru Ram's_ case _(ibid),_ these two respondents are entitled for consideration of release by the appropriate Government as per the prevailing rules or executive instructions. After the judgment dated 11.11.1980 in _Maru Ram's_ case, a number of life convicts filed batch of writ petitions in Writ Petition Nos. 1252-64 etc. etc. captioned _Sant Ram etc._ _etc._ v. _Union of India_ & _Ors. etc.,_ and those writ petitions were disposed of by an order of this Court dated December 10, 1980. Ram Diya, the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 365 of 1986 was one of the petitioners in the connected batch of Writ Petition Nos. 1532-1539 of 1980. The common order . passed in all those petitions reads thus: "All of these Writ Petitions except Writ Petition Nos. 1477 and 1478 of 1980 shall stand disposed of in accordance with the judgment of this Court dated November 11, 1980 in **.** .. STATE OF HARYANA _v._ RAM DIYA [PANDIAN, J.[ 437 _Maru Ram Etc. Etc._ v. _Union_ _of India_ _&_ _Anr.,_ W.P. No. 865/79 etc. etc. All persons who were released on bail shall surrender to their sentence and the respective State Governments will pass appropriate orders in each individual case or generally in any group or class of cases in the light of the judgment aforesaid within six months from today. If in particular cases, orders of release have been passed prior to the introduction of Section 433(A), Criminal Procedure Code, the accused need not surrender to their bail." From the impugned judgment of the High Court, it is seen that the respondent (Ram Saran) also filed a Criminal Writ Petition seeking direction to the State Government to consider his case for premature release and the same was disposed of by an order dated December 10, 1980 in accordance with the decision in _Maru Ram's_ case, and that Ram Saran who is said to have undergone 16 years 1 month and 28 days of imprisonment including 5 years 8 months and 27 days remissions as on July 21, 1982 was released on bail. It appears the Government have issued letter No. 43/15783-JJ(2) dated February 27, 1984 clarifying the earlier instructions dated November 28, 1977 and reiterating their inapplicability to life convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment on their mercy petitions and further stating that consideration of premature release of such convicts shall continue to be considered in the light of the Government policy decision dated December 12, 1967 thereby making it obligatory for them to undergo 14 years substantive sentence. A B c D E F Admittedly, the State Government did not take up the cases of }- the respondents for premature release within six months of the Order of the Supreme Court dated 10th December 1980 and deferred the consideration of premature relase till the respondents had completed 14 years of substantive sentence. Jn the written statement filed by the Inspector General of Prisons, it is averred as follows: G _T_ "It is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner during his confinement in the jail was satisfactory but it is irrelevant as far as the consideration of his premature release case is concerned. According to the Government policy his premature release case is to be considered when he has H A B c D E F G H 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R. undergone 14 years substantive sentence and 20 years sentence including remission. His jail conduct will be considered when he has completed 14 years substantive **sentence."** In _Sadhu Singh's_ case _(ibid),_ it has been urged on behalf of the lifers that the State Government relying upon the executive instructions issued on 30.1.76 had erroneously made a distinction between cases of prisoners who had been sentenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions had been commuted to life imprisonment and cases of prisoners who had been straightaway sentenced to life imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for premature release and that it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions dated 30.1.76 for making the distinction and pc_i.8!)Jcinini the consideration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them. This argument was answered by this Court holding thus: "The second contention also must fail in view of the admitted position that cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions has been commuted to life imprisonment (who constitute a distine! class) will now be governed by the 1976 instructions. Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of _Mehar Singh_ (supra) that the 1976 instructions issued on 30th of January 1976 will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that date is not tenable. Clearly existifg cases of life convicts falling within that category will be governed by those instructions." So far as these cases are concerned, premature release of the respondents has to be considered in view of the directions given by this Court in the Order dated December 10, 1980 in the batch of writ petitions which instructions admittedly have not been complied with merely on the ground that the respondents have not completed 14 years of actual imprisonment since these respondents constitute a distinct class in that they have been initially sentenced to death which has been commuted on their mercy petitions. This argument is not available to the appellant because the respondents' premature release is required to be considered as per the directions of this Court vide Order dated 10.12.1980. Hence it has become obligatory for the State to consider the cases of premature release of these respondents in _i•_ ## "' / __/ ... .-l ~ STATE OF HARYANA _v._ RAM DIYA [PANDIAN, J.[ 439 accordance witli the rules or executive instructions prevailing and applicable to them at the relevant time i.e. between the period 10.12.1980 and 9:l\: 1981. The plea of the appellant as reflected from the written statement filed by the Inspector General of Police that the premature release of the respondents was not considered since they have not completed 14 years of substantive imprisonment is in violation of the directions of the Order dated 10th December 1980 of this Court and so the appellant cannot be permitted to make such a plea on the strength of the executive instructions overlooking and ignoring the above directions. In the premises, we see no infirmity in the judgments of the High Court calling for interference. A B For the aforementioned reasons, we uphold the impugned Judg- C ment and Order of the High Court and dismiss these appeals as devoid of any merit. G.N. Appeals dismissed. _T_