High CourtDivision BenchAppeals allowed; Division Bench's order set asi...

STANTECH PROJECTENGG. PVT. LTD. v. NICCO CORPORATION LTD.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 7373 of 2005; 7374 of 2005
Neutral Citation:[2015] 9 S.C.R. 165

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Vikramajit Sen
  • Shiva Kirti Singh
Judgment Date
2015-08-13
Court Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Division Bench’s order, and reinstated the necessity of settling the admitted dues. It directed the respondent to pay Rs. 3,54,500 plus Rs. 8,08,314 (along with accrued interest at 10% per annum) and TDS amounts, if not already deposited, together with costs totaling Rs. 20,000 within 45 days. It warned that failure to comply would lead to the admission of the winding-up petition and expeditious proceedings under the relevant provisions of law. The Court criticized the Division Bench for leniency that fostered litigation proliferation and abuse of judicial process, and it restored the Company Judge’s actions to ensure prompt resolution of the debt.”,
Final Disposition
Appeals allowed; Division Bench's order set aside; respondent directed to pay admitted dues within 45 days; costs awarded; if default, winding-up petitions to be admitted again; case to be remitted for enforcement under applicable provisions.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Stantech Project Engg. Pvt. Ltd.

Respondents

  • Nicco Corporation Ltd.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • S. D. Singh
  • • Bharti Tyagi
  • • Vishwajit Singh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • R. C. Kohli

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Special winding-up dispute between Stantech Project Engg. Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioner) and Nicco Corporation Ltd. (the respondent) arising from admitted debts due under a turnkey project. Winding-up petitions were filed by the petitioner asserting that debts totaling Rs.3,54,500 plus interest and Rs.8,08,314 plus interest, with related TDS deductions, remained unpaid after service of a statutory notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956. In both matters, the respondent’s counsel reportedly gave a concession to pay the admitted amounts in installments (ten installments for one case; eight for the other) to avoid publication/advertisement of the winding-up petition. The Company Judge recorded these concessions and, on 24 July 2002, ordered installment payments with further modification on 8 August 2002. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court later set aside these orders, treating the concession as a mistake by counsel and remanding for rehearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Division Bench’s rationale was unjustified in law and equity. It held that the respondent had already failed to discharge the admitted debt after notice, and that the junior counsel’s concession had been exploited to defer payment, effectively abusing judicial process. The Court directed immediate payment of all dues with costs within 45 days, warning that failure would admit the winding-up petition again. The appeals were allowed, with directions to enforce the earlier Company Judge’s order.”

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 434, Companies Act, 1956Section 439, Companies Act, 1956

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Abuse of judicial process
  • Proliferation and prolongation of litigation
  • Bona fide (concept referenced in judgment)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the concession of paying the admitted debt in installments, recorded by the Company Judge, was binding and the Division Bench’s setting aside of that order was unwarranted. The admissions of debt and statutory notice sufficed to justify the winding-up process. The later intervention to modify or remand the matter undermined the established remedy of winding up and allowed unwarranted leniency that encouraged delay, thereby proliferating litigation. The Division Bench erred in treating the concession as a mistake by counsel and in not recognizing the need to enforce the admitted debt promptly, with costs, within a fixed timeframe to prevent commercial death and to protect the petitioner’s rights. The Court should restore the Company Judge’s order and prevent further delay in enabling creditor relief and the orderly winding-up process.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the junior counsel’s concession to pay in installments reflected a bona fide effort to settle the debt and avoid destabilising consequences of winding-up. They contended that the installments scheme, as modified by subsequent orders, was a reasonable arrangement to discharge the debt, mitigate publication harms, and preserve business operations. They urged that the Court should uphold the Division Bench’s discretion to consider modification of the consent order to reflect practicable payment terms, and argued that a strict, immediate winding-up without considering the financial realities could be unjust or counterproductive.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Shrimati Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarial Gulabchand(1975) 2 SCC 609PositiveCited to support the court’s condemnation of lax judicial conduct and to underscore the consequences of delaying rightful remedies in winding-up proceedings.
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak(1982) 2 SCC 463PositiveCited as authority reinforcing the need to avoid unwarranted leniency and to prevent prolongation of litigation, aligning with the Court’s stance against abuse of process.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2015] 9 S.C.R. 165 A ## STANTECH PROJECTENGG. PVT. LTD. v. ## NICCO CORPORATION LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 7373 of2005 etc.) AUGUST 13, 2015 B ## **[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]** - _Concession Winding up petitions against respondentcompany_ - _Concession by counsel of the respondents to_ c _pay the due debts in 10 and 8 equal instalments respectively_ - _Company Judge disposed of the petition in view of the_ - _concession Order of Company Judge challenged upto Supreme Court wherein the Court directed the respondent to move the Company Judge for modification of its order_ - D - _Company Judge refused the modification Division Bench of High Court by impugned order held that the counsel made the concession by mistake and set aside the order of_ - _Company Judge On appeal, held: Order of the Division Bench is unjustified legally as well as equitably_ - _Since the_ E _respondent-company had failed to discharge the admitted debt even after service of statutory notice, the Company Judge had no alternative but to proceed for the winding-up of the Company- The counsel of the respondent had displayed legal sagacity in getting the winding-up postponed and_ F _avoided the publication in the petition_ - _Had he not done so, the respondent would have had to pay the entire debt at once or face certain commercial death as_ a _consequence of_ - _publication/citation of winding-up petition The respondent_ G _abused the judicial process in order to delay the discharge of an acknowledged debt for almost_ a _quarter of_ a _century_ - _during which period he continued his business However,_ - _order of Company Judge modified The respondent• is directed to pay all the amounts due, alongwith the cost_ H 165 [2015] 9 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 166 A _imposed by the Company Judge and the cost of the present_ - _proceedings within 45 days of this judgment Appeals_ - - _allowed Companies Act, 1956 s. 439 -Administration of Justice -Abuse of Judicial Process._ B _Administration of Justice_ - _Proliferation and_ - _prolongation of litigation Unwarranted lenient approach of the courts, results in proliferation and prolongation of litigation, leading to insurmountable pendency of litigation._ C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7373 of2005 From the Judgment and Order dated 29.09.2003 of the High Court at Calcutta in T 490 of 2003 in C.P. No. 432 of D 2000 ## WITH C.A. No. 7374 of 2005 E S. D. Singh, Bharti Tyagi, Vishwajit Singh for the Appellant. R. C. Kohli for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F **VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.** 1. Both these Appeals assail the common impugned Order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta on 29.9.2003, setting aside the Order passed by the Company Judge rejecting the plea of the G Respondent that the so-called concession made by the Junior Counsel should not be given curial recognition. 2. The facts, succinctly stated, are that the Appellant had fileo Winding-up petitions against the Respondent on the H asseveration that debts admittedly payable by the Respondent 167 STANTECH PROJECT ENGG. PVT. LTD. v. NICCO CORPORATION LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] to the Petitioner had remained outstanding even subsequent A to the issuance of a statutory Notice issued under Section 434 of the Companies Act. 1956. Keeping in perspective the nature of the question of law raised before us, we need not go into the genesis or the characteristics of the contract between the parties. So far as Civil Appeal No. 7373 of 2005 is B concerned, the claim was for a sum of Rs.3,54,500/- together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum together with Rs.1,09,958/- deducted by the Respondent on account of the tax deducted at source (TDS). These amounts have remained unpaid even after the receipt of the statutory notice. It is C palpably clear that the statement made by the learned counsel for the Respondent that these amounts would be paid in ten equal installments commencing from 16.8.2002, was so done in order to avert the ordering of an advertisemenUcitation in D the proceedings by the Company Judge. In Civil Appeal No. 7374 of 2005, the claim was for a sum of Rs.8,08,314/- · together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum together with Rs.1,24,984/-which had been deducted by the Respondent on account of TDS. It appears that these amounts E were admitted by the Respondent in terms of its letter dated 8.2.2000 as also in the Affidavit of the Manager (Corporate) of the Respondent who, at the material time, was its Principal Officer. In the said Affidavit, it was admitted that the total amount payable was Rs.8,05,664/-which was being retained awaiting F final clearance from TISCO who had floated the subject turnkey project. As in the foregoing instance, the Company Judge recorded the statement of the counsel for the Respondent offering to pay the principal sum of Rs.8,05,664/-togetherwith Rs.1,24,984/- in four equal installments commencing from G 6.8.2002. It had been made clear by the Company Judge vide Orders dated 24. 7 .2002 that if these payments were not made, the Winding-up petitions would stand admitted and it would be open to the Appellant to pray for advertisemenUcitation. A fortnight later, i.e. on 8.8.2002, the foregoing Orders were H B D E [2015] 9 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1.68 A modified by the consent of the parties to the effect that it would be open to the Respondent to pay off the dues together with the interest accrued in eight monthly installments instead of four monthly installments as was directed in the Order dated 24.7.2002. B • 3. In these circumstances, these orders passed on the concession of the learned counsel for the Respondent were challenged by the Respondent before the Division Bench of the High Court, which we cannot but view as extraordinary. C The Division Bench disposed of the Appeal in terms of its Order dated 6.1.2003 with the observation that aJ;l application should be preferred before the learned Company Judge for modification of the order, which were assailed before this Court. We had disposed of the Special Leave Petition on D 3.3.2003 thus:- "Whether such application for modification is at all maintainable is a question which is expressly left along with other questions for being decided by the learned Single Judge if and when such application for modification is filed by the Respondent". E 4. Thereafter, a detailed Order came to be passed by the learned Company Judge on 22.8.2003 rejecting the prayer for re-hearing or modification of the consent Order, primarily on the premise that the so-called junior and an inexperienced F counsel had rightly made the statement that the admitted debt would be paid in installments. The learned Company Judge had recorded that the Respondent Company was fully aware that Winding-up petitions were going to be admitted, which situation is always stigmatic and therefore to be strenuously G avoided since it inexorably leads to a commercial death. The learned Company Judge found the conduct of the Respondent not to be _bona fide._ The second salvo of litigation, therefore, proved to be unsuccessful so _far_ as the Respondent is H concerned as the petition/application was dismissed by the STANTECH PROJECTENGG. PVT. LTD. v. NICCO 169 CORPORATION LTD. [VIKRAMAJITSEN,J.] Company Judge with costs assessed at 600 GMs. Thereafter, A these Orders dated 24.7.2002 came to be assailed once again before the Division Bench, which then passed the Orders now impugned before us. The Division Bench was of the view that the concession was made mistakenly by the counsel appearing forthe Respondent and on this predication, the Order was set B aside and the Company Petition was remanded to be heard once again. 5. We find no justification whatsoever, in law or in equity, for the rationale adopted by the Division Bench in the impugned C Order. The Company Judge had no alternative but to proceed for Winding up of the Respondent Company since it had failed to discharge the admitted debt even after the service of the afore-noted statutory notice. The said junior Advocate of the Respondent had, in fact, displayed legal sagacity in getting D the winding-up of the Company postponed and avoided the publication in the Winding-up petition by praying for and obtaining leave to pay the debt in installments. Had he not done so, the Respondent would have had to pay the entire debit at once or face certain commercial death as a E consequence publication/citation of Winding-up petition. It is note worthy that the Respondent so is transacting business even today. The Division Bench has been inexplicably and unjustifiably considerate towards the Respondent. It is this F kind of leniency that results in proliferation and prolongation of litigation, which approach has led to an almost insurmountable pendency of litigation. Learned counsel for the Appellant rightly relies on the decisions of this Court in Shrimati JamilabaiAbdul Kadarv. Shankarial Gulabchand (1975)2 SCC 609 and State G of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) 2 SCC 463. · 6. We accordingly set aside the common impugned Order of the Division Bench of the High Court. The Respondent has abused the judicial process in order to delay the discharge of H [2015] 9 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 170 - A an acknowledged debt for almost a quarter of a century, in which period it has continued in business. 7. These Appeals are allowed. We, however, modify the Orders of the learned Single Judge by directing the . B Respondent to pay the said admitted dues of Rs.3,54,500/and Rs.8,08.314/-togetherwith interest atthe rate often per cent per annum, as also the costs imposed by the learned Company Judge at 600 GMs. If the two sums of TDS of Rs.1,09,958/- and Rs.1,24,984/- have not been deposited with C the Income Tax Department, these sums shall also be paid to the Appellant. The Respondent shall also pay to the Appellant the costs of these proceedings quantified at Rs.20,000/-. All these amounts are payable within 45 days from today. No extension for payment shall be granted since the D . accommodation and the indulgence granted by the learned Company Judge has been abused by the Respondent. In the event of failure to make the above mentioned payments, the Appellant shall be entitled to once again move the learned Company Judge, who will thereupon admit the Winding-up E petition, and proceed with expedition under the relevant provisions of law. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.