High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeWrit petition dismissed; however, right to appe...

Sreejith V.M. v. State of Kerala and Others

Case / Petition Number:WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Anil K. Narendran
Judgment Date
2019-06-07
Court Decision / Holding
The writ petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner retains the right to challenge Ext.P5 through a statutory appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Final Disposition
Writ petition dismissed; however, right to appeal under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is preserved.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Sreejith V.M.

Respondents

  • The State of Kerala
  • The Joint Regional Transport Officer, Regional Transport Office, Thrissur
  • The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Civil Station, Thrissur
  • The Thrissur Corporation represented by its Secretary

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri. V.A. Johnson (Varikkappallil)

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri S. P. Poduval, SC, Thrissur
  • • Sri Harish K.P., Senior Government Pleader
  • • Government Pleader for respondents 1-3

Case Synopsis & Summary

The petitioner, Sreejith V.M., is the registered owner of autorickshaw KL-08/BS-5541, holding Ext.P3 registration and Ext.P4 contract carriage permit. The permit permits him to ply on all fit roads in Thrissur district, but bars parking or picking up within the city, mandating parking at Poochatty Panchayat. He sought variation of the permit’s parking condition to Naduvilal, Thrissur, but Ext.P5 (11.04.2019) rejected this request (3rd respondent). He approached the High Court under Article 226 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P5 and a mandamus to issue a permit with the proposed parking variation. Reliance was placed on Ext.P6, a State Transport Appellate Tribunal order in MVAA No.408/2012 (a different case) related to variation of a contract carriage permit. The respondents contended Ext.P5 is an appealable order under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and that writ jurisdiction should not bypass statutory remedies. The Court examined well‑established principles that, where an efficacious statutory remedy exists, a writ petition under Article 226 is typically not entertained, citing Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Das Agarwal, Mathew K.C., Thansingh Nathmal, Titaghur Paper Mills, and related authorities. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was given a right to challenge Ext.P5 via a statutory appeal under Section 89 of the MV Act, 1988, thus preserving the statutory remedy route.

Provisions of Law Cited

Article 226 of the Constitution of IndiaSection 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The remedy provided by the statute must be followed; when a statute provides a complete remedy, escalation through the statute is mandatory.
  • Where a right or liability is created by a statute which provides a complete machinery for enforcement, the remedy provided by the statute must be availed of.
  • A writ under Article 226 is discretionary and ordinarily should not bypass an efficacious statutory remedy; exceptions apply only in well-defined circumstances.
  • Discretionary nature of Article 226 jurisdiction: relief is not a free license to review questions requiring elaborate fact-finding or to act as a court of appeal against a tribunal’s decision.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner argued for quashing Ext.P5 and issuing relief by permitting variation of the parking condition, citing Ext.P6 (MVAA 408/2012) to show Tribunal support for a similar variation. He contended that Ext.P5 unjustly restricts his business activity and that essential statutory remedies must be available to challenge administrative decisions, particularly when formulating or enforcing transport permits. The petition stressed the need for timely redress and questioned the reasoning in Ext.P5, seeking mandamus for permit modification.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that Ext.P5 is subject to statutory remedy under Section 89 of the MV Act, 1988 and should be challenged before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal rather than through a writ petition. They relied on established authorities to urge restraint in entertaining writs where efficacious remedies exist and emphasized that the statutory mechanism provides the appropriate forum for redressal, without undermining the policy objectives behind regulating transportation permits.

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Das Agarwal[(2014) 1 SCC 603]PositiveUsed to establish the rule that a writ under Article 226 should not be entertained where an efficacious alternative remedy exists; discretionary and policy-based restraint.
Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.[(2018) 3 SCC 85]PositiveAffirms that Article 226 jurisdiction is not absolute and should be exercised with regard to available statutory remedies.
Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes[AIR 1964 SC 1419]PositiveConstitutes a foundational principle that High Courts should refrain from interfering where statutory remedies exist or where the jurisdiction would bypass statutory forums.
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa[(1983) 2 SCC 433]PositiveAffirms the necessity to rely on statutory remedies for redressal of rights and liabilities created by statute.
Wolverhampton Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford[(1859) 6 CBNS 336]PositiveHistorical articulation of the principle that statutory remedies must be followed.
Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.[1919 AC 368]PositiveEarly authority reinforcing the statutory-remedy doctrine.
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co.[1935 AC 532]PositiveFurther reinforcement of statutorily provided remedies.
Secretary of State v. Mask and Co.[AIR 1940 PC 105]PositivePCC decision aligning with the statutory-remedy principle.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **FRIDAY, THE 07TH DAY OF JUNE 2019 / 17TH JYAISHTA, 1941** ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019** ## **PETITIONER:** **SREEJITH.V.M, AGED 36 YEARS, S/O. MOHANAN, VYLOOKARAN HOUSE, KUTTICHIRA ROAD, OLLUKKARA P.O, SOUHRITHA NAGAR, KALATHODE, THRISSUR.** **BY ADV. SRI.V.A.JOHNSON (VARIKKAPPALLIL)** ## **RESPONDENTS:** |**1**|**THE STATE OF KERALA**| |---|---| ||**REPRESENTED BY CHIEF SECRETARY, SECRETARIAT,**| ||**THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.**| |**2**|**THE JOINT REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER,**| ||**REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICE, THRISSUR - 680 003.**| |**3**|**THE SECRETARY**| ||**REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, CIVIL STATION,**| ||**THRISSUR - 680 003.**| |**4**|**THE THRISSUR CORPORATION**| ||**THE OFFICE OF THE THRISSUR CORPORATION,**| ||**THRISSUR - 680 001,**| ||**REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.**| ||**BY ADV. SRI. SANTHOSH P.PODUVAL, SC, THRISSUR**| ||**CORPORATION**| ||**SRI HARISH K.P. - SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER**| **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 07.06.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 2** ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner who is the registered owner of an autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-08/BS-5541, covered by Ext.P3 certificate of registration and Ext.P4 contract carriage permit, whereby he has been permitted to ply the said autorickshaw in all fit roads of Thrissur district, subject to the condition that the said vehicle shall not park or pick up passengers from and within the city, with parking place at Poochatty Panchayat area. The petitioner moved an application seeking variation of the conditions of permit in so far as the parking place is concerned, in order to change the parking place to Naduvilal, Thrissur. The said application now stands rejected by Ext.P5 order dated 11.04.2019 of the 3[rd] respondent. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P5 order; and a writ of mandamus commanding the 3[rd] respondent to issue permit to the petitioner's autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-08/BS5541. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would place ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 3** reliance on Ext.P6 order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam in MVAA No.408/2012, which is an order passed by the Tribunal in an appeal filed under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the order rejecting the application for variation of the conditions of a contract carriage permit of another autorickshaw. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 4[th] respondent Corporation. 4. The sole issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P5 order dated 11.04.2019 of the 3[rd] respondent, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Admittedly, Ext.P5 order of the 3[rd] respondent is appealable before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in view of the provisions under Section 89 of the Act. The said Act fact is not in dispute. 6. In **Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Das Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]** , the Apex Court held that ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 4** non-entertainment of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule and self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the existence of alternative remedy. However, High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same, unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exists sufficient ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 7. In **Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.[(2018) 3 SCC 85]** the Apex Court reiterated that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 5** India ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in **Chaabil Das Agarwal's case (supra)** , i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. After referring to the law laid down in **Thansingh** **Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [AIR 1964 SC 1419]** and **Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2 SCC 433]** the Apex Court held that High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 6** 8. In **Thansingh Nathmal's case (supra)** a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily, the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not, therefore, act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 7** correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. 9. In **Titaghur Paper Mills' case (supra)** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in **Wolverhampton New** ## **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 8** **Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336]** at page 356 in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute ..... But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it ..... the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in that passage was approved by the House of Lords in **Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.[1919 AC 368]** and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in **Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. [1935 AC 532] and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. [AIR** **1940 PC 105]** . It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights and has been followed by the Apex Court throughout. 10. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for challenging **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 9** Ext.P5 order dated 11.04.2019 of the 3[rd] respondent, on the grounds raised in this writ petition. In such circumstances, this writ petition filed on 06.06.2019 is dismissed for the aforesaid reason; however, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to challenge Ext.P5 order by filing a statutory appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, invoking the provisions under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. **Sd/ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE** sru **WP(C).No. 15622 of 2019 10** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE RATION CARD NO.1841206242. EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE OFFER LETTER TO THE PETITIONER ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT. EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE VEHICLE BEARING REGISTRTION NO.KL 08 BS 5541. EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE CONTRACT CARRIAGE PERMIT OF THE VEHICLE BEARING REGISTRATION NO.KL 08 BS 5541. EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.G 12/3690/19 R DATED 11.4.2019 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN M.V.A.A.NO.408/2012 OF THE STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ERNAKULAM DATED 11.12.2012.**