Sree Gokulam Chit and Finance Co (P) Ltd. v. S Prathiba Uthradam and State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR** **TUESDAY, THE 5[TH] DAY OF DECEMBER 2023 / 14TH AGRAHAYANA,** ## **1945** **CRL.L.P. NO.407 OF 2023** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 11.01.2017 IN S.T.NO.604/2013 OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE ,KOLLAM** ## **PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT:** **SREE GOKULAM CHIT AND FINANCE CO(P) LTD. BISHOP JEROME NAGAR, KOLLAM, REPRESENTED BY ITS DEPUTY MANAGER, SUNIL KUMAR M.G., S/O.GOPALAKRISHNAN PANICKER, SREE GOKULAM CHIT AND FINANCE CO.(P) LTD., KOLLAM BRANCH, AT BISHOP JEROME NAGAR, KOLLAM. BY ADVS. K.S.BABU N.SUDHA** ## **RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED & STATE:** - **1 S.PRATHIBHA UTHRADAM, VETTILATHAZHAM, DECENT JUNCTION P.O., KOLLAM, PINCODE - 691 577.** **2 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI - 31. BY ADVS. K.G.BINDU T.S.MAYA (THIYADIL)(K/140/1995)** **THIS CRIMINAL LEAVE PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 05.12.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** 2 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J.** **----------------------------------------------------------Crl.L.P.No.407 of 2023 ----------------------------------------------------------Dated this the 5[th] day of December, 2023** ## **O R D E R** ## Crl.M.A.No.1 of 2021 This is a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963. Delay of 1357 days in filing the petition for leave to appeal is sought to be condoned. 2. The reasons stated for the delay are the following: The counsel for the petitioner appearing before the court below failed to submit an application for getting a certified copy in time. Only after repeated enquiry by the legal clerk of the petitioner, an application was come to be filed on 16.11.2019. A certified copy of the judgment was received by the petitioner on 09.12.2019 and delay again occurred in handing over the said copy to the petitioner. It is contended that not because of the negligence on the part of the petitioner, but on account of the inaction on the part of the counsel, the delay had occurred. Accordingly, the 3 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 petitioner seeks to condone the delay. 3. The 1[st] respondent filed a counter affidavit. It is contended that the period of delay stated is incorrect and the actual period of delay is 2374 days. The further contention is that the reason stated for the delay by the petitioner is totally false. The further plea is that in order to harass the 1[st] respondent alone, the present petition has been filed after the lapse of a long period. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the 1[st] respondent and also the learned Public Prosecutor. 5. The impugned judgment was rendered on 11.01.2017. It is seen that the petition for leave, which is dated 15.12.2020 was submitted before this Court on 18.01.2021. From the facts stated by the petitioners, it is seen that there occurred delay in getting certified copy of the impugned judgment and also in submitting the petition for leave after getting a certified copy. The reasons stated is that the counsel appearing for the petitioner before the court below took a recalcitrant attitude in making application for 4 ## Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 getting a certified copy. The contention of the 1[st] respondent that the delay is actually 2374 days is based on the assumption that the petition for leave was actually filed before this Court only on 16.09.2023. That is incorrect. As stated, the petition for leave was submitted before this Court as early as on 18.01.2021 itself. So the number of days calculated by the petitioner is correct. The question is whether there is sufficient reason to condone the delay? 6. In **Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107]** , in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court held that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. 7. In **Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649]** the Apex Court while summarising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay held that, the 5 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The Apex Court held further that, there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. Para.21 of the judgment reads thus; - “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 No presumption can be attached to deliberate 6 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7 The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the 7 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” [underlines supplied] ## 8. In **Rafeek and another v. K. Kamarudeen and** **another [2021 (4) KHC 34]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, though the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, as held by the Apex Court in **Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107]** , the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play, as held by the Apex Court in **Esha Bhattacharjee** 8 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 **[(2013) 12 SCC 649]** . Inordinate delay, which attracts doctrine of prejudice, warrants strict approach, whereas, a delay of short duration or few days, which may not attract doctrine of prejudice, calls for a liberal delineation. 9. The period of delay is inordinate. The petitioner is an institution, where competent persons, have been employed for looking after its legal matters. That is evident from the averments in the affidavit that the legal clerk of the company was repeatedly enquiring to the counsel regarding submission for application for a certified copy and also the availing of the certified copy of the judgment. When such an institution is the complainant, it cannot be treated at par with private individual. Vagaries and difficulties used to be confronted by private individuals cannot be an excuse for a corporate institution. 10. There must be sufficient justification and explanation if the delay of long period occasioned in filing a petition is to be condoned. The reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the present petition are insufficient when considered in the light of the law laid down 9 Crl.L.P No.407 of 2023 in the aforementioned decisions. Also, on account of such a long delay, the right flowing from the order of acquittal has become settled and final. Resumption of the proceedings after such a long period, would cause prejudice to the 1[st] respondent also. Accordingly I am of the view that this is not a case where the discretion of this Court can be exercised in favour of the petitioner to condone the delay. Hence this petition fails and is dismissed. Consequently leave petition is dismissed. **Sd/P.G. AJITHKUMAR JUDGE** PV