Special Tahsildar (LA) v Gee Varghese Sureju & The Kerala Upa Lok Ayukta, W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018

W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 1 : IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY THURSDAY, THE 4[TH] DAY OF AUGUST 2022 / 13TH SRAVANA, 1944 ## WP(C) NO. 7957 OF 2018 ## PETITIONER: THE SPECIAL TAHASILDAR (LA), GENERAL COLLECTORATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM COLLECTORATE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 043. BY ADV GOVERNMENT PLEADER ## RESPONDENT/S: - 1 GEE VARGHESE SUREJU TC 25/3525, THURUTHIYIL SUMESH VILLA, UPPALAMROAD, UR 123 A, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-1. - 2 THE KERALA UPA LOK AYUKTA REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, LEGISLATIVE COMPLEX,VIKAS BHAVAN P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 033. BY ADV SRI.BIJU BALAKRISHNAN SRI. S RENJITH, SPL. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.08.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 2 : ## **S. MANIKUMAR, CJ & SHAJI P. CHALY, J.** --------------------------------------------------------W.P.(C) No. 7957 of 2018 --------------------------------------------------------Dated this the 4[th ] day of August, 2022. ## **JUDGMENT** ## **SHAJI P. CHALY, J.** This writ petition is filed by the Special Tahsildlar, LA (General), challenging Exts.P3, P4 and P5 orders dated 17.12.2013, 24.01.2018 and 20.02.2018 passed by the Lok Ayukta in Complaint No. 1785/2012B, whereby the Land Acquisition Officer, was directed to send reference application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('Act, 1894' for short) in respect of 0.47 sq. meters of land comprised in survey No. 380 (re-Survey No. 2/28) of Sasthamangalam Village belonging to the complainant/first respondent and acquired for the development of the Vellayambalam-Sasthamangalam village, and the consequential orders seeking action taken report respectively . 2. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows: The property, belonging to the complainant/first respondent herein, having an extent of 0.47 sq. meters comprised in the above specified survey and village, was acquired for the development of Vellayambalam-Sasthamangalam road under the Capital Region W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 3 : Development Programme. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 was published on 10.09.2007 and later, after completing the proceedings, an award was passed on 25.02.2009 fixing compensation to be paid to the first respondent. The property was taken possession on 08.01.2009. The complaint was filed before the Lok Ayukta alleging that even though a reference application was given by the complainant/first respondent to the Land Acquisition Authority, no reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 was made to the competent Sub Court, and therefore, the petitioner/respondent in the complaint is guilty of maladministration. 3. The case projected by the first respondent in the complaint was that he sent an application for reference by registered post on 03.03.2009 and a reminder by registered post on 06.03.2009; however, no action was taken by the petitioner on that application. It is further alleged that on 29.02.2012, the complainant sent a notice by registered post to the petitioner requesting to refer the case on the basis of the reference application dated 03.03.2009. But, even after receipt of that notice, the petitioner did not refer the case to the Sub Court. In the complaint, yet another submission made is that the Officer now in charge had told him that the entire file, including the reference application of the complainant, was missing. 4. In the complaint, the petitioner has filed a statement stating W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 4 : that he did not receive any reference application given by the first respondent and according to him, on examining the file, it was seen that the complainant had given an application on 03.03.2009 requesting return of his original documents. But, no application for reference was filed by him and therefore, there was no application available on the files of the petitioner to make a reference to the Sub Court. 5.Apparently, the first respondent had produced a copy of the postal receipt to show that the reference application was sent to the Land Acquisition Officer on 03.03.2009; and a notice issued by the Advocate of the petitioner in the year 2012 requesting to make a reference under Section 18 of Act, 1894 on the basis of an application given by him on 03.03.2009 . However, according to the petitioner, no such application seeking reference was received on 03.03.2009. It is further stated that there were 10 Special Tahsildars (LA), Thiruvananthapuram and hence, even if the application for reference was sent by the first respondent, it would not have reached the proper office, which had to make a reference to the Sub Court. Other contentions were also raised by the petitioner before the Upa Lok Ayukta. 6. The Upa Lok Ayukta, after taking into account the rival contentions, and appreciating the documents produced, has W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 5 : categorically arrived at a finding that, along with the statement filed by the petitioner, copy of application given by the complainant to Special Tahsildar for return of documents is produced; but, mere fact that on 03.03.2009, the complainant gave an application for return of documents, that alone is not sufficient to hold that on 03.03.2009, the complainant did not give an application for reference. 7. It is further found that the documents produced by the complainant would go to show that he sent an application for reference dated 03.03.2009 to the Land Acquisition Officer for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. But, in spite of that, no reference is being made to the Sub Court, which resulted in an injustice and hardship to the complainant. It is, thus, challenging the illegality and correctness of the said findings and the directions issued accordingly as specified above that the writ petition is filed by the Special Tahsildar, LA (General), Thiruvananthapuram. 8. The paramount contention advanced is that the Upa Lok Ayukta ought to have considered the fact that the petitioner has not committed any mal administration as alleged in the complaint, especially when the question regarding the acceptance of reference application is a disputed question of fact and no evidence was produced by the complainant/first respondent to reach the conclusion that the reference application has been properly submitted by the W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 6 : petitioner. 9. It is also submitted that presumption of receipt of reference application sent by post would be applicable, only if it was sent to the addressee in the correct address. The postal receipt dated 06.06.2009 produced by the first respondent before the Upa Lok Ayukta would show that the same has been addressed in a wrong address. Moreover, in the Thiruvananthapuram Revenue District, the Revenue Department has not created any post as Special Tahsildar (LA), Thiruvananthapuram. It is also contended that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 ('Act, 1897' for short), presumption of service of notice can be made only when it is sent in the correct address by registered post. Therefore, the sum and substance of the submission is that unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice cannot be deemed to be made. 10. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the first respondent has failed to prove the filing of the reference application within the time period prescribed under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. It is also the contention of the petitioner that he is bound under the Act, 1894 to make a reference, only if a valid application is submitted within the time period provided under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that he has produced Ext. P2 postal receipt W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 7 : dated 06.03.2009 to show that a letter was posted by him to the Tahsildar, Thiruvananthapuram and further that Ext. P3 order was passed by the Upa Lok Ayukta on 17.12.2013; however, the writ petition was filed only on 06.03.2018. It is also submitted that when Ext. P2 postal receipt dated 06.03.2009 is produced by the first respondent before the Lok Ayukta, it is clear that the letter was addressed to the petitioner on 06.03.2009 and it was incumbent upon the petitioner to produce necessary proof in order to establish that such a letter was not received by him. 12. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the finding of the Upa Lok Ayukta that since there was delay and laches on the part of the petitioner to refer the application within a reasonable time, there is administration, and accordingly the Lok Ayukta was justified in issuing the directions contained in Ext. P3 order and consequential orders namely Exts.P4 and P5 dated 24.01.2018 and 20.02.2018 respectively directing the petitioner to submit an action taken report. 13. We have heard the learned Special Government Pleader Sri. S. Ranjit appearing for the petitioner and Adv. Sri. Biju Balakrishnan for the first respondent. 14. The foremost question that emerges for consideration is whether there was any proof before the Upa Lok Ayukta with respect W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 8 : to a reference application submitted by the first respondent. The predominant contention advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent is that Ext. P2 postal receipt dated 06.03.2009 makes it clear that a letter was posted by the first respondent to the Tahsildar, Sasthamangalam, Thiruvananthapuram. 15. On a perusal of Ext. P2 produced along with the writ petition and which is relied upon by the first respondent for sending the reference application to the petitioner, it is evident and clear that there is no name of the first respondent in the said postal receipt. It contains only the brief address to which the letter was made i.e., Special Tahsildar (LA), Thiruvananthapuram; apart from the same, the other details with respect to the post office and payment effected alone are contained in Ext. P2. Moreover, from Ext. P1 complaint, what we could gather is that, the complainant had a case that he had received the award amount under protest and sent a reference application on 03.03.2009, and also a reminder reference application through registered post on 06.03.2009. 16. But, fact remains, the application dated 03.03.2009 was produced by the petitioner before the Lok Ayukta and the Lok Ayukta has found that in the said application, the complainant has made a request for return of the original document. However, the Lok Ayukta presumes that merely because in the application produced by the W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 9 : petitioner, only a request to return the documents alone was made, that by itself is not a conclusive circumstance to show that no other request was made on 03.03.2009. 17. We are unable to agree with the said finding basically for the reason that when the first respondent has made a complaint before the Upa Lok Ayukta with regard to the maladministration of the petitioner, the first respondent had to produce the basic and necessary documents to show that a reference application was submitted by the petitioner either on 03.03.2009 or on 06.03.2009. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a presumption is available under Section 27 of the Act, 1897, we are of the view that a presumption can be drawn under Section 27 of the Act, 1897, only if the parameters provided thereunder are complied with by the complainant. 18. That apart , when the complainant had a case that, apart from the application requesting to return the original document, another application seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 was made, it was for the complainant to establish the same before the Upa Lok Ayukta. The complainant did not have a case at all in Ext. P1, complaint, that in the letter forwarded to the petitioner, on 03.03.2009, there were two applications, i.e., one for return of documents and the other for reference. Whatever that be, as we have W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 10 : pointed out above, even though the complainant has heavily relied upon Ext. P2 postal receipt dated 06.03.2009, on a perusal of the said document, there is no evidence at all on the face of that record to show that any letter was sent by the first respondent and for which the registration receipt was issued by the postal authority. 19. Section 27 of the Act, which deals with 'meaning of service by post', reads thus: “27 **Meaning of service by post.** Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression serve or either of the expressions give or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 20. It therefore means that a presumption can be drawn, only if the parameters provided thereunder are satisfied by the sender of the post. However, in the case on hand, there is no _prima facie_ proof produced by the complainant to establish the same. Further, Section 18 of Act, 1894, which deals with reference to court’ reads thus: “18. Reference to Court. - (1) Any person interested W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 11 : who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.” 21. The Land Acquisition Authority can forward a reference application, only if it is received within the time period prescribed under Section 18 of the Act, 1897. There is no evidence that any application was received by the authority in accordance with the prescription contained under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. This question was considered by us in _**Special Tahsildar v. Chandramathy**_ [2021 (2) KLT 748] in the matter of an order passed by the Upa Lok Ayukta. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus: “14. Having admitted the date of receipt of the award as W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 12 : 25.06.2003, at any stretch of imagination, it can only be concluded that the applications seen in the files are outside the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to S.18(2) of the Act, 1894.Therefore, in our considered opinion, the Lokayukta absolutely overlooked the imperative conditions contained under S.18 of Act, 1894, and without any evidence to the objection dated 17.07.2003 made to the Collector, merely to save the respondents from the harsh requirements of law, accepted the contention of the respondents that such an objection was submitted by the respondents before the Collector. We also have no doubt in our mind to say that the burden of proof of making the objection was on the respondents which was not discharged even prima facie. 15. As we have pointed out above, the proviso to S.18(2) is mandatory in all respects. A reference to a few of the decisions would make the situation very clear. The relevance and importance of the proviso to S.18(2) of Act, 1894 is very well reflected in the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Mahalekshmi Jayanthi v. State of Kerala (1989 (1) KLT 875). Paragraph 8 of the said decision reads thus: “8 . As per S.18 of Act 1 of 1894, any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by a written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for determination of the Court. It contemplates a written application to the Collector. Clause (2) of that Section together with the proviso makes it clear that the said application to the Collector should be within six weeks from W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 13 : the date of receipt of the notice under S.12. A reading of the above provisions proves beyond doubt that the written application should be to the Collector and it must be within the period prescribed in the Section. This means that the application should reach the Collector within the period fixed therein. Can an application entrusted with the postal authorities for being delivered to the Collector within the period prescribed by the Act 1 of 1894 but delivered to the Collector after the expiry of the period be taken as a reference application contemplated by the Section? Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner brought to my notice the decision in Achuthan v. State of Kerala (1982 KLT 466) in support of his argument that the reference application posted before the expiry of the period is a valid reference application even if it reaches the Collector beyond the said period. Since a different view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. C.R.Viran (1984 KLT 837), the above decision cannot help the petitioner. The Division Bench after analysing the provisions of S.20 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act which is on identical terms as S.18 of Act 1 of 1894, laid down the following requirements to satisfy a valid reference application: (1) a person interested in the award, but who has not accepted it; (2) a written application by such a person to the Collector; (3) a prayer in that application that the matter be referred to court; (4) specification in the application of the grounds of objection and (5) making of it within the time prescribed. As regards requirements (1), (2), (4) and (5) their Lordships took the view that the law is practically settled that no reference at all could be made to civil court in their absence. It means that the person interested in the award should file a written application to the Collector, specifying his ground of objection, within the time prescribed by the Statute. From this it is clear that the reference application should be to the Collector within the time prescribed by the statute. It cannot be to the post office, as contended by the petitioner. This aspect can be examined in another angle. Take a case where the petition is lost in transit. Can that petition be treated as a proper petition?The applicant has done whatever is possible W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 14 : by him. Can he be made to suffer for the laches of the postal authorities? The answer is quite evident. Such an application is not one coming under the purview of S.18. If the application is not made to the Collector there cannot be a reference to court. For a valid reference the application to Collector must be within the period prescribed. In these circumstances I have no hesitation in holding that the reference application under S.18 of Act 1 of 1894 should be to the Collector, within the period prescribed by the provisos to clause (2) of that Section. Since the reference application, Ext.P6 was received by the second respondent on 8-8-1984 only, it was beyond the period fixed by the Section. Consequently, the second respondent was justified in refusing to refer the matter to the civil court. Ext.P7 order of the second respondent calls for no interference.” 16. Likewise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of limitation prescribed under S.28A of the Act, 1894, which is almost typical to the proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, 1894 in regard to the redetermination of the compensation, a statutory benefit available to an aggrieved person who has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act, 1894, in the decision in Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors. (2013 (2) KLT OnLine 1102 (SC) = (2013) 10 SCC 765). Paragraphs 13 to 16 are relevant to the context, which read thus: “13. This Court in Union of India v. Mangatu Ram ((1997) 6 SCC 59 : AIR 1997 SC 2704) and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. ((1997) 6 SCC 280) dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi-judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section 28-A of the Act, has to be filed W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 15 : within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28-A of the Act. The said provisions require that an application for redetermination is to be filed within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award. 14. In State of A.P. v. Marri Venkaiah (2003 (2) KLT OnLine 1212 (SC) = (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949) , this Court reconsidered the aforesaid judgments including the judgment in Harish Chandra Raj Singh (AIR 1961 SC 1500) and held that the statute provides limitation of 3 months from the date of award by the court excluding the time required for obtaining the copy from the date of award. It has no relevance so far as the date of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant is concerned. In view of the express language of the statute, the question of knowledge did not arise and, therefore, the plea of the applicants that limitation of 3 months would begin from the date of knowledge, was clearly unsustainable and could not be accepted. The Court also rejected the contention of the applicants that a beneficial legislation should be given a liberal interpretation observing that whosoever wants to take advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take appropriate action within the time-limit prescribed under the statute. Such an applicant must at least be vigilant in making efforts to find out whether the other landowners have filed any reference application and if so, what is the result thereof. If that is not done then the law cannot help him. The ratio of the judgment in Harish Chandra Raj Singh (AIR 1961 SC 1500) was held to be non-applicable in case of S.28-A of the Act. The Court observed: (Marri Venkaiah case (2003 (2) KLT OnLine 1212 (SC) = (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949), SCC pp.284-85, paras 11-12) “11. ... In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso to Section 18 of the Act and held that clause {a) of the proviso was not applicable in the said case because the person W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 16 : making the application was not present or was not represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award. The Court also held that notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) was also not issued, therefore, that part of clause (b) of the proviso would not be applicable. The Court, therefore, referred to the second part of the proviso which provides that such application can be made within six months from the date of the Collector’s award. In the context of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, the Court held that the award by the Land Acquisition Officer is an offer of market price by the State for purchase of the property. Hence, for the said offer, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the party affected by the award was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore, the second part of the proviso must mean the date when either the award was communicated to the party or was known by him either actually or constructively. 12. The aforesaid reasoning would not be applicable for interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no question of issuing notice to such an applicant as he is not a party to the reference proceeding before the court. The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is no duty cast upon the court to issue notice to the landowners who have not initiated proceedings for enhancement of compensation by filing reference applications; maybe, that their lands are acquired by a common notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. As against this, under Section 18 it is the duty of the Collector to issue notice either under Section 12(2) of the Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the date to be pronounced before passing of the award and if this is not done then the period prescribed for filing application under Section 18 is six months from the date of the Collector’s award.” (emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Des Raj ((2004) 7 SCC 753 = AIR 2004 SC 5003) and Chitrasen Bhoi W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 17 : ## ((2009) 17 SCC 74). 15. In view of the above, there is no occasion for us to consider the judgments cited at the Bar on behalf of the appellants in support of its case. More so, the said judgments have been delivered by this Court while dealing with the applications under S.18 of the Act. If there are directly applicable precedents on the issue, the same have to be followed rather than to search for a new interpretation unless it is established that the earlier judgments require reconsideration. The suggestion of reconsideration has specifically been rejected by this Court in Marri Venkaiah (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949). 16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1966 SC 529), AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma (2012 (4) KLT SN 139 (C.No.134) SC = (2012) 13 SCC 792 = AIR 2013 SC 30).)”. “13. This Court in Union of India v. Mangatu Ram ((1997) 6 SCC 59 : AIR 1997 SC 2704) and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. ((1997) 6 SCC 280) dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi-judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would not apply and, therefore, W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 18 : the application under Section 28-A of the Act, has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28-A of the Act. The said provisions require that an application for redetermination is to be filed within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award. 14. In State of A.P. v. Marri Venkaiah (2003 (2) KLT OnLine 1212 (SC) = (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949) , this Court reconsidered the aforesaid judgments including the judgment in Harish Chandra Raj Singh (AIR 1961 SC 1500) and held that the statute provides limitation of 3 months from the date of award by the court excluding the time required for obtaining the copy from the date of award. It has no relevance so far as the date of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant is concerned. In view of the express language of the statute, the question of knowledge did not arise and, therefore, the plea of the applicants that limitation of 3 months would begin from the date of knowledge, was clearly unsustainable and could not be accepted. The Court also rejected the contention of the applicants that a beneficial legislation should be given a liberal interpretation observing that whosoever wants to take advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take appropriate action within the time-limit prescribed under the statute. Such an applicant must at least be vigilant in making efforts to find out whether the other landowners have filed any reference application and if so, what is the result thereof. If that is not done then the law cannot help him. The ratio of the judgment in Harish Chandra Raj Singh (AIR 1961 SC 1500) was held to be non-applicable in case of S.28-A of the Act. The Court observed: (Marri Venkaiah case (2003 (2) KLT OnLine 1212 (SC) = (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949), SCC pp.284-85, paras 11-12) “11. ... In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso to Section 18 of the Act and held that clause {a) of the proviso W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 19 : was not applicable in the said case because the person making the application was not present or was not represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award. The Court also held that notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) was also not issued, therefore, that part of clause (b) of the proviso would not be applicable. The Court, therefore, referred to the second part of the proviso which provides that such application can be made within six months from the date of the Collector’s award. In the context of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, the Court held that the award by the Land Acquisition Officer is an offer of market price by the State for purchase of the property. Hence, for the said offer, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the party affected by the award was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore, the second part of the proviso must mean the date when either the award was communicated to the party or was known by him either actually or constructively. 12. The aforesaid reasoning would not be applicable for interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no question of issuing notice to such an applicant as he is not a party to the reference proceeding before the court. The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is no duty cast upon the court to issue notice to the landowners who have not initiated proceedings for enhancement of compensation by filing reference applications; maybe, that their lands are acquired by a common notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. As against this, under Section 18 it is the duty of the Collector to issue notice either under Section 12(2) of the Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the date to be pronounced before passing of the award and if this is not done then the period prescribed for filing application under Section 18 is six months from the date of the Collector’s award.” (emphasis added) A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Des Raj ((2004) 7 SCC 753 = AIR 2004 SC 5003) and Chitrasen Bhoi W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 20 : ((2009) 17 SCC 74). 15. In view of the above, there is no occasion for us to consider the judgments cited at the Bar on behalf of the appellants in support of its case. More so, the said judgments have been delivered by this Court while dealing with the applications under S.18 of the Act. If there are directly applicable precedents on the issue, the same have to be followed rather than to search for a new interpretation unless it is established that the earlier judgments require reconsideration. The suggestion of reconsideration has specifically been rejected by this Court in Marri Venkaiah (2003) 7 SCC 280 = AIR 2003 SC 2949). 16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1966 SC 529), AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 21 : Prakash Sharma (2012 (4) KLT SN 139 (C.No.134) SC = (2012 17. Therefore it can be seen that the law is trite and well defined so far as the issue at hand is concerned and the land acquisition authority not being a court, has no power to condone the delay. Though a legal contention is also raised with respect to the power of Lokayukta to entertain such aspects as that of the one at hand, we have no hesitation to hold that if any valid application was submitted and it was kept pending for several years without being referred, it can only be seen and legally presumed that the act and the conduct of the concerned official is nothing but maladministration, which can be taken note of by the Lokayukta in terms of the provisions of the Lokayukta Act. Whatever that be, taking into account the factual and legal aspects discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the Lokayukta fell in error in directing the writ petitioner— Tahsildar to refer the matter to the Reference Court in contemplation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 1894. Upshot of the above discussion is that the Writ Petition is allowed and the order passed by the Lokayukta dated 05.08.2009 in Complaint No.599 of 2008 is quashed.” 22. Therefore, it can be seen that a presumption can be drawn on a registered letter, only if the letter is forwarded in the correct W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 22 : address to the addressee. In the case on hand, the petitioner has received a letter dated 03.03.2009 requesting him to return the documents to the first respondent, which was produced before the Upa Lok Ayukta. However, on a perusal of Ext. P2 registration receipt , it can never be presumed that it was sent to the petitioner in the correct address, which was the significant and basic factor to draw the presumption in contemplation of law. 23. Considering the facts and circumstances and the law involved in the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that interference is required to Ext. P3 order passed by the Upa Lok Ayukta, and the consequential orders seeking action taken reports sought for by the Upa Lok Ayukta as per Exts.P4 and P5 dated 24.01.2018 and 20.02.2018 respectively. Accordingly, we set aside the said impugned orders. Writ petition is allowed accordingly. sd/- **S. MANIKUMAR, CHIEF JUSTICE.** sd/- **SHAJI P. CHALY, JUDGE.** _Rv_ W.P.(C) No. 7957/2018 : 23 : ## APPENDIX OF WP(C) 7957/2018 PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS: EXHIBIT P1: TRUE COPY OF COMPLAINT NO.1785/2012 B FILED BEFORE THE HONOURABLE KERALA LOK AYUKTA. EXHIBIT P2: TRUE COPY OF THE POSTAL RECEIPT DATED 6.3.2009. EXHIBIT P3: TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT SENT BY THE HONOURABLE UPA LOK AYUKTA DATED 17.12.2013. EXHIBIT P4: TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER DATED 24.1.2018 OF THE HONOURABLE UPA LOK AYUKTA. EXHIBIT P5: TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 20.2.2018 IN COMPLAINT NO.1785/2012 B. ## RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS: NIL /True Copy/ rv PS To Judge.