High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; High Court’s judgment upheld;...

SMT. KASTURI v. GAON SABHA

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 351 of 1974

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Ranganath Misra
  • Kuldip Singh
Judgment Date
1989-07-27
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision that the disputed property constitutes 'land' under the Act and is liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha; it also affirmed that bhumidhari relief under section 11 is not maintainable in a Civil Court. Costs directed to be borne by the parties.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; High Court’s judgment upheld; costs"

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • SMT. Kasturi

Respondents

  • Gaon Sabha

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Rajinder Sachar, Sr. Adv. and K.C. Dua

Counsels for Respondents

  • • N.S. Das Babat and D.N. Puri

Case Synopsis & Summary

The plaintiff, SMT. Kasturi, sought a declaration that the disputed property included in the Gaon Sabha’s land records had vested in the Gaon Sabha under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, and prayed for bhumidhari rights under section 11. The suit contended the land was not “land” and not banjar (waste), and thus there was no vesting; the property was said to be used for fuel wood, ghats, and building stone. The trial court granted relief; the appellate courts affirmed, but the Delhi High Court reversed and dismissed the suit, holding that the property did fall within the Act’s broad definition of “land” and thereby became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha. The High Court further held that bhumidhari relief under section 11 was not maintainable in a Civil Court in view of section 185 read with Schedule I, as exclusive jurisdiction for such claims lies with Revenue Courts. This Court, upholding the High Court, reaffirmed that the definition of “land” under section 3(13) is wide and inclusive, and a land on which fuel wood is grown constitutes groveland. It rejected reliance on definitions from other statutes and emphasized that no digression from the Act’s own definition is permissible. The appeal was dismissed with costs directed to be borne by the parties.

Provisions of Law Cited

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - Section 3(13)Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - Section 11Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - Section 154(1)(i)-(vii)Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - Section 185Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 - Schedule I

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Statutory Interpretation: External aid—Word defined in another statute containing a different meaning—Not to be relied upon.
  • It is impermissible to rely on definitions containing meanings different from the definition under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 for determining the dispute.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The plaintiff contends that the suit land did not constitute 'land' under section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and therefore there was no vesting in law. She seeks a declaration of bhumidhari rights under section 11 but argues that the land is not banjar and does not fall within the vesting provisions of sections 154(1)(i)-(vii). The appellant relies on the land being used for fuel wood, ghats, and building stone to argue that the property did not fall within the inclusive definition of 'land' and should not vest in the Gaon Sabha.

Contentions of Respondents

The Gaon Sabha contends that the property falls within the wide definition of 'land' under section 3(13) and is therefore subject to vesting under the Act. It argues that bhumidhari relief under section 11 is not maintainable in Civil Court due to the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Courts under section 185 and Schedule I, and that the High Court correctly held that the property became gaon sabha land.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Hatti v. Sunder Singh[1971] 2 SCR 163PositiveEstablished that a claim under section 11 for bhumidhari rights is not maintainable in Civil Court; exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Revenue Courts.
Nemi Chand v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab & Anr.AIR 1964 (51) Punjab 373Mentioned OnlyCited in discussion on land definitions from other statutes; not adopted as controlling authority in light of the Act's own definition.
Rajinder Prashad & Anr. v. The Punjab State & Ors.AIR 1966 (53) Punjab 185Mentioned OnlyFull Bench decision cited and discussed but not relied upon due to the Act’s own definition of land.
Munshi Ram & Ors. v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & Ors.[1979] 1 SCC 471Mentioned OnlyCited in context of land meanings; not treated as controlling authority in light of the Delhi Act’s inclusive definition.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

### _f_ I SMT. KASTURI (DEAD) BY L.RS. A _v._ GAON SABHA \ JULY 27, 1989 [RANGANATH MISRA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.] B ~ _Delhi Land_ _Reforms Act,_ _1954:_ _Section 3( 13),_ _I I,_ _154,_ _185-_ , _Land'-When_ _vest_ _in_ _Gaon Sabha-Civil Suit-Declaration_ _of_ _bhumidhari right-Whether maintainable._ ###### Statutory Interpretation: External aid-Word defined in another c _statute containing different meaning-Not to be relied upon._ "" _Words_ _&_ _Phrases:_ _'Land'-'Garden'-'Grove'-Meaning of._ The appellant-plaintiff sued for declaration that inclusion of the disputed property in the land records of the respondent-Gaon Sabha on 'D the basis that it had vested under the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 was wrong, void and without jurisdiction, and for a **further declaration that she was entitied to bhumidhari rights in the** property under section 11 of the Act. In paragraph 4(d) of tbe plaint, it was pleaded that the suit land was not 'land' and was not banjar (waste) #### .J. and did not come within section 154(1)(i) to (vii) of the Act and, there- E fore, there was no vesting in law. The proprietor, according to the plaintiff, grew fuel wood and partly used the property as _ghatwars_ and used the stones for building purposes. ' I~ The suit was decreed in the trial court, and the 5'iid decree was affirmed in appeal, but at the instance of the respondent-defendant No. F 1-Gaon Sabha, the High Court in second appeal reversed the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the suit. The High 'Court found that the property came within the definition of 'land' and, therefore, was subjected to the legal incidence of the statutory provisions. In regard to the relief of hhumidhari rights, it held G that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable. Dismissing the appeal this Court, HELD: The definition of 'land' in section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 195.4 is wide. A land on which fuel wood is grown would H 59! 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1989] 3 S.C.R. A constitute groveland. In view of the inclusive definition of 'land', the _r--_ tinding or the High Court that the dispute property constituted land cannot be said to be wl'ODI!. [594C-D] B _Nemi Chand_ v. _Financial Commissioner, Punjab_ _&_ _Anr.,_ AIR 1964 (51) Pwtjab 373; _Rajinder Prashad_ _&_ _Anr._ v. _The Punjab State_ _&_ _Ors.,_ AIR 1966 (53) Pwtjab 185; _Munshi Ram_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Financial Com-_ ~ _missioner, Haryana_ _&_ _Ors.,_ [1979] l SCC 471; _Hatti_ v. _Sunder Singh,_ [1971] 2 SCR 163 referred to. - It is impermissible to rely .oo defmltions containiN meanings dlf. ferent from ~ definition under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 f~ C a proper resolution oftbe dispute. [595AI The High Court therefore came to the correct conclusion when it -.., held that the disputed property ~nstituted 'land' under the Act, and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act. [595B I D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil. Appeal No. 351 of 1974. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.2.1973 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 69of 1968. E Rajinder Sachar, Sr. Adv. and K.C. Dua for the Appellants. N.S. Das Babat and D.N. Puri forthe Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by . ## F RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal is by special leave and the ~\ sole legal representative of the original plaintiff is in appeal. The plaintiff sued for declaration that inclusion of the disputed property in the land records of the respondent Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested under the provisions of the Delhi Land G Reforms Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was wrong, void and without jurisdiction and for a further declaration that she was entitled to bhumidhari rights in the property under section 11 of the7 Act. Her suit was decreed in the trial court and the said decree was affirmedin appeal but at the instance of defendant no. 1, Gaon Sabha, the High Court in second appeal reversed the decrees of the courts H below and dismissed the suit. SMT. KASTURI _v._ GAON SABHA [MISRA, J.[ 593 The suit was instituted on 16.8.1966, The decision of this Court in tile case of _Hatti_ v, _Sunder Singh,_ [ 197!.] 2 SCR 163 settled the legal position that a claim under section 11 of the Act for declaration of bhumidhari right' was not maintainable in the Civil Court in view of section 185 of the Aci.read with Schedule I and'exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication of such claims vested in the appropriate Revenue Court. This position of law is not disputed before us. In regard to the relief of bhumidhari rights the High Court had, therefore, rightly held that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable. ~ · The only other submission advanced on behalf of the plaintiff for our consideration is that the disputed property did not constitute 'land' -., as defined in section 3( 13) of the Act and, therefore, the right, title and interest of the appellant as proprietor of the property was in no way affected by the provisions of the Act and the inclusion of the property in LR. 2 was void, and liable to vacation. In paragtaph 4(d) of the plaint, plaintiff pleaded that the suit land was not 'land' and was not _banjar_ (waste) and did not come within section 154( l)(i) to (vii) of the Act and, therefore, there was no vesting in law. Th.e proprie.tor, according to the plaintiff, grew fuel wood and partly used the property as _ghatwars_ and used the stones for building purposes. The High Court has found that the property came within the definition of 'land' and, therefore, was subjected to the legal incidence, of the statutory provisions. Section 3( 13) defines _land_ to mean: '· "land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes (a) buildings appurtenant therto, (b) village, abadis, (c) grovelands, ( d) lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for growing singharas and other produce or land in the **bed** **of a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation** The definition of land in the Act is wide and in paragraph 4( d) A B #### c D E F G H 594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 3 S.C.R. ~ A the admitted position is fuel wood was being grown on the property. 'Horticulture', 'garden' and 'groveland' in the absence of statutory definitions, would have the common parlance meaning. 'Horticulture', as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary indicates means: "the cultivation of a garden." ~·· B 'Garden', according to the Dictionary, means "an area of land, usually planted with grass, trees, flower beds, etc.; an area of land used for the cultivation of oma' mental plants, herbs, fruit, vegetables, trees, etc. # \, * ·..ti A grove, as the Dictionary puts it means; "A small wood.; small woodland area or plantation''. A land on which fuel wood is grown would constitute groveland. ln view of the inclusive d<jfinition of 'land', the finding of the D High <Cqurt that the disputed property constituted land cannot be said to be wtong. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Punjab High Court in _Nemi Chand_ v. _Financial Commissioner, Punjab_ _&_ _Anr.,_ AIR #### 1964 (51) Punjab 373 where the meaning of /and'in Punjab Security of l. Land Tenures Act was under examination and the Court was called upon to decide whether _banjar Jadid_ and _banjar quadim_ came within E the definition. For that purpose the meaning of land occurring in the Tenures Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887 was examined, The ## Court also referred to the definition of land in Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900. In the presence of a definition in the Act under consideration', we find no justification to refer to definitions in diffe###### rent statutes for finding out whether the disputed property was land. ~ F Appellant's counsel also placed reliance on the decision of a Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of _Rajinder Prasad_ _&_ _Anr._ v. _The Punjab State_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1966 (53) Punjab 185. Here again the question for consideration was whether _gair mumkin_ land was land within the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. For the reason indiG cated above, we do not thihk that the appellant is entitled to any ##### _-j_ support from the Full Bench Judgment. Lastly, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in _Munshi Ram_ & _Ors._ v. _Financial Commis-_ _sioner, Haryana_ & _Ors.,_ [1979] 1SCC471. The Court was considering the true meaning of 'permissible area' under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and for that purpose the meaning of land was being H examined; whether _banjar Jadid_ should be excluded with reference to SMT. KASTURI '· GAON SABHA [MISRA, J.J 595 the meaning of land under the East Pun jab Displaced Persons (Land A Settlement) Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act was being debated before the Court. We do not think in view of the statutory definition any digration is necessary. It is impermissible to rely on definitions . l containing meanings different from the definition under the Act for a '"f proper resolution of the dispute. The High Court, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion when it held that the disputed property B constituted land under the Act and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, is -lr upheld and the appeal is dismissed. In the peculiar facts of this case, _(_ the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this Court. ~ N.V.K. Appeal dismissed. C ###