Shyamala, Thomas Joseph @ Reji and Jancy Thomas v. Geetha Sukumar, Dr. Lekshmi Sukumar and Parvathy Sukumar

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR MONDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022 / 2ND PHALGUNA, 1943 R.C.REV.NO.370 OF 2019** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.07.2019 IN R.C.A.NO.13 OF 2018 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT JUDGE), ALAPPUZHA AND THE ORDER DATED 14.03.2018 IN R.C.P.NO.31 OF 2013 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (MUNSIFF), CHERTHALA** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS:** - **1 SHYAMALA,** **AGED 76 YEARS, W/O.RAJAPPAN, RESIDING AT RAJ BHAVAN, HOUSE NO.61, MAYITHARA P.O., WARD-12, CHERTHALA SOUTH PANCHAYAT, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT-688539.** - **2 THOMAS JOSEPH @ REJI,** **AGED 55 YEARS, S/O.KOSHY JOSEPH, RESIDING AT LEMON VILLA, NEAR PARADISE THEATRE, CHERTHALA NORTH VILLAGE, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT-688524.** - **3 JANCY THOMAS,** **AGED 49 YEARS, W/O.THOMAS JOSEPH, RESIDING AT LEMON VILLA, NEAR PARADISE THEATRE, CHERTHALA NORTH VILLAGE, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT-688524.** **BY ADVS.** **R.AZAD BABU SMT.REJITHA RAJAN SRI P.C.CHACKO** 2 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 ## **RESPONDENTS:** - **1 GEETHA SUKUMAR AGED 64 YEARS, W/O.SUKUMAR, RESIDING AT KIZHAKKEDATHU VEETTIL, CMC-IV, CHERTHALA NORTH MURI, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT688524.** - **2 DR.LEKSHMI SUKUMAR, D/O.GEETHA SUKUMAR, RESIDING AT KIZHAKKEDATHU VEETTIL, NO.210, WARD NO.10, CMC, CHERTHALA NORTH MURI, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA -688524.** - **3 PARVATHY SUKUMAR, D/O.GEETHA SUKUMAR, RESIDING AT KIZHAKKEDATHU VEETTIL, WARD NO.10, CMC, CHERTHALA NORTH MURI, CHERTHALA TALUK, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT -688524.** **BY ADVS.** ## **SRI.C.H CHANDRABHANU(CAVEATOR) SHRI.GOVIND CHANDRABHANU** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL** **HEARING ON 10.02.2022, THE COURT ON 21.02.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** 3 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 ## **O R D E R** ## Ajithkumar, J. The petitioners are the respondents in R.C.P.No.31 of 2013 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Cherthala. The respondents-landlords filed the R.C.P seeking eviction under Section 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court ordered eviction on all counts. The petitioners deposited the arrears of rent and got the order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act vacated. The appeal filed by them under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act as R.C.A.No.13 of 2018 was dismissed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge), Alappuzha. Feeling aggrieved thereof, this revision petition under Section 20 of the Act has been preferred. 2. The petition schedule building belongs to the family temple of the respondents. They want to construct a Kalyanamandapam, after demolishing the petition schedule shop room. Therefore, they are bonafide in need of the 4 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 petition schedule shop room. The shop room was let out in 2001 to the 1[st] petitioner. She sublet the petition schedule shop room to the 2[nd] and 3[rd] respondents. Despite notice, the sub-lessees were not avoided. Those are the grounds for eviction under Section 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Act, which alone now survives. 3. The petitioners resisted the eviction petition contending as follows: the respondents have no title to the petition schedule shop room. The shop room and the land belong to Mathoor Devaswom and the petition filed without impleading the Mathoor Devaswom is not maintainable. The respondents have no right to claim eviction for the need urged by them. It is totally incorrect that the 1[st] petitioner sublet the shop room to the other petitioners. The 3[rd] petitioner is the tenant. Husband of the 1[st] respondent used to receive rent from her. After terminating the tenancy arrangement with the 1[st] petitioner, petition schedule shop room was let out to the 3[rd] petitioner on 01.10.2008. The 3[rd] petitioner is conducting a hotel in the petition schedule shop room and the 5 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 income therefrom is the sole source for the livelihood of her family. No other suitable building is available in the locality to shift her business. 4. The Rent Control Court recorded oral evidence of PW1 and RW1. Documents exhibited are Exts.A1 to A9 and B1 to B13. Ext.B13 was admitted in evidence by the Appellate Authority. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 6.1. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the rent control petition was not maintainable for more than one reason, but both the courts below erroneously held the petition to be maintainable. That the building is in the temple property as could be seen from Ext.B1, and the petition as framed is not maintainable. It is also contended that the respondents have no right to claim eviction on their personal score, since the very proposal is to construct a Kalyanamandapam for the temple. In the absence 6 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 of the deity in the party array, the petition should not have been entertained. 6.2. As regards the need urged by the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that there is no material on record to show that the same is a genuine need. Even a permit and licence for such a construction was not obtained. None of the respondents gave evidence before court. All such circumstances would imply an inference that the claim for eviction is nothing, but a ruse to avoid the petitioners from the petition schedule shop room. 6.3. With respect to the subletting, the learned counsel mainly relied on Exts.B4 to B7 and the oral testimony of RW1 to submit that there is sufficient evidence to show that the 3[rd] petitioner is the actual tenant. It is submitted that the only probable finding inferable from the evidence on record is the shop room was entrusted with the 3[rd] petitioner on rent and thereby she became the lawful tenant. The learned counsel would submit that both the courts below did not consider those aspects in the proper perspective which resulted in their 7 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 rendering wrong findings. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, would contend that the very admissions by the petitioners is enough to find that there is subletting. Having the petitioners ubiquitously admitted that they got the room on rent from the 1[st] respondent, they cannot now contend that the respondents have no right to seek eviction. Under Section 11(1) of the Act, title as landlord alone is relevant; and not the paramount title. There is enough evidence to show that the respondents are the owners of the property and possessing the same for the benefit of their family temple, Mathoor Devi Temple, and when they claim eviction on the ground that they wanted to construct a Kalyanamandapam in the name of the temple, the petition does not suffer from any filing disability and it is maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that both the courts below, after appreciating the entire evidence available on record, arrived at correct conclusions and ordered eviction. 8 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 8. It is seen from Ext.B1 judgment in O.S.No.674 of 1955 that Mathoor temple and the appurtenant land were allotted to the sakha of the 1[st] respondent for administration for and on behalf of the temple. It implies that the land was earmarked for the purpose of administration of the temple and the obligation for the same has been vested with the 1[st] respondent and other members of the branch. The land naturally takes in the buildings thereon as well. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, pointing out that an idol is a judicial person capable of holding property, any proceedings for eviction of the tenant from a building belonging to the temple should have been in the name of the deity. Since this rent control petition was filed by the petitioners in their personal capacity, the same is not maintainable. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel in this regard on the decision in **Ram Jankijee Deities and** **others v. State of Bihar and others [(1999) 5 SCC 50].** In the said decision, the right to hold property by idols in a public temple was in question. Two deities were in the temple 9 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 and the question that arose was whether each of the said deities could hold separate properties. In that context, the Apex Court held that Hindu law recognises a Hindu idol as a juridical subject capable in law of holding property. 9. As regards the said aspect, there is no dispute between the parties. The question is only whether Mathoor Devaswom, being a private temple, and the respondents being its trustees having right of management can initiate a rent control proceeding in their personal name. Section 11 of the Act enables a landlord to apply for eviction on the grounds specified therein. Going by Section 2(3) of the Act, the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the building whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive, or entitled to receive the rent is the landlord. The petitioners have no case that the respondents are not the persons receiving rent. The petitioners have also no dispute that the respondents are the trustees of the temple. In that 10 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 view of the matter, the right of the respondents to initiate eviction proceedings in respect of buildings they owned and possessed on behalf of Mathoor temple cannot be disputed. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents invited our attention to the Full Bench decision of this Court in **Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar [2003 (2) KLT 230]** to explain the limit of powers of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. It was held therein that the provisions contained in Section 20 had not to be narrowly construed. The scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was not to be unnecessarily limited on the basis of the technicality. The court has to consider and decide the matter as the justice of the cause may demand. 11. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and 11 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be at its discretion. 12. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High 12 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it - cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 13. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini** 13 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 **Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 14. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** after considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 15. Having so said regarding the limit and ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act, we shall now consider legality, regularity and propriety of the findings of the courts below in regard to the claim for eviction on the 14 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 ground of the bonafide need as well as subletting. 16. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his 15 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 17. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As 16 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 18. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. In **Gireeshbabu T. P. v. Jameela and others [2021 (5) KHC** **SN 30]** a Division Bench of this Court (authored by Anil K. Narendran J.) reiterated that in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family 17 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 dependent on him. Once, on the basis of the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, of course, subject to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners at the outset contended that none of the landlords were examined and therefore the claim on the ground of the bonafide need has to be declined. In **Lakshmi v. Labbah Kunju Ameer Hamsa [2005(3) KLT 625]** , it was held that,- '8. In assessing the bonafides of the claim, what exactly is the need set up is to be considered. The need alleged is that the building is required for one of his sons to be used as a hotel after demolishing the existing building and reconstructing the same. Neither the landlord nor the son for whose need eviction is sought is examined in court. The examination of the landlord or the dependent son is not for the ritualistic purpose for complying with some provision of law but to enable the 18 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 court to assess objectively the nature of the claim and the bonafides of the claim.' 20. PW1 is the son in law of the 1[st] respondent. He stated that he has been looking after the affairs of the temple and property. When that assertion is not successfully challenged, there need not be any doubt regarding his capacity to prove the facts relevant in this case. Therefore, non-examination of any one of the respondents cannot be a reason to discard the entire evidence on the side of the landlords altogether. 21. As regards the proposal to construct a Kalyanamandapam, the version of PW1 is cogent. It is true that no building permit and licence obtained from the local authority for such construction is produced. The petitioner, on the other hand, produced Ext.B13 before the Appellate Authority in order to contend that the request submitted by the respondents for getting building permit and license was rejected by the Cherthala Municipality. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that on the eve of final hearing of the appeal, the petitioners produced 19 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 Ext.B13, which is an information furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005, and for that reason itself, the Appellate Authority did not place much reliance on it. The learned counsel explained that what is stated in Ext.B13 is that the request for the permit and licence was rejected for technical reasons, but licence and permit were, in fact, later granted by the District Town Planner. Since there was no opportunity for producing the same, the same could not be produced in court. 22. The question is whether or not the need urged by the respondents is bonafide. It is true, the proposal is to effect a new construction. Unlike a claim for eviction on the ground of reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, it cannot be insisted that the landlord should invariably produce building permit and licence in cases where bonafide need is a ground for eviction. The Court needs to ensure only that the need urged is natural, real, sincere and honest and for deciding that question, it is not a condition precedent for the landlord to obtain and produce building permit and licence. The petitioners are not successful in showing that the 20 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 evidence let in by the respondents that they have ability and resources, especially financial capacity, to construct such a Kalyanamandapam is unreliable or unrealistic. Taking into account the entire evidence and circumstances borne out from the materials on record, we are of the view that the need urged by the respondents is bonafide and the findings of the courts below in that regard do not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. 23. The petitioners have no case that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has application in this case. The 3[rd] petitioner, who is claimed to be the present tenant, raised a contention that she and her family have been depending for their livelihood solely on the income derived from the business in the petition schedule shop room and no other building is available in the locality to avail on rent. 24. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or 21 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. A Full Bench of this Court in **Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar [2003 (2) KLT 230]** held that it is for the tenant to prove both the limbs of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act and that the tenant cannot insist that alternative accommodation should be similar to that of the tenanted premises in terms of the rate of rent and convenience. In this case, however, there is absolutely no evidence in support of the contention based on the second proviso. Therefore we hold that the petitioners are not entitled to get the benefit of the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. 25. The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority found that the 1[st] petitioner sublet the petition schedule building to the 3[rd] petitioner unauthorisedly. The case of the respondents in this regard is that after the death of her husband, 1[st] respondent visited the petition schedule shop room and then she found petitioners 2 and 3 conducting 22 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 business there. The case of the petitioners is that as early as on 01.10.2008, the 3[rd] petitioner was put in possession of the petition schedule shop room as a tenant by the husband of the 1[st] respondent with her knowledge and consent and ever since she (3[rd] petitioner) has been in possession and occupation of the same. It is contended that after terminating the tenancy arrangement with the 1[st] petitioner, the shop room was given on rent to the 3[rd] petitioner. 26. By contending as above, possession and occupation of the premises by the 3[rd] petitioner is admitted and no further evidence is required to prove the fact of the 1[st] petitioner parting with possession. Once such transfer of possession is proved, that it was for consideration is a natural inferential fact. 27. While the definite case of the respondents is that they let out the building to the 1[st] petitioner and never had inducted the 3[rd] petitioner or anybody else into the building, the entire burden to prove that the 3[rd] petitioner is the real tenant and she obtained possession either directly from the respondents or from someone else with the consent of the 23 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 ## respondents is on her. In **Abdul Khader v. Ali [2003 (1) KLT 546]** , this court held that, 'To establish subletting two ingredients must be proved. Landlord has to prove that in between the tenant and subtenant there is a relationship of lessee and lessor and that the possession of the premise in question was parted with exclusively by the tenant in favour of the sub tenant. It is only if the landlord discharges the burden to prove exclusive transfer or possession and that the said transfer or possession being for consideration, the burden shifts to the sub lessee to show that he is in possession of the premises and disprove the case of sub lessee.' 28. The petitioners rely on the oral testimony of RW1 and Exts.B4 to B7 to prove that the 3[rd] petitioner is the lawfully inducted tenant. If she is a lawfully inducted tenant, she undoubtedly has immunity from eviction on the ground of subletting. In **Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr.Surinder Kaur [AIR 1982 SC 1043]** , the Apex Court held that, 'the tenant who has lawfully sublet with the written consent of the landlord must necessarily enjoy immunity from the process of eviction on that ground'. 24 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 29. RW1 is the 2[nd] petitioner and husband of the 3[rd] petitioner. He deposed that initially he along with the 3[rd] petitioner was conducting a dry cleaning shop in the petition schedule shop room and later started a hotel. It is his version that Exts.B5 to B7 documents were executed by the 1[st] respondent. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the 1[st] respondent purposefully avoided appearance in court as a witness with a view to avoid confronting these documents. In **Vishyadhar v Manikrao [(1999) 3 SCC 573]** the Apex Court held that 'where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be crossexamined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct'. This principle was reiterated in **Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. [(2005) 2 SCC 217]** and followed by this Court in **Ratheesh Kumar v. Jithendra Kumar [2005 (2) KLT 669].** 30. This is not a case where no oral evidence was let in 25 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 by the respondents. PW1 was examined for and on behalf of the respondents. Having found that he was a competent witness to give evidence on behalf of the respondents, it cannot be said that the respondents shied away from giving evidence. Exts.B5 and B7 are documents purportedly executed by the 1[st] respondent for the benefit of the 3[rd] petitioner. But, she also did not come to court to depose in proof of the said documents. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that when RW1, the husband of the 3[rd] petitioner, has been examined in court his evidence is as good as the evidence of his wife in view of the provisions of Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As per Section 120, a spouse is a competent witness to give evidence on behalf of the other spouse. The question here is regarding proof of execution and contents of Exts B4 to B7, documents. Respondents denied execution of those documents. It was therefore the burden of the petitioners to prove the execution as well as contents of the documents. The petitioners cannot resort to the excuse of non-examination 26 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 of the 1[st] respondent, who purportedly had executed Exts.B5 to B7, since the 3[rd] petitioner for whose benefit those documents were executed had not volunteered to give evidence. 31. Ext.B4 is only a draft of a unilateral rent agreement proposed to be executed by the 3[rd] petitioner. It cannot be given any importance in this case. Ext.B7 is a document seen executed prior to 01.10.2008, the date on which the 3[rd] petitioner claimed to have become the tenant. The Appellate Authority has considered in detail acceptability of Exts.B5 to B7. All aspects including criminal prosecution initiated alleging that Exts.B6 and B7 were falsely created were considered. It was after such detailed appreciation of evidence, the Appellate Authority concluded that those documents were not reliable. 32. When the petitioners claim that the 3[rd] respondent has been the tenant in the petition schedule shop room since 01.10.2008 and making payment of rent regularly, the best evidence to prove is the rent receipts. No such receipt is produced before court. Despite claiming that the 1[st] 27 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 respondent gave consent documents for getting electricity connection transferred in the name of the 3[rd] petitioner, no document effecting such transfer is produced by the petitioners. Considering the entire evidence on record, we find that there is no reliable evidence to probabilize that the 3[rd] respondent has been accepted as a tenant in the petition schedule shop room. Even though the petitioners contend that the tenancy arrangement with the 1[st] petitioner was terminated before 01.10.2008 itself, she is vehemently contesting the proceeding this far. Interestingly, it was she who made deposit of arrears of rent in court in order to get the order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act vacated also. These facts further improbibalise the claim of the petitioners that the respondents have lawfully inducted the 3[rd] petitioner as a tenant. Accordingly, we find that the finding rendered by the courts below that the 1[st] petitioner unauthorisedly sublet the petition schedule shop room to the 3[rd] petitioner, is not liable to be interfered with. 33. In view of what are stated above, we hold that the 28 R.C.Rev.No.370 of 2019 judgment of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.13 of 2018 dated 02.07.2019 or the order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P. No.31 of 2013 dated 14.03.2018 directing eviction under Section 11(3) and 11(4)(1) of the Act are not liable to be interfered with. This revision petition is therefore devoid of merits and it is dismissed. ## **Sd/-** **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-** **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** dkr