High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; University order quashed; relie...

SHRI KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 947 of 1975
Neutral Citation:(1976) 2 SCR 722

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • H. R. Khanna
  • P. N. Bhagatwati
  • S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
Judgment Date
1975-11-17
Court Decision / Holding
The impugned order was quashed; the University was directed to declare Shri Krishan’s LL.B. Part II results from the May 19, 1973 examination and to permit him to appear in the three subjects in Part I at the next examination; costs to the parties borne by themselves. The appeal was allowed.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; University order quashed; relief to appellant including re-examination opportunity and declaration of results.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Shri Krishan

Respondents

  • Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Kapil Sibal
  • • S. K. Gambhir

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S. K. Nandy

Case Synopsis & Summary

Shri Krishan, a government teacher, sought admission to Kurukshetra University’s three-year LLB course via its evening classes for in-service candidates. He failed three papers in Part I but was promoted to Part II and allowed to attempt Part II exams after promising to obtain employer permission to attend classes. He later abandoned the permission condition and requested his Part II results, but the University cancelled his candidature, claiming his attendance and the lack of prior permission justified dismissal. He challenged the decision, contending that the University’s power to withdraw Certificate (b) was limited to pre-examination scenarios under Clause 2(b) of Ordinance X; once examination permission was granted, withdrawal power could not be invoked for infirmities identifiable earlier. The University argued that absence of attendance and the required prior consent made him ineligible, and the undertaking to obtain permission was binding only as a contingency. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court held that (i) the last sentence of Clause 2(b) limits withdrawal of the provisional certificate to before the examination; (ii) failure to scrutinise admission forms or absence of employer permission cannot retroactively nullify admission already granted; (iii) the impugned order contained legal errors and lacked proper scrutiny and justification. The appeal was allowed; the University was directed to declare the May 1973 Part II results and permit re-examination in specified subjects.

Provisions of Law Cited

Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, Ordinance X, Clause 2(b)Clause 2(b) (last part) of Ordinance X (Certificate (b) provisional and withdrawable before examination)Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, Ordinance X, Clause 2(a) (certificate of passing examinations)Ordinance 10, Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, Rule 2(b)Ordinance Nos. 19 and 48 (Madhya Pradesh High Court reference cited in judgment)Indian Penal Code sections 363, 366, 376 (as context cited)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Suggesio falsi
  • Suppressio veri
  • Admissions made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress are not binding
  • Due diligence principle in fraud investigations

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that once he was allowed to appear for the LL.B. Part II Examination, withdrawal of his candidature for any infirmity that could have been checked beforehand was impermissible under Clause 2(b) of Ordinance X. The University failed to scrutinise the admission form, and the undertaking to obtain employer permission was given under duress and ignorance of legal rights, thus not binding. The University’s disparate positions and lack of vigilance should not penalise the appellant after he was permitted to take the exam.

Contentions of Respondents

The University contended that the appellant was short of attendance and had not obtained prior permission from his superior officers; hence the candidature could be cancelled before or during the examination process. The undertaking to obtain permission was not binding and the University acted within statutory powers, consistent with the requirement that candidates attend the prescribed course and secure permission when necessary.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Premji Bhai Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar University, Raipur and OthersA.L.R. 1967 M.P. 194, 197PositiveThe Madhya Pradesh High Court decision supportively held that scrutiny and validity of admission must occur before the examination; relied upon by the Supreme Court in interpreting the University’s powers and requirements.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A lB c 0 722 SHRI KRISHAN l'. THE KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY, KURUKSHETRA _November_ 17, 1975 [H. R. KHANNA, P. N. BHAGWATI AND S, MURTAZA FAZAL ·ALI, JJ.j _Statutes_ _of_ _Kurukshetra University-Ordinance X._ _cl._ 2(b _)-Scoo,,_ _of-_ _App/icarion for_ _examination-Not_ _scrutinised by the University in the beginninR_ _--If_ _could raise objection after the_ _examination-If_ _University could_ alle~e _fraud_ _!ater-Statunent_ _made in igndrance_ _of_ _law-Effect_ _of._ Under the statutes of the respondent-University persons in servke could take the three-year degree course in law by attending the evening classes. A candidate who had failed in some of the paP'ers or one year could cl-ear those papers before comple~ing the three-year course. Under cl. 2 (b) of Ordinance X contained in the University Calendar, Volume I, a candidate should sub.mil lo the University an application seeking permission to appear for an examination which should be signed by the Principal of the College or the head of the department concerned certifying that the candidate bad attended a regular course of study for the prescribed number of academic years. But, this certificate is provisional and could be withdrawn at any time before the examination 1t the applicant failed to attend the prescribed .course or lectures before the end of bis term. The appellant, a Government servant; joined the LLB. I year class o[ the University. He failed in three papers, but was promoted to the 'Second yc&r. B1;fore appearing in the second examination. however, he wrote to the University stating that. if be was not able to get the requisite permission from his employer to join the law classes he would abide by any order that the liniverE sity might pass. The appellant, however, wrote to the University later that this condition was not at all necessary and requested that his result in Pa.it 11 might be announced. In reply the University wrote to the appellant that since bis percentage of marks in Part I was short, bi's candidature for Part II examination stood cancelled. Having failed in his appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, he moved the High Court which dismissed his writ petition _in liminc._ A'!lowing the appeal to this Court, F G H HELD : The impugned order of the university suffers from errors of law patent on the face of' the record. This, was not a case which should have been dismissed by the High Court _in limine._ (730-A] (!) The last part of cl. 2(b) clearly shows that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures. But, this could be done _011/y_ _before the examination._ Once an applicant was allowed to take the examination, the statute which empqwers the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving permission to appear. [727-E-F] (2) It was the duty of the University to scrutinise the form for admission to the examination in order to find out whether it was in order. It was also the duty of the head of the department of law, before submitting the form to the University, to see that the form complied with all the requirements of Jaw. ff neither· took Ca$ to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise. Where a person on whom fraud is commiMed is in a position to discover the• truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved.' It was neither a case of _suggestio, falsi_ nor of _suppressio_ _1·cd._ [728 A-CJ _j_ _....._ # ## .. \ _{_ _I_ SHRI KRISHAN _v._ KURUKSHETRA UNIV. _(Fazal_ _Ali,_ _!.)_ 723 _Premii Bhai Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya_ v. _Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar Uni-_ _••ersity,_ _Raipur and qthers,_ A.LR. 1967 M.P. 194, 197, approved. (3 )(a) There is no provision of the University statutes which could have afforded jurisdiction to it to cancel the candidature of ihe appellant on the ground that he had not obtained the previous permission of his superior 1Jfficers. The impugned order did not mention this ground at all. [7280, 729-BC] (b) 'The undertaking given by the app~Hant that he would get the ~equisite permission of the employer did not put him out ~f wurt. It was wr.1tten b~­ cause he was anxious to appear in Part II exammat1on. and was written 111 _terrorem_ and in complete ignorance of his legal rights. Any admissions made in ignorance of legal ri'ghts or under dures~ cannot bind the maker of the admission. [729-DE] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 947 of 1975. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 2nd April, 1971 of the Punjab a_nd Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 1039 of 1974. _Kapil Sibal and_ S. _K._ _Gambhir_ for the appellant. S. _K._ _Nandy_ for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL Au, J.-What appears to have l?een a clear case of refusal of admission to the appellant or the cancellation of his candidature at the proper time has been completely bungled and ifcstroycd by the inherent inconsistency and seemingly contradictory stand taken by the respondent and lack of proper vigilance on the part of the Head of the Department of Law. The facts of the present case lie within a very narrow compass and only two short points of law have been raised before us by Mr. Kapil Sibbal learned counsel for the appellant. A B c D E The appellant was a teacher in the Government High School, Dumarkha in the District of Jind (Haryana). The University of Kuru kshetra was running law classes for three years Course and had extended the facility to persons who were in service to attend the evening classes and complete the three-years course _ta_ that manner. The appel- _IJs_ lant decided to take the benefit of the facility given by. the Kurukshetra University and joined the LL.B. Part I classes some time in the year 1971. According to the University statute a student of the Faculty of Law was given the option to clear certain subjects ill which he may have failed at one of the examinations before completing the threeyears course. The students were to appear in six papers each year. In April 1972 the petitioner appeared in the annual examination of G Part I but failed in three subjects, namely,, Legal Theory, Comparative Law and Constitutional Law of India. Subsequently· he was promoted to Part II which he joined in the year 1972. Under the Univer sity Statute the appellant was to appear in Part' II Examination in April 1973. On April 26, 1973 the appellant applied for his Roll Number to the University in order to reappear in the subjects in ~vhich - he had failed and to clear them but he was refused permission and H according to the appellant without any reasons. The annual examination for Part II was to be held on May 19, 1973 and the appellant ap proached the University for granting him provisional permission to A B c D E F G H 724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. appear subject _io_ his getting the permission from his employer to attend the Law Faculty. In between it appears that the appellant had been prosecuted for offence under ss. 376, 366 and 363 I.P.C. and was suspended durr11g the period when the case was going on against him. The appellant was, however, acquitted and was reinstated by his employer on August 22, 1972. It would thus appear that on May 18, 1973 as also on April 25, 1973 when he had applied for his Roll Number to clear the subjects, the stigma of criminal case had been completely removed. To start the thread the appellant as mentioned already approached the University on May 18, 1973 and wrote a letter to the University - authorities giving an undertaking that if he was not able to get the requisite permission from his employer to join the Law Classes, he would abide by any order that the University may pass. It appears that on the basis of this undertaking he was allowed to appear at the Part II Examination on May 19, 1973. On June 20, 1973 the appel: !ant wrote to the University authorities that the condition on which he was to get the permission was not at all necessary and that his results may now be announced. On June 26, 1973 the respondent informed the appellant that since his percentage was short in Part I his candidature stood cancelled. Thereafter there were series of correspondence between th~ appellant and the University authorities but the appellant . was refused admission to LL.B. Part III Class. The appellant then filed an appeal to the Vice Chancellor of the University on September 2@, 1973 which was also rejected on November 3, 1973. Thereafter the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for a writ of _certiorari_ to quash the order of the respondent cancelling the candidature of the appellant but the High Court after issuing notice to the other side and persuing the application form rejected the petition _in_ _limine._ Hence this appeal by the appellant by special leave to this Court. The sheet-anchor of the case of the respondcn t was that the appellant had been involved in a criminal case and therefore the Head of Institution could not give the certificate in the prescribed form that the appellant bore a good moral character. Subsequently it was said that as the appellant was short of the requisite perceatage in LL.B. Part I he could not insist on his being admitted to the Part II Examination; and lastly the stand taken by the respondent was that the Evening Law Classes were held to benefit the members of the Services and it was incumbent on the appellant to have obtained permission of his superior officers and as he did not do so, the University was well within its rights in refusing him permission to appear at the Part II Examination or in admitting him to Part III Law course. A long counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent of which some paragraphs are extracted below : "4. Para 4 of the writ petition is rebutted. The petitioner was involved in a case under sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. As a result, he was suspended. He remained under suspension till August 23, 1972, when he _j_ ### t • ###### •• 725 _I_ SHJU KRISHAN _v._ KURUKSHETRA UNIV. _(Fazal Ali,_ !.) was reinstated. Consequently, he attended the le_ctures in Part I. So far as Part II is concerned, the petitioner didn't attend the requisite number of lectures. According to the notice displayed on the notice board of the Department of Laws on January 24, 1973, the petitioner was falling short of attendance by 48 lectures upto December, 1972. There'after, another notice-Was displayed on the notice board on April 16, 1973, according to which the petitioner was falling short of attendance by 46 lectures. As such, the averment in the writ petition that he attended his lectures according to the rules is absolutely false. Vide letter dated November 17, 1972, the Headmaster, Government High School, Dumarkha (District Jind) made an inquiry from the University regarding the petitioner's result in the LL.B. Part I Examination. The intimation was sent by the University vide their letter· dated November 17, 1972. Thereafter, a letter dated January 1, 1973, was re. ceived in the University from the District Education Officer stating _inter_ _alia_ that "it may also be pointed out that Shri Siri Krishan, Teacher was reinstated on 23-3-1972 and thereafter he is attending his duties in School. I am amazed to learn that he is declared by your Law Department to be attendh1g classes in LL.B. Part II simultaneously". "A copy of this letter is appended as Anncxure 'R.1' to this affidavit. A perusal of this letter would show that the p(:titioner had not been granted permission by his employer to attend the law classes at the University. Furthermore, the approximate distance between his station of posting and the University is more than fifty miles. Keeping in view the fact that he was posted in the interior of District Jind, it is impossible that the petitioner could have attended the requisite number of lectures. Evidently, the petitioner was himself aware of the fact that he had not attended the requisite number of lectures. It is also incorrect to suggest that the petitioner's name could be sent for the examination only if he had completed and required minimum attendance of lectures. The examination fornis are always sent In December. Rule 2(b) of Ordinance 10 of the Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, provides as under _iiver_ _alia_ : "B.-that he has attended regular course of study for the prescribed number of academic years. Certificate (b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn at any time before the examinatiori if the applicant fails to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term." 5-Lt59SCI/76 A B c D E F G H It will be seen from the above affidavit that the stand taken by the respo'adent is by no means consistent. It may be mentioned that at one stage the University takes the stand that it was a case of shortage of percentage and therefore the appellant was refused admission to appear at Part II Examination. Later on this stan,d is given up and the respondent averred that as the appellant did not get the permission of his superior officers and since the University was moved by the District Education Officer to cancel the candidature of the appellant the impugned order was passed by the University. It was also argued by Mr. S. K. Nandy counsel for the respondent ~hat !he appellant knew fully well that his percentage was short and m spite of that he fraudulently suppressed this fact from the University authorities _j_ _..._ .. # ·• A B c D H ... 726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. The petitioner's examination form was, as such, sent provisionally and could be withdrawn at any time in case of his failure to attend the requisite percentage of lectures." 23. (i) In reply to sub-para (i) of the writ petition, it is submitted that the cancellation of the candidature of the petiti0ner for LL.B. Part II was not based on any extraneous· considerations. Under the rules of the University every student is required to attend the prescribed course of lectures delivered to the class in each of the subjects offered. Mr. Sri Krishan was short of attendance which was duly notified on the notice board of the Department of Law twice; once on January 24, 1973 and again on April 16, 1973. The admission of the petitioner to the Law course in the University was under dispute as a result of a complaint from the District Education Officer, Jind. The petitioner came to the Magistrate on May 18, 1973, with an application that pending final decision of his case, he may be allowed to sit in the examination provisionally at his own risk and responsibility. In this appliC'ation, the petitioner did not mention that he was also falling short in !ectures as notified by the Head of the Department of Law. Since the office was closed at that time and the examination was to start at 8.00 a.m. on May 19, 1973, the candidate was allowed to appear in the examination provisionally at his own risk and responsibility. (viii) In reply to sub-para (viii) of the writ petition, it is submitted that in the admission notice printed a.t page 75 · in the Hand Book of Information for the session 1971-72 to which the application for admission to the Department forms a part, mentions that LLB. Classes in the evening were for employed persons only. It was, therefore, implied that the applicant while seeking admission in this class would obtain the approval of his employers. This approval became particularly necessary because of the constant complaints of serious nature from the employers (the. Government) of the petitioner who insisted that he must obtain such permission. It may be recalled that the petitioner in his undertaking to the Registrar on May 18, 1973 promised-to produce the required permission." . SHRI KRISHAN _v._ KURUKSHETRA UNIV. _(Fazal Ali, I.)_ 727 when he was allowed to appear in the LL.B. Part I Exami'@tion in April 1972. Mr. Sibbal learned counsel for the appellant submitted two points before us. In the first place it was argued that once the appellant was allowed to 'appear at LLB. Part II Examination held on May 19, 1973 his candidature could not be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, in view of the mandatory provisions of clause 2(b) of the Kurukshetra University Calendar Vol. I, Ordinance X under which the candidature could be withdrawn before the candidate took the examination. Secondly it was argued that the order of the University was _mala fide_ because the real reason for cancelling the candidature of the appellant was the insistence of the District Education Officer that the appellant should not have. been admitted to the Law Faculty unless he had obtained the permission of his superior officers. In order to appreciate the first contention it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of the statute contained in Kurukshetra University Calendar Volume I, Ordinance X. Clause 2 of this Ordinance runs as follows : "2. The following certificates, signed by tlie Principal of the College/Head of the Department concerned, shall be required from each applicant:(a) that the candidate has satisfied him by the production of tlJe certificate of a competent authority that he has passed the examinations which qualified him for admission to the examination; and (b) tlmt he has attended a regular course of study for the rprescribed number of academic years. Certificate (b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn at any time before the examination if the applicant fails to attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his term." 1be last part of this s~atute clearly shows that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures:·· But this could be done only . before the examination. It is, therefore, manifest that once the appellant was allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear. It was, however, submitted by Mr. Nandy learned counsel for the respondent that the names of the candidates wh() were short of percentage were displayed on the Notice Board of the College and the appellant was fully aware of the same and yet he did not draw the attention of the University authorities when he applied for admission to appear in LL.B. Part II Examination. Thus the appellant was guilty of committing serious fraud and was not entitled to any indulgence from this Court. It appears from the averments made in the counter-affidavit that according to the procedure prevalent in the College the admission forms are forwarded by the Head of the Department in December preceding A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 197 6] 2 S.C.R. the year when the Examination is held. In the instant case the admission form of the appellant must have been forwarded in December 1971 whereas the examination was to take place in April/May 1972. It is obvious that during this period of four to five months it was the duty of the University authprities to scrutinise the · form in order to find out whether· it was in order. Equally it was the duty of the Head of the Department of Law before submitting the form to the University to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. If neither the Head of the Department nor the University authorities took care to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise. It is well settled that where a person on whom fraud is committed is i~ a position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved. It was neither a case of _suggestio falsi,_ or _suppressio veri._ The appellant never wrote to the University authorities that he had attended the prescribed number of lectures. There was ample time and opportunity for the University authorities to have found out the defect. In these circumstances, therefore, if the University authorities acquiesced in the infirmities which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part I Examination in April 1972, then by force of the University Statute the University had no power to withdraw the candidature of the appellant. A somewhat similar situation arose in _Premji Bhai_ _Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya_ v. _Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar_ _University,_ _Raipur and others(i_ _[1]_ _)_ where a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh observed as follows : "From the provisions of Ordinance Nos. 19 and 48 it is clear that the scrutiny as to the requisite attendance of the candidates is required to be made befoi;e the- admission cards are issued. Once the admission cards are issued permitting the candidates to take their examination, there is no provision in Ordinance No. 19 or Ordinance No. 48 which would enable the Vice-Chancellor to withdraw the permission. The discretion having been clearly exercised in favour of the petitioner by permitting him to appear at the examination, it was not open to the Vice-Chancellor to withdraw that permission subsequently and to withhold his result." We find ourselves in cou;iplete agreement with the reasons given by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the view of law taken by the learned Judges. In these circumstances, therefore, once the appellant was allowed to appear at the Examination in May 1973, the respo•ndent had no jurisdiction to cancel his candidature for th~t examination. This was not a case where on the undertaking given by a candidate for fulfilment of a specified condition a provisional admission was given by the University to appear at the examination which c~uld be withdrawn at any moment on the non-fulfilment of the aforesaid condition. If this was the situation then the candidate himself would have contracted out of the statute which was for his benefit and the statute (1) A.LR. 1967 M. P. 194, 197. ##### • ....... ' •' \ _i_ SHRI KRISHAN _v .._ KURUKSHETRA UNIV. _(Fazal Ali,_ T.) 729 therefore would not have stood in the way of the University authorities A in cancelling the candidature of the appellant. As regards the second point that the order was ·passed _mala fide,_ it. is difficult to find any evidence of _mala {ides_ in this case. The order suffers from yet another infirmity. The annexures filed by the appellant and the respondent as also the allegations made in the counteraffidavit clearly show that there were series of parleys and correspon- B dence between the District Education Officer and the respondent in the course of which the respondent was being persuaded, to the extent of compulsion, to withdraw the candidature of the appellant because he had not obtained the permission of his superior officers. Mr. Nandy appearing for the respondent has not been able to show any provision in the statutes of the University which required that the candidates attending the evening law classes who are in service should first get C the prior permission of their superior officers. We have also perused the University Statute placed before us by counsel for the appellant and we do not find any provision which could have afforded justification for the respondent to cancel the candidature of the appellant on the ground that he bad not obtained the previous permission of his superior officers. Mr. Nandy counsel for the respondent placed great reVance on the letter written by the appellant to the respondent wherein he undertook to file the requisite permission or to abide by any other order that may D be passed by the University authorities. This letter was obviously written because the appellant was very anxious to appeal in Part II Examination and the letter was written _in terrorem_ and in complete ignorance of his legal dght~. The appellant did not know that there E was any provision in the University Statute which required that he should obtain the permission of bis superior officers. But as the respondent was bent on prohibiting him from taking the examination he had no alternative but to write a letter per force. It is well settled that any admission made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress cannot bind the maker of the admission. In these circumstances we are clearly of the opinion that the letter written by the appellant does F not put him out of court. If only the University authorities would have exercised proper diligence and care by scrutinising tlie admission form when it was sent by the Head of the Department to the University as far back as December 1971 they could have detected the defects or infirmities from which the form suffered according to the University Statute. The Head of the Department of Law was also guilty of dereliction of duty in not scrutinising the admission form of the appellant G before he forwarded the. same to the University. Moreover, the stand taken by the respondent that as the appellant did not get the requisite permission from his superior officers, therefore he was not allowed to appear at the examination, does not merit consideration, because the impugned order does not mention this ground at all and it was not open to the respondent to have refused H admission to the appellant to LL.B. Part III or for that matter to refuse permission to appear at the examination on a ground which was not mentioned in the impugned order. _j_ ####, **A** **B** 730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 S.C.R. Having gone into the circumstances mentioned above, we are of the view that the impugned order suffers from errors of law patent on the face of the record, and in any event this was not a case which should have been dismissed by the High Court _in limine._ The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the University dated June 26, 1973, is hereby quashed by a writ of _certjorari._ The respondent is directed to declare the result of **LL.B.** Part II Examination in which the appellant had appeared on May 19, 1973 and also to give him an opportunity to appear in the three subjects in which he had failed in **LL.B.** Part I Examination, at the next examination which may be held by the University. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. **P.B.R .** _Appeal allowed._