High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeCrl.M.C. disposed; quashed the Anx. B final rep...

Shiyas S/o Hamsa v. State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:Crl.MC.No. 4449 of 2015
Neutral Citation:/null

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Alexander Thomas, J.
Judgment Date
2015-07-16
Court Decision / Holding
Quashed: The Anx. B final report/charge sheet in Crime No. 1375/2013 and all further proceedings arising therefrom before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad, are set aside and the Crl.M.C. is disposed of accordingly.
Final Disposition
Crl.M.C. disposed; quashed the Anx. B final report/charge sheet and all further proceedings arising therefrom.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Shiyas S/o Hamza

Respondents

  • State of Kerala
  • Z. Surendran, DYSP, DCRB, Palakkad

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri M. Shaju Purushothaman
  • • Sri K. S. Rajesh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Public Prosecutor, Sri V. Suresh

Case Synopsis & Summary

Shiyas S/o Hamsa, the petitioner in Crl.M.C. No. 4449/2015, seeks to quash the final report/charge sheet (Anx. B) in Crime No. 1375/2013 of Town South Police Station, Palakkad, which led to Calendar Case No. 146/2014 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad. The offences alleged include sections 294(b) and 506(i) IPC and Section 66A of the IT Act. The petition relies on the Supreme Court’s Shreya Singhal v. Union of India decision (AIR 2015 SC 1523), which held Section 66A of the IT Act unconstitutional and unenforceable, rendering prosecutions under that provision untenable. The court then scrutinizes the remaining offences. It notes that the sole basis for invoking 294(b) IPC is the petitioner’s alleged use of vulgar or abusive language. Relying on Latheef v. State of Kerala and earlier rulings (P. T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko; Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala), the court reiterates that abusive or humiliating words by themselves do not amount to obscenity; for 294(b) the words must satisfy the obscenity test (lasciviousness, prurient appeal, or depraving effect). The court finds the alleged words abusive but not obscene. As for 506(i) IPC, it is a non-cognizable offence and the record shows no magistrate’s prior permission under Sec. 155(2) Cr.P.C. Therefore the impugned Anx. A/B proceedings are not sustainable, and the calendar proceedings against the petitioner stand quashed. The petition is disposed of accordingly.

Provisions of Law Cited

Sec. 294(b) IPCSec. 506(i) IPCSec. 66A IT ActSec. 155(2) Cr.P.C.Sec. 292 IPC (definition of obscenity)Sec. 292(1) IPC (definition of obscenity)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Obscenity test: whether the matter charged as obscenity tends to deprave and corrupt those open to immoral influences (Latheef v. State of Kerala; PT Chacko v. Nainan Chacko).
  • To satisfy obscenity, words must be lascivious or arouse prurient interest or deprave and corrupt.
  • Abusive words or humiliating/defamatory words are not, by themselves, obscene under IPC.
  • Shreya Singhal v. Union of India: Section 66A IT Act is unconstitutional and unenforceable.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioners argued for quashing the Anx. B final report/charge sheet on the ground that Section 66A IT Act is ultra vires and unenforceable as held in Shreya Singhal. They submitted that the alleged 294(b) conduct does not satisfy the obscenity test and is not punishable under obscenity provisions; 506(i) IPC is non-cognizable and requires prior magistrate permission under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C., which was not obtained. Therefore, the entire proceeding is unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the prosecution should be maintained under the charged offences, including those involving 66A (before it was struck down), and that the remaining provisions should be examined in light of obscenity jurisprudence. However, after considering the Supreme Court’s Shreya Singhal decision and the obscenity tests, the court found 66A unconstitutional and 294(b) not made out; the non-cognizable nature of 506(i) and lack of prior permission under Sec. 155(2) Cr.P.C. further undermined the case, leading to quashing.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Shreya Singhal v. Union of IndiaAIR 2015 SC 1523; 2015 (5) SCC 1; 2015 (2) KLT 1 (SC)PositiveHeld Section 66A IT Act unconstitutional; used to justify the quashing of the 66A charge.
Latheef v. State of Kerala2014 (2) KLT 987PositiveObscenity test requires more than abusive words; abusive words alone do not constitute obscenity.
P. T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko1967 KLT 799PositiveTest of obscenity: whether matter tends to deprave and corrupt those open to immoral influences.
Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala2008 (2) KLT 745PositiveObscenity test includes ability to arouse sexually impure thoughts in listeners.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS** **THURSDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JULY 2015/25TH ASHADHA, 1937** **Crl.MC.No. 4449 of 2015 () ---------------------------** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC 146/2014 of C.J.M.PALAKKAD DATED CRIME NO. 1375/2013 OF PALAKKAD TOWN SOUTH POLICE STATION , PALAKKAD** **PETITIONER(S)/ACCUSED: ----------------------** **SHIYAS S/O. HAMSA, KURIAPPILLY HOUSE, MATHILAKAM P.O. THRISSUR DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS.SRI.M.SHAJU PURUSHOTHAMAN SRI.K.S.RAJESH** **RESPONDENT(S)/COMPLAINANT:** **--------------------------** **1. STATE OF KERALA REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA ERNAKULAM, REPRESENTING THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER TOWN SOUTH POLICE STATION, PALAKKAD - 678 001.** **2. Z.SURENDRAN DYSP, DCRB, PALAKKAD - 678 001.** **R1 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.V.SURESH** **THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 16-07-2015, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** **Crl.MC.No. 4449 of 2015 ()** **---------------------------** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS** **------------------------** **A - CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO. 1375/2013 OF TOWN SOUTH POLICE STATION, PALAKKAD D T. 03.7.13.** **B - CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CRIME NO. 1375/2013 DT. 29.8.14.** ## **RESPONDENT(S)' EXHIBITS** **------------------------** ## **NIL** **/TRUE COPY/** **PS TO JUDGE** **vgs** ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. ================== Crl.M.C.No. 4449 of 2015 ================== Dated this the 16[th] day of July, 2015 O R D E R The prayer in this Crl.M.C. is for an order from this Court to quash the impugned Anx.B final report/charge sheet filed in the impugned Crime No.1375/2013 of Town South Police Station, Palakkad, which has led to the pendency of Calendar Case, C.C.No. 146/2014 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Palakkad and all further proceedings arising therefrom. The offences alleged in the impugned Anx.B final report/charge sheet are those under Secs.294(b) & 506(i) of the I.P.C. and Sec.66A of the Information Technology Act. 2. Heard Sri.M.Shaju Purushothaman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent State of Kerala. 3. The Apex Court in the celebrated case Shreya Singhal v. Union of India reported in 2015 (5) SCC 1 = AIR 2015 SC 1523 = 2015 (2) KLT 1 (SC), has held that the impugned provisions contained in Sec.66A of the Information Technology Act are ultra Crl.M.C.4449/15 - : 2 :- vires and unenforceable and accordingly struck down the said provision. Therefore, the prosecution on the basis of the offence under Sec.66A of the Information Technology Act is no longer tenable. 4. The other offences alleged in this impugned criminal proceedings are those under Secs.294(b) and 506(i) of the I.P.C. From a reading of the contents in column No.12 of the impugned Anx.A FIR and column No.16 of the impugned Anx.B final report/charge sheet it can be seen that the only allegation raised therein to make an attempt to justify the invocation of the offence under Sec. 294(b) of the I.P.C. is that the petitioner has used vulgar and abusive language against the defacto complainant. It has been held by this Court in the case Latheef v. State of Kerala reported 2014(2) KLT 987, based on the earlier rulings of this Court as in P.T Chacko v. Nainan Chacko reported in 1967 KLT 799 and Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala reported in 2008 (2) KLT 745 that abusive words or humiliating words or defamatory words will not as such amount to obscenity as envisaged in Secs.292 and 294(b) of the I.P.C. To make the words obscene, as punishable under Section 294(b) IPC, it must satisfy the definition of obscenity Crl.M.C.4449/15 - : 3 :- and that being a continuation of the subject dealt with under Sec.292 I.P.C., the definition of obscenity under Sec.292(1) IPC can be applied in a prosecution under Sec.294(b) of the I.P.C., as there is no separate definition for obscenity in Sec.294. That to make it punishable the alleged words must be in a sense lascivious, or it must appeal to the prurient interest, or will deprave and corrupt persons. That the alleged words uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of its hearers and thus to make the alleged words of obscene it must involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or the words must have the effect of depraving persons and defiling morals by sex appeal or lustful desires. That merely because the words are abusive, defamatory or humiliating will not make by obscene so as to attract offence under Sec. 294(b) of the I.P.C. The legal position in this regard was laid down by this Court in paragraph 5 of Latheef's case supra, which reads as follows: '5. Abusive words or humiliating words or defamatory words will not as such amount to obscenity as defined under the law. Of course there is no doubt that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner are in fact abusive and humiliating. But to make it obscene, punishable under Section 294(b) IPC, it must satisfy the definition of obscenity. Section 294 IPC does not define obscenity. Being a continuation of the subject dealt with under Section 292 IPC the definition of obscenity under 292(1) IPC can be applied in a prosecution under Section 294 IPC also. To make punishable, the alleged words must be in a sense lascivious, or it Crl.M.C.4449/15 - : 4 :- must appeal to the prurient interest, or will deprave and corrupt persons. In P.T Chacko V. Nainan Chacko reported in (1967 KLT 799) this Court held that, “ the test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.” In Sangeetha Lakshmana V. State of Kerala reported in (2008(2) KLT 745) this Court held thus, “in order to satisfy the test of obscenity, the words alleged to have been uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of its hearers.” Thus it is quite clear that, to make obscene the alleged words must involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or the words must have the effect of depraving persons, and defiling morals by sex appeal or lustful desires. I find that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner in this case are really abusive and humiliating, but those words cannot be said to be obscene. As already stated, every abusive word or every humiliating word cannot, by itself, be said to be obscene as defined under the Indian Penal Code. I find that the conviction against the revision petitioner under Section 294 (b)IPC in this case, on the basis of the above words alleged to have been used by him, is liable to be set aside, and the revision petitioner is entitled to be acquitted.' 5. In the instant case also, from a mere perusal of the materials available on record, it can be seen that the only allegation raised by the defacto complainant is that the petitioner accused has used humiliating, abusive, vulgar or defamatory words and not even of remote whisper is anywhere therein that the words used contained lascivious elements or prurient elements or using sexual thoughts or feelings or that the words must have the effect of depraving persons, and defiling morals by sex appeal or lustful desires, etc. Therefore, offence under Sec.294(b) is not made out in the facts of this case. 6. The only other surviving offence is the one under Crl.M.C.4449/15 - : 5 :- Sec.506(i) of the I.P.C., which is indisputably a non-cognizable offence and there is no case for the prosecution that prior permission of the Magistrate was secured as envisaged in Sec.155 (2) of the Cr.P.C. The impugned Anx.A FIR does not have any other offence. 7. In the light of these aspects, it is held that the impugned proceedings for the aforestated offences are not sustainable or tenable. Accordingly, the impugned criminal proceedings at Anx.B final report/charge sheet filed in Anx.A Crime No.1375/2013 of Town South Police Station, Palakkad, which has led to the institution of the Calendar Case, C.C.No.146/2014 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Palakkad pending against the petitioner herein and all further proceedings arising therefrom pending against the petitioner herein stand quashed. With these observations and directions, the Crl.M.C. stands finally disposed of. Sd/sdk+ ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE ///True copy/// P.S. to Judge Crl.M.C.4449/15 - : 6 :-