Shibu v. Chandrasekharan Nair

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR** **THURSDAY, THE 26[TH] DAY OF MAY 2022 / 5TH JYAISHTA, 1944** **R.C.REV.NO.136 OF 2020** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 22.10.2019 IN R.C.A.NO.14 OF 2019 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (DISTRICT COURT), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM AND THE ORDER DATED 28.02.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.105 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF),THIRUVANANTHAPURAM** ## **REVISION PETITIONER:** **SHIBU, AGED 47 YEARS, S/O.O.M.SIRAJUDEEN, KADAYARA HOUSE, PERUMATHURA P.O., SARKARA VILLAGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 303.** **BY ADVS.P.B.KRISHNAN SRI.P.B.SUBRAMANYAN SRI.SABU GEORGE SMT.B.ANUSREE SRI.MANU VYASAN PETER SMT.MEERA P.** ## **RESPONDENT:** **CHANDRASEKHARAN NAIR AGED 73, S/O.V.K.ACHUTHAN NAIR, RESIDING AT T.C.28/1394, SREEKANTESWARAM, FORT P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695023.** **BY ADVS.SRI.V.SURESH SRI.G.SUDHEER SRI.R.HARIKRISHNAN (H-308)** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 26.05.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 -2- ## **ORDER** Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner, who is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.105 of 2016 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Thiruvananthapuram, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building, under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the landlord, who is the proprietor of a business in manufacture of readymade garments, under the name and style 'Cessna'. His daughter-in-law, namely, Sree Remya is the holder of Degree in Apparel Fashion Designing and Diploma in Apparel Designing and Merchandising. She is actively involved in the business enterprise of the landlord. The landlord intends to expand his business by starting a show room for his own products, with the active and technical support of his daughter-in-law, who is in the business of garment designing and dependent on the landlord for a showroom to conduct her -3- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 business. 2. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant entered appearance and filed counter opposing the order of eviction sought for in the R.C.P. under Section 11(3) of the Act. Before the Rent Control Court, the landlord and his daughter-in-law were examined as PWs.1 and 2 respectively, and Exts.A1 to A23 were marked on the side of the landlord. On the side of the tenant, he was examined as CPW1 and Exts.B1 to B4 were marked. The report of the Advocate Commissioner was marked as Ext.C1. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide; the provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application; and that the tenant is not entitled to protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, by the order dated 28.02.2019, the Rent Control Court allowed R.C.P.No.105 of 2016, granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act and the tenant was directed to put the landlord in vacant possession -4- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 of the petition schedule building, within a period of one month, failing which the landlord is entitled to get it recovered through the process of the court, in execution. 3. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Court in R.C.P.No.105 of 2019, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.14 of 2019 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge), Thiruvananthapuram, invoking the provision under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 22.10.2019, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act. Challenging the order of eviction dated 28.02.2019 of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.105 of 2016 and also the judgment dated 22.10.2019 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.14 of 2019, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 5. During the course of arguments, the learned -5- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 counsel for the petitioner-tenant would confine the challenge made in this Rent Control Revision against the concurrent finding of the authorities below that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide. Therefore, in this Rent Control Revision we are not called upon to consider the legality or otherwise of the finding of the authorities below on the first and second provisoes to Section 11(3) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant has also raised a contention that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking eviction of the petition schedule building falls under Section 11(8) of the Act, which deals with eviction on the ground of additional accommodation, which will not fall within the scope of Section 11(3) of the Act and as such, the authorities below ought to have dismissed the Rent Control Petition. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would contend that the concurrent findings of the authorities below while ordering eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting -6- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. The learned counsel would also contend that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition squarely falls within the scope of Section 11(3) of the Act and not under Section 11(8). 7. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 -7- so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 8. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. -8- ## R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 9. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. 10. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition, for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is that the landlord wants to expand his business in ready-made garments with the active and technical support of his daughter-in-law, who is having business in garment designing, who brought innovative ideas for the design, manufacture and marketing of ready-made garments. She is actively involved in -9- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 the ready-made garments manufacturing business conducted by the landlord under the name and style 'Cessna'. The landlord was examined as PW1 and his daughter-in-law was examined as PW2, who is the holder of Degree in Apparel Fashion Designing and Diploma in Apparel Designing and Merchandising. Therefore, the landlord decided to expand his business by marketing the ready-made garments manufactured by his enterprise, through own showrooms and his daughter-in-law has offered to lend active and technical support for such showrooms, who has business in garment designing. She is a dependent on the landlord for a building to accommodate a showroom for ready-made garments. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition was substantiated by the oral testimony of the landlord, who was examined as PW1 and that of his daughter-in-law, who was examined as PW2. The qualification or experience of PW2 to start the proposed business is not in serious dispute. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below concurrently found that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of -10- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 the Act is bona fide. The said finding of the authorities below are neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that while arriving at such a finding, the authorities below committed any manifest error, warranting interference of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 11. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant is that, when the need projected in the Rent Control Petition is for starting a showroom in connection with the garment manufacturing business conducted by the landlord, the need of the petition schedule building falls under Section 11(8) of the Act and not under Section 11(3) of the Act and such the authorities below ought to have dismissed the Rent Control Petition as not maintainable. 12. As per Section 11(8), a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use. Section 11(10) of the Act -11- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 provides that, claim under sub-section (3), (4), (7) or (8) should be bona fide. As per Section 11(10), the Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord - - under sub section (3), (4), (7) or sub section (8) is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application. As per the first proviso to Section 11(10), in the case of an application made under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. As per the second proviso to Section 11(10), the Rent control Court may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate. 13. In **Hassan Koya K. v. James George and others [2019 (4) KLJ 74]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent -12- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 Control) Act, the distinction maintained by the legislature between Section 11(3) and Section 11(8) is clear. The test to be applied in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) or Section 11(3), as the case may be, for distinguishing these two grounds of eviction is to ascertain whether landlord and tenant are stated to be occupying different portions of the same building owned by the landlord or whether the tenant is stated to be occupying the whole building of the landlord. If the landlord is in occupation of a portion of his building and asks for eviction of the portion let to his tenant urging need for additional accommodation for personal use, it would then be a case of eviction falling under Section 11(8). On the other hand, if the tenant is put in occupation of a building owned by the landlord who has no part of the structure in his custody, it is then a case brought for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act alone, provided other conditions for eviction are also present. Legally, the grounds of eviction under Section 11(3) and Section 11(8) are fundamentally different and considered therefore as mutually exclusive. The distinction emerging between these two grounds has been discussed in **S.R. Sabu** -13- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 ## **v. T.K. Vasudevan [(2001) 8 SCC 110]** and **Indian Saree House and others v. Radhalakshmy and others [2006 (3) KLT 129]** . 14. In **Hassan Koya K. [2019 (4) KLJ 74]** the Division Bench noticed that, the bona fide claim understood in terms of Section 11(10) of the Act is no way different from the expression 'bona fide' used in Section 11(3) of the Act. Bona fide need or requirement must be the outcome of the natural, sincere, real and honest desire of the landlord rather than a mere wish or desire. This principle of law has long been settled as is discernible from **Mattulal v. Radhe Lal [(1974) 2 SCC 365], Chandukutty v. George [1977 KLT 607]** and **Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) By Lrs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and others [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** . 15. In **Hassan Koya K.** the Division Bench held that, it is mandatory that a definite finding on the issue of comparative hardship between the parties must be entered in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) of the Act. If the Rent Control authorities find on evidence that hardship to which the tenant would be exposed in the case of eviction will -14- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 be higher than that of the landlord in the case of refusal of eviction, prayer for eviction could only be declined. If, on the other hand, the evidence fortifies a finding that landlord would suffer greater than the tenant in case of refusal of eviction, an order of eviction under Section 11(8) in such a case would certainly be justified. 16. In **Hassan Koya K.** the Division Bench held that, Section 11(3) of the Act has laid down in very clear and specific terms certain conditions to be satisfied by the landlord as well as tenant in prosecution or defence of eviction proceeding, as the case may be, before the Rent Control authorities. A landlord not being in possession of any building of his own in the locality sufficient to satisfy his proved bona fide need, cannot nonetheless recover tenanted premises on the ground of Section 11(3), if the tenant mainly depends on the income derived from his business and further has no alternative suitable accommodation available in the locality for shifting his business. Strictly speaking, none of the conditions appearing in Section 11(3) is relevant in an eviction petition brought under Section 11(8) seeking additional -15- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 accommodation. Section 11(8) is absolutely silent as to the relevant considerations on which comparative hardship in issue between parties could be decided. Nonetheless the preponderance of judicial precedents is in favour of the view that availability of suitable and alternative premises with both the landlord and tenant to satisfy their needs in a proceeding for eviction under Section 11(8) is one of the matters relevant to the decision on the issue of comparative hardship between the parties. Equally relevant is the question as to whether parties mainly depend for their livelihood on the income derived from the business or trade in case tenanted premises have been let out for conducting business. 17. In **Hassan Koya K.** the Division Bench found that, the considerations relevant for decision on the issue of comparative hardship in terms of Section 11(10) of the Act are unrestricted and wider in scope than the conditions specified in Section 11(3). But only thing that needs to be ensured by the court is that those considerations must be materially relevant and essential to the just decision of the issue. Discretion of the court in this respect should be -16- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 exercised carefully guided by sound judicial principles and also in conformity with principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Burden of proving such relevant facts within the scope of Section 11(10) is equal to both the parties unlike the burden of proof cast by Section 11(3) of the Act. The landlord seeking eviction under Section 11(8) has not only to prove the bona fides of his claim for additional accommodation but also the comparable degree of hardship which he would suffer than the tenant in the case of refusal of eviction. Burden thereafter shifts to the tenant who would then be liable to show that hardship on him will exceed than that of the landlord in case he fails to secure a decision favourable to his continuance. 18. As we have already noticed, the respondentlandlord is doing business in the manufacture of ready-made garments under the name and style 'Cessna'. He is having an establishment with necessary building and machinery for the manufacture of ready-made garments. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition, seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is for starting a showroom in the petition schedule building, with the active and technical -17- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 support of his daughter-in-law, who was examined as PW2, for marketing the ready-made garments manufactured by his enterprises. Such a need projected in the Rent Control Petition squarely falls within the scope of Section 11(3) of the Act and not under the scope of Section 11(8), which deals with eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition falls within the scope of Section 11(8) of the Act and as such the authorities below ought to have dismissed the Rent Control Petition as not maintainable under Section 11(3) of the Act. 19. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the -18- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 20. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. -19- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 21. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. -20- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 ## 22. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate -21- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 23. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 -22- 24. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 25. In **Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, even though in the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, it has been held that, in revisional jurisdiction there cannot be a reappreciation of evidence in order to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts, it has been held in those decisions itself that, if the view taken is perverse and the statutory scheme has not been kept in mind and if it requires correction, then Court can re-appreciate the evidence. When -23- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 the argument is that, the approach made by the authorities are perverse, it cannot be said that this Court cannot look into the pleadings and scan through the evidence to find out whether the conclusions have been arrived at properly on the pleadings and evidence. 26. In **Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016 (2) KLJ 164]** , a Division Bench of this Court held that, the High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court on the touch stone of whether it is according to law. For that limited purpose, it may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. 27. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that no interference is warranted on the concurrent finding of the authorities below while granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20. -24- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, the tenant may be given six months' to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building. 29. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord would submit that a reasonable period may be granted to the tenant for giving vacant possession of the petition schedule building, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues, if any, towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 30. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord. 31. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision is -25- ## R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 dismissed declining interference on the impugned order of the Rent Control Court and the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority; however by granting six months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the respondent-landlord, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the petitioner-landlord within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule building; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding month, without any default; - (iii) Needless to say that, in the event of the -26- R.C.Rev.No.136 of 2020 respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. **Sd/ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** **Sd/-** **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** AV/27/5