Shereef v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Perinthalmanna; Alipparamba Grama Panchayath; Convener, Local Level Monitoring Committee, Agriculture Office, Anamangad

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **FRIDAY, THE 08TH DAY OF MARCH 2019 / 17TH PHALGUNA, 1940 WP(C).No. 4960 of 2019** ## **PETITIONER:** **SHEREEF, AGED 42 YEARS, S/O.ABOOBACKER, ETTAMTHARAYIL HOUSE, CHAMMANNUR P.O., THRISSUR DISTRICT.** **BY ADV. SRI.U.K.DEVIDAS** ## **RESPONDENTS:** |**1**|**THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER,**| |---|---| ||**PERINTHALMANNA, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-679322.**| |**2**|**ALIPPARAMBA GRAMA PANCHAYATH,**| ||**PARAL, THOOTHA P.O., MALAPPURAM -679357,**| ||**REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.**| |**3**|**THE CONVENER,**| ||**LOCAL LEVEL MONITORING COMMITTEE,**| ||**AGRICULTURE OFFICE, ANAMANGAD,**| ||**MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-679357.**| **SRI K.P.HARISH, SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 08.03.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** 2 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner, who is stated to be the owner of 0.2296 hectors of land comprised in Re-Survey No.19/3-5 of Anamangad village in Perinthalmanna Taluk, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P6 order dated 14.01.2019 of the Secretary of the 2[nd] respondent Grama Panchayat, whereby the application made by the petitioner for development permit for developing housing plots and to construct houses, stands rejected for the reason that the description of land in the revenue records is 'nanja'. The petitioner has also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding the 2[nd] respondent to grant him development permit based on the application dated 05.01.2019 for development permit, referred to in Ext.P6. 2. On 19.02.2019, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to get instructions. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 3 and also the learned counsel for the 2[nd] respondent Grama Panchayat. 4. Ext.P6 order dated 14.01.2019 of the Secretary of 3 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 the 2[nd] respondent Grama Panchayat, whereby the application made by the petitioner for development permit stands rejected, is an appealable order, in view of the provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. The said fact is not in dispute. 5. In **Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Das Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]** , the Apex Court held that nonentertainment of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule and self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the existence of alternative remedy. However, High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same, unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exists sufficient ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 6. In **Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.[(2018) 3 SCC 85]** the Apex 4 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 Court reiterated that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in **Chaabil Das Agarwal's case (supra)** , i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. After referring to the law laid down in **Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [AIR 1964 SC 1419]** and **Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2 SCC 433]** the Apex Court held that High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law 5 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 7. In **Thansingh Nathmal's case (supra)** a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily, the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not, therefore, act as a court of appeal against the 6 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. 8. In **Titaghur Paper Mills' case (supra)** a ThreeJudge Bench of the Apex Court held that, the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in **Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336]** at page 356 in the following passage: 7 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute ..... But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it ..... the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in that passage was approved by the House of Lords in **Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1919 AC 368]** and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in **Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. [1935 AC 532] and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. [AIR 1940 PC 105]** . It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights and has been followed by the Apex Court throughout. 9. In _**Pavithran V. State of Kerala (2009 (4) KHC 4)**_ , a Full Bench of this Court held that, whenever an adverse order is passed against a person, unless the same is challenged before the appropriate forum, within the prescribed time limit, the said order will become final. 10. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that in view of the statutory remedy available under sub-section (4) of 8 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 Section 276 of the Panchayat Raj Act, the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P6 order. In the result, this writ petition filed on 18.02.2019 is dismissed for the aforesaid reason; however, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to challenge Ext.P6 order by filing statutory appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act. Sd/- **JUDGE** **yd** 9 WP(C)4960 OF 2019 ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1** **TRUE COPY OF THE ASSIGNMENT DEED NO.1994/18 OF S.R.O. PERINTHALMANNA DATED 05.05.2018.** **EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE BASIC TAX RECEIPT DATED 05.06.2018.** **EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.G6620/83 DATED 16.01.1984.** **EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE ASSIGNMENT DEED NO.3263/1996 OF S.R.O. PERINTHALMANNA, DATED 25.09.1996.** **EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE THANDAPER ACCOUNT OF THE ABOVE PROPERTY DATED 03.05.2018.** **EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 14.01.2019 ISSUED BY THE SECOND RESPONDENT.** ## **RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:NIL** ## **TRUE COPY** ## **P.A. TO JUDGE**