Sheejabi @ Sheeja Majeed & Others v. Jiss S/o Poulose; Nandanam S/o Prabhakaran; Oriental Insurance Company Limited

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **MONDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2019 / 27TH KARTHIKA, 1941** ## **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 1885/2001 DATED 19-01-2007 OF &MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,THRISSUR** ## **APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS :** - **1 SHEEJABI @ SHEEJA MAJEED & OTHERS W/O.LATE MAJEED.** - **2 JASHIM MINOR, S/O.LATE MAJEED. 3 HASHIM MINOR, S/O.LATE MAJEED.** - **4 MOUSHIDA MINOR, D/O.LATE MAJEED.** - **5 AMINA W/O.KUNJICHEKKU.** **(MINOR APELLANTS 2 TO 4 ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR, GUARDIAN MOTHER THE 1ST APPELLANT HEREIN),** - **ALL ARE RESIDING AT PALIYATHAZHATH HOUSE,, P.O.MANNUTHY, MULLAKKARA, THRISSUR DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS. SRI.T.C.SURESH MENON SRI.P.S.APPU SRI.JIBU P THOMAS** ## **RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS :** - **1 MR. JISS, S/O.POULOSE, RESIDING AT KADHALIPARAMBIL HOUSE, X/491 A-KANNAKY,, PANANCHERY, THRISSUR DISTRICT.** - **2 NANDANAN S/O.PRABHAKARAN RESIDING AT PANGAPARAMBIL HOUSE, THANIKUDAM, MADAKKATHARA VILLAGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT.** - **3 THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED BRANCH OFFICE, DIVISIONAL OFFICE, IIIRD FLOOR,, MAHESWARI BUILDINGS, M.G.ROAD, THRISSUR.** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **2** **R2 BY ADV. SRI.M.ANIL KUMAR BY ADV. SMT.PREETHI K.PURUSHOTHAMAN R3 BY ADV. P.JACOB MATHEW(BY ORDER) R3 SMT K.S.SANTHI- STANDING COUNSEL** **THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.11.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **3** ## **JUDGMENT** The appellants are the claimants in O.P.(MV)No.1885 of 2001 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on account of the death of one Majeed, husband of 1[st] appellant, father of appellants 2 to 4 and son of the 5[th] appellant, in a motor accident which occurred on 26.06.2001, while he was walking through the side of National Highway. At the place of accident, he was knocked down by a motorcycle bearing registration No.KL-7/J-6378, owned by the 1[st] respondent, ridden by the 2[nd] respondent and insured with the 3[rd] respondent. In the accident, he sustained fatal injuries, who succumbed to the injuries on the way to hospital. Alleging that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the 2[nd] respondent rider, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal, claiming a total compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- under various heads. 2. Before the Tribunal, the 1[st] respondent owner did not file written statement. The 2[nd] respondent rider filed **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **4** written statement denying negligence alleged against him. He contended that the accident was due to the negligence on the part of the deceased while crossing the road. The 3[rd] respondent insurer filed written statement admitting the policy coverage of the motorcycle involved in the accident. The insurer contended that, as the 2[nd] respondent was not holding a valid driving licence, at the time accident, there is violation of policy conditions. The age, occupation, monthly income, etc. stated in the claim petition and also the compensation claimed under various heads are also disputed. 3. Before the Tribunal, the claim petition was tried along with O.P(MV)No.2917 of 2002 arising out of the very same accident. Exts.A1 to A20 were marked on the side of the claimants. Exts.B1 and B6 were marked on the side of the respondents. The 1[st] appellant/1[st] claimant was examined as PW1. The respondents have not chosen to adduce any oral evidence. 4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the accident **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **5** occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of motorcycle by the 2[nd] respondent. Since the insurance coverage of the said vehicle was not in dispute, the insurer was held liable to indemnify the insured. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.7,22,000/- together with interest at the rate 7% per annum from the date of petition, i.e., from 31.07.2001, till date of actual payment, with proportionate cost and directed the 3[rd] respondent insurer to satisfy the award. 5. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads, the appellants/claimants are before this Court in this appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/ claimants and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 3[rd] respondent insurer. Since the insurance coverage of the offending vehicle is admitted by the insurer, service of notice on the 1[st] respondent is dispensed with. 7. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellants/claimants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **6** under various heads. ## 8. In **Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation** **[(2009) 6 SCC 121]** the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that, the compensation awarded does not become 'just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier. 9. In **National Insurance Company Ltd. v.** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **7** **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of 'just compensation' and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of 'just compensation' has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e., just compensation. 10. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal under **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **8** various heads reads thus; |us heads reads thus;|| |---|---| |Head of claim|Amount awarded<br>(in Rupees)| |Expense for transportation|1000| |Damages to clothing and<br>articles|1000| |Expense for funeral|5000| |Compensation for pain and<br>suffering|15000| |Loss of love and affection|25000| |Compensation for loss of<br>dependancy|600000| |Loss of consortium|25000| |Loss of estate|50000| |**Total**|**722000**| 11. The accident occurred on 26.06.2001. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged 41 years. It was claimed that, at the time of accident, the deceased was earning a monthly income of Rs.35,000/- as a Tailor in UAE. In order to prove the monthly income, Ext.A7 employment agreement; Ext.A8 passport; Exts.A10 passbook of the deceased; and Ext.A11 passbook of the 1[st] appellant were produced. After considering the materials placed on record, the Tribunal fixed the monthly income of the deceased notionally as Rs.5,000/-. ## 12. In **Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **9** ## **Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited** **[(2011) 13 SCC 236]** the Apex Court reckoned the monthly income of a coolie (manual labourer), who met with a road accident in the year 2004, at the age of 35 years, notionally as Rs.4,500/-. The Apex Court held that, the claimant who was working as a coolie cannot be expected to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim. In the absence of any other evidence contrary to the claim made by the claimant, in the facts of the said case, the Tribunal should have accepted the claim of the claimant. The Apex Court made it clear that, in all cases and in all circumstances, the Tribunal need not accept the claim of the claimant, in the absence of supporting material. It depends on the facts of each case. In a given case, if the claim made is so exorbitant or if the claim made is contrary to ground realities, the Tribunal may not accept the claim and may proceed to determine the possible income by resorting to some guess work, which may include the ground realities prevailing at the relevant point of time. 13. In **Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **10** **India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2014) 2 SCC 735]** , taking note of the earlier decision in **Ramachandrappa's case (supra)** , the Apex Court reckoned the monthly income of a vegetable vendor, who met with a road accident in the year 2008, at the age of 24 years, notionally as Rs.6,500/-. In the said decision, the Apex Court held that, a labourer in an unorganised sector doing his own business cannot be expected to produce documents to prove his monthly income. Therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal and the High Court to ask for evidence to prove his monthly income. Going by the state of economy prevailing at that time and the rising prices in agricultural products, the Apex Court accepted his case that a vegetable vendor is reasonably capable of earning 6,500/- per month. 14. In **Jiju Kuruvila v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2013) 9 SCC 166]** the appellants before the Apex Court were the legal representatives of the deceased, who was about 45 years of age as on the date of accident (16.04.1990) and was working as a Manager in Freeman Management Corporation, New York Branch in USA for more **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **11** than 9 years and was receiving a monthly salary of 2500 US Dollars, equivalent to Rs.43,100/-. He was provided with quarter by the employer and was residing alongwith his wife. The deceased used to give Rs.30,000/- per month to his wife for the household expenses and savings after meeting his personal expenses. He was healthy, energetic, otherwise, had longevity of life and could have continued in service up to the age of 65 years as per service conditions, i.e., for another 20 years. Tribunal fixed Rs.10,000/- as the monthly contribution by the deceased. The High Court held that the Tribunal wrongly fixed Rs.10,000/- as the monthly contribution by the deceased to the family and observed that even if 1/3[rd] was deducted towards personal expenses of the deceased, more than 1600 US Dollars could be taken as dependency benefit. However, while determining the compensation, the High Court took the figure of 1500 US Dollars as the dependency benefit. The exchange rate as was prevailing on the date of filing of the claim petition, i.e., April, 1990 was taken into consideration based on Ext.A7 and worked out the contribution to the family as **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **12** Rs.25,950/- per month. One of the questions before the Apex Court was whether the foreign currency amount has to be converted into the currency of the country on the basis of exchange rate as on the date of filing claim petition (April, 1990) or as on the date of determination (May, 1993). The claimants filed a petition in April, 1990 (affidavit sworn on 24[th] March, 1990) and claimed compensation in INR, i.e., Rs.57,25,000/-. Such compensation was not claimed in US Dollars. For the said reason and in view of the decisions in **Forasol v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission [(1984) Supp. SCC 263]** and **Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [(1994) 1994 Supp. 1 SCC 644]** the Apex Court held that the date of filing of the claim petition (April, 1990) is the proper date for fixing the rate of exchange at which foreign currency amount has to be converted into currency of the country (INR). The Tribunal and the High Court have rightly relied on Ext.A7, to fix the rate of exchange as Rs.17.30 (as was prevailing in April, 1990). 15. In **Jiju Kuruvila,** on the question of just and **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **13** proper compensation, the Apex Court noticed that, both the Tribunal and the High Court have accepted that the deceased was 45 years of age at the time of accident; he was working as Manager, Freeman Management Corporation, New York Branch, USA and was getting a monthly salary of 2500 US Dollars. The High Court accepted that the deceased, as per conditions of service, could have continued the employment up to the age of 65 years. Ext.A6 is a certificate issued by the employer of deceased, i.e., Freeman Management Corporation, USA dated 23.04.1990, as per which his annual salary was 30,000 US Dollars. He was in their employment for 9 years and had an excellent standing and his employment was of a permanent nature. The deceased would have continued in service up to the age of 65 years. Ext.A6 was attested by Notary Public and counter signed by the Consulate General of India, New York, as per Section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. On the basis of the aforesaid annual income and exchange rate of Rs.17.30 per US Dollar, as applicable in April, 1990 (as per Ext.A7), the Apex Court **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **14** found that the annual income of the deceased if converted in Indian currency will be 30,000 x 17.30 = Rs.5,19,000/at the time of death. 16. In **Jiju Kuruvila** , the deceased was in the employment Freeman Management Corporation, New York Branch, USA for 9 years and his employment was of a permanent nature. He was provided with quarter by the employer and was residing alongwith his wife. He was working as Manager and was getting a monthly salary of 2500 US Dollars. The deceased would have continued in service up to the age of 65 years. In the said case, Ext.A6 certificate issued by the employer of deceased, which was attested by Notary Public and counter signed by the Consulate General of India, New York, as per Section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 was also produced before the Tribunal. The law laid down by the Apex Court in **Jiju Kuruvila** cannot be applied - in the case of non permanent employment with uncertainty regarding continuance. The monthly income of the injured/deceased, which he was alleged to have been **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **15** earning in a Gulf country where the employment of such nature is not permanent and is likely to be terminated at the whims and fancies of the Sponsor cannot be relied upon for the purpose of assessing compensation payable under the head disability in injury cases/loss of dependency in death cases. 17. In **Valsamma and another v. Binu Jose and others [2014 (1) KHC 207]** the case of the appellants before the Division Bench of this Court was that the deceased, who was aged 29 years, was working as spray painter in Oman and getting Rs.20,000/- per month. In order to prove the same, they have produced Ext.A5 agreement entered into between the deceased with one Bahwan Automotive Centre, Sultanate of Oman dated 15.05.2001; Ext.A7 labour card; and Ext.A8 passport. But, those documents were not proved in accordance with law. The executant of Ext.A6 agreement was not examined to prove the contents of the same. The passport entry would show that the deceased was having visa up to 25.03.2005 and the accident occurred on 18.09.2004. The Division **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **16** Bench held that those documents are not sufficient to prove that the deceased was having so much income there. The Division Bench noticed that, employment in Gulf countries is not certain and it is likely to be terminated at any time. So, under such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is a permanent employment as in a Government service there. If the deceased was a permanent employee there, then that can be taken as a permanent income and that may be useful to assess the compensation payable to his dependents on that basis. In the case of a non-permanent employment with uncertainty regarding continuance, it is not safe to rely on that income for the purpose of assessing compensation under the head 'loss of dependency'. So, in such circumstances, the Court will have to assess the income of the person, in the context of Indian standards, taking the probable income which he may have fetched if he was working in India during the relevant time and the income which he was alleged to have been earning in a Gulf country where the employment of such nature is not permanent and is likely to be terminated at the whims and **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **17** fancies of the Sponsor cannot be relied upon. So, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in not relying on the document produced and the income alleged to have been derived by the deceased at Oman for the purpose of considering the compensation payable on his death. The Division Bench held that, some guess work will have to be made for assessing the income of the deceased who was not having permanent job or self employment, but having some fixed income. The deceased was working as a spray painter and so a person of that caliber in Kerala during 2004 will be getting at least Rs.3,000/- and including his future prospects, the Division Bench took his income as Rs.5,000/per month, for the purpose of assessing compensation under the head of loss of dependency. 18. In **Abraham Jacob @ Avarachan v. N. Mubarak and others [2014 (3) KLT 883]** , according to the appellant before the Division Bench of this Court, at the time of accident, he was working as a Sales Manager in Buzwair Engineering & Contracting, Doha, Qatar, and earning a monthly income of Qatari Riyal 10,000/- **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** ## **18** (equivalent INR 1,15,000/-). Ext.A4 was the salary certificate issued by his employer, certifying that he is working with them as an employee and his basic salary is Qatari Riyal 10,000/- per month. Ext.A4 was authenticated by the Consular Officer of the Embassy of India at Doha (Qatar), in accordance with the provisions under the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. Though the salary certificate was marked as Ext.A4, the Tribunal refused to rely on the same stating that it has not been proved as required by law. 19. In **Abraham Jacob** the Division Bench held that sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 confers power on the Indian diplomatic and consular officers in foreign countries to administer any oath and take any affidavit and also do any notarial act which any notary public may do within a State and every oath, affidavit and notarial act administered, sworn or done by or before such diplomatic and consular officers shall be as effectual as if duly administered or done by any lawful authority in a State. **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **19** Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act lays down that any document purporting to have affixed, impressed or subscribed thereon or thereto the seal and signature of the diplomatic and consular officers authorised by the Act to administer an oath in testimony of any oath, affidavit or act, being administered, taken or done by or before him, shall be admitted in evidence without proof of the seal or signature being the seal or signature of that person, or of the official character of that person. The Division Bench held that Section 3 of the Act does not dispense with the proof of a document according to law if it is to be used as evidence in a court of law. All that Section 3 does is to enable a court to dispense with the proof of the genuineness of the seal and signatures of a diplomatic or consular officer on a particular document. If the document is otherwise relevant and proved in accordance with law, a copy of the said document duly authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Act can be admitted in evidence. 20. In **Abraham Jacob** , the appellant, who was only a Postgraduate in Botany, has no case that he had **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **20** acquired any prior experience or special qualification to hold the post of Sales Manager in engineering and contract field. In such circumstances, the Division Bench held that, though Ext.A4 is a document authenticated in accordance with Section 3 of the Act, the monthly income of Qatari Riyal 10,000/- shown in that certificate cannot be taken as the basis for calculating compensation payable under various heads. The document marked as Ext.A10 was a copy of the passport of the appellant, as per which, he went to Doha in the year 1998 and returned on 18.04.1999. Ext.A11 certificate issued by the Asst. General Manager, the Lord Krishna Bank Ltd., Kottayam Branch showed that he was having a NRE (Non-Resident External) term deposit to the tune of Rs.49,04,857/-, as on 31.03.1999. Ext.A12 was another certificate issued by the Manager, Punjab National Bank, Kottayam Branch, certifying that the appellant and his wife Mollykutty were having accounts with them and the balance as on 31.03.1999 was Rs.36,95,199/-. The Division Bench found that Exts.A11 and A12 certificates indicate that the appellant was drawing a reasonably good salary from **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **21** his overseas employment. As per Annexure C certificate issued by the Chief Executive Officer of Buzwair Engineering & Contracting, Doha, produced before this Court, along with I.A.No.285/2014, a document authenticated in accordance with Section 3 of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948, the service of the appellant was terminated as he could not rejoin service after the accident occurred on 10.05.1999. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the Division Bench found that the monthly earning capacity of the appellant, as on the date of accident, can be reasonably fixed at Rs.40,000/-, as against Rs.10,000/- fixed by the Tribunal, for calculating compensation under various heads. 21. In **Sherfuddin v. Saveesh K. and another [2014 (1) KHC 242]** the case of the appellant before the Division Bench was that, at the time of accident he was a driver-cum-salesman working in Qatar and getting Rs.28,000/- per month. He had produced Ext.A15 driving licence and Exts.A10 and A10(a) passport to prove that he was employed in Qatar. But, he had not produced any **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **22** document to prove that he was getting Rs.28,000/- per month at that time. He had no consistent case regarding his income. Though, in the claim petition, he had mentioned his income as Rs.28,000/- per mensum, when he was examined as PW1, his case was that his income was Rs.60,000/- per month. He had produced his passbook to show that he had sent Rs.58,103/- during a span of 7 months. The Division Bench held that, the fact that the appellant had sent Rs.58,103/- during a span of 7 months alone is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that he was getting a stable income in a foreign country. It was not a permanent income and it has got its own uncertainties. In such circumstances, the income alleged to have been earned by a person in a foreign country cannot be taken as such for the purpose of assessing his monthly income. The Court has to consider the standards in India as to what would have been the probable income that such a person will earn if he was employed here. The Division Bench, under the circumstances, found that the monthly income of Rs.5,000/fixed by the Tribunal is just and proper, which requires no **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **23** enhancement. 22. In **Satheesan E.K. v. Musthafa K.P. and another [2018 (5) KHC 884]** one of the contentions raised before this Court by the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer was that the income as revealed by the documents produced in evidence cannot be taken in toto, since employment in a foreign country is beset with uncertainties. It was also argued that if such an income is taken for computation of future earnings, it would lead to undue benefit being conferred on the claimant. After considering the rival contentions, this Court held that, **Valsamma [2014 (1) KHC 207]** is a case in which the claimant, who was the legal heir of the deceased, asserted an income of Rs.20,000/- and relied on an agreement with the foreign employer, the labour card and the Passport. There was no clear indication of the amounts received by the deceased as income. In that context, finding that the documents are not sufficient to prove the income of the deceased, the Court assessed the income of the person in the context of Indian standards, and for a Spray Painter the **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **24** income was fixed at Rs.5,000/- per month. **Sherfuddin [2014 (1) KHC 242]** was a claim filed by the injured itself, asserting an income of Rs.28,000/- in his foreign employment at Qatar. Again, the Court found that there was no document showing the exact amount received by the claimant in his foreign employment. It was also found that the pleadings indicated an assertion of an amount of Rs.28,000/- per mensem, while in deposition he stated it to be Rs.60,000/-. Finding discrepancy in the versions of the claimant itself as also the finding the exact amounts not being proved, the income of a driver-cum-salesman was fixed at Rs.5,000/-. In **Abraham Jacob @ Avarachan [2014 (3) KLT 883]** the appellant produced a salary certificate authenticated by the Consular Officer of the Embassy of India at Doha (Qatar) in accordance with the provisions under the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948. The Court found that such authentication would not give a go by to the requirement of proof insofar as the contents of the documents. Therein also, when the claim of income from the foreign employer **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** ## **25** was of Rs.1,15,000/- per month, the monthly income accepted, following **Valsamma** , was Rs.40,000/-. It is fairly discernible that in all these decisions the different Division Benches adopted 1/4th of the amounts asserted by the claimants as the monthly income of the injured/deceased from the foreign employment. The uncertainties insofar as the foreign employment, as has been found in the various decisions, loom large and stand against the claimant in the present case also. But, that would not deter this Court from making a reasonable computation of the monthly income, again going by the binding precedents, at least 1/4th of the income in the foreign employment which, in the present case, stands proved unequivocally by reason of no objection having been raised on the proof of its contents at the time when it was marked in trial. 23. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, taking into consideration the oral testimony of the 1[st] appellant as PW1 and also Exts.A10 and A11 passbooks, the monthly income of the deceased is refixed notionally as Rs.9,000/-, for the purpose of re-fixing **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **26** compensation under various heads. 24. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the determination of 'just compensation' has to be on the foundation of evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating to multiplier has been clearly stated in **Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** and it has been approved in **Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65]** . The age and income, as stated earlier, have to be established by adducing evidence. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum. In such an adjudication, the duty of the Tribunal and the Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **27** has been made by this Court for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. In **Pranay Sethi** the Apex Court approved the principle of 'standardisation' so that a specific and certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the basis of age. 25. In **Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]** , a Three- Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in case of self-employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. In **Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma [(2015) 6 SCC 347]** another Three- Judge Bench followed the principle stated in **Rajesh** . In **Pranay Sethi** , after expressing the opinion that the dicta laid down in **Reshma Kumari** being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in **Rajesh** , the Constitution Bench observed that, in **Munna Lal Jain** , the Three-Judge **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **28** Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in **Reshma Kumari** which has concurred with the view expressed in **Sarla Devi** or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a Larger Bench. 26. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench held that, while determining the income, an addition of **50%** of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a **permanent job** and was **below the age of 40 years** , should be made. The addition should be **30%** , if the age of the deceased was **between 40 to 50 years** . In case the deceased was between the age of **50 to 60 years** , the addition should be **15%** . Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. The Apex Court held further that, in case the deceased was **self-employed** or on a **fixed salary** , an addition of **40%** of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was **below the age of 40 years** . An addition of **25%** where the deceased was **between the age of 40 to 50 years** and **10%** where **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **29** the deceased was between the age of **50 to 60 years** should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. 27. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 41 years. It was claimed that, at the time of accident, the deceased was earning a monthly income of Rs.35,000/- as Tailor in UAE. In the impugned award, the Tribunal did not add anything to the notional monthly income of the deceased, towards future prospects. 28. As already noticed, no reliable materials were placed before the Tribunal to show that, at the time of accident, the deceased had a permanent job. Therefore, the deceased can only be treated as self-employed. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi,** an addition of **25%** of the notional monthly income of the deceased, as re-fixed in this appeal considering the economic conditions prevailing at the time of accident and taking note of the fixation of notional monthly income by the Apex Court in **Ramachandrappa** and in **Syed Sadiq** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **30** referred to supra, can be made towards future prospects, since the deceased was between the age of **40 to 50 years** . 29. Therefore, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, **25%** of the monthly income of the deceased notionally re-fixed in this appeal as Rs.9,000/-, i.e., a sum of Rs.2,250/- (9,000 x 25/100) has to be added towards future prospects. In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of re-fixing the compensation under the head loss of dependency, is reckoned as Rs.11,250/- (9,000 + 2,250). 30. In **Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** , the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in **Kerala State** **Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176]** , **U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362]** and **New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC 720]** held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table in paragraph 40 of the said decision [prepared by applying **Susamma Thomas** , **Trilok Chandra** and **Charlie** ], which starts with an **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **31** operative multiplier of **18** [for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years], reduced by one unit for every five years, i.e., multiplier of **17** for 26 to 30 years, multiplier of **16** for 31 to 35 years, multiplier of **15** for 36 to 40 years, multiplier of **14** for 41 to 45 years, and multiplier of **13** for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, i.e., multiplier of **11** for 51 to 55 years, multiplier of **9** for 56 to 60 years, multiplier of **7** for 61 to 65 years and multiplier of **5** for 66 to 70 years. 31. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, as far as the multiplier is concerned, the Claims Tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds place in paragraph 19 of **Sarla Verma** , read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment. 32. In the instant case, as on the date of accident, the deceased was aged 41 years. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in **Sarla Verma's case** and **Pranay Sethi's case** referred to supra, the multiplier of 15 applied by the Tribunal is not correct and proper and the proper multiplier to be adopted is **14** . **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **32** 33. In **Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121]** the Apex Court, on the question of deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependents. Where the deceased was **married** , the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be **one-third** where the number of dependent family members is **2 to 3** ; **one-fourth** where the number of dependent family members is **4 to 6** ; and **one-fifth** where the number of dependent family members **exceeds 6** . In regard to **bachelors** , normally, **50%** is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **33** considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is **large and dependent on the income of the deceased** , as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to **one-third** and contribution to the family will be taken as **two-third** . 34. In **Reshma Kumari [(2013) 9 SCC 65]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reproduced paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of **Sarla Verma** and approved the same, in paragraph 38 of the decision, by stating that, the standards fixed in **Sarla Verma** provide guidance for **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **34** the appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion of a man's net earnings that he saves or spends exclusively for the maintenance of others does not form part of his living expenses but what he spends exclusively on himself does. The percentage of deduction on account of personal and living expenses may vary with reference to the number of dependent members in the family and the personal living expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of dependants. Therefore, the standards fixed in **Sarla Verma** on the aspect of deduction for personal living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 must ordinarily be followed unless a case for departure in the circumstances noted in the preceding paragraph is made out. In paragraph 43.6 the Apex Court directed that, insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in **Sarla Verma** , subject to the observations made in para 38 of **Reshma Kumari** . 35. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , the **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **35** Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, after considering the analysis made in **Sarla Verma** , which was reconsidered in **Reshma Kumari** , approved the method provided therein by stating that, as far as the guidance provided for appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals and Courts should be guided by the conclusion in paragraph 43.6 of **Reshma Kumari** . 36. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 41 years with a family consisting of 5 dependants. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari and **Pranay Sethi** referred to supra, the deduction of only **1/4[th]** of the notional monthly income of the deceased towards his personal and living expenses alone is possible, therefore the Tribunal went wrong in deducting 1/3[rd] of the notional monthly income towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased. 37. Towards loss of dependency, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- (5,000 x 12 x 15 x 2/3). In this appeal, the monthly income of the deceased has **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **36** already been re-fixed as Rs.9,000/-. Adding 25% of the notional monthly income of the deceased towards future prospects (9,000 + 2,250 = 11,250); deducting 1/4[th] towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased; and applying the multiplier of 14, the compensation under the head loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs.14,17,500/(11,250 x 12 x 14 x 3/4), resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.8,17,500/-** (14,17,500 – 6,00,000). 38. In the impugned award, towards funeral expenses the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/-. Towards loss of consortium the 1[st] appellant is awarded a sum of Rs.25,000/-. Towards loss of love and affection appellants 2 to 5 are awarded a sum of Rs.25,000/-. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.50,000/- under the head loss of estate. 39. In **Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **37** 40. In **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though **Rajesh** refers to **Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited [(2012) 6 SCC 421]** , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **38** namely, **loss of estate** , **loss of consortium** and **funeral expenses** should be **Rs.15,000/-** , **Rs.40,000/-** and **Rs.15,000/-** respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis **in every three years** and the enhancement should be at the rate of **10% in a span of three years** , which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. 41. In **Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh [(2018) 9 SCC 146]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in **Pranay Sethi** , to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, who died in a motor accident, which occurred on **30.12.1992** . 42. In **Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi v. New India Assurance Company Limited [(2018) 15 SCC 649]** the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **39** heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in **Pranay Sethi** , i.e., Rs.15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium; and Rs.15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on **16.08.1998** . In the said decision, Rs.40,000/- granted in **Pranay Sethi** towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the **parents** of the deceased, towards **loss of love and affection** . Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus; “ **1.** Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on **16.8.1998** . The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal. xxx xxx xxx **14.** Now coming to the last aspect, i.e., the conventional heads, in **National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** , it has been standardised at Rs.15,000 for loss **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **40** of estate; Rs.40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs.15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs.70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 per cent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years.” “underline supplied” 43. In **Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram [(2018) 18 SCC 130]** , after referring to the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', 'parental consortium' and 'filial consortium'. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. **Spousal consortium** is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the **surviving spouse** for loss of 'company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation'. **Parental consortium** is granted to the **child** upon the **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **41** premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training'. **Filial consortium** is the right of the **parents** to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their **love** , **affection** , companionship and their role in the family unit. 44. In **Magma General Insurance** the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the **love** , **affection** , care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **42** Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their **minor child** , or **unmarried son or daughter** , the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of **filial consortium** . Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the **principles** of awarding compensation under 'loss of consortium' as laid down in **Pranay Sethi** . 45. In **Magma General Insurance** , the deceased was aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing 'namkeen products', who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The **father** , **brother** and **sister** of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the **brother** of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependent. Compensation was awarded to the **father** and **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **43** **unmarried sister** of the deceased, who were held to be dependents. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs.50,000/- x 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter alia, that the father and sister of the deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs.1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs.30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in **Pranay Sethi** . [i.e., loss of estate - **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** ## **44** Rs.15,000/- and funeral expenses – Rs.15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3[rd] towards personal expenses of the deceased. [Para.16 @ page 135 of SCC] The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had **pre-deceased** him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was **contributing** a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. [Para.18 @ page 136 of SCC] Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para.52 of the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , decreased the compensation **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **45** under the head funeral expenses from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of **spousal consortium** , **parental consortium** and **filial consortium** , the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 46. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi** , which was followed in **Santhosh Devi** and **Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi** referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years. 47. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd** ., after referring to the decision in **Pranay Sethi** , the surviving spouse is **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **46** entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in **Pranay Sethi** . 48. In **Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72]** one of the contentions raised was that, any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows; "Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **47** propose to examine that aspect." Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para.26 of the judgment; "26. ….... Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/ relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/ relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. …..." 49. In **State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih [(2014) 8 SCC 883]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in **ABS Marine Products' case (supra)** **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** ## **48** holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras.11 to 13 of the judgment read thus; "11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **49** 141 of the Constitution. 12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. 'Declaration of Law' as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of **Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72]** , **Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381]** and in **State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667]** , has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **50** Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment." 50. In **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** , the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High Court at the rate of Rs.50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and affection. However, the compensation under the head **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **51** funeral expenses was decreased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, after quoting para 52 of the decision in **Pranay Sethi** . After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 51. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of **love and affection** and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or overlapping of compensation **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **52** under the relevant heads. 52. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in **Magma General Insurance Company Ltd.** does not speak anything as to the right of **siblings** to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In **Magma** , after noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had predeceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was **contributing** a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs.40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs.50,000/- x 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **53** as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 53. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi** and **Magma General Insurance Company** **Ltd.** referred to supra, Rs.5,000/- awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned award towards funeral expenses is enhanced to Rs.15,000/-, resulting an an additional payment of **Rs.10,000/-** (15,000 – 5,000); Rs.25,000/awarded towards loss of consortium to the 1[st] appellant is enhanced to Rs.40,000/- and the same is granted under the head spousal consortium, resulting an an additional payment of **Rs.15,000/-** (40,000 – 25,000); Rs.25,000/awarded towards love and affection to appellants 2 to 5 is re-fixed as Rs.1,60,000/- (40,000/- x 4) and the same is granted under the head parental consortium to appellants 2 to 4 and under the head filial consortium to the 5[th] appellant, resulting an additional compensation of **Rs.1,35,000/-** (1,60,000 – 25,000). 54. The Tribunal awarded Rs.50,000/as compensation towards loss of estate. In view of the law laid **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **54** down by the Apex Court in **Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]** an amount Rs.15,000/- can be granted under the head loss of estate. Accordingly, the sum of Rs.50,000/awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of estate is scaled down to Rs.15,000/-, resulting an **excess payment** of **Rs.35,000/-** (50,000 – 15,000), which has to be deducted from the additional compensation granted in this appeal. 55. The Tribunal awarded Rs.15,000/- as compensation towards pain and suffering of the deceased. 56. In **Jyni and others v. Raphel P.T. and others [2016 (2) KHC 870]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **55** amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/- could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such cases. 57. In the instant case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the way to hospital. Therefore, the compensation of Rs.15,000/- awarded by the Tribunal under the head pain and suffering of the deceased is scaled down to Rs.5,000/-, resulting **an excess payment** of **Rs.10,000/-** (15,000 – 5,000), which has also to be deducted from the additional compensation granted in this appeal. 58. Towards transportation to hospital the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.1,000/-. Considering the fact that the accident is of the year 2001, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under this head represents just and reasonable compensation, which requires no enhancement in this appeal. 59. In the result, the appellants/claimants are entitled **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **56** for payment of an additional compensation of **Rs.9,32,500/-** (Rupees Nine lakh thirty two thousand and five hundred only) [(8,17,500 + 10,000 + 15,000 + 1,35,000) – (35,000 + 10,000)] in this appeal, which will carry interest at the rate of **8%** per annum from the date of petition till realisation. The additional compensation granted in this appeal, excluding that granted to the appellants under the head spousal/parental/filial consortium shall be apportioned among the appellants in the ratio 50:10:10:10:20. The 3[rd] respondent/insurer shall satisfy the additional compensation granted in this appeal, together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the appellants/claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. Payment of additional compensation granted in this appeal shall be made to the appellants/claimants as per the directives issued by this Court in Circular No.3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No.D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. The **MACA.No.148 OF 2008** **57** appellants to provide their Bank account details before the Tribunal, with copy to the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. This appeal is disposed of as above. No order as to costs. **Sd/-** **ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE** AV/21/11