Shanmughan P.K. v. Shafna and Shijumon

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT:** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **& THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH** **TUESDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016/24TH KARTHIKA, 1938** **MACA.No. 3461 of 2016 () -------------------------** **AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 705/2013 of MACT, IRINJALAKUDA** ## **APPELLANT/1ST RESPONDENT :** **----------------------------** **SHANMUGHAN P.K.** **AGED 60 YEARS, S/O. KUTTAPPAN, PALAPARAMBIL HOUSE, VADAMA, THRISSUR DISTRICT-680 732.** **BY ADVS.SMT.JEENA JOSEPH SRI.G.D.PANICKER** ## **RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER-RESPONDENT :** **-------------------------------------** ## **1. SHAFNA** **AGED 21 YEARS, D/O. VAHIDA, THOTTUPARAMBATHU HOUSE, KAIPAMANGALAM P.O., CHALINGAD, VIA-KALAMURI, THRISSUR DISTRICT.** ## **2. SHIJUMON** **S/O. SADANANDAN, KIZHAKKEDATH HOUSE, PERINJANAM WEST, PERINJANAM VILLAGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT-680 686.** **THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15-11-2016, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ## **C.T.RAVIKUMAR & K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH, JJ.** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ## **M.A.C.A.No.3461 OF 2016** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 15[th] day of November, 2016 ## **JUDGMENT** ## Ravikumar, J. This appeal by the insured owner of the offending vehicle carries a point of law for resolution. The appellant herein was the first respondent and 2[nd] respondent herein was the 2[nd] respondent, in O.P. (MV)No.705/2013 on the files of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda. The said claim petition was filed by the first respondent herein under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking compensation for the injuries sustained by her in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 14.12.2011 at about 4.30 p.m. On that day, while she was travelling in the autorickshaw bearing Reg.No.KL 08/J 7941 through NH 17, the car bearing Reg.No.KL 45/E – 2846, driven by the second respondent came from the opposite direction and dashed against the said autorickshaw. Consequently, she sustained injuries which ultimately resulted in permanent disability. It is in the said MACA No.3461/2016 2 circumstances that she filed the above mentioned petition claiming a total compensation of Rs.2,09,500/-. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to hereafter in the judgment in accordance with their rank and status before the Tribunal unless otherwise specifically mentioned. 2. Before the Tribunal the 2[nd] respondent-driver remained ex parte and the appellant herein filed written statement taking up the contention that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the autorickshaw in which the petitioner was travelling. The basic foundation for the main ground raised before us, was laid therein by taking a specific objection regarding the very maintainability of the claim petition viz., it is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties inasmuch as the driver, owner and insurer of the autorickshaw bearing Reg.No.KL-08/J-7941 were not joined as respondents in the claim petition. It was also averred in the written statement that the driver of the said autorickshaw was a minor and he had no licence to drive the same. Furthermore, it was contended that he was none other than the brother of the petitioner. After considering the rival contentions and MACA No.3461/2016 3 the evidence on record, the Tribunal as per the impugned judgment passed an award for a total compensation of Rs.1,31,330/- along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of petition till realization. The Tribunal found that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the car, viz., the 2[nd] respondent and therefore he is primarily liable to pay the compensation. Being its owner viz., the first respondent therein/the appellant herein was held vicariously liable to compensate the petitioner, the first respondent herein. In consequence thereof, the appellant and the 2[nd] respondent were held jointly and severally liable to compensate the petitioner and passed the award accordingly. Obviously, nobody got a case before the Tribunal as also before this court that the offending vehicle viz., the car bearing Reg.No.KL/E-2846 was having a valid insurance, at the time of the accident. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The main contention of the learned counsel is that the Tribunal had gone wrong in rejecting the application of the appellant to implead the driver and owner of the autorickshaw involved in the accident. According to MACA No.3461/2016 4 the appellant, dismissal of I.A.Nos.3304/2016 and 3305/2016 filed respectively with the prayers to reopen the evidence and to implead the owner and driver of the autorickshaw, was unjust, unfair and illegal especially taking note of the fact that the Tribunal, on analysing the evidence on record had arrived at the conclusion that the cause of accident is composite negligence and left open the apportionment interse negligence between the driver of the autorickshaw and the 2[nd] respondent, the driver of the car. 4. The sum and substance of the contention of the appellant is that when the cause of motor vehicle accident is composite negligence of the drivers of vehicles involved in the accident concerned. The Tribunal got a duty to see that all the joint tort feasors are brought on record so as to consider the question of negligence properly and also to apportion the degree of negligence between the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident and then to apportion the liability of the joint feasors. It is further contended that if the aforementioned interlocutory said applications were allowed and such a course of action was adopted the present precarious situation could have been averted. Evidently, MACA No.3461/2016 5 the Tribunal declined to uphold the contention of the appellant in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. and others [ 2015 (3) KHC 70 (SC)]** and the Tribunal relying on the said decision held that when the claimant opted only to sue one of the joint tort feasors, the non-joinder of other joint tort-feasor could not be a reason for dismissing the claim of the petitioner. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Khenyei's** case, the Tribunal further held that it need not enter into a finding regarding the inter se negligence of the joint tort feasors because as regards the claimant the liability of the joint tort feasors is joint and several. Virtually, it is the said finding arrived at by the Tribunal relying on the decision in **Khenyei's** case of the Hon'ble Apex court, is under challenge in this appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the understanding of the ratio of the decision by the Tribunal in **Khenyei's** case is nothing, but a misconception. To buttress the said contention, the learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 13 of the decision in **Khenyei's** case, which reads thus : “13. In our opinion, the law laid down by the MACA No.3461/2016 6 Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Sushila Bhadoriya (supra) is also in tune with the decisions of the High Court of Karnataka in Ganesh (supra) and Arun @ Aravind (supra). However, at the same time, suffice it to clarify that even if all the joint tort feasors are impleaded and both the drivers have entered the witness box and the tribunal or the court is able to determine the extent of negligence of each of the driver that is for the purpose of inter se liability between the joint tort feasors but their liability would remain joint and several so as to satisfy the plaintiff/claimant.” 5. The learned counsel for the appellant, in elaboration of his contentions, submit as hereunder :- Though the claimant was not under any legal obligation to sue all the joint tort-feasors in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Tribunal ought to have discharged its duty to bring on record all of them either by issuing a direction on its own or MACA No.3461/2016 7 by allowing the applications filed by the appellant herein for the purpose of impleading the joint tort feasors who were left out to be impleaded by the claimant. It is a case where the claimant had purposefully omitted to join the other joint tort feasors as the driver of the autorickshaw in which she was then travelling was none other than her own brother and on the date of the accident, he was a minor and naturally, he was not then possessing a licence to drive the autorickshaw. By showing such disinclination to allow the application for impleadment, the Tribunal virtually disabled itself from considering the case of the appellant in its true perspective and to dispose of the claim petition more appropriately and in a just manner. The term ends of justice, even in a claim petition filed under the provisions of the M.V. Act could not be viewed only from the point of view of the claimant and it has also to be viewed from the point of views of the tort-feasors. Owing to the failure on the part of the Tribunal in allowing the aforesaid interlocutory applications and consequently in not apportioning the inter se liability between the joint-tort feasors, now the appellant and the 2[nd] respondent are called upon to satisfy the MACA No.3461/2016 8 entire award eve after finding that the cause of the accident is composite negligence. Normally, when the 2[nd] respondent is also a person saddled with the liability, jointly with the appellant, we would issue notice to him. But then, we are of the considered view that the first question to be decided in this appeal, at this stage, is whether it deserves to be admitted ? Therefore, only subject to the answer to that question we need to consider whether notice need be issued to the 2[nd] respondent. 6. The arguments advanced by the appellant, at the first blush, appear to be forceful and acceptable. True that justice is the pursuit and end of all law. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah reported in AIR 1955 SC 425 the Hon'ble Apex Court held : “By 'ends of justice' is meant not only justice to the parties but also to witnesses and other who may be inconvenienced”. Therefore, the contention of the appellant appears to be well founded. True that in a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act a justice oriented consideration is contemplated and the said objective cannot be confined to the point of view of the claimant alone. If a party is not legally to be saddled MACA No.3461/2016 9 with the liability to compensate the claimant he cannot be fastened with the liability and certainly, only a party who is legally liable alone can be mulcted with such liability. The undisputed position obtained in this case is that the offending vehicle viz., car bearing Reg.No.KL-45/E2846 was lacking a valid insurance coverage at the time of the accident and in terms of the statutory mandate under Section 146 of the M.V.Act no owner of a vehicle is allowed to ply his vehicle without insurance coverage. We will deal with that issue little later. 7. Essentially, the contention of the petitioner is that evenafter finding that the cause of the accident is composite negligence the Tribunal ought not to have made him liable to pay the entire amount of compensation. In the contextuation situation and in view of the aforesaid contentions it is only desirable to consider the question whether the Tribunal had actually entered into a finding that cause of the accident was composite negligence. The tenor of the judgmnet and award would reveal that exclusive negligence is not found against the 2[nd] respondent specifically and at the same time, the Tribunal had only left the question whether there was negligence on the part of the driver MACA No.3461/2016 10 of the autorickshaw, as well, after finding that the cause of the accident was the negligence on the part of the 2[nd] respondent, the driver of the car. Paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment and award would unravel that position clear and it, reads thus : “I have already found that there is negligence on the part of the 2[nd] respondent in causing the accident. Since the driver of the autorickshaw is not arrayed as a party in this case, the interse negligence between them is left open. The 1[st] and 2[nd] respondent are granted the right to file appropriate proceedings against the driver and owner of the autorickshaw to fix the interse liability between them. Since the 2[nd] respondent is a joint tort feasors, as far as the petitioner is concerned, he is liable to pay the entire sum found due to the petitioner. The 1[st] respondent is the owner of the car. So he is vicariously liable to compensate the petitioner for all acts, omission and commission on the part of the 2[nd] respondent. Hence R1 and R2 and (sic. are) jointly and severally liable to compensate the petitioner.” It is after making the said position clear in paragraph 9 itself that the Tribunal went on to make the afore-extracted conclusions and findings. In paragraph 9 it MACA No.3461/2016 11 was stated thus :- “ The question whether there is negligence on the part of the driver of the autorickshaw is left open. Since going by the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in 2015(3) KHC 70 this Tribunal is not required to decide the interse negligence between the joint tortfeasors.” 8. True that the second sentence in paragraph 10 as extracted earlier, whereby the first and second respondents are granted the right to file appropriate proceedings against the driver and owner of the autorickshaw to fix inter se liability between them, would tend anyone to conclude that there is finding by the Tribunal that the cause of the accident is a composite negligence on the part of the drivers of both the vehicles involved in the accident. In other words, the fact is that there is absolutely no clear finding by the Tribunal that the accident in which the petitioner/the first respondent in the appeal, sustained injuries, was caused by the composite negligence of the drivers of the autorickshaw and the car. In fact, taking into account Exts.A1, A2, A4 and A5 which are respectively, FIR in Crime No.1529/11 of Mathilakam police MACA No.3461/2016 12 station, First Report, scene mahazar and AMVI report the Tribunal found that the 2[nd] respondent's negligence had caused the accident. At the same time, evidently, the Tribunal had also taken note of the case of the appellant in the written statement that the accident had happened on account of the negligence of the driver of KL-08/J-7941 autorickshaw, as can be seen from paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment and award. So also, it is a fact that the first respondent herein/the petitioner therein has specifically contended by the appellant that the driver of the autorickshaw was a minor and he had no driving licence to drive an autorickshaw and further that he was the brother of the petitioner. These contentions must have been the reason that made the Tribunal to leave open the question whether the driver of the autorickshaw had also contributed to the accident. 9. Still, we will examine the question whether, apart from the above circumstances, there exists any other reason that persuaded the appellant to take the contention that the Tribunal had arrived at a finding that cause of the accident is composite negligence. On our very careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment and award we could find MACA No.3461/2016 13 only one such reason viz., the one is available in its paragraph 7 of the impugned award. It, in so far as relevant, reads thus :- The accident was not disputed by the 1[st] respondent. The only dispute is regarding the negligence attributed against the 2nd respondent. Admittedly, the petitioner was passenger in the autorickshaw. Hence this is a case of composite negligence. (emphasis added) 10. Thus, it is obvious that the above extracted portion of the judgment is the actual foundation for the contention of the appellant that the Tribunal had entered into a finding that the cause of the accident is composite negligence. The distinction between 'composite negligence' and 'contributory negligence' has to be looked into in this context. 11. 'Composite negligence' refers to a case where without any negligence on the part of the victim, be the injured or the deceased, the accident had occurred and it occurred on account of the combined effect of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers ( See the MACA No.3461/2016 14 decision of the Hon'be Apex Court in T.O.Antony v. Karvaran reported in [(2003) 3 SCC 748]. The expression ' contributory negligence' does not mean breach of duty. It can only mean the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that, he becomes blameworthy in part as an 'author of his wrong', of course concurring with negligence of the other ( see the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pramod Kumar Rasikhbai Jhavery v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak ( reported in AIR 2002 SC 2864). There is absolutely no case for the appellant regarding any blameworthy act or omission from the part of the petitioner/the first respondent in the appeal. As noticed hereinbefore, the case of the appellant is that the accident had occurred due to the negligence on the part of the driver of the autorickshaw who was not made a party by the petitioner. In such circumstances, it is evident that it cannot be taken as a case of 'contributory negligence'. Simply because the petitioner was a passenger in the autorickshaw it also cannot be said that the cause of the accident is composite negligence though on proof, it could be established that she got injured by the composite negligence of the drivers of both the car and the MACA No.3461/2016 15 autorickshaw. As per the impugned judgment and award what the Tribunal had decided is that the cause of the accident is the negligence of the 2[nd] respondent , the driver of the car while leaving open, based on the appellant's contention, the question whether the driver of the autorickshaw had also contributed to the accident in question. 12. It is the aforesaid background that the contention of the appellant that the Tribunal had passed the award in misconception of the decision in Khenyei's decision ( supra) has to be appreciated. The position that the decision in Kenyei's case is one applicable in view of the appellant's own case, cannot be disputed. We may hasten to add, in view of the fact that the driver of the autorickshaw is not a party in this proceedings as also before the Tribunal and that the 2[nd] respondent was ex parte before the Tribunal and that we have not issued notice to him, at this stage we do not think it proper to go into the question whether the averments raised against the driver of the autorickshaw, adverted to hereinbefore are sufficient to arrive at a conclusion as to whether he too, had contributed to the cause of the accident through his negligence. MACA No.3461/2016 16 13. For appreciating the contention of the appellant it is only appropriate to consider the question as to what exactly is the enunciation of law in the decision in **Khenyei's** case (supra). A bare perusal of the decision in **Khenyei's** case would reveal that in that case the claimant in claim a petition filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act did not join all the joint tort feasors as parties to the claim petition. Nevertheless, it was found by the Tribunal that the accident in which the claimant sustained the injuries was caused by composite negligence of the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident and in troth, the Claims Tribunal had also apportioned the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of the trailer-truck and the bus, the vehicles involved in the accident as 2/3[rd] and 1/3[rd] respectively. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the main question arose for consideration was whether it would be open to the claimant to recover the entire compensation from one of the joint tort feasors, particularly when in accident caused by composite negligence of drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident. In fact, in that case in the appeal from the award of the Tribunal the High Court interfered with the judgment and MACA No.3461/2016 17 award and upon finding that the claimants sustained the injuries when a bus and a trailor-truck collided with each other and the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. was admittedly the insurer of one of the vehicles viz., the bus it could not be called upon to satisfy 2/3[rd] of the award. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to paragraph 18 of the decision which reads thus : “This Court in Challa Bharathamma & Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject -matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle -trailor -truck which was not insured with the MACA No.3461/2016 18 insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor -truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: (i) In the case of composite negligence, Plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis -à -vis the Plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. MACA No.3461/2016 19 (iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the Plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.” (emphasis added) MACA No.3461/2016 20 14. Thus, it is evident that in unambiguous terms, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in a case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/ claimant in a claim for compensation filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act is entitled to sue both or any one of the tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of the joint tort feasors is joint and several. Further, it was held by the Apex Court that in the case of such composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis-a-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible and he can recover at his option whole damage from any one of them. The conclusion in clauses (iii) and (iv) would definitely reveal that there is no basis in the grievance of the appellant and further that what the Tribunal did as per the impugned judgment and award is perfectly, in conformity with and compliance with the enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Clause (iii) would reveal that in a case where all the joint tort feasors were impleaded and evidence is sufficient it would be open to the court or the Tribunal to determine the inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident. Evidently, in such cases based on the MACA No.3461/2016 21 apportionment/extent of their negligence determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint feasor could recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings as distinguished from the liability/entilement available under clause (iv), in the absence of non-impleadment of the other tort-feasors. What should be done in such cases was also specifically held by the Apex Court in the decision it was held that : “ In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings.” 15. Thus the answer to the question as to what should be done in such a case where even after arriving at a conclusion that the cause of accident is composite negligence and if one of the joint tort feasors is not a party to the proceedings has been given in unambiguous terms by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it was held that in such circumstances, the remedy open to the joint tort feasor who was impleaded in the proceedings and was called upon to pay the liability of the other, is to sue the other joint tort-feasor in independent proceedings after the MACA No.3461/2016 22 passing of the decree or award. Conclusion No. (iii) in the form of findings would reveal that even in a case where all the joint tort-feasors are impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers and such determination is only for the purpose of enabling one of the joint tort-feasors to recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the claimant, to the extent it satisfied the liability of the other. The difference is that in such circumstances, the joint tort-feasor who satisfied the entire claim can recover the amount due to it from the other in the execution proceedings. 16. We are of the view that while considering the case on hand, it will be worthwhile to refer to the provisions under the Kerala Torts ( Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976 ( for short Kerala Torts Act only) as well. It is an enactment intended to unify and amend the law relating to survival of causes of action, liability of joint tort feasors and liability in cases of contributory negligence in respect of torts. Section 7 and 8 (2) and (3) of the Act are relevant for the purpose of this case. They read thus : MACA No.3461/2016 23 ## **7. Proceedings against, and contribution** ## **between, joint and several tortfeasors -** - (1) Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not), - (a) judgment obtained against any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any other person who would; if sued, have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage. (b) if more than one action is brought in respect of that damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered, or for the benefit of his estate, or of the dependants of that person, against tortfeasors liable in respect of the damage (whether as tortfeasors or the sum joint otherwise), recoverable under the judgments given in those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the MACA No.3461/2016 24 judgement first given; and in any of those actions, other than that in which judgement is first given, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action. (c) any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so however that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by him in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought. (2) In any proceedings for contribution under this section, the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having MACA No.3461/2016 25 regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity. ## 8. **Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence -** (2) Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (1), subject to any reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault. (3) Section 7 shall apply in any case where two or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of sub-section (1) in respect of the damage suffered by any person. MACA No.3461/2016 26 17. A scanning of the said provisions would reveal that even before the decision in Khenyei's decision (supra) the same was the position available in Kerala by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of the Kerala Torts Act. In other words, going by the provisions of the said Act, in a case where one joint tort feasor was called upon to pay the entire liability arising from an award, the remedy open to the said joint tort feasor is to sue the other joint tort feasor and get the amount which it was made to pay for discharging the liability of the other joint tort feasor. In the light of the discussion as above, we do not find any illegality, perversity or irregularity in the decision of the Tribunal warranting an appellate interference. In the result, this appeal is liable to fail and accordingly, it is dismissed. The parties have to suffer their respective costs. **Sd/-** ## **C.T.RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE** ## **K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH, JUDGE** sv.