Shah Nawaj v. State of U.P. & Anr.

·•. A _J_ B .• "" ## [2011] 9 S.C.R. 859 # SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 1531 of 2011) AUGUST 05, 2011 # **[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]** _,>_ .. _Juvenile Justice/Care and Protection of Children) Rules,_ - - _2007 Claim of juvenility FIR lodged against appellant for commission of offence u/ss. 302 and 307 /PC_ - _Application_ c _filed by appellant's mother before the Juvenile Justice Board that he was_ a _minor at the time of the alleged occurrence on_ - _basis of her son's school leaving certificate Application_ - _allowed Session Judge set aside the order passed by the_ - _Board Said 'order upheld by the High Court on the ground_ D - _of absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificate On ,appeal held: Documents furnished-mark sheet of High School Examination issued by the School Authority and the School Leaving Certificate issued by the Preparatory School clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant was noted_ E - _as 18.06.1989 Entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet as also school leaving certificate are valid proof_ - _of evidence for determination of age of an accused person Date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been coffoborated by the_ F _School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk and the_ - _principal of the School Mother of the appellant corroborated his academic records which clearly depose his date of birth as 18. 06. 1989 and the appellant_ was _a juvenile on the date_ G _of occurrence as alleged in the FIR_ - _Thus, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to_ 859 H 860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A _the Rules_ - _Decision of the Board is upheld and that of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court are set aside_ - _Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000._ 8 An FIR was lodged against the appellant and others for commission of offence under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. The mother of the appellant filed an application before the Juvenile Justice Board that the minor was a juvenile on the alleged date of occurrence. The witnesses C were cross-examined and the Board declared the appellant juvenile under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The complainant-wife of deceased filed an appeal and the order passed by the Board was set aside. The appellant filed criminal revision. The High Court dismissed the D revision on the ground that in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificate and the language used in Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 was with reference to only certificate and not the mark sheet. Therefore, the E appellant filed the instant appeal. ## Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and F Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical opinion from the medical board should be· G sought only when the matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or by any Panchayat or municipality is not available. [Paras 19 and 21] [873-B-C; 874-B] H SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 861 1.2 The documents furnished mark sheet of High A School Examination issued by the School Authority and the School leaving certificate dated 11.07 .2007 issued by the Preparatory School clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant was noted as 18.06.1989. The entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one B of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly c been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of the School and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving Certificate 0 issued by the Principal of the School as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said school which was proved by the statement of the Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother E of the appellant categorically stated on oath that the appellant was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic records from preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, 18.06.1989, thus, her statement corroborated his academic records which clearly depose F his date of birth as 18.06.1989. Thus, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence as alleged in the FIR. [Para 20] [873-D-H; 874-A-B] F > 1.3 From the acceptable records, it is held that the date of birth of the appellant is 18.06.1989. Though the G > Board correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in determining the age of the appellant > ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents H [2011] 9 S.C.R. .. ## 862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS A which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules. While upholding the decision of the Board, the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court are set aside. The appellant is declared to be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence and may be proceeded in B accordance with law. [Paras 19 and 22] [873-B-C; 874-CD] _Raju and Anr. vs. State of Haryana_ 2010 (3) SCC 235: 2010 (2) SCR 57 4; _Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr._ C 2009 (13) SCC 211: 2009 (7) SCR 623; _Bhoop Ram vs. State of U.P._ 1989 (3) SCC 1: _Rajinder Chandra vs. State of Chhatisgarh and Anr._ 2002 (2) SCC 287; _Amit Das vs.State of Bihar_ (2000) 5 SCC 488: 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 69; _Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P._ 2006 (5) SCC 584: 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 615; _Pradeep Kumar vs. State of U.P._ 0 - 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 419 referred to. 0 ## Case Law Reference: E F 2010 (2) SCR 574 Referred to Para 7 2009 (7) SCR 623 Referred to Para 7 1989 (3) sec 1 Referred to Para 8 2002 (2) sec 287 Referred to Para 9 2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 69 Referred to Para 10 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 615 Referred to Para 11 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 419 Referred to Para 12 • CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal G No. 1531 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 10.12.2010 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009. H SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. 863 .. ' D Dinesh Kumar Garg, B.S. Billowria, Abhishek Garg, Dhananjay Garg for the Appellant. A R.K. Gupta, Rajeev Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B **P. SATHASIVAM,** J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 10.12.2010 passed by the High Court of c Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009 whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal revision filed by the appellant herein. ## 3. Brief facts: ,,.. (a) The appellant claims to have born on 18.06.1989 in Village and Post Dadheru Kala, Police Station Charthawal, District Muzaffamagar, U.P. He was admitted in Class I in Nehru Preparatory School, Khurd, Muzaffarnagar on 05.07.1994 and studied there till 20.05.1998. Thereafter, on 04.07.1998, he got admission in Class VI in the National High School Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar and studied there till Class X. The date of birth in the mark sheet is mentioned as 18.06.1989 . E .; (b) On 04.06.2007, a First Information Report (in short "the FIR") was lodged by Khatizan, wife of Nawab-the deceased, against the appellant herein and three others for the alleged occurrence which culminated into Crime Case No. 215 of 2007 at Police Station Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short "the IPC") . F G .... (c) On 12.06.2007, the mother of the appellant submitted an application before the Juvenile Justice Board (in short "the Board"), Muzaffarnagar. U.P. stating that the appellant was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. After examining H 864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011J 9 S.C.R. A the witnesses, the Board, vide judgment and order dated 24.01.2008, declared the appellant juvenile under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). .. - (d) Against the judgment of the Board, Khatizan the wife 8 of the deceased filed Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2008 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under - Section 52 of the Act. The State respondent No.1 did not file any appeal. Vide judgment dated 13.01.2009, the Additional C Sessions Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 24.01.2008 passed by the Board. (e) Challenging the judgment dated 13.01.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009 before the High Court of Allahabad. D The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 10.12.2010, dismissed the criminal revision. Hence this appeal by way of special leave. - 4. Heard Mr. Dinesh Kumar Garg, learned counsel for the E appellant and Mr. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the State. Despite notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of respondent No.2. 5. Before considering the merits of the claim of the appellant and the stand of the State, let us consider Rule 12 of F the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which reads as under:- "12. Procedure to be followed in determination of G Age.- (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from H the date of making of the application for that purpose. 865 SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] B . . _f_ .. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining - A c - (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; • I (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the D absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; _.:;_ .... I - (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of[E ] clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the F Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. G and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence H SUPREME COURT REPORTS 866 [2011] 9 S.C.R. ## A B c D E F whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7 A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law." _+·_ 6. In the light of the above procedure to be followed in determining the age of the child or juvenile, let us consider various decisions of this Court. G 7. In _Raju and Anr. vs. State of Haryana_ (2010) 3 SCC 235, this Court had admitted "mark sheet" as one of the proof in determining the age of the accused person. In that case, the appellants therein Raju and Mangli along with Anil alias Balli and Sucha Singh were sent up for trial for allegedly having H committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with 867 SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. "-f [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] • • Section 34 of the IPC. Accused Sucha Sil']gh was found to be A a juvenile and his case was separated for separate trial under the Act. Others were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the !PC and were sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Apart from contending on the merits of the prosecution case, insofar as appellant No. 1, B Raju, is concerned, the counsel appearing for him submitted that on the date of the incident that is on (31.03.1994), he was a juvenile and as per his mark sheet, wherein his date of birth was recorded as 1977, he was less than 17 years of age on the date of the incident. Learned counsel submitted that having c regard to the recent decision of this Court in _Hari Ram_ vs. _State of Rajasthan_ & _Anr.,_ (2009) 13 SCC 211, appellant No. 1 must be held to have been a minor on the date of the incident and the provisions of the Act would apply in his case. Learned counsel furthercontended that the ap~ellant No. 1 would have D to be dealt with under the provisions of the said Act in keeping with the decision in the aforesaid case. On merits, while accepting the claim of the learned counsel for accusedappellant, this Court altered the conviction and sentence and convicted under Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC E instead of Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. As far as appellant No. 1, namely, Raju was concerned, while accepting the entry relating to date of birth in the mark sheet referred his case to the Board in terms of Section 20 of the Act to be dealt under the provisions of the said Act in keeping with the F provision of Section 15 thereof. It is clear from the said decision that this Court has accepted mark sheet as one of the proof for determining the age of an accused person. E F 8. Similarly, this Court has treated the date of birth in School Leaving Certificate as valid proof in determining the age G of an accused person. In _Bhoop Ram_ vs. _State of U.P._ (1989) 3 sec 1, this Court considered whether the appellant therein is entitled lesser imprisonment than imprisonment for life and . should have been treated as a "child" within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 (1 of 1952). The H 868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R. A following conclusion in para 7 is relevant which reads as under:- 8 "7 ..... The first is that the appellant has produced a school certificate which carries the date 24-6-1960 against the column "date of birth". There is no material before us to hold that the school certificate does not relate to the appellant or that the entries therein are not correct in their particulars .... " It is clear from the above decision that this Court relied on the entry made in the column "date of birth" in the School Leaving C Certificate. 9. In _Rajinder Chandra vs._ State _of Chhattisgarh and Anr._ (2002) 2 sec 287, this Court once again considered the entry relating to date of birth in the mark sheet and concluded as o under: E F "5. It is true that the age of the accused is just on the border of sixteen years and on the date of the offence and his arrest he was less than 16 years oy a few months only. In Amit Das v. State of Bihar this Court has, on a review of judicial opinion, held that while dealing with the question of determination of the age of the accused for the purpose of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible on the said evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. The law, so laid down by this Court, squarely applies to the facts of the present case. G 10. In _Amit Das vs. State of Bihar,_ (2000) 5 SCC 488, this Court held that while dealing with a question of determination of the age of an accused, for the purpose of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hyper-technical approach should not H be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf 870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R. A U.P. Children Act, 1951 and as such on conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC should have been sent to an approved school for detention till the age of 18 years. At the time of granting special leave, appellant, by name, Jagdish produced High School Certificate, according to which he was B[about ][15 ][years ][of ][age ][at ][the ][time ][of ][occurrence. ][Appellant ][-] Krishan Kant produced horoscope which showed that he was 13 years of age at the time of occurrence. So far as appellant - Pradeep was concerned, a medical report was called for by this Court which disclosed that his date of birth as 07 .01.1959 c[was ][acceptable ][on ][the ][basis ][of ][various ][tests ][conducted ][by ][the ] medical authorities. In the above factual scenario/details, this Court concluded as under:- "3. It is thus proved to the satisfaction of this Court that on the date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16 years of age and as such they should have been dealt with under the U.P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisonment on conviction under Section 302/34 of the Act" D E[After ][saying ][so ][and ][after ][finding ][that ][the ][appellants ][were ][aged ] more than 30 years, this Court directed not to send them to an approved school under the U.P. Children Act for detention, while sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all the charges framed against them, quashed the sentences awarded to them F[and ][ordered ][their ][release ][forthwith. ] r ' .. 13. The applicability of the Act and the Rules in respect of "Juvenile" and "Juvenile in conflict with law" have been elaborately considered by this Court in _Hari Ram_ (supra}. After analyzing the Scheme of the Act and various Rules including G Rule 12 and earlier decisions of this Court laid down various principles to be followed. After applying those principles and finding that the appellant therein was 16 years of age on the date of the commission of the alleged offence and had not been completed 18 years of age, remitted the matter to the H Board for disposal in accordance with law. 871 ~ " # SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] ·-i ·< /. • A ## Discussion on merits: 14. In the light of the above principles, now let us consider the claim of the appellant. According to him, on 18.06.1989, he was born in Village and Post Dadheru Kala, Police Station Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. On 05.07.1994, he B was admitted in Class I in Nehru Preparatory School, Khurd, Muzaffarnagar. The appellant left the said school on 20.05.1998. On 04.07.1998, he was admitted in Class VI in the National High School Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar, U.P. On 21.05.2004, he left the said school, namely, National c High School as he failed in High School. From Class VI till Class X the appellant remained and studied continuously in the aforesaid school. The date of birth in the mark sheet is mentioned as 18.06.1989. The alleged occurrence took place on 04.06.2007. The FIR was lodged on 04.06.2007 which D culminated into Crime Case No. 215 of 2007 at Police Station Charthawal, District Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under Sections 302 and 307 ofthe4PC. On 12.06.2007, the mother of the appellant submitted an application before the Board at Muzaffarnagar stating that the appellant was a minor at the time of alleged occurrence. The appellant was provided a School Leaving E Certificate dated 11.07.2007 from Nehru Preparatory School, Khurd, Muzaffarnagar. The mother of the appellant made a statement dated 26.07.2007 regarding the age of her son. She was cross-examined at length. On 16.10.2007, the statement of clerk of Nehru Preparatory School was recorded by the F Board. The said clerk brought the entire records maintained by the School. The said clerk was also cross-examined at length. 15. The Board, vide judgment and order dated 24.01.2008, declared the appellant juvenile under the Act. Against the G judgment of the Board, the complainant Smt. Khatizan, wife of deceased Nawab filed Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2008 under Section 52 of the Act before the learned Additional Sessions · Judge, Muzaffarnagar. It is relevant to point out that the State, who is the prosecuting agency did not file any appeal. The H 872, SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R. A Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar recorded the statement of Guljar Hussain, Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar on 07 .08.2008. By order dated 13.01.2009, the Additional Sessions Judge allowed the said appeal filed by the B complainant and set aside the order dated 24.01.2008 passed by the Board. 16. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, the appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009 C before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the said Revision mainly on the ground that in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificate and considering the language used in Rule 12 with reference to only "Certificate" and not "mark sheet", dismissed the Revision petition. D 17. We have already referred to the decision of this Court about the entry relating to the date of birth made in the mark sheet of High School examination. The appellant has produced mark sheet of High School examination issued by the school authority, namely, National High School, Dadheru, Khurd-0E Kalan, Muzaffarnagar. A perusal of the above said certificate makes reference to appellant's Roll No., his name, Date of Birth, name of the school, details regarding various subjects, maximum marks, marks obtained and ultimate result in the examination. The certificate contained signature of the Clerk F Salim Ahmed, who prepared the same, the signature of the examiner and signature and seal of the Head Master. It is dated 21.05.2004. 18. Another document relied on by the appellant is School Leaving Certificate dated 11.07.2007 issued by Nehru G Preparatory School, Khu rd, Muzaffarnagar wherein it noted the registration no., name of the school, student's name, date of birth (18.06.1989) written in words also, Father's name, occupation, caste, residential address, date of admission in school, date of leaving of school. The certificate contained the H 873 SHAH NAWAJ _v._ STATE OF U.P. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] ~ " .. • ,_, signature and seal of the Head Master and the same is dated. 11.07.2007. A 19. The documents furnished above clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant had been noted as 18.06.1989. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical B opinion from the medical board should be sought only when the matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or :by any Panchayat or municipality is not available. We are of the view that though the Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of c birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules. _,j•_ D 20. We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. ·The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determin'ing the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in E the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has F also been recorded as 18.06.1989 in School Leaving Certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-0-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said school at S. No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of G the Principal of that school recorded before the Board. Apart from the clerk and the Principal of the school, the mother of the appellant has categorically stated on oath that the appellant was born on 18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic records from preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, F H 874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R. A 18.06.1989, hence her statement corroborated his academic records which clearly depose his date of birth as 18.06.1989. Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007. ## B 21. We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report. c 22. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that from the acceptable records, the date of birth of the appellant is 18.06.1989, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed an error in taking contrary view. While upholding the 0[decision ][of ][the ][Board, ][we ][set ][aside ][the ][orders ][of ][the ][Additional ] Sessions Judge dated 13.01.2009 and the High Court dated 10.12.2010. Accordingly, the appellant is declared to be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence and may be proceeded in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. E N.J. Appeal allowed.