High CourtDivision BenchAppeal disposed of. Impugned judgment set aside...

SHAH MANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL (D) THROUGH LRS. v. GOHIL AMARSING GOVINDBHAI (D) THROUGH LRS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 5614 of 2006

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT
  • S. H. KAPADIA
Judgment Date
2006-12-05
Court Decision / Holding
The impugned High Court judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal disposed of. Impugned judgment set aside; matter remitted to High Court for disposal in accordance with law; no order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganlal (D) Through LRS.

Respondents

  • Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (D) Through LRS.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. Raghunath

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Rameshwar Prasad Goyal

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal concerns the validity of a Gujarat High Court decision under Section 100 CPC, where the Second Appeal was allowed on grounds of substantial questions of law without the High Court having formulated such questions. The Supreme Court scrutinizes whether the High Court actually formulated a substantial question of law and whether the Second Appeal was heard on that formulated question. It emphasizes that, post-1976 amendments, Section 100 CPC requires the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law; the memorandum of appeal must specify it precisely; and the appeal must be heard on the formulated question, with a proviso allowing consideration of another substantial question only if one has already been formulated. Citing Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, and subsequent cases (Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar; Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram; Joseph Severane v. Benny Mathew; Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair; Jawala Singh (D) by Lrs. v. Jagat Singh (D) by Lrs.; C.A. Sulaiman & Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and Ors.), the Court reiterates that jurisdiction under Section 100 is confined to substantial questions of law and that proper formulation is essential. The Court ultimately sets aside the impugned judgment, remitting the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law, and disposes of the appeal without costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 100(1) CPCSection 100(2) CPCSection 100(3) CPCSection 100(4) CPCSection 100(5) CPC

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the High Court erred in allowing the Second Appeal without formulating any substantial question of law, a prerequisite under Section 100(4) and (5) CPC. The memorandum failed to state a precise substantial question of law and no such question was formulated or addressed on its basis.

Contentions of Respondents

No substantive arguments are recorded for respondents in the provided text; appearance was noted but no detailed counter-arguments are reproduced.

Cited Precedents (9)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal[2000] 1 SCC 434PositiveCited to emphasize that after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and not reverse a first appellate judgment without such formulation.
Roop Singh v. Ram Singh[2000] 3 SCC 708PositiveAffirms that the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is confined to appeals involving substantial questions of law and not mere questions of fact.
Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar[2003] 1 SCC 430PositiveReiterates the necessity of formulation of substantial questions of law for second appeals.
Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors.[2004] 6 SCC 359PositiveStates that the memorandum shall precisely state the substantial questions of law and the appeal must be heard on those questions.
Joseph Severane and Ors. v. Benny Mathew and Ors.[2005] 7 SCC 667PositiveCited as part of the line of authority clarifying Section 100 requirements.
Sasikumar and Ors. v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.[2005] 12 SCC 588PositiveCited to reinforce formulation and hearing on formulated questions under Section 100.
Jawala Singh (D) by Lrs. v. Jagat Singh (D) by Lrs.JT (2006) 8 SC 483PositiveCited as authority reinforcing the need for proper formulation in second appeals.
C.A. Sulaiman & Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and Ors.[2006] 6 SCC 392PositiveCited within the same doctrinal framework on Section 100 procedural requirements.
Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar[1994] 6 SCC 591PositiveCited for the proposition that mere possession over time does not establish adverse possession, relevant to factual background in the case.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

SHAH MANSUKHLAL CHHAGANLAL (D) THROUGH LRS. _v._ GOHIL AMARSING GOVINDBHAI (D) THROUGH LRS. DECEMBER 5, 2006 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] _Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second appealMaintain'!bility of. when substantial question of law not formulated-Held: Not maintainable._ c _Words and Phrases-Expression 'on any other substantial question of law'-Meaning of-In the context of S. I 00(5J of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908._ The question for consideration in the present appeal is whether High D Court was justified in allowing the second appeal filed in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Disposing of the appeal and remitting the matter to High-Court, the Court HELD: 1. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High E Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the Second Appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. [137-C-D] _Ishwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal_ [2000) 1 SCC 434; _Roop Singh_ v. _Ram_ F _Singh,_ [2000) 3 SCC 708; _Kanhaiyalal_ v. _Anupkumar,_ [2003) l SCC 430; _Chadat Singh_ v. _Bahadur Ram and Ors.,_ [2004] 6 SCC 359; _Joseph Severane and Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ [2005] 7 SCC 667; _Sasikumar and Ors._ v. _Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.,_ [2005) 12 SCC 588; _Jawala Singh (DJ by Lrs. v. Jagat Singh (DJ by Lrs.,_ · JT (2006) 8 SC 483 and _C.A. Sulaiman_ & _Ors._ v. _State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and Ors.,_ [2006] 6 SCC 392, G relied on. 2. The proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 100 is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it 135 H 136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. A empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier cari be taken up by the High Court for B reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5614 of2006. From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.8.2002 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in S.A. No. 491 of 1978. C A. Raghunath for the Appellant. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Respondents. > The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court. Second appeal filed by the respondents in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'Code') was allowed. Though various questions were raised in support of the E appeal, it was primarily highlighted that the ~econd Appeal was allowed without formulating any substantial.ques~ion of law. There is no appearance on behalf of respondents when the matter is called though learned counsel had entered appearance. F Section 100 of the Code deals with "Second Appeal". The provision reads as follows: G "100(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed _ex-parte._ H - SHAH MANSUKJILAL CHHAGANLAL (0) 111ROUGH LRS. _v._ GOHIL AMARSING GOVINDBHAI (0) 111ROUGH LRS. If ASAY AT. J. ( 13 7 (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall A precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the B respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not c formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the Second Appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained. D _In Ishwar Dass Jain_ v. _Sohan Lal,_ [2000] 1 SCC 434, this Court in para l 0 has stated thus: "10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendinent, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law E and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so." Yet again in _Roop Singh_ v. _Ram Singh,_ [2000] 3 SCC 708, this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads: F "7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section l 00 G CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the H ... 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. B _v_ c A possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was pennissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity. illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus Page 1532 and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting pennissive possession into adverse possession _(Thakur Kishan Singh_ v. _Arvind Kumar),_ [1994) 6 SCC 591. Hence the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below." The position has been reiterated in _Kanhaiya/al_ v. _Anupkumar,_ [2003) 1 sec 430. D In _Chadat Singh_ v. _Bahadur Ram and Ors.,_ [2004) 6 SCC 359, it was observed thus: E "6. In view of Section I 00 of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions involved in the appeal as required under Sub-section (3) of Section I 00. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question under Sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in Sub-section (5) of Section 100." F The position was highlighted by this Court in _Joseph Severane and Ors._ v. _Benny Mathew and Ors.,_ [2005] 7 SCC 667; _Sasikumar and Ors_ v. _Kunnath Chellappan Nair and Ors.,_ [2005] 12 SCC 588; _Jawala Singh (D) by Lrs._ v. _Jagat Singh (D) by Lrs.,_ JT (2006) 8 SC 483 and _C.A. Su/aiman & Ors._ v. _State Bank of Travancore, Alwayee and Ors.,_ [2006] 6 SCC 392. ## G The proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 100 is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law H already formulated and then only another substantial question· of law which SHAH MANSUKHLALCHHAGANLAL (D) 'JllROUGH LRS. _v._ GOlllL AMARSING GOVINDBHAI (D) 'JllROUGH LRS. IPASA Y AT. J.l } J 9 was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons A to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set,aside, and the matter is remitted to the High Court for disposal in accord~.ce with law. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to B ccsts. D.G. Appeal disposed of.