Shabu v. State of Kerala and Others

``` IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM ``` ``` PRESENT ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN ``` ``` & ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. GIRISH ``` ``` TUESDAY, THE 16[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2024 / 26TH POUSHA, 1945 ``` ``` WP(CRL.) NO. 1000 OF 2023 ``` ``` CRIME NO.100/2023 OF Cherpu Police Station, Thrissur ``` ## **`PETITIONER:`** ``` SHABU AGED 31 YEARS THAYADA HOUSE, CHERUSSERY, VALLACHIRA VILLAGE, THRISSUR, KERALA, PIN - 680562 BY ADV SARATH BABU KOTTAKKAL ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS:`** ``` 1STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM -695001, PIN - 682031 2THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, THRISSUR RANGE, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680001 3SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, THRISSUR RURAL, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680003 4STATION HOUSE OFFICER CHERPU POLICE STATION, THRISSUR, PIN - 680561 BY ADDL.DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION SRI.C.K.SUMESH, SR.P.P ``` ``` THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 18.12.2023, THE COURT ON 16.01.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 2 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 ## **JUDGMENT** ## G.Girish, J. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 order of externment dated 19.07.2023 passed by the 2[nd] respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. 2. The petitioner is alleged to have been involved in various crimes registered at various police stations of Thrissur District right from the year 2013 onwards. The proceedings under challenge in this writ petition were initiated in respect of three crimes committed by the petitioner during the period from 20.09.2017 to 05.02.2023. It is alleged that the petitioner is a hard core criminal involved in cases of culpable homicide and hurt, and that he has been causing public threat and nuisance. The 3[rd] respondent Superintendent of Police, Thrissur Rural submitted a report dated 26.06.2023 to the 2[nd] respondent for initiating action under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (for brevity ‘KAA(P) Act’) against the petitioner since there were no other ways to prevent him from his involvement in criminal and anti social activities. After scrutinizing the above report, the 2[nd] respondent issued show cause notice dated 03.07.2023 to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why proceedings under Section 15(1)(a) of 3 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 the KAA(P) Act shall not be initiated against him. The petitioner appeared before the 2[nd] respondent on 12.07.2023 and explained that he has been falsely implicated in the criminal cases registered against him. After considering the explanation offered by the petitioner and personally hearing him, the 2[nd] respondent, who is the Authorised Officer, issued Ext.P1 order under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act restraining the entry of the petitioner in Thrissur Revenue District for a period of six months from the date of receipt of that order. Challenging the above order of externment of the 2[nd] respondent, the petitioner is now before this Court. 3. The petitioner would contend that Ext.P1 order has been passed by the 2[nd] respondent in an arbitrary and illegal manner and that no subjective satisfaction, on the basis of material aspects, has been recorded in Ext.P1 order. According to the petitioner, there is an inordinate delay of 5 months and 14 days in passing Ext.P1 order after the last prejudicial activity attributed to the petitioner. Thus it is stated that the live link, as between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention, has been snapped. The petitioner would state that he will not fall under the definition of ‘known rowdy’ or ‘known goonda’, and the said aspect was not considered by the 2[nd] respondent. It is the further case of the petitioner that the 2[nd] respondent passed Ext.P1 order without considering whether the bail 4 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 conditions imposed by the courts concerned in the criminal cases registered against him, are sufficient to deter the petitioner from indulging in further anti social activities. It is also stated that the non-involvement of the petitioner in any crime during the period from 07.09.2018 to 05.02.2023 was not considered by the 2[nd] respondent while issuing Ext.P1 order. The petitioner also finds fault with Ext.P1 order for not stating any reason as to why an order for externment for a period less than six months was not preferred. The delay on the part of the sponsoring authority in recommending externment and the delay in transmitting Ext.P1 order to the Government and passing confirmation order by the Government, are also cited as reasons for challenging the said order. 4. On 18.10.2023, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader took notice for the respondents and sought time for filing counter affidavit. 5. The 2[nd] respondent Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range has filed a counter affidavit dated 15.11.2023 opposing the reliefs sought for in this writ petition, wherein it has been contended that the petitioner is a hard core criminal involved in several crimes including hurt and homicide cases since 2013, and that he has been causing public threat and nuisance. It is further stated that the impugned order was passed to prevent his anti-social 5 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 activities and to protect the general public from his threat and to maintain public tranquillity prevailing in the area. According to the 2[nd] respondent, Ext.P1 order was passed after scrutinizing three criminal cases committed by the petitioner from 21.09.2017 to 05.02.2023, and arriving at the conclusion that he is a ‘known rowdy’. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for the respondents. 7. As already stated above, the 2[nd] respondent initiated proceedings under Section 15(1)(a) of KAA(P) Act against the petitioner after arriving at a finding that the petitioner would come under the definition of ‘known rowdy’ envisaged under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. The above provision of KAA(P) Act is extracted as follows: - _“2._ _**Definitions.-** In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-_ - _(a) xxx_ _xxx_ _(p) “known rowdy” means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act,-_ ## _(i) xxx_ _(ii) xxx_ 6 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _(iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2:_ 8. Among the three cases of the above category dealt with by the 2[nd] respondent, the first one was Crime No.916 of 2017 of Cherppu Police Station in respect of the commission of offence under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323 and 324 I.P.C read with Section 149 I.P.C, in which the petitioner is arraigned as the 6[th] accused. In the above crime which is said to have taken place on 29.09.2017 at about 11:30 P.M, the police had filed final report before Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thrissur on 08.02.2018 and the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. 9. The second crime which has been reckoned by the 2[nd] respondent in the impugned proceedings, is Crime No.514 of 2018 of Cherppu Police Station in respect of the offence under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 326, 506 and 308 I.P.C read with Section 149 I.P.C and Section 27 of the Arms Act, in which the petitioner has been arraigned as the second accused. In the above incident, which is said to have taken place on 07.09.2018 at about 11:30 P.M, the police filed final report before the Judicial First Class 7 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 Magistrate Court-I, Thrissur on 30.12.2018. The petitioner had been granted bail in the said case by this Court as per order dated 16.10.2018 in BA.No.6947/2018. The said case is now pending trial before the Additional Assistant Sessions Court-I, Thrissur. 10. The third case dealt with by the 2[nd] respondent in this proceedings is Crime No.100 of 2023 of Cherppu Police Station in respect of the offence under Sections 324 and 308 I.P.C wherein the petitioner is the sole accused. The incident in the said case is said to have occurred at 11:30 P.M on 05.02.2023 at the premises of Thayamkulangara Subramanya Swami Temple. In the above case also, the petitioner was granted bail by this Court as per order dated 28.03.2023 in B.A.No.2361/2023. The investigating agency is said to have filed final report in the said case before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thrissur, on 27.05.2023. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the 2[nd] respondent failed to arrive at subjective as well as objective satisfaction that the petitioner is indulging in, or about to indulge in, or likely to indulge in anti social activities and that an order of externment under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act is necessitated to prevent him from so acting, within the jurisdiction of the 2[nd] respondent. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the 2[nd] respondent had not arrived at a finding in 8 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 Ext.P1 proceedings that the bail conditions imposed by this Court upon the petitioner while granting bail in Crime No.514 of 2018 and Crime No.100 of 2023 of Cherppu Police Station would be insufficient and ineffective in preventing the unlawful activities of the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that the above failure on the part of the 2[nd] respondent would disclose the absence of subjective satisfaction while issuing Ext.P1 proceedings. 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard is bereft of merit. A perusal of Ext.P1 order would reveal that the 2[nd] respondent had arrived at the conclusion that despite the registration of the above three cases and the arrest of the petitioner, he has been unabatedly indulging in crimes and anti social activities, posing threat to the peaceful living of the public at large. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner is found to have involved in crime No.100 of 2023 of Cherppu Police Station in respect of the offence under Sections 324 and 308 I.P.C notwithstanding the bail conditions imposed by this Court in Crime No.514 of 2018 of Cherppu Police Station while enlarging the petitioner on bail in that case where the offences included Sections 324 and 308 I.P.C. The above aspect itself would reveal that the imposition of bail conditions are of no use in keeping the unlawful and criminal activities of the petitioner under check. It has been held by a Division Bench of this 9 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 Court in **Kiran Shaji v. State of Kerala and Others [2018 (4) KHC 465]** that the non-consideration of the conditions imposed in granting bail to the offender by the authority concerned is not fatal to the order passed by the said authority under the relevant provisions of the KAA(P) Act. Paragraph 13 of the judgment of this Court in the said case is extracted as follows for easy reference. _“13. Yet another contention taken up by the petitioner is that while granting bail in Crime No. 1060/2017 of Angamali Police Station, this Court had imposed certain conditions, one of which was restricting his entry into Ernakulam District for a period of two months. It is contended that the detaining authority while passing the order did not consider this condition imposed in the bail order. It is true that the detaining authority has not discussed the sufficiency of the restriction imposed in the bail order but the fact regarding grant of bail was noticed and necessarily the order was passed subsequent to the consideration of these facts. The authority was of the opinion that despite the restriction issued by the Court to keep the accused outside the jurisdiction of Ernakulam, the time for which such order was effective was not sufficient. The impugned order also reserves the right of the petitioner to approach the rural police chief with a written request for permission to enter the district in case of any contingencies, like attending marriage or death of near relatives or in case he requires medical treatment for himself. It is to be understood that this is not a case where a detention order has been passed under KAAPA. It is only an order restricting the petitioner's entry into Ernakulam_ 10 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _Sessions Division where he is involved in six crimes. Even this Court while sitting on bail jurisdiction, had deemed it appropriate to impose restrictions on the petitioner entering Ernakulam District for two months, looking at the one crime he was involved in. In the impugned order, the period of the restriction was for a longer period of one year considering the gravity of the fact regarding the number of crimes that the petitioner is involved in. That period too has been reduced to six months by Ext.P2 order. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that non - consideration of the condition imposed in granting bail by the authority is not fatal to the impugned restraint order.”_ ## 13. Again, in **Anita Antony v. State of Kerala and Others** **[2022 (4) KHC 427]** , a Division Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the challenge on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority upon the ground that the compliance with the bail conditions in the last crime committed by the detenu had not been taken into account while passing the impugned order of preventive detention. Repelling the above challenge, it has been held by this Court in the said decision that the compliance with the bail conditions in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenu to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is otherwise established by materials on record. Paragraph 12 of the judgment in the said case is extracted hereunder for easy reference. _“12. The second contention is a claim that the detenu had scrupulously followed the bail conditions in the last crime_ 11 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _(Crime No.460 of 2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station) and therefore, the subjective satisfaction to initiate proceedings under the KAA(P)A is vitiated. We cannot endorse the said submission of the learned counsel. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the last prejudicial activity reckoned by the detaining authority is the fourth crime and in all previous crimes, while being enlarged on bail, the detenu was put on similar condition that he shall not indulge in any criminal activity while on bail. This condition has been contemptuously violated by the detenu, as is established by the subsequent crimes, including the last one of the year 2021. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the compliance with the bail condition in the last crime cannot be gainsaid by the detenu, to assail the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is otherwise established by materials on record.”_ 14. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the 2[nd] respondent failed to appreciate the sufficiency of the proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C initiated by the Sub Divisional Magistrate against the petitioner towards preventing his involvement in crimes and unlawful activities, and hence the impugned proceedings against the petitioner are vitiated for lack of subjective satisfaction. Here also, it is not possible to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner since it is writ large from Ext.P1 order that in spite of all such measures initiated by the law enforcing agencies against the petitioner, he had been unabatedly involving in crimes and anti social activities and 12 ## W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 causing threat to the peace and security of the people of that locality. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in **Thejas** ## **v. Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range [2015 (3) KHC** **656]** that if a particular act constitutes an anti social activity and if any of the conditions prescribed under sub Clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (p) or sub Clause (i) and (ii) of Clause (o) of Section 2 of KAA(P) Act applies in a particular case, the power conferred on the authority under the KAA(P) Act cannot be further restricted with a condition that the person concerned should have indulged in another criminal act after the initiation of the proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. Paragraph 20 of the judgment of this Court in the said case is extracted as follows for easy reference. “ _20. The main contention raised is that if proceedings are initiated against the person concerned under Section 107 CrPC, it is necessary that he should have indulged in another criminal activity in order to enable the authority to pass an order of detention under Section 3 or an order of externment under Section 15 of the KAAPA. This argument is fallacious. As stated above, Section 3 as well as Section 15 of the KAAPA are intended to be applied against a "known goonda" or a "known rowdy". Section 2(p) defines "known rowdy". A person becomes a "known rowdy" if any of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) of Clause (p) of Section 2 are satisfied. Sub-clause (i) applies to a person who was made guilty by a competent Court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of Clause (t) of_ 13 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause. It is sufficient if he has been made guilty with respect to an act done within the previous seven years of the order imposing any restriction or detention under the Act. "Known goonda" is defined under Section 2(o) of the KAAPA. A person becomes a "known goonda" if any of the conditions in sub-clauses (i) or (ii) of Clause (o) of Section 2 is satisfied. Sub-clause (i) would apply if the person concerned was found guilty, with respect to an act done within the previous seven years, by a competent Court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term 'goonda' as defined in Clause (j) of Section 2. If a person can be detained or externed under Section 3 or Section 15 respectively, on being found guilty for a single act within a period of seven years, how could it be said that he cannot be proceeded with under Section 3 or Section 15 unless and until he indulges in a criminal act after initiation of the proceeding under Section 107 CrPC? If such an interpretation is taken, we would be putting fetters on the power given to the authorities under the KAAPA. That would be adding to the conditions in Clauses (o) and (p) of Section 2 of KAAPA. It is true that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or the authority passing an order of externment as provided in the KAAPA is required. But such subjective satisfaction cannot be circumscribed by a condition that the person concerned should have committed another crime after the date of initiation of proceedings under Section 107 CrPC against him. The KAAPA does not contain such a condition. The Code of Criminal Procedure also does not provide anywhere of such a condition in the matter of preventive detention or externment under any law for preventive detention. The Constitution of India also does not provide for the same. The_ 14 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _existence of an order under Section 107 CrPC would be relevant only in the realm of subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned before passing an order under Section 3 or Section 15 of the KAAPA. That subjective satisfaction is with respect to the likelihood of the person concerned indulging in any anti - social activity and the measures to be taken to prevent the same. If a particular act constitutes an anti - social activity and if any of the conditions prescribed under sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (p) or sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause (o) of Section 2 of KAAPA applies in a particular case, the power conferred on the authority under the KAAPA cannot be further restricted with a condition that the person concerned should have indulged in another criminal act after initiation of the proceedings under Section 107 CrPC. That will be adding something to the legislative enactment.”_ ## 15. The dictum laid down in **Thejas** (supra) has been followed by this Court in **Anita Antony** (supra) wherein it has been held in paragraph 14 as follows: _“14. …………………………….. The fact that, the detenu had indulged in 6 crimes (although four crimes alone were reckoned for the purpose of proceedings under the KAA(P)A), which includes crimes after initiation of proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C, as well, would establish that proceedings under Section 107 is not sufficient to restrain the petitioner from indulging in further crimes. We cannot, but approve the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority based on the recommendation of the sponsoring authority. In adopting the above view, we garner strength from a Division Bench_ 15 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _judgment of this Court in Thejas v. I.G. of Police, 2015 (3) KLT 1.”_ 16. The contention of the petitioner that there had been inordinate delay in passing Ext.P1 order after the last criminal activity attributed against him, is also devoid of merit since it is seen that the delay of 5 months and 14 days which occasioned in between 05.02.2023, when the petitioner committed crime No.100 of 2023 of Cherppu Police Station, and 19.07.2023, the date of Ext.P1 order, was only the usual and natural time lag between the various procedures initiated against the petitioner, which is perfectly justifiable. As already stated above, the petitioner was arrested in connection with Crime No.100 of 2023 of Cherppu Police Station on 06.02.2023, and he remained under judicial custody in the said case upto 28.03.2023. Thereafter, on 26.06.2023, the 3[rd] respondent submitted report before the 2[nd] respondent for initiating preventive action against the petitioner under the KAA(P) Act. The petitioner was issued a show cause notice dated 03.07.2023 in that matter, which he received on 09.07.2023, and appeared personally before the 2[nd] respondent on 12.07.2023. After hearing the petitioner and scrutinizing the records, the 2[nd] respondent passed Ext.P1 order on 19.07.2023. The chronology of events related to the above 16 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 procedures would make it clear that the delay of 5 months and 14 days in passing Ext.P1 order is perfectly justifiable. 17. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Golam** **Hussain Alias Gama v. The Commissioner of Police [(1974) 4 SCC 530]** in paragraph 5 of that judgment as follows: _“..…….. It is true that there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the Offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. ………….”_ 18. Following the above dictum of the Apex Court, a Division Bench of this Court, in **Rahila Nazeer v. State of Kerala [2016** **(3) KHC 189]** held in paragraph 12 of the said judgment as follows: _“12. It is not the delay alone that matters. If the delay in passing the order of detention is unexplained and inordinate, it could be said that the live link between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention is snapped. It is not a mechanical test that can be applied in the matter of ascertaining whether the live link is snapped. If the delay is_ 17 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _satisfactorily explained, it cannot be held that the live link is snapped. The KAA(P) Act does not provide that if the period of six months from the last prejudicial activity expires, no order of detention can be passed. The Legislature in its wisdom did not think that an order of detention cannot be passed after the expiry of the period for which a person can be detained under Section 3, reckoning the period from the date of the last prejudicial activity to the order of detention. The period of detention under Section 3 as such cannot be a determining factor to assess whether there is inordinate and unexplained delay. The facts and circumstances of the case are relevant in each case. Reasons may be varied as to why the order of detention is passed after several months of the date of the last prejudicial activity. If the person concerned is in judicial custody and there is no likelihood of his being released shortly, the detaining authority may stay its hands for a short while and think of passing an order of detention subsequent to the release of the person concerned. It is not necessary that the person concerned should commit another crime after the expiry of his judicial custody (in the crimes already registered and pending investigation) in order to enable the detaining authority to pass an order of detention. In short, the facts situation in each case makes it relevant the question whether the delay is inordinate so as to vitiate the order of detention on the ground of lack of live nexus between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention.”_ 19. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is not possible to conclude that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose 18 ## W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 of detention has been snapped due to the delay of 5 months and 14 days, which was only the ordinary and usual course of delay which had occasioned while resorting to the procedural formalities prescribed by the KAA(P) Act. 20. The other contentions raised by the petitioner about the delay in supplying Ext.P1 order to the Government, and the delay in confirming the order by the Government, are also totally unfounded. Though the proviso to Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act requires the communication of the order thereunder to the Government through the Director General of Police, there is absolutely nothing stated in the said provision about the necessity to have a confirmation by the Government before implementing the said order. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in **Aji @ Vettu Aji v. State of Kerala and Others : 2015 (3) KHC 332** that an order of restraint passed under sub Section (1) of Section 15 does not require approval by Government, or reference to the Advisory Board, or getting the opinion of the Advisory Board or confirmation or revocation of the order of restraint. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment of this Court is extracted hereunder: _“10. Where an order of restraint is passed under sub-section (1) of Section 15, it does not require approval by the Government, or reference to the Advisory Board, or getting the opinion of the Advisory Board or confirmation or revocation of_ 19 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 _the order of restraint. On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 15 gives liberty to the person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (1) of Section 15 to represent before the Advisory Board within fifteen days of the date of service of the order. On receipt of the representation, the Advisory Board shall consider the same and within thirty days of the date of receipt of the representation, shall annul, amend or confirm the order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the KAAPA, either in part or in full. The Advisory Board dealing with the matter under Section 10 of the KAAPA can only submit a report specifying its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. The consequence of such a report is specifically provided under sub-section (4) of Section 10 and the authority who has to pass the order thereafter, either confirming or revoking the order of detention, is the Government. In the case of a restraint order under Section 15, the Government or the authority which issued the order under sub-section (1) has the power to annul or amend the order at any time, either in part or in full, on its own motion, as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 15. That power under sub-section (3) is not based on any opinion or order of the Advisory Board, but suo motu. The power of the Government under sub-section (4) of Section 10 and that under sub-section (3) of Section 15 are quite different in its nature and content. The Advisory Board can annul, amend or confirm the order as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 15 and it need not be approved by any authority. It will operate on its own.”_ 21. The contention of the petitioner about the omission on the part of the 2[nd] respondent to state in Ext.P1 order as to why a 20 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 lesser term of externment below six months has not been preferred, is also unsustainable since it could be seen from the impugned order that the 2[nd] respondent has clearly stated thereunder that a restraint against the entry of the petitioner in Thrissur Revenue District for a period of six months was found to be necessary to prevent his continued involvement in crimes and unlawful activities disrupting the tranquillity and peaceful living of the public at large. Therefore, the challenge raised by the petitioner against the absence of objective and subjective satisfaction of the 2[nd] respondent while promulgating Ext.P1 order, is found to be totally unsustainable. 22. As a conclusion to the discussions aforesaid, we find that Ext.P1 order passed by the 2[nd] respondent does not suffer from any factual, procedural or legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Therefore, this writ petition challenging the proceedings of externment initiated against the petitioner, can only fail. In the result, the petition is hereby dismissed. (sd/-) ## **G. GIRISH, JUDGE** jsr 21 W.P.(Crl) No.1000 of 2023 ## **`APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 1000/2023`** ``` PETITIONER EXHIBITS ``` ``` Exhibit P1THE TRUE PHOTOCOPY OF THE EXTERNMENT ORDER PASSED ``` ``` BY THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, THRISSUR RANGE, THRISSUR DATED 19.07.2023 ```