High CourtDivision BenchAppeal disposed of; No order as to costs.

SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. v. PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2333 of 2007
Neutral Citation:[2012] 6 S.C.R. 182

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Dr. B. S. Chauhan
  • Dipak Misra
Judgment Date
2012-05-29
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal disposed of.
Final Disposition
Appeal disposed of; No order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors.

Respondents

  • Prabhash Chandra Mirdha

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R.P. Bhatt
  • • Sunita Sharma
  • • B.V. Balaramdas
  • • R. Bala
  • • Anil Katiyar

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Civil Appeal arises from a dispute over disciplinary proceedings in a government service context, focusing on who may initiate misconduct inquiries and charge sheets against a delinquent employee. The court reconfirms that removal or dismissal for misconduct must be by an authority not below the appointing authority, but it clarifies that initiation of disciplinary proceedings may be undertaken by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, provided the delinquent retains a right of appeal and the ultimate punishment is imposed by an appropriate authority. The decision surveys a line of precedents to delineate the permissible scope of initiation, initiation by delegated authorities, and the role of prejudice to the delinquent in quashing or continuing proceedings. It notes that a chargesheet or show-cause notice should not ordinarily be quashed at an initial stage merely because it was issued by a subordinate authority, unless it is shown that the issuing authority lacked competence. The Tribunal’s quashing of the chargesheet after a long delay is criticized, and the Court leaves the matter open in part, emphasizing that delays must be weighed against prejudice and that gravity of misconduct is a relevant factor. Ultimately, the Court disposes of the appeal without deciding the merits of the charges, but without endorsing a blanket negation of the disciplinary process.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution of India, Article 311 (1950)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contend that the disciplinary process operates in three stages—initiation, inquiry, and punishment—and that Article 311 requires removal/dismissal for misconduct by an authority not below the appointing authority. However, initiation of proceedings may be by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority so as not to deprive the delinquent of the right of appeal, and punishment may be imposed by a higher authority if not the appellate authority. They rely on precedents such as Sampuran Singh, Surjit Ghosh, Balbir Chand, and A. Sudhakar to justify initiation by delegated authorities and to argue that a delay in proceedings must be weighed against prejudice to the employee. The Tribunal’s quashing of the chargesheet on the ground of incompetence to issue the charge memo is unwarranted, absent a showing of delegation or lack of authority to initiate. The party emphasizes that the court should allow the proceedings to continue, potentially de novo, considering gravity and delay rather than dismissing the case at the outset.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the charge memo was issued by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority, rendering the initiating authority incompetent to initiate disciplinary proceedings. They supported the Tribunal’s quashing of the chargesheet on this ground and contended that initiation by a subordinate authority without proper delegation undermines due process. They maintain that chargesheets or show-cause notices, issued by an authority lacking competence, should be quashed and that the disciplinary process cannot proceed under such circumstances. Their position underscores the necessity for authority competence in the initiation stage and relies on established rules regarding jurisdiction and authority to initiate disciplinary action, along with the principle that delay and prejudice should be weighed in assessing the validity of the charges and the continuation of proceedings.

Cited Precedents (19)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Sampuran Singh v. State of PunjabAIR 1982 SC 1407; 1982 (3) SCC 200PositiveCited as authority supporting the proposition that initiation of disciplinary proceedings may be by authorities subordinate to the appointing authority, with prejudice considerations guiding subsequent actions.
Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors.AIR 1995 SC 1053; 1995 (2) SCC 474PositiveRelied on for principles related to prejudice to the delinquent and the right of appeal in disciplinary proceedings.
Balbir Chand v. FCI Ltd. & Ors.AIR 1997 SC 2229; 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 156PositiveCited in the context of discipline initiation and prejudice considerations; supports permissive initiation by delegated authorities.
A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster-General Hyderabad & Anr.(2006) 4 SCC 348; 2006 (3) SCR 373PositiveUsed to reinforce the permissible scope of initiation by authorities other than the appointing authority.
Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. ThavasiappanAIR 1996 SC 1318; 1996 (1) SCR 977PositiveNoted as a case where the court reconsidered earlier judgments and accepted initiation by subordinate authorities in appropriate cases.
Steel Authority of India & Anr. v. Dr. R.K. Diwakar & Ors.AIR 1998 SC 2210; 1997 (11) SCC 17PositiveAffirms the view that initiation can be by a subordinate authority and that the punitive action may be by another competent authority.
State of U.P. & Anr. v. Chandrapal Singh & Anr.AIR 2003 SC 4119; 2003 (2) SCR 1062PositiveCited to reaffirm permissible initiation by delegated authorities and to emphasize due process in disciplinary matters.
Transport Commissioner, Madras -5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy(1995) 1 SCC 332PositiveSupports unobjectionable initiation by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority.
Director General, ES/ & Anr. v. T. Abdul Razak etc.AIR 1996 SC 2292; 1996 (3) SCR 80PositiveUsed to discuss the delegation and authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Ananta Saha & Ors.(2011) 5 SCC 142PositiveCited for principles relating to the initiation and scope of disciplinary actions in large organizations.
Swamy(2007) 14 SCC 49PositiveCited in the context of the broader parameters of disciplinary proceedings and the authority to initiate.
Secretary, Forest Department & Ors. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury(2009) 7 SCC 305PositiveUsed to discuss that delay in and continuation of disciplinary proceedings should be weighed against prejudice to the employee.
State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt SharmaAIR 1987 SC 943PositiveCited for general principles of initiating and conducting disciplinary actions and the impact of delays.
Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors.(1996) 1 SCC 327; 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 543PositiveUsed to illustrate precedents on initiation and the role of the initiating authority.
Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commissioner, Mysore & Ors.AIR 2000 SC 3603; 2001 (10) SCC 639PositiveCited to discuss principles of disciplinary actions and competent initiating authorities.
Special Director & Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr.AIR 2004 SC 1467; 2004 (1) SCR 399PositiveRelied on for disciplinary procedure norms and authority delegation.
Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty SatyanarayanaAIR 2007 SC 906; 2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 257PositiveCited in context of delegation and initiation of disciplinary action.
State of Orissa & Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra & Anr.(2010) 13 SCC 311PositiveUsed to emphasize that final conclusions rest with the disciplinary authority post enquiry.
Union of India & Ors. v. Upendra Singh(1994) 3 SCC 357PositiveCited regarding general rules of initiating disciplinary actions and due process.

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## [2012] 6 S.C.R. 182 A ## THE SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA (Civil Appeal No. 2333 of 2007) B ## MAY 29, 2012 **[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]** - - - _Service Law Misconduct Disciplinary proceedings Whether the authority, lower or higher than of the appointing_ C _authority, can initiate the proceedings against the delinquent_ - _on grounds of alleged misconduct Held: Removal and dismissal of a delinquent on misconduct must be by the authority not below the appointing authority- However, it does not mean that disciplinary proceedings may not be initiated_ D _against the delinquent by the authority lower than the_ - _appointing authority It is permissible for an authority, higher than appointing authority to initiate the proceedings and impose punishment, in case he is not the appellate authority so that the delinquent may not loose the right of appeal_ - _In_ **E** _other case, delinquent has to prove as what prejudice has been caused to him_ - _Constitution of India, 1950_ - _Article 311._ _Sampuran Singh v. State of Punjab_ **AIR 1982 SC 1407: 1982 (3) SCC 200;** _Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank_ & _Ors._ **AIR 1995 SC 1053: F 1995 (2) SCC 474;** _Balbir Chand v. FC/ Ltd._ & _Ors._ **AIR 1997 SC 2229: 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 156;** _A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster-General Hyderabad_ & _Anr._ **(2006) 4 SCC 348: 2006 (3) SCR 373;** _Inspector General of Police_ & _Anr. v. Thavasiappan_ **AIR 1996 SC 1318: 1996 (1) SCR 977;** _Steel_ G _Authority of India_ & _Anr. v. Dr. R.K. Diwakar_ & _Ors._ **AIR 1998 SC 2210: 1997 (11) SCC 17;** _State of U.P._ & _Anr. v. Chandrapa/ Singh_ & _Anr._ **AIR 2003 SC 4119: 2003 (2) SCR 1062;** _Transport Commissioner, Madras_ - _5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy_ **(1995) 1 SCC 332;** _Director General, ES/_ & **H** 182 183 ## SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA _Anr. v. T. Abdul Razak etc._ **AIR 1996 SC 2292: 1996** (3) **Suppl. SCR 80 and** _Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited_ & _Ors. v. Ananta Saha_ & _Ors._ **(2011) 5 SCC 142: 2011 (5) SCR 44 - relied on.** A - - - _Service Law Misconduct Disciplinary proceedings_ - - _Chargesheet Challenge to Held: A chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily_ - _be quashed by the Court Chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate_ - _the disciplinary proceedings Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet can be qliashed at an initial stage as it would be_ a _premature stage to deal with the issues_ - _Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay_ - _creates prejudice to the delinquent employee Gravity of alleged misconduct_ is _a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings._ 8 C D E _The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh_ & _Anr._ **AIR 1990 SC 1308: 1990 Suppl. SCC 738;** _State of Punjab_ & _Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal_ **(1995) 2 SCC 570: 1995 (1) SCR 695;** _Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad v. Sachindra f'Jath Pandey_ & Ors. **(1995) 3 SCC 134;** _Union of_ F _India_ & _Anr. v. Ashok Kacker_ **1995 Supp (1) SCC 180;** _Secretary to Government, Prohibition_ & _Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan_ **(1996) 3 SCC 157: 996 (2) SCR 737;** _State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan_ **AIR 1998 SC 1833: 1998 (2) SCR 693;** _Food Corporation of India_ & _Anr. v. V. P. Bhatia_ **(1998) 9 SCC 131;** _Additional Supdt. of Police v. T._ G _Natarajan_ **1999 SCC (L&S) 646;** _M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India_ & _Ors._ **AIR 2006 SC 3475: 2006 (3) SCR 896;** _P.O. Agrawal v. State Bank of India_ & _Ors._ **AIR 2006 SC 2064: 2006 (1)** . **Suppl. SCR 454;** _Government of A.P._ & Ors. _v. V. Appala_ **H** [2012] 6 S.C.R. ## 184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS A _Swamy_ (2007) 14 SCC 49: 2007 (2) SCR 19; _Secretary, Forest Department_ & _Ors. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury_ (2009) 7 SCC 305; _State of UP. v. Brahm Datt Sharma_ AIR 1987 SC 943: 1987 (2) SCR 444; _Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh_ & _Ors._ (1996) 1 SCC B 327: 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 543; _Ulagappa_ & _Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore_ & _Ors._ AIR 2000 SC 3603: 2001 (10) SCC 639; _Special Director_ & _Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse_ & _Anr._ AIR 2004 SC 1467: 2004 (1) SCR 399; _Union of India_ & _Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana_ AIR 2007 SC 906: 2006 (9) c Suppl. SCR 257; _State of Orissa_ & _Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra_ & _Anr;_ (2010) 13 SCC 311 an~ _Union of India_ & _Ors. v. Upendra Singh_ (1994) 3 SCC 357 ·_ relied on. ## Case Law Reference: 0 E F G H |1982(3)sec200|relied on|Para 5| |---|---|---| |1995 (2)sec474|relied on|Para 5| |1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 156|relied on|Para 5| |2006 (3) SCR 373|relied on|Para 5| |1996 (1) SCR 977|relied on|Para 6| |1997 (11)sec11|relied on|Para 7| |2003 (2) SCR 1062|relied on|Para 7| |(1995) 1sec332|relied on|Para 8| |1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 80|relied on|Para 8| |2011(5)SCR 44|relied on|Para 8| |1990 Suppl.sec738|relied on|Para 9| |1995 (1) SCR 695|relied on|Para 9| |(1995) 3sec134|relied on|Para 9| |1995 Supp (1)sec1so|relied on|Para 9| SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ 185 PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA |SECRETARY,<br>PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA|PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA||| |---|---|---|---| |1996 (2) SCR 737|relied on|Para 9|A| |1998(2)SCR 693|relied on|Para 9|| |(1998) 9sec131|relied on|Para 9|| |1999sec(L&S) 646|relied on|Para 9|B| |2006(3)SCR 896|relied on|Para 9|| |2006(1)Suppl. SCR 454|relied on|Para 9|| |2007(2)SCR 19|relied on|Para 9|| ||||c| |(2009)_1_sec305|relied on|Para 10|| |1987(2)SCR 444|relied on|Para11|| |1995(5)Suppl. SCR543|relied on|Para11|| |2001(1o)sec639|relied on|Para11|D| |2004 (1) SCR 399|relied on|Para11|| |2006(9)Suppl. SCR 257|relied on|Para11|| |(2010) 13sec311|relied on|Para 12|E| |(1994) 3sec357|relied on|Para 12|| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2333 of 2007. F From the Judgment & Order dated 26.2.2004 of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 14674 of 1997. R.P. Bhatt, Sunita Sharma, B.V. Balaramdas, R. Bala, Anil Katiyar for the appellants. G The Order of the Court was delivered ## ORDER H 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned [2012] 6 S.C.R. ## 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A judgment and orders dated 26.2.2004 and 13.8.2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 14674 of 1997, and in Review W.P.M.P. No. 18654 of 2004. The issue involved in this case is as to whether the authority, lower or higher than of the appointing authority, can - B initiate the proceedings against the delinquent on grounds of alleged misconduct. 2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that: C A. Respondent had been working as an Assistant Foreman in the Ordnance Factory, Yeddumailaram, when charge memo dated 8.1.1992 was issued to him on the alleged demand of bribe of Rs.37,000/- and acceptance of Rs.4, 150/- on 3.8.1991 in cash from the representative of firm D M/s Teela International Limited, Hosur, Bangalore. B. Aggrieved by the said charge memo, respondent preferred O.A. No. 1641 of 1995 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (hereinafter called as E 'Tribunal') on 23.12.1995 on the ground that the charge memo had been issued to the respondent by the authority not competent to do so, being subordinate to his appointing authority. C. The said application was allowed vide judgment and F order dated 4.1.1996 only on the ground that the officer who had issued the charge memo was subordinate to the appointing authority of the delinquent and thus, had no competence to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. G D. Aggrieved by the said order, a Review Application was filed by the appellants which was dismissed vide order dated 20.3.1997. H E. Aggrieved, the appellants filed the Writ Petition No. 14674 of 1997 before the High Court which has been SECRETARY, .MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ 187 PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.6.2004. Review Application filed by the appellants also stood dismissed vide order dated 13.8.2004. A Hence, this appeal. 3. This Court entertained the appeal vide order dated 30.4.2007 but did not grant any interim relief and in spite of notice to the respondent, he did not enter appearance. B 4. The legal proposition has been laid down by this Court while interpreting the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution c of India, 1950 that the removal and dismissal of a delinquent on misconduct must be by the authority not below the appointing authority. However, it does not mean that disciplinary proceedings may not be initiated against the delinquent by the authority lower than the appointing authority. D 5. It is permissible for an authority, higher than appointing authority to initiate the proceedings and impose punishment, in case he is not the appellate authority so that the delinquent may not loose the right of appeal. In other case, delinquent has to prove as what prejudice has been caused to him. (Vide: _Sampuran Singh v. State of Punjab,_ AIR 1982 SC 1407; _Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1995 SC 1053; _Balbir Chand v. FCI Ltd._ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1997 SC 2229; and _A. Sudhakar v. Postmaster-General Hyderabad_ & _Anr.,_ (2006) 4 SCC 348). E F 6. In _Inspector General of Police_ & _Anr. v. Thavasiappan,_ AIR 1996 SC 1318, this Court reconsidered its earlier judgments on the issue and came to the conclusion that there is nothing in law which inhibits the authority subordinate to the appointing authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings or issue charge memo and it is certainly not necessary that charges should be framed by the authority competent to award the punishment or that the inquiry should be conducted by such an authority. G H 188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 6 S.C.R. A 7. In _Steel Authority of India_ & _Anr. v. Dr. R.K. Diwakar_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 1998 SC 2210; and _State of UP._ & _Anr. v. Chandrapal Singh_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 2003 SC 4119, a similar view has been reiterated. 8 8. In _Transport Commissioner, Madras_ - _5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy,_ (1995) 1 SCC 332, this Court held: "Insofar as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now that it is unobjectionable. The initiation can C be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. Only the dismissal/removal shall not be by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Accordingly it is held that this was not a permissible ground for quashing the charges by the Tribunal." D (See also: _Director General, ES/_ & _Anr. v. T. Abdul Razak etc.,_ AIR 1996 SC 2292; and _Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited_ & _Ors. v. Ananta Saha_ & _Ors.,_ (2011) 5 sec 142). E 9. Law does not permit quashing of chargesheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the chargesheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the chargesheet is F challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the chargesheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against G the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. (Vide: _The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 1990 SC 1308; _State of Punjab_ & _Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal,_ (1995) 2 SCC 570; _Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad v._ H _Sachindra Nath Pandey_ & _Ors.,_ (1995) 3 SCC 134; _Union of_ 189 ## SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA _India_ & _Anr. v. Ashok Kacker,_ 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180; _Secretary to Government, Prohibition_ & _Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan,_ (1996) 3 SCC 157; _State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan,_ AIR 1998 SC 1833; _Food Corporation of India_ & _Anr. v. V.P. Bhatia,_ (1998) 9 SCC 131; _Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan,_ 1999 SCC (L&S) 646; _M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 2006 SC 3475; _P.O. Agrawal v. State Bank of India_ & _Ors.,_ AIR 2006 SC 2064; and _Government of A.P._ & _Ors. v. V. Appala Swamy,_ (2007) 14 sec 49). 10. In _Secretary, Forest Department_ & _Ors. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury,_ (2009) 7 SCC 305, this Court dealt with the issue and observed that delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should be permitted to continue. A B C D E 11. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party 1.,mless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/ competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or othe_rwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide : _State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma,_ AIR 1987 SC 943; _Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh_ & _Ors.,_ (1996) 1 SCC 327; _Ulagappa_ & _Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore_ & _Ors.,_ F G H 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R. - A AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2); _Special Director_ & _Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse_ & _Anr.,_ AIR 2004 SC 1467; and _Union of India_ & _Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana,_ AIR 2007 SC 906). 12. In _State of Orissa_ & _Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra_ B & _Anr.,_ (2010) 13 SCC 311, this Court held that normally a chargesheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. C (See also: _Union of India_ & _Ors. v. Upendra Singh,_ (1994) 3 sec 357). 13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of D challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a E premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant F factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings. 14. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The respondent delinquent challenged the chargesheet on the ground that it had G been issued by the authority not competent to do so. The Tribunal vide impugned order dated 4.1.1996 quashed the same only on the ground that the Deputy Director General of Ordnance Factory was the appointing authority of the delinquent employee and competent to impose the penalty referred to H under the statutory rules. The chargesheet had been issued by _ 191 SECRETARY, MIN.OF DEFENCE & ORS. _v._ PRABHASH CHANDRA MIRDHA the authority subordinate to him. Thus, the same was not issued by the competent authority. 15. The said judgment and order of the Tribunal shows that the present appellants were not represented nor any argument had been advanced on their behalf as neither name of the counsel for the appellants has been mentioned rather the space is left blank, nor any reference to his argument had been made. The appellants filed a review petition according to which the order had been passed by the Tribunal without giving an opportunity to the appellants to file a detailed counter affidavit and a plea had been taken that the authority which issued the chargesheet had been authorised by the disciplinary authority to serve the charge memo and conduct/conclude the enquiry in the name and under the order of the competent authority. However, the said authority was authorised to impose the punishment. A B C D The review has been rejected by a cryptic order. The High Court concurred with the findings recorded by the Tribunal. 16. Even before us, no order of authorisation in general or any rule permitting the competent authority to delegate its power for conducting the enquiry has been produced. Thus, in such a fact-situation, it is neither desirable nor possible to deal with the issue, rather it is desirable that the issue be left open. Be that as it may, in case the Tribunal as well as the High Court has permitted the appellants to proceed de novo, we fail to understand why such a course was not adopted though the appellants wasted 20 years in litigation without any purpose. 17. However, in the instant case, the Tribunal has quashed the chargesheet vide order dated 20th March, 1997 in respect of misconduct alleged to have taken place on 31.8.1991. Though the allegations against the delinquent had been very serious i.e. demand and acceptance of bribe, a period of two decades has passed since the alleged incident. Disciplinary E F G H 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R. - A proceedings could not be proceeded further as the chargesheet itself had been quashed. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent delinquent is still in service and that even if the appellants are permitted to proceed with the inquiry, the evidence which was available 21 years ago - 8 would be available today. 18. In view of the above, while leaving the question of law open, we do not want to proceed with the appeal further on merit. C The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs. 8.8.8. Appeal disposed of.