SASI@P.C.SASEENDRAN v. P. RAMAKRISHNAN

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR FRIDAY, THE 4[TH] DAY OF MARCH 2022 / 13TH PHALGUNA, 1943 RCREV. NO. 34 OF 2020** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.10.2019 IN R.C.A.NO.3 OF 2018 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, ALAPPUZHA ARISING OUT OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.10.2017 IN R.C.P.NO.10 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT,** ## **ALAPPUZHA.** ## **REVISION PETITIONER:** **SASI@P.C.SASEENDRAN AGED 58 YEARS S/O.CHELLAPPAN CHETTIYAR, M/S.SALESH DRESS CLEANERS, ROOM NO.XII/814 (NEW NO.30/470), SREEKRISHNA BUILDINGS, PAZHAVEEDU BHAGAVATHY TEMPLE, PAZHAVEED.P.O., ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN-688009, RESIDING AT SALESH NIVAS, KAITHAVANA, SANATHANAPURAM.P.O., ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN-688003. BY ADVS. M.P.MADHAVANKUTTY SHRI. SHIJOY JOHN MATHEW** ## **RESPONDENT:** **P.RAMAKRISHNAN AGED 80 YEARS S/O.PADMANABHA BHATTAR, LAKSHMI GARDENS, PAZHAVEEDU, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN-688003. BY ADVS. M.NARENDRA KUMAR V.SATHEESH** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 04.03.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 2 ## **ORDER** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Alappuzha, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord, under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking an order of eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building in which he is conducting dry cleaning business. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition, seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is that the son of the landlord, who requires the land having an extent of 49 cents in which the petition schedule building situates for constructing a residential building. The tenant filed objection in the Rent Control Petition, opposing the order of eviction sought for. Before the Rent Control Court, the landlord was examined as PW1 and his son was examined as PW2 and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked on the side of the landlord. DWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exts.X1 to X1(c) were marked on the side of the tenant. Before the Rent Control Court, R.C.P.No.10 R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 3 of 2016 was tried along with a connected matter, i.e., R.C.P.No.12 of 2016. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016, seeking order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is bona fide and that, the provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application. Insofar as the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the first limb was found in favour of the landlord and the second limb was found in favour of the tenant. In view of the law laid down in **Shahul Hameed v. Abdu Razak [2017(1) KLT SN 37 (C.No.42)]** , since both limbs are not found in favour of the tenant, the Rent Control Court by the order dated 31.10.2017 granted an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act and the tenant was directed to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord, within 30 days from the date of that order. The ground of eviction sought for under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act was rejected. In the connected RCP, i.e., R.C.P.No.12 of 2016, the Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction under Section R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 4 ## 11(3) of the Act. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court dated 31.10.2017 in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.3 of 2018 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Alappuzha, under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 31.10.2019, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act. Challenging the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority dated 31.10.2019 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2018 and also the order of the Rent Control Court dated 31.10.2017 in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, under Section 20 of the Act. 3. On 07.02.2020, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued notice to the respondent. In I.A.No.1 of 2020, this Court granted an interim order staying the execution proceedings in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016, for a period of two weeks. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time, is still in force. R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 5 4. On 29.09.2021, when this Rent Control Revision came up for consideration, the interim order in I.A.No.1 of 2020 was extended on condition that the petitioner shall pay arrears of rent as on date, within a period of one month, and shall continue to pay monthly rent for the subsequent period, without any default, during the pendency of this revision. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 6. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether the judgment dated 31.10.2019 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.3 of 2018 and the order dated 31.10.2017 of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.10 of 2016 warrant interference, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would challenge the findings of the Rent Control Court and also the Appellate Authority granting eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, by contending that, the need projected in the Rent Control Petition is only a ruse to evict the tenant from the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 6 petition schedule building, for one reason or other. Further, the findings of the Rent Control Court and also the Appellate Authority on the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is legally unsustainable. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlady would contend that, on a proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition, for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is bona fide; that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application on the facts of the case on hand and that the tenant is not entitled to claim protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 9. Section 11 of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 7 any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 10. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 8 premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 11. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. 12. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 9 Petition is that the son of the landlord has to construct a residential building in the land in which the petition schedule building is situated. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition was substantiated by the oral testimony of the landlord as PW1 and that of his son as PW2. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the authorities below have concurrently found that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide and it is not a ruse to evict the tenant from the petition schedule building, for one reason or other. The said finding is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 13. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. 14. In **M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2** R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 10 **SCC 355]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement was sought for under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the said decision, the Apex Court relied on the law laid down in **Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141]** , wherein it was held that the question whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the question regarding bona fide requirement. Whether the landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would not solely depend upon pleadings and non-disclosure by the landlord. The landlord having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court found that, even though the landlord has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material in respect of the other two premises was placed R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 11 before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no prejudice has been caused, and the parties have squarely dealt with this question. 15. In **Vasantha Mallan v. N.S. Aboobacker Siddique [2020 (1) KHC 21]** the question that arose before a Division Bench of this Court was whether a landlord is bound to plead under first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the availability of vacant building in his possession and seek to explain special reason for non-occupation of such premises, in a proceeding initiated for eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench held that the initial burden to prove that landlord is in possession of vacant building, if any, is only upon the tenant unless the landlord himself admits any such vacant building to be in his possession. Only when the primary burden of proof in this behalf is discharged by the tenant, the burden shifts to the landlord to show otherwise or that the vacant premises are not suited to his needs. He can successfully discharge his part of the burden by adducing evidence either through his own testimony or others or in any other legal manner. Law does R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 12 not require the landlord to plead that he is in possession of any vacant building and has special reasons for its nonoccupation. It is up to the tenant alone to take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession of premises. 16. In **Vasantha Mallan** , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **M.L. Prabhakar [(2001) 2 SCC 355]** the Division Bench held that, it is not incumbent on the landlord to disclose in his pleading availability of vacant building in his possession. The non-disclosure of vacant premises cannot be picked up as a reason or circumstance to doubt the bona fides of the claim of the landlord put forward under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Division Bench made it clear that it is not obligatory for the landlord to disclose in his pleadings the details of the vacant buildings available in his possession. Nor does first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act insist the landlord to plead that the buildings available in his possession are not sufficient to meet his requirements. These are matters of evidence rather than pleadings. Failure of the landlord to disclose availability of buildings in his possession R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 13 and plead special reasons for not occupying them, cannot be taken as a valid and legal ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord as not bona fide. What could at the most be said is that it might be a fair and reasonable conduct if the landlord disclosed in his pleadings the details of buildings in his possession and simultaneously explained the reason for non-occupation of the premises for his alleged needs. 17. In the instant case, as rightly noticed by the Rent Control Court, the tenant has no case that the landlord is in vacant possession of another building in the locality, suitable for the need projected in the rent control Petition, in order to attract the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. In the absence of any reliable materials the Rent Control Court and also the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the provisions under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application in the facts of the case on hand. The said finding is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting an interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 18. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 14 Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 19. In **Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another [2019 (2) KHC 465]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive and the burden of proof is on the tenant. Thus, the legal position has been settled by a long line of decisions and the courts below have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide: **Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430]** , **Prasannan v. Haris [2005 (2) KLT 365]** , **Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016** **(1) KHC 631]** . In view of the legal position well settled by the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 15 of each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income. Merely on the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the tenant. When the second proviso itself imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the landlord to get the order of eviction R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 16 under Section 11(3), the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 20. Regarding non-availability of other suitable building in the locality to carry on the dry cleaning business conducted by the tenant in the petition schedule building, the tenant has chosen to take out a Commission for local inspection. Other than the interested testimony of DW1, no reliable materials were paced before the Rent Control Court to prove the non-availability of vacant rooms in the locality for the tenant to shift the dry cleaning business conducted in the petition schedule building. In the absence of any reliable materials, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority rightly found that the tenant has not succeeded in proving the first limb of second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 21. Insofar as the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the Rent Control Court found the second limb of the second proviso in favour of the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 17 tenant. Since both limbs, i.e., first limb and second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, were not found in favour of the tenant, the Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act holding that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso. The aforesaid finding of the Rent Control Court is confirmed by the Appellate Authority in its judgment in R.C.A.No.3 of 2018. The concurrent finding of the authorities below that the tenant is not entitled to the protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal or it cannot also be said that while arriving at such a finding, the authorities below have committed any material irregularity, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. 22. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 18 time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 23. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 19 Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it - cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 24. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari** **[(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 20 But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 25. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 21 expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional - court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 26. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 22 confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 27. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 28. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 23 Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under Section 11(3) of the Act. 29. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would would submit that considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the tenant may be given at least ten months' time to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building. 30. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the tenant, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would submit that a reasonable period for surrendering the vacant possession of the petition schedule building can be granted, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 31. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 24 remaining period, without any default, till he give vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord. 32. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision Petition is dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and also the order of the Rent Control Court; however by granting ten months' time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the respondent-landlord, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of COVID-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the petitioner-landlord within ten months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule building and further he shall conduct any business in the petition schedule building only on R.C.Rev.No.34 of 2020 25 the strength of a valid licence/permission/ consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; - (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondenttenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. Sd/- ## **ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE** Sd/- **P.G. AJITHKUMAR JUDGE** **yd**