SASI v. State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN** **FRIDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF AUGUST 2013/25TH SRAVANA, 1935** ## **Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 2707 of 2006 (C)** **--------------------------------CRL.A. NO.147/2005 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS FAST TRACK COURT-II, ALAPPUZHA SC. NO.104/2003 OF PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT SESSIONS COURT, ALAPPUZHA.** **............** ## **PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:** **------------------------------------------------------** **SASI, S/O.VASUDEVAN, KOTTOOR VADAKKETHIL VEEDU, PATHIYOOR MURI, PATHIYOOR VILLAGE, KAYAMKULAM.** **BY ADVS.SRI.B.RAMAN PILLAI, SRI.GEORGE PHILIP, SRI.R.ANIL, SRI.RAJU RADHAKRISHNAN.** ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:** **--------------------------------------------------------------------** **STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.** ## **BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR MR.ROY THOMAS.** **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 29-07-2013, THE COURT ON 16-08-2013 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** **rs.** ## P. BHAVADASAN, J. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crl.R.P. No. 2707 of 2006 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 16[th] day of August, 2013. ## ORDER Undaunted by the concurrent findings against him of having committed offences punishable under Sections 376 and 450 of Indian Penal Code and having suffered conviction and sentence for the said offences, the accused in S.C. 104 of 2003 before the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Alappuzha has come up in revision. 2. P.W.1 is the prosecutrix in this case. She is married and has a child. Her husband is working abroad. The accused is her neighbour. It so happened that P.W.1 had gone to the house of P.W.6 where her child fell ill. She needed money. She asked the accused if he could lend Rs.500/- to her. The accused replied that he was not in his house and the money may be collected from his brother-in-law's house at Chettikulangara. P.W.1 reached the said house and found the accused and a lady there. The allegation is that under the Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 2 pretext of showing the house which was a newly constructed one, P.W.1 was taken to a room at the first floor and as soon as she entered the room, the door was closed. Thereafter the accused snatched the child from her, threatened her with dire consequences if she did not pose nude for him to take photographs. Left with no choice, she had to relent and her nude photographs were drawn by the accused. Thereafter using those photographs, on a subsequent date, it is alleged that the accused went to the house of the victim and ravished her. The accused did not stop at that. He then wanted the victim to play in blue films and also to submit herself to the persons whom the accused indicated. She was unwilling to do either of these. Out of fear of humiliation and the threat meted out by the accused, the victim kept silent. But her patience reached its nadir when the accused instigated her to poison her husband. That paved the way for P.W.1 to Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 3 confess to her husband of what had transpired. She then laid Ext.P1 private complaint before the court concerned. 3. The private complaint laid by the prosecutrix was forwarded for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. P.W.11, the Sub Inspector of Police, Mavelikkara, who received the complaint, on the basis of Ext.P1 complaint, registered Crime No. 53 of 2001 as per Ext.P14 FIR. He then found that the incident had occurred within the jurisdiction of the Kayamkulam Police Station and therefore, he forwarded Ext.P14 FIR with relevant documents to that Police Station. The Sub Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam Police Station, namely, P.W.12, on receipt of Ext.P14 re-registered crime as per Ext.P15 FIR. P.W.15 took over investigation. He prepared Ext.P12 scene mahazar and recovered the dress handed over by P.W.1 as per Ext.P21 mahazar. He conducted a search of the house of the accused after following the necessary procedures and seized the Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 4 negatives of the photographs. The bill book containing the counter foil of the bill issued to the petitioner from Challenger Colour Lab was seized as per Ext.P24 mahazar. The bill book was later returned on kychit. On surrender by the accused before P.W.15, he was subjected to potency test. The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of witnesses, completed investigation and laid charge before court. 4. The court, before which charge was laid, took cognizance of the offences. Finding that the offences are exclusively triable by a court of Sessions committed the case to Sessions Court, Alappuzha as per Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court, Alappuzha made over the case to Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Alappuzha for trial and disposal. The latter court, on receipt of records and on appearance of the accused, framed charge for the offences punishable under Sections 342, 376, 384, 385, 450 and 506 of Indian Penal Code. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 5 The prosecution therefore had P.Ws. 1 to 16 examined and had Exts.P1 to P29 marked. M.Os. 1 to 5 were got identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against him and maintained that he is innocent. He denied having committed any act which would constitute offences and he came forward with an explanation that it was his brother-in-law, Soman, with whom his relationship was far from pleasant, who had manipulated things to falsely implicate him. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 Cr.P.C., he was asked to enter on his defence. He examined D.Ws.1 to 4 and had Exts.D1 to D9 marked. On a consideration of the materials before it, the trial court came to the conclusion that the accused had committed the offences punishable under Sections 376, 342, 384, 385, 450 and 506 of I.P.C. The conviction and sentence for the offences Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 6 followed. It was also directed that if the fine amount imposed was realised, it shall be paid to P.W.1 as compensation. Substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently and set off as per law was allowed. 5. The disappointed accused carried the matter in appeal as Crl.Appeal No.147 of 2005 before the Additional Sessions Court, Fast Track -II, Alappuzha. The said court, after an independent evaluation of the evidence, found no grounds to interfere with the finding of the court below and confirmed the same. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner contended that both the courts below have acted in a mechanical manner and had not cared to critically analyse the evidence of P.W.1, the prosecutrix, in this case. Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner contended that he had no quarrel with the proposition that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is found cogent, convincing and creditworthy, Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 7 a conviction can be certainly based on that. But in the case on hand, it is far from so. The evidence of P.W.1 is open to serious doubt as it is replete with contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments and developments. A reading of the evidence of P.W.1, taken along with Exts.P1 and P18, shows that she has no consistent case and a proper appreciation of her evidence will bring out the inherent improbabilities in the prosecution story. The evidence of P.W.1 is destroyed by the evidence of P.W.6, who is none other than the sister of P.W.1. Recalling the prosecution case, learned counsel pointed out that P.W.1 is alleged to have gone to the house of P.W.6 from where she requested the money from the accused. Not only does P.W.6 denies the said fact, P.W.15, the Investigating Officer, has categorically stated that during investigation, it was not revealed that the child of P.W.1 had fallen ill. A reading of the evidence of P.W.1, when compared with Exts.P1 and P18, will show that there are Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 8 material contradictions and inconsistencies in the material aspects of the case. Apart from the evidence of P.W.1, there is no material to prove the prosecution case. 7. Learned counsel pointed out that it is not necessary in all cases that the evidence of the prosecutrix should invariably be accepted. True, her position is that of an injured witness. But, according to the learned counsel, that does not mean that whatever she says is the gospel truth. For the said proposition, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Rajoo and Others v. State of M.P. (AIR 2009 SC 858). 9. According to the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, a reading of the evidence of P.W.1 along with Exts.P1 and P18 would show that the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of events and that makes the evidence of P.W.1 open to serious doubt. This infirmity in the evidence of P.W.1 probabilises the defence version. For the Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 9 said proposition, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand (2013Cri.L.J. 2062). 10. Finally, it was contended that there is inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. The incidents are said to have occurred in the year 1999 and the complaint has been laid only two years thereafter, for which no satisfactory explanation is offered. Both the courts below have brushed aside the contentions on this behalf very lightly. For the proposition that delay in such cases is fatal, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra (2006(11) SCALE 340). According to the learned counsel, the above aspects have not been considered by the courts below and that vitiates the finding. 11. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand pointed out that this court may remind itself that it is exercising the revisional jurisdiction which is considerably Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 10 limited in its scope and power. It is infact, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, a supervisory jurisdiction which is to be exercised to ensure that the courts below have exercised their jurisdiction properly. It does not contemplate a re-appreciation of the evidence to see whether the findings of the courts below are justified. Nor does it allow the revisional court to reverse the finding merely because the revisional court feels that a different view is possible. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, unless and until it is shown that the findings of the courts below suffer from illegality, irregularity or impropriety, it will not be proper for this court to interfere with the findings of the court below. It is significant to notice, according to the learned Public Prosecutor that both the courts below have independently considered the evidence on record and have come to identical conclusions that the offences are made out. It could not be Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 11 said that the findings are either perverse or contrary to the evidence of record. 12. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the infirmities pointed out in the evidence of P.W.1 are without basis. It is only natural that when the witness speaks after a lapse of time, inconsistencies, contradictions, embellishments and developments are bound to occur. Further, it is pointed out that moral indignation of the prosecutrix will result in the contribution to her approach. Merely because there may be some inconsistencies or contradictions, the evidence of P.W.1 is not liable to be rejected. Read as a whole, it can be seen that her evidence has a ring of truth and merely because P.W.6 has chosen to contradict P.W.1, and also that there is some difference in the narration of the incident in Ext.P1 and Ext.P18 will not be sufficient to throw out the evidence furnished by P.W.1. The suggestion put to P.W.1 that it was at the behest of Soman, the brother-in-law of the accused, that Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 12 the complaint was laid, the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the defence put up is a cock and bull story and cannot even stand. 13. Learned Public Prosecutor further pointed out that in such case, one has to depend to a great extent on the evidence furnished by the prosecutrix. Unless it is shown that her evidence suffers from inherent improbabilities or is unacceptable when viewed in the light of the other evidence adduced in the case, it will not be proper for the court to look upon the evidence of P.W.1 with suspicion. Learned Public Prosecutor did not dispute the principle that in all cases, the statement of the prosecutrixc cannot be treated as the gospel truth. 14. Learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that there is no merit in the contention based on delay. A reading of the evidence of P.W.1 and also the various documents produced by the prosecution will clearly show that she was 13 Crl.R.P.2707/2006. agitating her case, may be in the wrong forum. She approached the Women's Commission and they threw up their hands in despair when the accused did not appear before them. Reasonable explanation has been offered for the delay. 15. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that both the courts below considered the above aspects in considerable detail and have come to identical conclusions. Under such circumstances, it may not be proper for this court to interfere with the finding of the court below on the mere ground that it has no basis or foundation. In short, the contention is that no grounds are made out to interfere with the finding of the court below. 16. True, the story may look improbable at the first blush. P.W.1 is the victim and the prosecutrix. She as already noticed, was married and had a child. Her husband was working abroad. According to the evidence of P.W.1, it so happened that she had to go to the house of P.W.6 where her Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 14 child fell ill. She needed money and she contacted the accused who was her neighbour. P.W.1 would say that the accused had asked her to go over to a house at Chettikulangara which was under construction to receive the amount. P.W.1 says that she bona fide believed the accused, and at the time she entered the house, she found the accused and a lady sitting on the varenda. P.W.1 would say that being a newly constructed house, the accused offered her to take her to the house. She went along with him. P.W.1 would then say that they went to upstair portion and as soon as they entered into an A.C. Room, the accused closed the door and snatched the child from her. Then, according to P.W.1, she was threatened with the life of the child if she did not heed to the demands of the accused. Having no other choice, P.W.1 would say that she relented. Her statement is that compelling her to undress, the accused captured her nude photographs. Thereafter, she was taken to another house where she was Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 15 threatened with dire consequences if she dared to reveal the incident to anybody. The house where she was taken on the second occasion was at Thattarambalam. As per the evidence furnished by P.W.1, on 15.2.1999 at 2.30 p.m., the accused came to her residence and threatening her with publication of the nude photographs which he had drawn on the earlier occasion, she was made to subject herself to his lust. The accused initially had promised that if she heeded to his desire, the photographs would be returned to her. Lured by the offer, she succumbed. But, after the act was over, the accused did not return the photographs. Instead, going by the evidence of P.W.1, he came forward with more demands like acting in blue films and also compelling her to share bed with persons whom the accused would indicate. P.W.1 would say that she resisted these demands of the accused. That made him to take a different approach. He then demanded money from P.W.1 and she had to simply sign cheques in his favour. Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 16 She then speaks about the ultimate act which made her to file the complaint. 17. That she was taken on the first occasion to the house where the accused had indicated is borne out from the evidence of P.W.5, an autorickshaw driver. His evidence shows that he had taken the lady to the house where the accused had asked P.W.1 to come to receive money. 18. It is true that even though the prosecution witness P.W.6, who is none other than the direct elder sister of P.W.1, chose to betray the prosecution, she even went to the extent of suggesting illicit relationship between P.W.1 and Soman, who is none other than the brother-in-law of the accused. She denied the statement given by her to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. with absolute impunity. However, in cross-examination, it was brought out that a short period before giving evidence, the relationship between P.W.1 and P.W.6 had become extremely bitter. It was so bitter that Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 17 P.W.6 did not invite P.W.1 for the marriage of her own daughter also. 19. Relying on the evidence of P.W.6 and P.W.15, it is contended that the version given by P.W.1 that she had gone to the house of P.W.6 where her child fell ill and she demanded money from the accused, it is contended that the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be accepted. It is difficult to accept the contention so raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. P.W.6 had her own reasons as could be seen from her own testimony to speak against the victim. Both the courts below have found that the evidence of P.W.6 cannot be accepted. Both the courts below found that she was deliberately speaking falsehood to spike her vengeance against P.W.1. The views so taken by the courts below are possible views. 20. In the decision reported in Rajoo and Others v. State of M.P. (AIR 2009 SC 858) it was held as follows: Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 18 “9. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspect and should be believed, the more so as her statement has to be evaluated at par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the Court. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 19 or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh's case to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape. It is, however, significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two Sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualized as the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be Crl.R.P.2707/2006. ## 20 presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case, and others such as this one, need to be examined.” 21. When one goes through the decision, one cannot omit to notice the facts of the said decision. The evidence adduced in the said case created certain serious doubts regarding the version given by the prosecutrix and her conduct was also open to serious doubts. In that context, it was held that merely because the prosecutrix says that she was raped, that cannot be taken as gospel truth. The decision should be confined to the facts of the said case. 22. It is well settled by now that the prosecutrix in an offence of rape is not an accomplice, but is in the position of an injured witness. One has also to remember that the offence is one which is committed in secrecy and it will be Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 21 imprudent on the part of the court to insist for corroborative items of evidence except the medical evidence in certain cases. Of course, the court has to critically scrutinize the evidence of the prosecutrix for the simple reason that most of the findings will have to be rendered on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone. Unless it is shown that there is ill-will on the part of the victim, or that the victim, in order to escape from unpleasant consequences, has foisted a case on the accused, or until it is shown that there are compelling circumstances to doubt the version given by the prosecutrix, it will not be proper for the court to reject the evidence of the prosecutrix for want of corroboration. One should remember that it is seldom that a lady comes forward with an accusation of rape. It brings her no credit. This aspect also have to be borne in mind while appreciating the evidence in the case of rape. The only suggestion to P.W.1 that it was at the behest of the brother-in-law of the accused that the case has been Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 22 foisted on him which is denied by her. The inconsistencies and contradictions pointed out in the evidence of P.W.1 taken along with Exts.P1 and P18 do not materially affect her testimony. The inconsistencies and contradictions relate to insignificant aspects and even assuming that there are some areas of her evidence which cannot be believed, still it cannot be said that her entire evidence has to be thrown out. She might have exaggerated. She might have developed the story. But if the substratum remains the same, there is no reason why the court should refuse to accept the testimony of the prosecutrix. 23. In the decision reported in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand (2013 Cri.L.J. 2062), on facts it was found that the sequence of events spoken to by the prosecutrix was not convincing enough and that created serious suspicion in the mind of the court coupled with various other circumstances, also the delay in lodging the FIR. The prosecution also had a Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 23 case that the two persons who were in the know of things, when they examined, did not support the prosecution. It is also significant to notice that in the above case, neither the doctor nor the investigating officer was also examined. Further, the reason offered for the delay was not convincing enough. Under those circumstances, it was held that since the prosecutrix failed to narrate the sequence of events, the prosecution had to fail. The facts are narrated in detail in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision. 24. On facts, the principle laid down in the above decision can have no application to the present case. The fact that P.W.1 had gone to the house indicated by the accused to receive a sum of Rs.500/- is borne out from the testimony of P.W.5, the autorickshaw driver who dropped her in that house. It was very vehemently contended before this court that it is inconceivable that the accused would have held the child in one hand and with the other hand he could have taken the Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 24 photographs. According to the learned counsel, it is highly improbable and inconceivable that such a thing could have happened. 25. The evidence of P.W.1 shows that as soon as she entered into the A.C. room on the first floor, the accused closed the door and snatched the child from her. The evidence also shows that her dress was torn by the accused and also that the child was kept between his knees when he drew the nude photographs of P.W.1. Even though there is slight inconsistency in the sequence of events given by her, it is insufficient to reject her evidence in toto. 26. Both the courts below have considered the evidence of P.W.1 in considerable detail and have come to the conclusion that there is no justification or reason to doubt her version. 27. Coming to the question of delay, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has to fail as Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 25 has been found by both the courts below. True, the two incidents complained of, namely, the drawing of nude photographs and also the rape on P.W.1 were committed in 1999 and the private complaint was laid only in 2001. In the decision reported in Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra (2006 (11) SCALE 340) relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the consequence of the delay in lodging the FIR was considered in detail. In the said case, it was found that no reasonable explanation had been offered for the delay and it was held that that should prove fatal to the prosecution. 28. However, in the above decision, it has also been observed that mere delay in lodging the FIR is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. In no less terms, the court has held that the said issue has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. The said decision does not lay down any universal principle. Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 26 29. Coming back to the facts of the case, the evidence of P.W.1 shows that after having committed sexual assault on her, the accused made certain objectionable demands from her, to which she did not relent. She has also given evidence to the effect that utilizing the photographs and also the pitiable state of affairs, the accused squeezed money from her. That the accused had encashed cheques is evident from the testimony of P.W.13, the Manager of the Indian Overseas Bank, Kayamkulam where P.W.1 maintained her account. Ext.P16 is the extract of the S.B. Account maintained by P.W.1. Of course, the accused had a case that being a friend of P.W.1, she used to ask him to encash cheques for her. The explanation so offered is too weak to accept. 30. The further evidence of P.W.1 is to the effect that later on when her husband returned in 1999 and scrutinized the account, he found large sums of money Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 27 missing from the account of P.W.1. Unable to resist the queries made by the husband, she had to disclose the incident to him. P.W.1 has also given evidence to the effect that thereafter the accused even instigated her to poison her husband which shocked P.W.1 and then she decided to complain. Ext.P18 is the complaint said to have been filed by P.W.1 before the Women's Commission. P.W.14, the Senior Superintendent of Kerala State Women's Commission was examined to prove that P.W.1 had infact filed a complaint. As per her evidence, complaint was filed on 7.8.2000 and the entire file relating to the said matter was produced before court. The evidence shows that inspite of notice issued to the accused, he did not turn up resulting in the Women's Commission unable to take any effective steps in the matter and the Commission was compelled to close the file with a direction to P.W.1 to take such steps as are available to her in law. Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 28 31. It could therefore be seen that it is not as if the victim, namely, P.W.1 had been kept silent till she laid Ext.P1 private complaint. She had been taking steps to redress her grievances, but that yielded no result. Viewed in the context of the case, and the facts and circumstances of the case revealed through the evidence of P.W.1 and such other evidence produced by the prosecution, it cannot be said that there is deliberate delay in lodging the FIS. The accused was unable to show that there was any ill-motive in delaying the lodging of the FIS. But, on the other hand, a reading of the evidence of P.W.1 taken along with the other evidence, namely, bank accounts etc., and also the mediation talks in the presence of the Circle Inspector of Police at one point of time would show that P.W.1 was making every effort to extricate herself from the clutches of the accused and to have her grievances redressed. Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 29 32. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the two courts have independently considered the evidence on record and have come to the conclusion that there is no reason to reject the evidence of P.W.1, the prosecutrix, which stands scrutiny. Even though in revisional jurisdiction a reappreaisal of the evidence is not normally permissible, in the light of the vehemence with which the matter was argued before this court and in the light of the complaint that the courts below have not appreciated the evidence of P.W.1 in the proper perspective, this court has also gone through the evidence of P.W.1. May be that there are some infirmities in the evidence of P.W.1, but it could not be said that her story is totally false or highly improbable. The attempt on the part of the accused by adducing evidence to show that he is innocent has not succeeded. 33. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, it may be possible to say that on a reappraisal of Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 30 the evidence in the case, a different view is possible. But, two courts, one of them is final court on facts, have chosen to believe the version given by P.W.1 and have arrived at a conclusion that offences have been made out. It could not be said that the views so taken by both the courts below are perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. The revision petitioner was unable to establish any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the findings of the courts below. 34. There was a frantic attempt then to contend for the position that the sentence imposed for the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is highly excessive and is not warranted in the facts of the case. 35. The contention is without basis. The trial court has awarded only seven years' rigorous imprisonment, which is the minimum period as per the statute. Of course, under exceptional circumstances, the court concerned could reduce the period of imprisonment. However, in the case on hand, Crl.R.P.2707/2006. 31 the exception does not apply. If at all the court below has erred in any manner, it has erred on the side of leniency. The result is that this revision petition is without merits and it is liable to be dismissed. I do so, confirming the conviction and sentence as confirmed by the appellate court. P. BHAVADASAN, JUDGE sb.