High CourtSingle JudgeAppeal allowed

Sadhu Singh Gruman v. Food Corporation of India & Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1990

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • K. Jagannath Shetty
  • R. M. Sahai
Judgment Date
1990-02-14
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s order is set aside and the trial court’s stay order is restored. No order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Sadhu Singh Gruman

Respondents

  • Food Corporation of India
  • Respondents 2–7 (unnamed in document)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Mukul Mudgal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S.S. Javali
  • • Y.P. Rao
  • • Raju Ramachandran

Case Synopsis & Summary

This appeal arises from a suit filed by the Food Corporation of India for recovery of Rs. 2 lakhs on the basis of an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The appellant, Sadhu Singh Gruman, appeared and, because photostat copies of the original documents were unclear, sought production of the originals so that a written statement could be filed. Subsequently, the appellant moved under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of the suit on the ground that there exists an arbitration clause covering the dispute. The Food Corporation opposed the stay, arguing that the appellant had already taken steps in the suit, namely an adjournment for filing the written statement. The trial court granted a stay; the Additional District Judge, however, vacated it; the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the revision. The central issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the expression “a step in the proceeding” under Section 34. The Court held that the phrase is not every step, but a step that abandons the right to stay the suit and advances submission to the court’s jurisdiction for merits. It relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer, and General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co. to expound the principle. Considering the circumstances and the parties’ intention, the Court held the appellant did not abandon the arbitration right, allowed the appeal, and restored the trial court’s stay, while setting aside the High Court’s order. The decision underscores protecting arbitration rights against technical proceduralities, balancing forum selection with access to justice.

Provisions of Law Cited

Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 34

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The 'step in the proceeding' doctrine under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  • The 'election or affirmation' doctrine (as interpreted in General Electric Co. v Renusagar Power Co.).
  • 'Forum of mutual choice' concept in arbitration vs. court adjudication.
  • Right to arbitration should not be defeated by vague or amorphous references to arbitration; abandonment requires clear intent to pursue merits in court.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contended that the arbitration clause in the contract governs the dispute and that Section 34 should operate to stay the suit unless the right to arbitration has been unequivocally abandoned. The production of original documents and the request for adjournment to enable filing a written statement do not, in isolation, amount to an admission of the merits in court or a conscious submission to the forum for adjudication. The right to arbitrate is contractual and must not be defeated by technicalities. The Court should examine the substance and intention behind the steps taken, and in the present case there was no clear intent to abandon arbitration and proceed on merits in court.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the conduct of the defendants—seeking production of original documents and requesting an adjournment to file a written statement—constitutes steps in the proceedings that indicate a willingness to progress in the court and therefore undermines the arbitration clause. They contended that these actions reflect submission to the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of adjudication on merits, justifying denial of a stay under Section 34.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra[1974] 1 SCR 31Mentioned OnlyCited as a prior authority related to Section 34 but not central to the ratio decided in this case.
Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer[1983] 1 SCR 95PositiveCited and relied upon as part of the framework for interpreting stay under Section 34 and the arbitration-right analysis.
General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co.[1987] 4 SCC 137PositiveCentral to the articulation of the ‘step in the proceeding’ doctrine and the standard for abandoning arbitration rights in favor of merits adjudication.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

SADHU SINGH GRUMAN A _v •_ _.-.i,_ FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. FEBRUARY 14, 1990 [K. JAGANNATHA SHETIY AND R.M. SAHA!, JJ.] I:! _Arbitration Act,_ _1940:_ _Section 34-"A step in_ _the proceeding"-_ #### _)_ _What is-Interpretation thereof._ In a suit filed by tbe Respondent for recovery of a certain amount from the appellants and others, on the basis of an agreement between ###### c the parties, appellant entered appearance and prayed for the production of original documents, since photostat copies were not clear, so that written statement may be filed. Thereafter the appellant moved the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for stay of the suit on the ground that there was D an arbitration clause in the suit agreement covering the matter in dispute. Though the Respondent Cm,·poration admitted the existence of such a clause, it opposed the prayer for stay of the proceedings on the plea that the appellant had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit, in J,l, that an adjournment was taken for filing written statement. Staying the proceedings, the trial court observed that there was no prayer for E adjournment of the case for filing the written statement. "" On appeal by the Respondent-Corporation, the First Appellate Court vacated the stay order passed by the trial court. The Revision petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. F This appeal, by special leave, is against the High Court's order. Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 The expression "a step in the proceeding" which would disentitle the defendant from invoking section 34 of the Arbitra- G tion Act is not every step taken by him In the suit. It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed. It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit. The step must have been consciously taken with ## I( a view to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of abandon the right to have the suit stayed. It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit. The step must have been consciously taken with a view to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on merits. [356C-D] ~ 353 A B c 354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] l S.C.R. 1.2 Before the trial court, the defendants only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement. It was not stated that they wonld file the written statement. They never took any other step submitting to the jurisdiction of the court to decide the case on merits. The right to have the dispute settled by arbitration has been conferred by agreement of parties and that right should not be deprived of by technical pleas. The Court must go into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken. The conrt must examine whether the party has abandoned his right under the agreement. In the light of these principles and looking to the substance of the application dated January 4, 1985, one cannot form an opinion that the defendants have abandoned their right to have the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the written statement. (357B-D] _State_ _of UP._ v. _Janki Saran Kai/ash Chandra,_ [1974] 1 SCR 31; _Food Corporation_ _of India_ v. _Yadav Engineer,_ [1983] 1 SCR 95 and _General Electric Co._ v. _Renusagar Power Co.,_ [1987] 4 SCC 137, relied D on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1201 of 1990 From the Judgment and Order dated 5.6.87 of the Punjab and E Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 556/87. Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant. F S.S. Javali, Y.P. Rao and Raju Ramachandran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Special leave granted. Food Corporation of India filed a suit for recovery of Rs.2 lacs G against the appellant and respondents 2 to 7 on the basis of an agreement between the parties. After service of notice, the appellant entered appearance on December 10, 1984. On January 4, 1985, the ###### appellant filed an application stating as follows: )I "'fhat the photostat copy of the original agreement and H other documents which have been produced by the plaintiff SADHU SINGH _v._ F.C.I. IJAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.] 355 _I_ in their evidence are not visible and clear, and it is very difficult for the defendants to inspect and give the written statement. 3. That it is very essential to get the original documents produced in the court which are in possession of the plaintiff so that the defendants may file the written statement. 4. It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the plaintiff may kindly be ordered to produce the original agreement and other documents which has been filed with the plaint." A B On January 21, 1985, the appellant moved the Court under Sec- C tion 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of the proceeding of the suit on the ground that there exists an arbitration clause in the suit agreement covering the matter in dispute. The Food Corporation of India contended that the appellant had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit since an adjournment was taken for filing written statement. It was [) however, admitted the existence of the arbittation agreement covering the matter in dispute in the suit. The Trial Court accepted the request of the appellant and stayed the suit _inter-alia_ observing: " . . . . . This application did 9ot contain any prayer for adjournment of the case for filing the written statement. E The prayer contained in this application was that the plaintiff be directed to produce the original agreement and other documents so that the defendants may file the written statement ..... \ ### _(_ But the Additional District Judge, in the appeal preferred by the Food Corporation of India has reversed the order of the trial court. He was of the view that a written request made by the defendants by their application dated January 4, 1985 for an adjournment to enable them . . . . . In the present case, the prayer of the defendants that F the plaintiff be directed to file Jhe original agreement and other documents in the court before they could file the' written statement cannot be said to be a step in the proceedings **because it was not a prayer for adj,oumment of the case for** filing writte~tatement." G to file the written statement was a step in the proceedings and the trial ·court was not justified in staying the suit. Accordingly, he accepted the H A B c _D_ E F G H 356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) I S.C.R. appeal and vacated the stay order and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has dismissed the revision petition of the appellant. The High Court has also observed that the defendants having moved the application dated January 4, 1985 for production of original documents and seeking an adjournment of the suit to enable them to file written statement would certainly be construed as··a step taken in the proceedings. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has received the consideration of this Court in _State of Uttar Pradesh_ v. _Janki Saran Kai/ash Chandra,_ [ 1974] I SCR 31, (ii) _Food Corporation_ _of India_ v. _Yadav Engineer,_ I 1983] 1 SCR 95 and more recently in _General Electric Co._ v. _Renusagar Power Co.,_ [ 1987) 4 SCC 137. It may be noted that the expression "a step in the proceeding" which would disentitle the defendant from invoking section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not every step taken by him in the suit. It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed. It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit. The step must have been consciously taken with a view to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on the merits. In _General Electric_ _Co. 's_ case this Court after considering the previous decisions observed (at 155-56): " ..... thus a step in the proceeding which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Section 34 of the Arbitration Act should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit or submission to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. The step must be such as to _manifest_ the intention of the party unequivocally to abandon the right under the arbitration agreement and instead to opt to have the dispute resolved on merits in the suit. The step must be such as to indicate an election or affirmation in favour of the suit in the place of the arbitration. The election or affirmation may be by express choice or by necessary implication by acquiescence. The broad and general right of a person to seek redressal of his grievances in a court of law is subject to the right of the parties to have the disputes settled by a ' forum of mutual choice. Neither right is insubstantial nor the right can be allowed to be defeated. by any manner of technicality. The right to have the dispute adjudicated # by a civil court cannot be allowed to be defeated by vague [•] SADHU SINGH _v._ F.C.I. (JAGANNATHA SHEITY, J.] 357 or amorphouse mis-called agreements to refer to 'arbitra- A tion'. On the other hand, if the agreement to refer to arbitration is established, the right to have the dispute settled by arbitration cannot be allowed to be defeated on technical **grounds."** In the application filed by the defendants in this case, they only B sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement _l_ and other documents so that they may file written statement. It was / · not stated that they would file the written statement. They never took any other step submitting to the jurisdiction of the court to decide the case on merits. The right to have the dispute settled by arbitration has been conferred by agreement of parties and that right should not be C deprived of by technical pleas. The Court must go into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken. The Court must examine whether the party has abandoned· his right under the agreement. In the light of these principles and looking to the substance of ~J the application dated January 4, 1985, we cannot form an opinion that D the defendants have abandoned their right to have the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the written statement. In the result the appeal is allowed in setting aside the order of the High Court and·restoring the order of the trial Court. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. G.N. Appeal allowed. ##### 1 I E