Sabu K. Baby v. The State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **MONDAY, THE 25[TH] DAY OF OCTOBER 2021 / 3RD KARTHIKA, 1943** **CRL.MC NO. 5234 OF 2020** **SC 1012/2019 OF SESSIONS COURT,THALASSERY** ## **PETITIONER/ACCUSED** SABU K.BABY AGED 48 YEARS S/O. BABY, KORATTIYIL HOUSE, KADUMENI, KADUMENI P.O, CHITTARICKAL VILLAGE, KASARAGOD DISTRICT, PIN-670 511 BY ADVS. K.M.GEORGE KUM.CHITHRA P.GEORGE ## **RESPONDENT/STATE** 1 THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031 2 DEFACTO COMPLAINANT XXX (Impleaded as per order dated 3.12.2020 in Crl.M.A.2/2020) BY ADV SRI.M.T.SURESHKUMAR PP SEENA.C THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 25.10.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: Crl.M.C.5234/2020 2 ## ORDER Dated : 25[th] October, 2021 1. Petitioner is the sole accused in Crime No.303/2017 of Cherupuzha police station registered for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. This Crl.M.C has been filed seeking to quash the entire proceedings in S.C.1012/2019 on the file of Sessions Court, Thalassery, which arose out of the above said Crime. 2. Additional 2[nd] respondent, the de facto complainant is a 40 year old lady. The allegation in the complaint is that during 1.12.2013 to 30.9.2016, while she was living separate from her husband along with her children in a rented house at Peringanam, accused got acquainted with her when he came for work with a JCB. It is further alleged that, promissing to marry her and threatening her, with force accused committed rape upon her in house No.CP-III/195 of Cherupuzha Grama Panchayat of CW2 ; at house No.XII-572 of East Elery Grama Panchayat owned by CW5; house No.XVIII-521 of Cherupuzha Grama Panchayat owned by CW6, on several occasions and thereby accused committed the offence afore. Crl.M.C.5234/2020 3 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the time of filing complaint, accused was 48 years old and the de facto complainant was 40 years old. He is a married man, living with wife and son at a distance of 7 Kms from the house of the de facto complainant. It is also his contention that he employed the petitioner for a short while in March, 2016 at the request of a relative of him who is no more and she was terminated within three months. It is also contended that though the allegation is that, from December 2013 to September 2016, for two years and ten months, he had committed the offence , this complaint has been filed only on 22.5.2017. So even as per the complaint there is a delay of about 7½ months in lodging the FIS. 4. Annexure-A1 series are the copies of FIR, FIS and final report in Crime No.303/2017. Annexure-A2 is the copy of the judgment in O.P.360/2013 dated 18.7.2014 of Family Court, Kasargode, which was an OP for divorce filed by the husband of the de facto complainant seeking for divorce on the ground of adultery and the adulterer is the 2[nd] respondent in that case. He would contend that the allegation of the husband of the petitioner in Annexure-A2 was that from September 2011 the de facto complainant has been leading an adulterous life with the 2[nd] Crl.M.C.5234/2020 4 respondent in Annexure-A2 case and he had seen them in compromising position in September 2011 and also on 31.07.2013. So according to him, when the alleged act of rape in December 2013 is attributed against him she was contesting the case against her husband in Annexure-A2 case. The judgment in Annexure-A2 case is dated 18.7.2014. So if at all he also has committed rape within that period, he also ought to have been impleaded as an adulterer in Annexure-A2 case. It is further his contention that when her marriage was subsisting with her husband, the question of rape committed offering to marry her will not stand since both of them belong to Christian community where polygamy is strictly prohibited. According to him, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted as true, it would only amount to a consensual act of sexual intercourse on the part of the de facto complainant and hence continuation of the trial in S.C.1012/2019 would be a mere waste of time and hence he seeks to quash the proceedings against the accused in the said case. 5. The de facto complainant was subsequently impleaded as additional 2[nd] respondent. The learned counsel for the de facto complainant and also the learned Public Prosecutor were heard. Crl.M.C.5234/2020 5 It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the de facto complainant that the petitioner offered to marry the de facto complainant and accommodated her in different rented houses at his instance. It is also her contention that she was living separate from her husband even at the time of filing Annexure-A2 case and hence Annexure-A2 case has no bearing to quash the present proceedings against the petitioner. From the side of the learned Public Prosecutor 164 statement of the de facto complainant has been produced. 6. So the question for consideration is whether the further proceedings against the accused in S.C.No.1012 of 2019 is liable to be quashed? 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on **Uday v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2003 SC 1639 = MANU/SC/0162/2003)** , **Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi (AIR 2013 SC 2753 = MANU/SC/0063/2013), Vinod Kumar v. State of Kerala (2014 CriLJ 2360 = MANU/SC/1275/2014), Vineeth Kumar and Ors v. State of U.P. and Anr. (Crl.A.577/2017 dated 31.3.2017)** , **Ratheesh v. State of Kerala (2017 SCC Online Ker. 200), Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors (AIR** Crl.M.C.5234/2020 6 ## **2019 SC 327 = MANU/SC1518//2018),** and **Maheshwar Tigga v. The State of Jharkhand (Crl.A.635/2020 – arising out of SLP (Crl.393/2020)** 8. **Uday v. State of Karnataka** was a case in which a prosecutrix aged 19 years on the date of occurrence and accused/appellant aged about 20 -21 years at the time of occurrence. Accused was a friend of her brother and has been residing nearby the house of the prosecutrix and there developed a friendship and close intimacy in between them and the accused proposed to marry her and ultimately she became pregnant and accused withdrawn from the promise and thereafter the complaint was filed. While deciding that case, the Apex Court after discussing various decisions ultimately found in paragraph 24 which is relevant in this context to be extracted which reads thus :- “Keeping in view the approach that the Court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was however aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the Crl.M.C.5234/2020 7 appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact”. 9. Paragraph 26 is also relevant in this context which reads thus :- “There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of Crl.M.C.5234/2020 8 both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, is permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 O'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are over come with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court Crl.M.C.5234/2020 9 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No…… of 2013, arising out of SLP (Crl.) no.4883 of 2008, decided on 23.1.2013) wherein this Court inter alia held as under: 22. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the Crl.M.C.5234/2020 10 allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to marry her, but because she also desired it. In these circumstances it would be very difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to consent.” ## 10. **Vinod Kumar v. State of Kerala w** as also a case arose out of an appeal against the concurrent finding of conviction and Crl.M.C.5234/2020 11 sentence passed under Section 376 IPC. That was a case in which the prosecutrix and accused were in love and used to have daily telephonic conversation and they consented to meet each other and thereafter she accompanied the accused to Ponmudi where he proposed the marriage. The parties also belong to two different religion and the evidence of prosecutrix was that the accused told her that after conversion their marriage can be performed and to know all about it they went to meet Imam who informed the accused that conversion is not possible just for marriage and hence conversion is possible only after a registered marriage. So she agreed for marriage. In the said circumstances, the Apex Court held that the couple were infatuated with each other and wanted to live together in relation as close to matrimony as circumstances would permit and the prosecutrix was aware that accused was already married and possibly because polygamous relationship was not anathema to her because of her faith which he adheres she was willing to start living with the accused. In the said circumstances it was held that it cannot be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that accused is culpable for offence of rape. On the other hand, the reason relentlessly points to commission to consensual sexual Crl.M.C.5234/2020 12 relationship. In that decision, in paragraph 8, paragraph 12 of **Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala MANU/SC/0966/2013** was quoted which reads thus :- In Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113, my esteemed Brother has explained the essentials and parameters of the offence of rape in the extracted words, which renders idle any further explanation or elaboration:- “12.Section 375 IPC defines the expression “rape”, which indicates that the first clause operates, where the woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second, where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. The expression “against her will” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act complained of Section 90 IPC refers to the expression “consent”. Section 90, though, does not define “consent”, but describes what is not consent. Crl.M.C.5234/2020 13 “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances”. 11. So the dictum laid down by the Apex Court would clearly point to the position that consensual act of sex at any moment will not amount to rape. 12. The learned counsel further relies upon **Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi** wherein also it has been reiterated that there is no offence of rape in consensual relationship. That was also a case in which the accused challenged the framing of charge against him under Sections 376, 354 and 328 IPC. The High Court dismissed the revision petition and thereafter the accused approached the Apex Court. It is held in paragraph 19 thus :- 19. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Crl.M.C.5234/2020 14 Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No…… of 2013, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4883 of 2008, decided on 23.1.2013) wherein this Court inter alia held as under: 22. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section -482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges Crl.M.C.5234/2020 15 levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 13. So from the above, it can be concluded that a consensual relationship without any assurance will not substantiate the offence under Section 376 IPC. 14. In **Ratheesh v. State of Kerala** in an Appeal against conviction and sentence in a case charged under Section 376 IPC, the prosecution case was that under a false promise to Crl.M.C.5234/2020 16 marry the accused enticed the prosecutrix and took her to a hotel at Ernakulam where he subjected her to sexual intercourse at a room, with force and thereafter on three occasions at her residence also, she was subjected to sexual intercourse on a promise that he would marry her and the prosecution case is that when retracted from the promise, the prosecutrix made an attempt to commit suicide on 3.4.2008 and thereafter she made complaint alleging rape on 4.8.2008. While disposing that appeal, this Court found that it was a case of consent and the sexual intercourse was not at any time vitiated by any false promise and hence conviction under Section 376 is not sustainable. ## 15. **Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. The State of** **Maharashtra and Ors,** was an appeal directed against the judgment and order in a criminal application whereby high Court dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing the First Information Report registered for the offence punishable under Section 376(2) (b) and 420 r/w 34 IPC and under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the chargesheet filed before the Judicial Magistrate. In that case during the relevant time the appellant Crl.M.C.5234/2020 17 was serving as a Medical Officer and the complainant was working as Assistant Nurse in the same establishment. Her husband died leaving behind her and two children. During that time, appellant informed her that there had been differences between him and the wife and he is planning to divorce his wife. He also informed the complainant that since they belonged to different communities, a month time is needed for registration of marriage. So she started living with the appellant at his Government Quarters and she fell in love with the appellant and she needed a companion as she was a widow. But the appellant failed to marry her as promised. Thereafter the complaint was filed. Paragraph 20 of the said judgment is relevant in this context to be extracted which reads thus :- “Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an Crl.M.C.5234/2020 18 act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. ## 16. In **Maheshwar Tigga v. The State of Jharkhand,** a similar position was reiterated. 17. Coming to the fact situation of this case, it has come out that while alleging the act of rape against the accused by the de facto complainant, Annexure-A2 case filed by her husband for divorce making herself and another Mohanan Thekelath as the respondent, was pending. The prosecution allegation itself was that from December 2013 till September 2016 accused committed rape upon the de facto complainant who was living separate from her husband, whereas the allegations in Annexure-A2 case by her husband was that the cause of action Crl.M.C.5234/2020 19 for filing the petition for divorce arose in September 2011 and on 31.7.2013 when she committed adultery. At the time when the petitioner alleged to have committed rape in December 2013, she had been actively contesting the case filed by her husband as the 2[nd] respondent in that case as adulterer. One of the contentions of the learned counsel was that if at all the prosecution allegation is true the accused herein also ought to have been added as adulterer in Annexure-A2 case, because the judgment in that case, was pronounced on 18.7.2014. The learned counsel also would contend that the medical examination report produced along with the final report, would go to show that the de facto complainant refused to undergo the medical examination. So there is no medical evidence as such to prove the alleged act of rape also. So also pendency of Annexure-A2 case would also go to show that at the time when the alleged act at the instance of the accused taken place in December 2013, she was legally wedded wife of the petitioner in Annexure-A2 case and she was also contesting that case because Annexure-A2 case would show that she has been examined in that case and filed written statement refuting the allegations. It has also come out that the de facto complainant Crl.M.C.5234/2020 20 was a married woman with two children. So prima facie her allegation of sexual intercourse on a promise to marry is not sustainable in law. 18. Though the learned counsel for the de facto complainant would contend that the petitioner/accused had been taking her to different houses and offered to look after her children and accommodated them by taking houses in various places and hence the de facto complainant was in a bona fide belief of the promise of marriage by the petitioner and hence there are materials pirma facie to attract the offence under Section 375, it is to be noted that in **Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors,** also the de facto complainant was a widow with two children and the petitioner/accused in that case was also a married man alleged to be living at longer heads with his wife and he promised to marry her and they started living together and subsequently he withdrew from the promise and thereafter the complaint was filed. In such circumstances it has been categorically held by the Apex Court that there is distinction between rape and consensual sex. The Court in such cases must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had _mala fide_ motives or Crl.M.C.5234/2020 21 had made false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust. It is also held that there is also a distinction between mere promise and not fulfilling a false promise and if the accused had not made promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual act, such an act would not amount to rape. In the present case, the prosecution case itself is that initially while the marriage of the de facto complainant with her husband was subsisting, she had sexual intercourse with the accused on the alleged promise of him to marry her and look after the prosecutrix and children. So _prima facie_ the allegations in the complaint and the records produced from the side of the prosecution would only points to a consensual act of sex from the side of the petitioner. She appeared to have given consent for her companionship and as a person to look after her children. It cannot at any moment be considered as a rape as described in Section 375 of IPC. The alleged promise to marry and subsequent sexual intercourse with the de facto complainant also will not _prima facie_ come under the misconception of fact, because her marriage itself was subsisting at the time when the alleged promise for marriage was made by the accused. Petitioner is also a married man having wife and children. She Crl.M.C.5234/2020 22 was also hotly contesting a case filed by her husband for divorce alleging adultery against another man and that OP was also allowed as per Annexure-A2 judgment. In Section 164 Cr.P.C statement given to the Magistrate, the de facto complainant had categorically stated that when the accused promised to marry her, she refused initially since he told that he has got wife and children and is not in good terms with the wife. Thereafter, she developed intimacy and he started coming to her house and had been having sexual contact on promise of marriage. Being a Christian she will be quite aware that petitioner can not legally marry her during the subsistence of his marriage. All those factors only point to the consensual act of sexual intercourse on the part of the de facto complainant. 19. So also as per the prosecution case, lastly she had been raped from 2015-December to 2016-September at the house of CW6 at Vaniyamkunnu. But the complaint has been filed only on 22.5.2017. That delay of more than seven months is also not explained while giving the complaint. 20. In the above circumstances, even if the criminal proceedings are allowed to be continued against the petitioner, there are not even remote chances for ending the same in a Crl.M.C.5234/2020 23 - conviction. So the entire proceedings to be carried out in conducting the trial by calling the witnesses and adducing evidence etc, would ultimately be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of court. 21. In the result, Crl.M.C allowed and further proceedings in S.C.No1012/2019 on the file of Sessions Court, Thalassery in Crime No.303/2017 of Cherupuzha police station, is hereby quashed. Sd/- ## **M.R.Anitha, Judge** Mrcs/11.10. Crl.M.C.5234/2020 24 ## **APPENDIX** ANNEXURE ANNEXURE A1 CERTIFIED COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET IN S.C. NO. 1012/2019 ON THE FILE OF SESSIONS COURT, THALASSERY (CRIME NO.303/2017 OF THE CHERUPUZHA POLICE STATION, KANNUR DISTRICT), REGISTERED U/S. 376(2) (N) OF THE I.P.C. ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 18.07.2014 OF THE FAMILY COURT, KASARGODE IN O.P. NO. 360/2013 FILED ON 05.09.2013. ANNEXURE A3 CERTIFIED COPY OF THE F.I.R IN CRIME NO. 472/2013 OF VELLARIKUNDU POLICE STATION, KASARGODE.