High CourtDivision BenchAppeals and writ petition dismissed with costs.

S. Kodar v. State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:Writ Petition No. 363 of 1969; Civil Appeals Nos. 1010-1011 of 1973; 2552-2559/72; 179-180/74; 2/73; 2684/72; 1022/73; 927/73; 179-180/74
Neutral Citation:(1975) 1 SCR 122

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • A. N. Ray
  • K. K. Mathew
  • A. Alagiriswami
  • P. K. Goswami
  • R. S. Sarkaria
Judgment Date
1974-04-17
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals and writ petition dismissed with costs.
Final Disposition
Appeals and writ petition dismissed with costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • S. Kodar

Respondents

  • State of Kerala

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K. Jayaraj
  • • D. D. Sharma
  • • Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan
  • • K. S. Ramamurthy
  • • B. R. Agarwal
  • • D. N. Gupta

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Dr. Syed Mohammed
  • • K. M. K. Nair
  • • S. Govind Swaminadhan (Advocate General, Tamil Nadu)
  • • A. V. Rangam
  • • K. Venkataswami
  • • Subhashini

Case Synopsis & Summary

This case concerns the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970, which imposed a 5% additional tax on dealers whose annual turnover exceeded Rs 10 lakhs, atop the existing Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax regime. Writ petitions challenged the Act on three main grounds: (i) legislative competence under Entry 54, List II; (ii) violation of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g); and (iii) violation of Article 14 due to differential rates based on turnover. The Madras High Court dismissed the petitions; on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s validity. The Court held that the additional tax is essentially a tax on the sale or purchase of goods, not on the dealer’s income, and that the object is to augment the existing sales tax while tying the additional burden to turnover. The conclusion rests on the view that entry 54 List II authorizes taxes on the sale of goods, and the fact that the quantum is tied to the pre-existing tax does not alter the character of the levy. The Court also stated that the incidence of such a tax may fall on the dealer but need not be pass-on to the purchaser to be constitutional. It affirmed rational, turnover-based classification as reasonable within Article 14, and asserted that taxation can serve revenue and economic regulation purposes. The appeals and writ petition were dismissed with costs.

Provisions of Law Cited

Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1950Tamil Nadu Sales of Motor Spirit Taxation Act, 1939Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Rules, 1970Section 2(1)Section 2(2)Section 2(3)Section 3(1)Section 3(2)Section 3(3)Section 4Article 19(1)(f)Article 19(1)(g)Article 14Entry 54, List IISchedule VIIArticle 32

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The object of a tax is to raise revenue and regulate the economic life of society.
  • The economic wisdom of a tax is within the exclusive province of the legislature.
  • Capacity to pay and equality: proportioning the payment to capacity to pay can be legitimate to achieve genuine equality.
  • A tax on sales may be collected from the seller without requiring a direct right of recoupment from the purchaser; pass-through is not a necessary feature of a sales tax.
  • Classification of taxpayers by turnover for graded rates is permissible if relevant to the legislative objective under Article 14.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioners contended that the Act exceeded legislative competence (being outside Entry 54, List II), violated Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) by imposing an unreasonable restriction on trade, and contravened Article 14 by discriminating based on turnover. They argued the tax is effectively a tax on income, not on sale, and that the prohibition on passing the incidence to purchasers rendered the tax an unjust restriction. They urged the need for a consistent, proportional tax design and challenged the graded rate scheme as arbitrary.

Contentions of Respondents

The State argued that the Act imposes a tax on sale of goods, not on income, and that entry 54 List II authorizes taxes on sale or purchase of goods. It defended the 5% flat surcharge as a reasonable, turnover-based levy aimed at revenue generation and economic regulation. It contended that pass-through to buyers is not essential for a valid sales tax and that differential rates based on turnover are constitutionally permissible when grounded in the capacity-to-pay concept and the need for social justice.

Cited Precedents (7)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Ernakulam Radio Company v. State of Kerala—PositiveCourt adopted the view that the tax is on sale of goods, not on dealer income, aligning with the Act’s objective.
Kiliker v. Sales Tax Officer—PositiveDivision Bench of Kerala High Court’s affirmation of the sale-tax approach was followed.
A. S. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh—PositiveSupported the sale-tax interpretation and constitutional stance.
J.K. Jute Mills Co. v. State of U.P.—PositiveCourt recognized sale tax need not be strictly pass-through to consumer.
Konduri Buchira lingam v. State of Hyderabad—PositiveSales tax can be levied without mandatory pass-through to purchasers.
Tall Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar—PositiveReinforced idea that tax on sales can be structured to reflect capacity to pay.
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis294 U.S. 550PositiveUsed to illustrate that a sales tax need not be an indirect tax by necessity.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

121 S. KODAR _v ._ STATE OF KERALA _April_ 17, 1974 [A. N. RAY, C. J., K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAMi, P. K. GOSWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.] Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act. 1970-Constitutional validityWh-!ther outside the ·.:.:op~ of entry 54, List II-Whether viol&tes fundamental right under Art. J9(1)(f) and (g). _Constitution_ _of_ _India,_ _1950-Art._ 19(1)(f) _and_ _(g)_ _Entry_ 54. _List_ _Il,_ _Schedule_ _Vil._ ##### • A B C The Tamil Nadu Additional Sales-tax Act 1970 imposed additional sales-tax ot 5% on a dealer whose annual total turnover exceeded Rs. ten lacs. Writ petitions questioning the constitutional validity _of the Act were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal it was contended that (i) the State legislature had no power to enact the Act as the tax was outside the scope of entry 54 of List II; (ii) that the provisions of the Act violated the fundamental rights of the appellant under 1\rl. 19(1)(f) anct (g) of the Constitution and (iii) that the provisions of the Act imnosed different rates of tax upon different dealers depending on their 0 turnover and were. therefore! violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Disini.;;sing the appeal. E F G H HELD: (1) The contention of the appellants that the additional sales-tax is not a tax on sales but on the income of the dealers is without any basis. The additional tax is really a tax on the sale of goods. The object of the Act is to increase the tax on the sale or purchase of goods imposed by the Tamil Nadu General Sales-tax Act. 1959 and the fact that quantum of the additional tax is determined with reference to the sales-tax imposed would not alter its character. Th¢ additional sales-tax is to be imposed only if the turnover of a dealer exceeds &. 10 lacs. It is in reality a tax un the aggregate of sales effected by a dealer during a year. [1230-E) _Kil1kar_ v. _Sales Tax Officer,_ 21 S.T.C. 253, and _A._ _S._ _Ra111achandra_ _Rao_ v. _State_ _of_ _Andhra Pradesh, 25_ S.T.C. 133, approved. (2) (a) It cannot be said that the provisions ot the Act imposed any unrea· son.able restrictions upon the appellants' right to carry on trade. It is no doubt true that every tax imposes some restrictions upon the right to Carry on business but it would not follow that the imposition of ta·x in question was an unreasonable restric:-tion upon the appellants' fundamental right to carry on trade. · GeneraUy speaking, the amount or rate of a tax is a matter exclusively within legislative judgment and as long as a tax retains its avowed character and does not confiscate. the property to the State under the guise of a tax, its reasonableness is outside the judicial ken. [123F-124A] . . (b) It is not necessary that the dealer should be enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser in order that it might be a tax on the sale of goods. Although the legal incidence of a tax on sale of goods under the. Act falls squarely on the dealer, it may be that he can add the tax to the Pnce .of the goods sold and thus pass it on to the purchaser. It is not Possible to say tha.t_ because a dealer is disabled from passing on the incidence of tax to the purchaser to provisions of the Act imnose unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental rights of the appellants under Art. 19 (I) (f) or 19(1) (g). [124B-C, C-] _!._ _K._ _lute_ _Mills Co._ v. _State_ _of_ _U.P.,_ [1962] 2 S.C.R. 1 at 13, and _Konduri_ _Buchiraialigam_ v. _State_ _of_ _Hyderabad,_ [1958] 9 S.T.C. 397, referred to. (3) It can be said that a legislative classification making the burden of the tax heavier in proportion to the increase in turnover would be reasonable. A _122_ SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1975] 1 s.c.R. **flat. rat_e** i~ **thought** **to** **be** **less** **efficient** **than** **the** **graded** **one** **as** **an** **instrument** **of** **A** **social** **Justice..** **The** **economic** **wisdom** **of a** **tax** **is within** **the** **exclusive** **province** ~f Ie~1slat_ure: **The only question for the Court to consider** **it** **whether there** **is** **rattonahty** **1n** **the** **bdief** **of the** **legislature** **that** **capacity** **to pay the tax increases,** **by** **and large** **with** **an** incr~ase **of receipts.** **An attempt to proportion the** **paYment** **to capacity to pay and thus bring about a** **real** **and factual equality cannot** **be** **rul.ed** **out** **as** **irrelevant** **in** **levy** **of** **tax on** **the** **sale** **of** **purchase** **of** **goods.** **The** **obJect** **of** **a tax** **is** **not only to raise revenue bot also to regulate the economic** life of the 'ociety. rI24H-!25D; 126A-B] B ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 363 of 1969. Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH CIVIL APPEALS Nos. 1010-1011 OF 1973. ##### From the Judgment and Order dared the 6th April, 1972 of the c / Madras High Court in W.P. Nos. 3826-3827170. AND CIVIL APPEALS Nos. 2552-2559172, 179-180174, 2/73, 2684/ 72, 1022173. From the Judgment and Order dated ! !th August 1971 of Madras High Court in W.P. Nos. 3551-52, 3564-3567, 4056-57/ **D** 70, 3967-68 /70, 3934/70, 3960170 and 496/71 respectively. ~ND CIVIL APPEAL No. 967-- OF 1971. From the Judgment and Order dated 19th August, 1971 of the Madras High Court in WP No. 4469170. E AND CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 929-930 OF 1973. From the Judgment and Order dated the 11th August, 1971 of the Madras High Court in W .P. No. 293 of 1971. _K._ _Jayari:l,'11_ for the Petitioners (In WP. 363 /69) and for the **F** Appe!lants in CAS. Nos. 1010-1011/73, 2552-2559/72 and 2/73. _D._ _D.· Sharma_ for the Appellant in CA 2684172. _Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan_ for the Appellant In CAS. 927173 and l 79-80174. _K._ S. _Ranwmurthy_ and _B._ _R._ Agarwr~la for the appellant in CA 1022173. _K._ S. _Ramamurthy_ and _D._ _N. Gupta_ for the Appellant in CAS. 929'-G0/73. _Dr. Syed Mohammed_ and _K. M. K._ _Nair_ for Respondent in WP. 363/69. ### • G **H** S. _Govind Swaminadhan,_ Advocate General fo~ _Tamil Nadu,_ _A._ _V. Rangam,_ _K. Venkataaswamt_ _Subhashini_ _for_ Respcindent Jn all the appeals. the State of and _Miss_ _A._ A ###### _1'_ # • • B #### c D E F G H s. KODAR _v._ KERALA _(Mathew,_ _!.)_ 12 3' The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, J.-The question raised in the Civil Appeals are substantially the same as those raised in the writ petition. We will deal with the Civil Appeals and our decision there will govern and dispose of the writ petition . The appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court of Madras. challenging the validity of the Tamil N adu Additional Sales Tax Act (Act No. 14 of 1970), 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that the State Legislature has no co1!1petance to enact. it, that its provisions violated their fundamental nghts . under arhcle 19(l)(f), 19(1)(g) and article 14 of the Consut~t1on. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions by a common Judgment. These appeals are filed on the basis of a certificate from the High Court. The material provisions of the Act are as follows. Section 2(1) provides that the tax payable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1950, shall, in the case of a dealer whose,total turnover for a year exceeds 10 lakhs of rupees, be increased by additional tax at the rate of 5 per cent of the tax payable by that dealer for that year and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, shall apply in relation to the additional tax payable under the said Act. Sub-section (2) of s. 2 says that notwithstanding anything con· tained in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax, 1959, no dealer referred to in sub-section ( 1) shall be entitled to collect the additional tax payable under the said sub-section. Sub-section ( 3) of s. 2 states that any dealer who collects the additional tax payable under sub-section (1), in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (2) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. Sub-section ( 1) of s. 3 says that the tax payable by any importer or wholesale dealer under the Tamil Nadu Sales of Motor Spirit Taxation- Act, 1939, shall be increased by an additional tax at the rate of five per cent of the tax payable under the said Act and the provisions of the said Act shall apply in relation to the tax payable under the said Act. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 3 are to the same effect as sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 2 Section 4 relates to the rule making power. In the exercise of this power, rules have been framed which are called the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Rules, 1970. The appellants contend firstly that the legislature of Tamil N adu has no power to enact the Act as the tax imposed by the Act is a tax on the income of the dealer, and that the imposition of such a tax is outside the scope of entry 54 List II. Secondly, they contend that the provision of the Act in so far as it prohibits a dealer from collecting the tax from purchaser, is an unreasonable restriction upon their fundamental right to carry on trade under article 19(1) (g) and of their right to hold property under article 19 (I )(f). Thirdly, they sub· mit that the provisions of the Act are violative of their fundamentaf 124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 1 s:c.R. eight uuder article 14 in that they impose different rates of tax on the A sale of same goods according to the turnover of the dealer. - As regards the contention that the State Legislature has no power to pass the measure, we are of the view that additional tax is really a tax on the sale of goods. The object of the Act, as is clear from its provisions, is to increase the tax on the sale or purchase of goods imposed by Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the fact that B quantum of the additional tax is determined with reference to the sales tax imposed would not alter its character. It may be noted that additional tax is to be imposed only if the turnover of a dealer exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs. It is in reality a tax on the aggregate of sales effected by a dealer during a year. The additional tax, therefore, is an enhancement in the rate of the sales tax when the turnover of a dealer exceeds ### Rs. 10 lakhs a year and it is a tax on the aggregate of the sales affected c by the dealer during the year. The decision in _Ernakulam Radio_ _Company_ v. _State_ _of_ _Kerala(1_ _[1]_ _)_ which was ·affirmed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in _Kiliker_ v. Sa~es _Tax Officer(")_ took that view. The same view was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in _A._ S. _Ramachandra_ _Rao_ v. _State_ _of Andhra Pradesh.(")_ This is the correct view. Entry 54 in List II authorises the state legislature to impose a tax on the sale or purchase of goods. So, the contention D of the appellants that the additional sales tax is not a tax on sales but on the income of the dealer is without any basis. B ### c _-+_ ###### • D As regards the second contention that the provisions of the Act ' are violative of the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g), as the tax is upon the sale of goods and is not shown to be confiscatory, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Act impose any unreasonable restrictions upon the appellants' right to carry on trade. It is, no doubt, true that every tax imposes some restriction upon the right to carry on a business; but it would not follow that the imposition of the tax in question is an unreasonable restriction upon the appellants' fundamental right to carry on trade. Generally speaking, the amonnt or rate of a tax is a matter exclusively within the legislative judgment and as Jong as a tax retains its avowed character and does not confiscate property to the State under the guise of a tax, its reasonableness is outside· the judicial ken. E F But it wa~ contended that as the dealer is prohibited from passing on the incidence of tax to the purchaser, the additional tax, unlike sales tax, is a tax on income of the dealer which he must pay whether he makes any profit or not and is, therefore, an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental rights under article 19 ( 1 )(g). G The legal incidence of tax on sale of goods under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax, 1959 falls squarely on the dealer. It may be that he can add the tax to the-price of the goods sold and thus pass it on to the purchaser. But it is not necessary that the dealer should be _enabled to pass on the incidence of the tax on sale to the purchaser 1ll order that it might be a tax on sales of goods. H (I) 18 S. T. C. 445, 449. (2) 21 S. T. C. 253. (3) 25 S. T. C. 133. s. KODAR _v._ KERALA _(Mathew,_ _!.)_ !25 In _J.K. Jute Mills Co._ v. _State_ _of_ U.P.(1 [1] ) this Court said, although it is true that sales tax is, according to accepted notions, intended to be passed on to the boyer, and provisions authorising and regulating the collection of sales tax by the seller from the purchaser are a usual feature of sales tax legislation, it is not an essential characteristic of a sales tax that the seller must have the right to pass it on to the consumer, nor is the power of the legislature to impose a tax on sales conditional on its making a provision for sellers to collect the tax from the purchasers. In _Konduri Buchira;alingam_ v. _State_ _of_ _Hyderabad,(_ _[2 ]_ _)_ this Cciurt said: ## i • ###### • # • A B "It is then said that the sales tax is essentially an indirect C tax and therefore it cannot be demanded of the appellant without allowing him to recoup himself by collecting the amount of the tax from the persons with whom he deals. This Court has already decided in the case of _Tal{l_ _Iron and Steel_ _Co._ _Limited_ v. _The State_ _of_ _Bihar_ [1958] 9 S.T.C. 267 that in law a sales tax need not be an indirect tax and that a tax can be a sales tax though the primary liability for it is put D upon a person without giving him any power to recoup the amount of the tax payable, from any other party." As we saic!, the additional tax is a tax upon sales of goods and not upon the income of a dealer and so long as it is not made out that the tax is confiscatory, it is not possible to accept the contention that because the dealer is disabled from passing on the incidence of tax toE the purchaser, the provisions of the Act impose an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(g) or 19(1)(f). The last contention namely that the provisions of the Act impose different rates of tax npon different dealers depending upon their turnover which in effect means that the rate of tax on the sale of goods. F would vary with the volume of the turnover of a dealer and are, therefore, violative of article 14 is also,without any basis. Classification of dealers on the basis of their respective turnover for the purpose of graded imposition so long as it is based on differential criteria relevant to the legislative object to be achieved is not unconstitutional. A classification, depending upon the quantum of the turnover for the purpose of exemption from tax has been upheld in several decided cases. By· G parity of reasoning, it can be said that a legislative classification making the burden of the tax heavier in proportion to the increase in turnover would be reasonable. The basis is that just as in taxes upon income or upon transfers at death, so also in imposts upon business, the little man, by reason of inferior capacity to pay, should bear a lighter load of taxes, relatively as well as absolntely, than is borne by the big one. The flat rate is thought to be Jess efficient than the graded one as an H instrument of social justice. The large dealer occupies a position of economic superiority by reason of his greater volume of his business .. (1) [1962] 2. S. C.R. I at 13. (2) (19581 9 ~. T. C. 397. .12 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] l s.c.R • An?, to m~ke. his tax heavier, both absolutely and relatively; is not A .arbitrary d1scnmmahon, but an attempt to proportion the payment to .capacity to pay and thus to arrive in the end at a more genuine equality. The economic wisdom of a tax is within the exclusive province of legislature. The only question for the court to consider is 'Whether there is rationality in the belief of the legislature that capacity .to pay the tax increases, by and large, with an increase of receipts. ### ' ll # • **;'Certain** **it** **is that** **mcrChants** **have faith** **in** **such a corres-** pondence and act upon that faith. . . If experience did, not teach that economic advantage goes along with larger sales, there would be an end to the hot pursuit for wide and wider markets.. . In brief, the.re is a relation of correspondence between capacity to pay and the amount of business done. Exceptions, of course, there are. The law builds upon the probables, and shapes the measure of the tax accordingly ... At the· very least, . an increase of gross sales carries with it an increase of opportunity for profit, which supplies a rational basis for division into classes, at all events when coupled with evidence of a high degree of probability that the opportunity will be fruitful". (See the dissenting .iudgment( [1] ) of Justice Cardozo, Justice Brandeis and Justice Stone). The reasoning of the minority in that case appeals to us as more in ·Consonance with social justice in an egalitarian state than that of the :majority. As we said, a large dealer occupies a position of economic supe'Iiority by reason of. his volume of business. and to make the tax heavier on him both absolutely and relatively is not arbitrary discrimination but an attempt _to_ proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus arrive in the• end at a more genuine equality. The capa~ity of a dealer, in particular circumstances, to pay. tax is not an irrelevant ·factor in fixing the rate of tax and one index of capacity is the quantum of turnover. The argument that while a dealer beyond certain limit is obliged to pay higher tax, when others bear a less tax, and it is consequently discriminatory, really misses the point namely that the former kind of dealers are in a position of economic superiority by reason of their volume of business and form a class by themselves. They cannot be treated as on a par with comparatively small dealers. An attempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and thus bring about a real and factual equality- cannot be ruled out as irrelevant in levy of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. The object of a tax is not only to ·raise revenue but also to regulate the economic life of the society. We dismiss the appeals and writ petition with costs. One set of ·hearing fee. P.B.R. _Appeals_ _and_ _petitions_ _dismissed._, (1) Ste.wart Dry Goods Co. _v._ Lewis, 294 U. S. 550. ##### c **D** E F G H