Riju Puthukudy and Padmakumari Baby v. Daya Vipina, Riya, Raju Koloth and Velayudhan
Case Details & Bench
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Hon'ble Judges
- Anil K. Narendran
- P. G. Ajithkumar Friday
- Judgment Date
- 2022-09-30
- Court Decision / Holding
- OP (FC) 470/2022 allowed. I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2022 in O.P. No. 151 of 2019 are allowed on payment of costs of Rs. 5,000 to the 1st respondent within three weeks. The Family Court, Malappuram, shall restore O.P. No. 151 of 2019 to file and dispose of it in accordance with law.
- Final Disposition
- Original Petition allowed; condonation of delay; ex parte decree set aside; costs awarded; matter to be restored to file for disposal in accordance with law.
Parties to the Case
Appellants / Petitioners
- Riju Puthukudy
- Padmakumari Baby
Respondents
- Daya Vipina
- Riya
- Raju Koloth
- Velayudhan
Legal Representation & Advocates
Counsels for Petitioners
- • KRISHNA PRASAD. S
- • SINDHU S KAMATH
- • SWAPNA S.K.
- • ROHINI NAIR
- • SURAJ KUMAR D.
Counsels for Respondents
- • Shiraz Abdulla
- • M.S K.ABDUL NASSAR
Case Synopsis & Summary
This is an Original Petition (Family Court) No. 470 of 2022 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the Family Court, Malappuram’s order dated 11 February 2022, which dismissed I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of O.P. No. 151 of 2019. The underlying O.P. No. 151 of 2019, instituted by the first respondent (wife) and others against the petitioners (husband and mother) sought return of gold ornaments and maintenance arrears; the O.P. was decreed ex parte on 08 December 2021 because the petitioners failed to appear. The petitioners contend that the first petitioner was not in station on the date due to being held up in New Delhi by COVID-19 restrictions, supported by medical certificates, and argue that a short delay of 12 days in filing I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 should be condoned. The Family Court refused, relying on the principle that nonappearance by the petitioner limited the ability to proceed, and did not apply liberal delay principles. The High Court, invoking Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee and Rafeek, held that the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic, and a short delay warrants liberal consideration if reasonable and just, balancing prejudice. Consequently, the delay is condoned, the ex parte decree set aside on payment of costs, and the matter restored for disposal in accordance with law. The judgment endorses a measured liberal approach to condonation of delay, in line with established principles of ends of justice.
Provisions of Law Cited
Legal Doctrines & Maxims
- Sufficient cause
- Liberal approach to condonation of delay
- Doctrine of prejudice
- Ends of justice
Submissions & Arguments
Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners
The petitioners submit that the 1st petitioner could not attend the O.P. No.151/2019 trial on 06.12.2021 because he was detained in transit via Delhi owing to COVID-19 restrictions. A medical certificate and Ext.R1 details establish the constraint. They argue that delay of 12 days in filing I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2022 was not intentional but resulted from the unavoidable circumstance and that a liberal, yet reasonable, approach to condonation should apply, as enshrined in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji and later enunciations in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Rafeek v. K. Kamarudeen. They seek setting aside of the ex parte decree and order restoration of OP No. 151/2019 to enable proper adjudication, with costs to compensate the respondent for inconvenience.
Contentions of Respondents
Respondents contend that the Family Court’s refusal to condone the delay was justified; the 12-day delay in filing the applications is short but enough to attract prejudice in the ongoing proceedings. They emphasize that nonappearance by the petitioners on the trial date cannot automatically entitle a liberal delay; the co-respondents attended and participated in the proceedings, and the petitioner should have coordinated with counsel and appeared. They rely on procedural precedents that require a reasonable, but not unfettered, exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and emphasize that the ex parte decree was properly issued and should not be annulled without substantial justification or prejudice to the respondent.
Cited Precedents (3)
| Case Name | Citation | Treatment | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji | (1987) 2 SCC 107 | Positive | Cited to support a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and to endorse a flexible approach to condonation of delay in the ends of justice. |
| Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy | (2013) 12 SCC 649 | Positive | Cited for principles on liberal delay, with emphasis on reasonableness and distinction between inordinate delay and short delay. |
| Rafeek and another v. K. Kamarudeen and another | 2021 (4) KHC 34 | Positive | Division Bench precedent reinforcing liberal approach to delay while considering prejudice; supports court’s decision in this matter. |
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