Remya T. and Deenadayal K. v Union of India and others
Case Details & Bench
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Hon'ble Judges
- V.G. Arun
- Judgment Date
- 2023-01-18
- Court Decision / Holding
- The court declined to grant permission for the termination of pregnancy and dismissed the writ petition.
- Final Disposition
- Dismissed
Parties to the Case
Appellants / Petitioners
- Remya T.
- Deenadayal K.
Respondents
- Union of India
- State of Kerala
- The Director of Health Services General Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram
- The Director of Medical Education Medical College, Chalakuzhi, Thiruvananthapuram
- The Superintendent Government Medical College, Kozhikode
Legal Representation & Advocates
Counsels for Petitioners
- • Akash S.
- • Girish Kumar M S
- • V.S. Varalekshmi
- • Devika Jayaraj
Case Synopsis & Summary
This writ petition challenges the refusal to permit termination of a pregnancy beyond 36 weeks in light of foetal microcephaly and the absence of a Medical Board under Section 3(2C) of the 2021 amendment to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. The first petitioner, a 2nd gravida with a prior caesarean, and the second petitioner sought permission to terminate after ultrasound and fetal Doppler scans in January 2023 revealed microcephaly with arrested brain development. A Medical Board constituted by Government Medical College, Kozhikode, concluded that the pregnancy was initially uncomplicated, that there was a very high likelihood of a live, viable baby at 36 weeks, and that after 38 weeks termination would require cesarean delivery. The Board suggested that continuing for two more weeks would not adversely affect the mother and that long-term prognosis could only be ascertained after delivery. The petition relied on the constitutional right to reproductive choice (Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration) and its reiteration (Mrs.X v GNCTD), arguing that Section 3(2B) permits termination beyond the gestational maximum in cases of substantial foetal anomaly. The government contends that the Medical Board opinion against termination and the lack of substantial anomaly justify denial. The court held that, although reproductive liberty exists, it must be balanced with the statutory framework, and given the Board’s conclusions and gestational age, declined to permit termination. The writ petition is dismissed.
Provisions of Law Cited
Legal Doctrines & Maxims
- Right to reproductive choice as a dimension of personal liberty (Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, 2009)
Submissions & Arguments
Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners
The petitioners argued that a woman's right to reproductive choice is a dimension of personal liberty; under Section 3(2B) amended in 2021, termination beyond 24 weeks can be permitted if a Medical Board finds substantial foetal anomalies. They relied on Suchita Srivastava and Mrs.X to support the argument for flexibility in late gestation termination; the Medical Board's opinion indicating that continuation may be preferable given the lack of a substantial anomaly should be reconsidered in light of the mother's health and gestational age. They asserted the court's power to safeguard reproductive rights within the statutory framework and to prevent undue confinement by rigid gestational limits.
Contentions of Respondents
Opposed termination, pointing to the Medical Board's report against termination, and the absence of a substantial foetal anomaly. They argued that continuation of pregnancy would not threaten the mother's health and that the Act's safeguards and gestational limits must be respected, with termination permitted only under the conditions contemplated by the amended Act and the Board's findings.
Cited Precedents (2)
| Case Name | Citation | Treatment | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suchita Srivastava and another v. Chandigarh Administration | [(2009) 9 SCC 1] | Positive | The case is cited to establish that reproductive choice is a dimension of personal liberty, which the court acknowledges but must balance against statutory restrictions. |
| Mrs.X v GNCTD and another | [2022 SCC OnLine Del 4274] | Mentioned Only | Cited as reiterating the liberty principle, but not treated as binding or central to discount the statutory framework in the present case. |
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